I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in STEPANYAN v. ARMENIA.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2023-01-24
  • Communication date: 2015-10-06
  • Application number(s): 12105/13
  • Country:   ARM
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 2, 2-1
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.850564
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

The applicant, Mr Grigor Stepanyan, is an Armenian national who was born in Yerevan and lives in Abovyan.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 6 July 2010 at around 9 p.m. the applicant’s daughter, Magdalena Stepanyan, born on 1 July 2009, was taken to Abovyan Medical Centre (the Hospital) because she had a high fever, had been vomiting and refused to eat.
On the same day Magdalena Stepanyan was examined by H.A., a resident physician in the department of infectious diseases of the Hospital, who diagnosed acute intestinal infection, gastroenteritis and toxicosis with exicosis.
The child was placed in the intensive therapy room to receive treatment corresponding to this diagnosis.
On 7 July 2010 at 6.55 a.m. Magdalena Stepanyan’s condition sharply deteriorated.
She turned pale, her respiration was superficial, her heartbeat became inaudible and no pulse could be felt.
The child was transferred to the operating room and A.M., the intensive care specialist on duty, was called.
At that point the child was in a terminal condition.
On the same day at 7.45 a.m. Magdalena Stepanyan’s death was registered.
On the same day at 3 p.m. Magdalena Stepanyan’s grandfather reported to the police that his granddaughter had died in the Hospital as a result of negligence on the part of H.A.
On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 130 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of Magdalena Stepanyan’s death.
On 8 July 2010 the investigator assigned a forensic medical examination to determine, inter alia, the cause of Magdalena Stepanyan’s death, the diseases she had suffered from during her life, the type of treatment she had received in the Hospital, whether her condition had been correctly diagnosed and whether any errors or omissions had been committed during her medical treatment at the Hospital and, if so, which member of the medical personnel was responsible for them.
On 9 August 2010 the forensic medical expert’s opinion was produced, which stated that the cause of Magdalena Stepanyan’s death had been cardiopulmonary arrest as a result of myocarditis, cardiomyocyte contractile dysfunction, oedema, interstitial lung disease and bronchial desquamation from which the deceased had suffered during her life and which was directly linked to her death.
It was further stated in the expert’s opinion that the rest of the questions could be answered via panel expert examination.
On 4 November 2010 the opinion of the panel of medical experts was received, the relevant parts of which read as follows: “... after admission to the department of infectious diseases, patient [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s medical examinations were insufficient and deficient.
In particular, blood, urine and stool tests were not performed and no chest x-ray was taken.
Having diagnosed toxic shock syndrome and also taking into account the child’s severe condition on admission to hospital, it was necessary to place her in the intensive care unit with mechanical ventilation to support the vital functions.
The treatment provided was not contraindicated in the determined diagnosis.
Taking into consideration the patient’s acute condition as a result of her diseases ... it is not possible to state definitively whether it would have been possible to save the child’s life even by having placed her in the intensive care unit, however, the panel finds it worth noting that, had the tests been fully done and the treatment organised in the intensive care unit, the probability of saving the child would have been higher.
... doctor [H.A.]
should have placed the patient in the intensive care unit ...
There are no significant contradictions between [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s medical documents and the records with regard to the cause of death of the forensic medical examination of the body.” It appears that at some point the applicant requested an additional forensic medical examination to be assigned and submitted questions which he asked to have included in the list of questions to be put to the experts.
On 3 December 2010 the investigator assigned an additional forensic medical examination to be carried out by a panel of experts.
It appears that the applicant’s questions, reformulated in legal terms by the investigator, were included in the list of questions to be put to the experts.
On 18 February 2011 the additional forensic medical examination was completed.
In their opinion the panel of medical experts stated, inter alia, the following: “According to the medical documents... [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s medical examinations were not fully performed ...the diagnosis was incomplete; [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s cardiopulmonary pathology was not diagnosed.
As for the treatment provided, it corresponded to the diagnosis made which was not contraindicated, however, given that [Magdalena] Stepanyan had not been fully examined and her cardiopulmonary pathology had not been diagnosed, the doctor in charge did not provide treatment in that respect.
In order to find out [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s genuine condition and determine the type of necessary treatment, blood and urine ... tests, electrocardiogram and chest x-ray should have been performed...
In such a situation it was appropriate to place [Magdalena] Stepanyan in the intensive care unit, which was not done in this case...
In case of treatment in the intensive care unit the chances of a positive outcome could possibly have been higher.
... there is a high mortality rate among children suffering from such diseases.
That is, in such cases even in the event of correct diagnosis and treatment, it is not possible to rule out the chance of a negative outcome.
...it cannot be conclusively stated that there is a direct causal link between the deficiencies and omissions during [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s treatment and her death.
There are inconsistencies between [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s medical documents and the records contained in the opinion of the forensic medical expert.
In particular, cardiopulmonary pathology discovered as a result of the forensic medical examination of [Magdalena] Stepanyan’s body had not been discovered while she was still alive.” On 4 March 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings.
The decision stated that the members of the medical personnel of the hospital, including doctors H.A.
and A.M., had failed to provide requisite medical treatment to Magdalena Stepanyan.
In particular, they had not diagnosed Magdalena Stepanyan’s cardiopulmonary pathology and did not carry out blood and urine tests, an electrocardiogram and a chest x‐ray to check her state of health.
It was further stated that it would have been more appropriate to place Magdalena Stepanyan in the intensive care unit, which could possibly have raised the chances of a positive outcome.
However, that was not done.
Nevertheless, the investigator found that there was no causal link between the mentioned shortcomings and omissions in Magdalena Stepanyan’s treatment and her death, since the mortality rate is high with the diseases from which she suffered, especially at that age and with the health problems she had, and also in view of her late hospitalisation.
Moreover, even with requisite and timely medical treatment a negative outcome could not possibly be ruled out in such cases.
Therefore, despite the above-mentioned shortcomings and omissions, the prosecution in respect of the members of the medical personnel who had been involved in Magdalena Stepanyan’s treatment at the Hospital was to be stopped and the criminal proceedings terminated.
On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint against the investigator’s decision.
He claimed, inter alia, that the investigation into his daughter’s death had been ineffective in that the investigator had either modified the questions submitted by him or in general had failed to include them in the list of questions to the panel of experts when assigning an additional forensic medical examination.
He further complained that in the circumstances where the treating doctor had not diagnosed the life‐threatening disease, and had provided treatment in respect of an illness not linked to the death, such treatment could not be considered adequate.
The applicant submitted that instead of considering the chances of saving his daughter’s life, which was not an obligation for any member of the medical personnel, the investigator should have examined whether or not the members of the medical staff of the hospital had failed to perform their professional duties properly.
He also submitted that the exact cause of his daughter’s death was not established during the investigation.
He finally submitted that, because of the ineffectiveness of the investigation, he was deprived of the possibility to claim compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the doctors’ actions.
On 15 June 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court (the Regional Court) quashed the investigator’s decision to terminate the criminal proceedings.
In doing so, it found that the investigator had failed to consider properly the results of the forensic medical examinations to be able to reach correct conclusions.
The Regional Court stated that Article 130 of the Criminal Code envisaged responsibility for failure by medical personnel to perform their professional duties properly and did not envisage responsibility or exonerate from it for having secured a high or low probability of saving a patient’s life during treatment.
It found that the results of the forensic medical examinations substantiated that Magdalena Stepanyan’s diagnosis and treatment at the Hospital had not been adequate.
In particular, doctor H.A.
had failed to place Magdalena Stepanyan in the intensive care unit and had wrongly diagnosed her illnesses, as a result of which the doctor had not provided any treatment in respect of the illnesses that she had failed to diagnose.
It appears that the Regional Court’s decision was not appealed against and the criminal proceedings were reopened.
It further appears that H.A.
requested the assignment of an additional panel medical examination, which request was granted by the investigator.
It appears from the opinion of the panel of experts that the addition panel medical examination was completed on 21 December 2011.
In their opinion the panel of experts stated, inter alia, that Magdalena Stepanyan’s medical examinations were insufficient, the diagnosis was incomplete and the medical staff of the Hospital failed to place her in the intensive care unit, which could have increased the probability of a positive outcome.
Moreover, they stated that there were inconsistencies between Magdalena Stepanyan’s medical records and the information recorded in the opinion of the forensic medical expert who had conducted the examination of her body.
In particular, the cardiopulmonary pathology discovered as a result of the forensic medical examination of Magdalena Stepanyan’s corpse had not been diagnosed during her lifetime.
The experts, at the same time, concluded that the medical staff of the Hospital had not committed any significant medical errors and there was no causal link between them and Magdalena Stepanyan’s death.
The experts’ opinion stated that the measures undertaken by doctors H.A.
and M.A.
during the patient’s resuscitation had been adequate and complete and that her placement in the intensive therapy room was not contraindicated.
It was further stated that Magdalena Stepanyan’s diseases had not been diagnosed fully by the doctor.
In particular, the interstitial lung disease and myocarditis were not diagnosed.
On 26 December 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings on the ground that there was no causal link between the deficiencies and omissions in the treatment provided to Magdalena Stepanyan and her death.
On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Regional Court against the investigator’s decision.
He argued that the investigating authority had failed to consider properly the Regional Court’s findings reflected in the decision of 15 June 2011.
In particular, the investigator had found it sufficient to assign an additional forensic examination which, in essence, had repeated the conclusions of the previous expert opinions.
However, the new additional expert examination had not revealed any new circumstances concerning his daughter’s death, given that the exact cause of her death still remained unknown and the inconsistencies in medical records relating to the diseases which had caused her death had not been clarified.
The applicant finally argued that there had not been an effective investigation into his daughter’s death, in violation of the guarantees of Article 2 of the Convention and that, as the victim’s legal heir, he was deprived of the possibility to receive any compensation for the damage caused as a result of medical negligence.
During the proceedings before the Regional Court the applicant submitted, inter alia, that doctor H.A.
had made a wrong diagnosis, as a result of which the child’s cardiopulmonary pathology had not been diagnosed.
Instead, only the intestinal infection was diagnosed and corresponding treatment provided.
He also submitted that the child’s treatment should have been organised in the intensive therapy unit, which was not the case.
In addition, he complained that the investigator had not submitted sufficient questions to the experts, as a result of which it had not been possible to obtain comprehensive answers.
On 14 March 2012 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint and fully upheld the investigator’s decision.
The Regional Court stated in its decision that the applicant had failed to submit to the investigator any questions which in his opinion would help to establish the truth, and that in such circumstances the investigator had submitted to the experts those questions which he found to be appropriate.
The Regional Court concluded that there were not sufficient grounds to hold H.A.
criminally responsible.
In doing so, it relied on the conclusion of the panel of experts of 21 December 2011 according to which there was no direct causal link between Magdalena Stepanyan’s death and the deficiencies and omissions which had occurred during her medical treatment at the Hospital.
On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the Regional Court’s decision.
He reiterated his arguments submitted to the Regional Court as regards the inadequacy of the investigation into his daughter’s death and his inability to receive any compensation for medical negligence.
The applicant also complained that the Regional Court had failed to assess properly the conclusion of the panel of experts having conducted the additional forensic medical examination.
He argued that the doctor had committed negligence by failing to carry out the necessary medical examinations and make a correct diagnosis, which had resulted in the child’s death.
The applicant claimed that this fact alone was enough to establish that medical negligence had been committed and that there was a causal link since, in the absence of a correct diagnosis, it is impossible to provide proper treatment.
On 16 May 2012 the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s complaint and fully upheld the Regional Court’s decision.
In doing so, the Court of Appeal mainly restated the investigator’s decision to terminate the criminal proceedings and the Regional Court’s decision which upheld it, finding these to have been lawful and well-founded.
The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law reiterating the same arguments as before.
In particular, he continued to argue that the exact cause of the child’s death was never established and that the inconsistencies in the medical records relating to the diseases which had caused the death were never clarified.
On 14 July 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.
B.
Relevant domestic law 1.
The Criminal Code (in force since 1 August 2003) Article 130 § 2 provides that failure to perform or improper performance of professional duties by medical and support personnel as a result of negligence or bad faith, which has negligently caused the death of the patient undergoing treatment, shall be punishable by imprisonment from two to six years, with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or practise certain activities for a maximum of three years.
2.
The Civil Code (in force since 1 January 1999) According to Article 17 § 1 the person whose rights have been violated may claim full compensation for the damage suffered, unless the law or contract envisages a lower amount of compensation.
According to Article 17 § 2, damages are the expenses borne or to be borne by the person whose rights have been violated, in connection with restoring the violated rights, loss of his property or damage to it (material damage), including lost income.
Article 1058 § 1 provides that damage caused to a person or his property, as well as damage caused to the property of a legal entity, is subject to compensation in full by the person who has caused such damage.
A person not responsible for causing damage may bear an obligation stated by the law to compensate it.
According to Article 1058 § 2, the person who has caused damage is exempted from its compensation if it is established that the damage has been caused in the absence of his guilt.
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article 2 of the Convention that the authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into his daughter’s death.
The applicant further complains under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention that, in the absence of establishment of criminal liability of the medical personnel, he had no possibility to claim any compensation for civil damages suffered as a result of medical negligence.
In particular, he complains that the domestic legal system does not provide a mechanism for the establishment of civil liability and compensation in cases of medical negligence.

Judgment

FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF STEPANYAN v. ARMENIA
(Application no.
12105/13)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
24 January 2023
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Stepanyan v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Anja Seibert-Fohr, President, Armen Harutyunyan, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,and Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no.
12105/13) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 January 2013 by an Armenian national, Mr Grigor Stepanyan, born in 1983 and living in Abovyan (“the applicant”), who was represented by Ms M. Grigoryan, a lawyer practising in Abovyan;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, and subsequently by Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 December 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The applicant’s daughter, M. Stepanyan, was born on 1 July 2009. 2. On 6 July 2010 at around 9 p.m. M. Stepanyan, who was weak, had vomited and had diarrhoea, was admitted to Abovyan Medical Centre. She was examined by Dr H.A., who diagnosed acute intestinal infection, gastroenteritis and toxicosis with exicosis and placed her in the intensive therapy room. 3. On 7 July 2009, at 6.55 a.m., M. Stepanyan’s condition sharply deteriorated and an intensive care specialist was urgently invited. The child died at 7.45 a.m.
4.
On the same date criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 130 § 2 of the Criminal Code (medical negligence resulting in death). 5. According to the autopsy report of 9 August 2010, the cause of death had been cardiopulmonary arrest as a result of myocarditis, cardiomyocyte contractile dysfunction, oedema, interstitial lung disease and bronchial desquamation. 6. The expert panel report received on 4 November 2010 found, inter alia, that M. Stepanyan’s examinations after her admission to hospital had been insufficient and deficient while the provided treatment had been incomplete and incorrect. Taking into account the child’s extremely severe condition upon admission, intensive care with mechanical ventilation to support vital functions had been necessary. Considering the child’s acute condition, it could not be stated definitively whether it would have been possible to save her life, however, had the tests been fully done and the treatment organised in the intensive care unit, the probability of saving the child would have been higher. Thus, H.A. should have placed the child in the intensive care unit. 7. On 18 February 2011 an additional expert panel report was delivered which found, inter alia, that M. Stepanyan’s cardiopulmonary pathology had not been diagnosed as a result of the failure to carry out the necessary medical examinations (blood and urine tests, electrocardiogram and chest X-ray). As a result, the child had not been provided with the treatment that had been necessary for her condition. In case of treatment in the intensive care unit the chances of a positive outcome could possibly have been higher. However, there was a high mortality rate among children suffering from such diseases and a negative outcome could not be ruled out even in case of correct diagnosis and treatment. 8. On 4 March 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings finding that there was no causal link between the shortcomings in M. Stepanyan’s treatment and her death and that even with requisite and timely medical treatment a negative outcome could not possibly be ruled out. 9. Upon the applicant’s appeal, by a decision of 15 June 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court set aside the decision to terminate the proceedings, finding that the investigator had failed to consider properly the results of the forensic medical examinations. It stated that Article 130 of the Criminal Code envisaged responsibility for failure by medical personnel to perform their professional duties properly and did not envisage exoneration from it for having secured a high or low probability of saving a patient’s life. There was sufficient forensic evidence that H.A. had failed to place M. Stepanyan in the intensive care unit and had wrongly diagnosed her illnesses, as a result of which H.A. had not provided any treatment in respect of the patient’s actual illnesses. 10. The criminal proceedings were reopened and, upon the request of H.A., an additional expert examination was assigned. In its opinion of 21 December 2011 the new panel essentially reiterated the findings of the previous expert reports. 11. On 26 December 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as before. 12. The applicant’s appeals against that decision were dismissed in the final instance on 14 July 2012 by the Court of Cassation. 13. Relying on Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into his daughter’s death and that no effective mechanism was in place to enable him to obtain compensation. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
14.
The applicant’s complaints are most appropriately examined under Article 2 of the Convention (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080/13, § 145, 19 December 2017). 15. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 16. The applicable general principles concerning the State’s procedural obligations in the field of medical negligence have been summarised in Lopes de Sousa Fernandes, cited above, §§ 214-21; see also, under Article 8 of the Convention, Botoyan v. Armenia, no. 5766/17, §§ 90-95, 8 February 2022). 17. The applicant did not allege that the death of his daughter had been caused intentionally. Nor do the facts of the case suggest otherwise. Therefore, Article 2 of the Convention did not necessarily require a criminal‐law remedy (see Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 90, ECHR 2004-VIII). In so far as such a remedy was provided and the applicant availed himself of it (see paragraph 4 above; see also Botoyan, cited above, § 110), such proceedings would by themselves be capable of satisfying the procedural obligation of Article 2, if deemed effective (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes, cited above, § 232, and Scripnic v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 63789/13, §§ 31 and 35, 13 April 2021). 18. The Court notes that the criminal investigation opened into M. Stepanyan’s death was terminated twice (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above) for absence of a causal link between the medical negligence and the death of the applicant’s child. In view of the Regional Court’s findings that the investigation prior to its decision of 15 June 2011 had not been effective (see paragraph 9 above), the Court will examine the investigation which took place after that decision (Baranin and Vukčević v. Montenegro, nos. 24655/18 and 24656/18, § 141, 11 March 2021). 19. Despite the existence of two expert reports (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above), the validity of which was not questioned during the initial investigation and which were relied on by the Regional Court in its decision of 15 June 2011 as valid and admissible evidence (see paragraph 9 above), the investigator assigned yet another forensic medical examination upon the request of the doctor (see paragraph 10 above). 20. Although the third expert report did not contain any new findings, the criminal proceedings were once again terminated on the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 above) in a situation where, as pointed out by the Regional Court, there was sufficient evidence already showing that H.A. had failed to carry out all the necessary medical examinations, thereby failing to diagnose and provide corresponding treatment to the applicant’s child (see paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 above). 21. Against this background, the Court considers that the investigation’s conclusions were not based on a thorough and objective analysis of all relevant elements (see Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 11275/07, § 135, 24 November 2016; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 69517/11, § 126, 5 April 2022; and contrast Sarishvili-Bolkvadze v. Georgia, no. 58240/08, § 85, 19 July 2018). The Court concludes therefore that the criminal proceedings in the present case fell foul of the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the Convention. 22. In view of the above finding, the Court must examine whether the applicant had other notably civil or disciplinary measures available to him (see Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002-I, and Vo, cited above, § 90). 23. However, the Court has already found in a previous case that there were no effective civil or administrative remedies in the Armenian legal system in respect of complaints concerning alleged medical negligence (see Botoyan, cited above, §§ 116-30). 24. Nothing in the present case allows the Court to reach a different conclusion. The Court therefore considers that there was no effective procedure available for the applicant to bring his medical claim and obtain compensation for the medical malpractice to which his child had fallen victim (see, mutatis mutandis, Botoyan, cited above, § 131). 25. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26.
The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, 500,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) (approximately EUR 925) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and AMD 900,000 (approximately EUR 1,660) for those incurred before the Court. 27. The Government contested those claims. 28. The Court awards the applicant EUR 12,000 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 29. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 January 2023, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Valentin Nicolescu Anja Seibert-Fohr Acting Deputy Registrar President

FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF STEPANYAN v. ARMENIA
(Application no.
12105/13)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
24 January 2023
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Stepanyan v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Anja Seibert-Fohr, President, Armen Harutyunyan, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,and Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no.
12105/13) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 January 2013 by an Armenian national, Mr Grigor Stepanyan, born in 1983 and living in Abovyan (“the applicant”), who was represented by Ms M. Grigoryan, a lawyer practising in Abovyan;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, and subsequently by Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 13 December 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The applicant’s daughter, M. Stepanyan, was born on 1 July 2009. 2. On 6 July 2010 at around 9 p.m. M. Stepanyan, who was weak, had vomited and had diarrhoea, was admitted to Abovyan Medical Centre. She was examined by Dr H.A., who diagnosed acute intestinal infection, gastroenteritis and toxicosis with exicosis and placed her in the intensive therapy room. 3. On 7 July 2009, at 6.55 a.m., M. Stepanyan’s condition sharply deteriorated and an intensive care specialist was urgently invited. The child died at 7.45 a.m.
4.
On the same date criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 130 § 2 of the Criminal Code (medical negligence resulting in death). 5. According to the autopsy report of 9 August 2010, the cause of death had been cardiopulmonary arrest as a result of myocarditis, cardiomyocyte contractile dysfunction, oedema, interstitial lung disease and bronchial desquamation. 6. The expert panel report received on 4 November 2010 found, inter alia, that M. Stepanyan’s examinations after her admission to hospital had been insufficient and deficient while the provided treatment had been incomplete and incorrect. Taking into account the child’s extremely severe condition upon admission, intensive care with mechanical ventilation to support vital functions had been necessary. Considering the child’s acute condition, it could not be stated definitively whether it would have been possible to save her life, however, had the tests been fully done and the treatment organised in the intensive care unit, the probability of saving the child would have been higher. Thus, H.A. should have placed the child in the intensive care unit. 7. On 18 February 2011 an additional expert panel report was delivered which found, inter alia, that M. Stepanyan’s cardiopulmonary pathology had not been diagnosed as a result of the failure to carry out the necessary medical examinations (blood and urine tests, electrocardiogram and chest X-ray). As a result, the child had not been provided with the treatment that had been necessary for her condition. In case of treatment in the intensive care unit the chances of a positive outcome could possibly have been higher. However, there was a high mortality rate among children suffering from such diseases and a negative outcome could not be ruled out even in case of correct diagnosis and treatment. 8. On 4 March 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings finding that there was no causal link between the shortcomings in M. Stepanyan’s treatment and her death and that even with requisite and timely medical treatment a negative outcome could not possibly be ruled out. 9. Upon the applicant’s appeal, by a decision of 15 June 2011 the Kotayk Regional Court set aside the decision to terminate the proceedings, finding that the investigator had failed to consider properly the results of the forensic medical examinations. It stated that Article 130 of the Criminal Code envisaged responsibility for failure by medical personnel to perform their professional duties properly and did not envisage exoneration from it for having secured a high or low probability of saving a patient’s life. There was sufficient forensic evidence that H.A. had failed to place M. Stepanyan in the intensive care unit and had wrongly diagnosed her illnesses, as a result of which H.A. had not provided any treatment in respect of the patient’s actual illnesses. 10. The criminal proceedings were reopened and, upon the request of H.A., an additional expert examination was assigned. In its opinion of 21 December 2011 the new panel essentially reiterated the findings of the previous expert reports. 11. On 26 December 2011 the investigator decided to terminate the criminal proceedings on the same grounds as before. 12. The applicant’s appeals against that decision were dismissed in the final instance on 14 July 2012 by the Court of Cassation. 13. Relying on Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into his daughter’s death and that no effective mechanism was in place to enable him to obtain compensation. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
14.
The applicant’s complaints are most appropriately examined under Article 2 of the Convention (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080/13, § 145, 19 December 2017). 15. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 16. The applicable general principles concerning the State’s procedural obligations in the field of medical negligence have been summarised in Lopes de Sousa Fernandes, cited above, §§ 214-21; see also, under Article 8 of the Convention, Botoyan v. Armenia, no. 5766/17, §§ 90-95, 8 February 2022). 17. The applicant did not allege that the death of his daughter had been caused intentionally. Nor do the facts of the case suggest otherwise. Therefore, Article 2 of the Convention did not necessarily require a criminal‐law remedy (see Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 90, ECHR 2004-VIII). In so far as such a remedy was provided and the applicant availed himself of it (see paragraph 4 above; see also Botoyan, cited above, § 110), such proceedings would by themselves be capable of satisfying the procedural obligation of Article 2, if deemed effective (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes, cited above, § 232, and Scripnic v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 63789/13, §§ 31 and 35, 13 April 2021). 18. The Court notes that the criminal investigation opened into M. Stepanyan’s death was terminated twice (see paragraphs 8 and 11 above) for absence of a causal link between the medical negligence and the death of the applicant’s child. In view of the Regional Court’s findings that the investigation prior to its decision of 15 June 2011 had not been effective (see paragraph 9 above), the Court will examine the investigation which took place after that decision (Baranin and Vukčević v. Montenegro, nos. 24655/18 and 24656/18, § 141, 11 March 2021). 19. Despite the existence of two expert reports (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above), the validity of which was not questioned during the initial investigation and which were relied on by the Regional Court in its decision of 15 June 2011 as valid and admissible evidence (see paragraph 9 above), the investigator assigned yet another forensic medical examination upon the request of the doctor (see paragraph 10 above). 20. Although the third expert report did not contain any new findings, the criminal proceedings were once again terminated on the same grounds as before (see paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 above) in a situation where, as pointed out by the Regional Court, there was sufficient evidence already showing that H.A. had failed to carry out all the necessary medical examinations, thereby failing to diagnose and provide corresponding treatment to the applicant’s child (see paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 above). 21. Against this background, the Court considers that the investigation’s conclusions were not based on a thorough and objective analysis of all relevant elements (see Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 11275/07, § 135, 24 November 2016; Nana Muradyan v. Armenia, no. 69517/11, § 126, 5 April 2022; and contrast Sarishvili-Bolkvadze v. Georgia, no. 58240/08, § 85, 19 July 2018). The Court concludes therefore that the criminal proceedings in the present case fell foul of the procedural requirements of Article 2 of the Convention. 22. In view of the above finding, the Court must examine whether the applicant had other notably civil or disciplinary measures available to him (see Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002-I, and Vo, cited above, § 90). 23. However, the Court has already found in a previous case that there were no effective civil or administrative remedies in the Armenian legal system in respect of complaints concerning alleged medical negligence (see Botoyan, cited above, §§ 116-30). 24. Nothing in the present case allows the Court to reach a different conclusion. The Court therefore considers that there was no effective procedure available for the applicant to bring his medical claim and obtain compensation for the medical malpractice to which his child had fallen victim (see, mutatis mutandis, Botoyan, cited above, § 131). 25. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26.
The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, 500,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) (approximately EUR 925) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and AMD 900,000 (approximately EUR 1,660) for those incurred before the Court. 27. The Government contested those claims. 28. The Court awards the applicant EUR 12,000 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 29. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 January 2023, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Valentin Nicolescu Anja Seibert-Fohr Acting Deputy Registrar President