I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in TOPI v. ALBANIA and 5 other applications.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2018-05-22
  • Communication date: 2012-06-26
  • Application number(s): 14816/08
  • Country:   ALB
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 6, 6-1
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings
    Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)
    Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Constitutional proceedings
    Article 6-1 - Access to court)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.825214
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

THE FACTS The applicants are Albanian nationals.
A.
The circumstances of the cases The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1.
Application no.
14816/08 was lodged on 14 February 2008 by Mr Arben Topi, who is currently serving a prison sentence.
He is represented by Mr Ardian Kasapi, a lawyer practising in Tirana.
On 19 April 2000, following proceedings in absentia, the Durrës Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of several criminal offences and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment.
That decision became final on 7 December 2000 following the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the applicant’s appeal.
On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania.
On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia.
On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia.
On 22 October 2007 the Constitutional Court declared the appeal time-barred, the two-year time-limit having started to run on 7 December 2000.
2.
Application no 48717/08 was lodged on 29 September 2008 by Mr Gazmir Karemani, who is serving a prison sentence.
He is represented by Mr Halit Demaj, a lawyer practising in Vlora.
On 25 April 2001, following proceedings in absentia and following appeals lodged by other co-defendants, the Supreme Court convicted the applicant of several criminal offences and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On 1 December 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania.
He was officially informed of his conviction in absentia on the same day.
(a) Application for leave to appeal out of time On 8 December 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Fier District Court (“the District Court”) for leave to appeal out of time.
On 25 January 2007 the District Court rejected the application finding that the Supreme Court’s decision of 25 April 2001 had become res judicata and, consequently, the applicant could not be tried twice for the same offence.
On 8 June 2007 and 2 July 2010, following the applicant’s appeals, the Vlora Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that decision.
On 8 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal.
On 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Court, by majority, sitting as a full bench, dismissed the appeal finding it time-barred.
As regards his application for leave to appeal out of time, the Constitutional Court relied on the Supreme Court’s unifying decision no.
1 of 20 January 2011 (see “Domestic courts’ practice concerning proceedings in absentia” below).
(b) Constitutional appeal proceedings On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant also lodged a constitutional appeal complaining about his conviction in absentia.
On 25 September 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as having been lodged out of time, the two-year time-limit having started to run on 25 April 2001.
3.
Application no 33158/11 was lodged on 13 May 2011 by Mr Ilir Trushi, who lives in Korça.
He is represented by Mr Simon Vorfi, a lawyer practising in Tirana.
The applicant had been living with his grandparents since he was two years of age.
Between 2004 and 2005 the applicant and his grandparents concluded a number of contracts, according to which the applicant bought real estate from the grandparents.
The contracts of sales were subsequently registered with the Office for the Registration of Immovable Properties, registration certificates having been submitted by the applicant.
On 5 September 2005 the grandparents lodged a civil claim requesting the annulment of the above contracts on the grounds that they had been defrauded.
On 23 January 2006, in proceedings in absentia, the Korça District Court examined the request.
It found that the contracts had been entered into as a result of fraud committed by the applicant.
Consequently, it annulled the sale contracts.
That judgment became final on 8 February 2006, no appeal having been filed against it.
On 2 March 2007 the District Court rectified some errors in the above judgment.
On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal out of time.
On 5 November 2007 the District Court accepted that the applicant had been living abroad at the time of the proceedings in absentia, but rejected the application on the ground that the summonses had been properly notified to the applicant’s official address.
The applicant appealed.
On 24 December 2007 and 4 December 2009 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, rejected his appeals.
On 24 January 2011 the Constitutional Court, following the applicant’s constitutional appeal, declared the appeal inadmissible.
4.
Application no 57456/11 was lodged on 25 August 2011 by Mr Blerim Muça, who is currently living in Rrogozhina.
He is represented by Mr Vangjel Muzina, a lawyer practising in Tirana.
On 1 November 1999 the Kavaja District Court (“the District Court”) found the applicant not guilty as charged and ordered his release.
He had attended the trial and was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing (A.).
The prosecutor appealed.
On an unspecified date the applicant left Albania.
It would appear that he was not informed of the prosecutor’s appeal, but that lawyer A was so informed.
On 28 February 2000 the Durrës Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the District Court’s decision and remitted the case for re-examination.
The applicant was represented by lawyer A.
On an unspecified date in 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed A’s appeal.
On 26 December 2000, in retrial proceedings, the District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of premeditated murder and sentenced him to 23 years’ imprisonment.
Even though the applicant was represented by lawyer A, the decision stated that the lawyer had been appointed by the court.
Two other co-defendants appealed.
On 10 September 2001 and 14 December 2001 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the decision.
The applicant was represented by a new court-appointed lawyer.
On 14 April 2004 the applicant’s mother appointed another lawyer to make an application for review, which was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court.
On 8 July 2005 the applicant was informed of his conviction in absentia by his family members.
He made an application to appeal out of time against the decision of 26 December 2000, arguing that he had never been informed of his conviction in absentia since he had been living abroad.
On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 the District Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, dismissed his application.
The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings since he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A, who had been informed of the prosecutor’s appeal and, since his mother had appointed a lawyer to make and application for review.
Judge A. H, who had been a member of the District Court’s bench of 26 December 2000, also sat in the District Court’s bench of 4 November 2005 that dismissed his application.
Judges V. C and Sh.
M, who had been members of the Court of Appeal’s bench of 10 September 2001, also sat in the Court of Appeal’s bench of 29 September 2006 that rejected his appeal.
On 16 March 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court’s decision which had dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal.
The Constitutional Court, relying on the knowledge of lawyer A and his mother, stated that there existed no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings.
5.
Application no 72359/11 was lodged on 31 October 2011 by Mr Vladimir Malo who is currently serving a prison sentence.
He is represented by Mr Sokol Luci, a lawyer practising in Tirana.
On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court convicted the applicant of several criminal offences and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment.
Three other co-defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty.
On 7 October 2002 the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the decision in absentia.
On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant’s extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time.
On an unspecified date in October 2007 the applicant lodged his appeal.
In the first place, he requested that his case be re-examined separately from that of his co-defendants on the grounds that he had not sought the use of the summary procedure.
He relied on the Supreme Court’s unifying decision no.
2 of 29 January 2003 (see “The Supreme Court’s practice concerning summary procedure” section below).
Secondly, he requested that fresh examination of evidence be conducted in his presence and that a number of witnesses be questioned.
On 17 December 2007 the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction in absentia.
The court ruled that the applicant did not put forward new evidence which would change the outcome of the proceedings in absentia.
His request was directed against the probative value of evidence which had already been examined and decided upon.
In upholding the conviction, the court relied on forensic evidence produced in 1997 and 1999 and on witnesses’ statements made in 2001 and 2002.
On 5 March 2010 the Supreme Court, following the applicant’s appeal complaining of a breach of his right to have witnesses questioned and evidence re-examined, dismissed the appeal finding that it lacked any grounds of appeal as prescribed by law.
On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court.
On 9 May April 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court’s decision which had declared his appeal inadmissible.
6.
Application no 72361/11 was lodged on 7 November 2011 by Ardit Hysi, who is currently serving a prison sentence.
On 10 November 2005, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of several criminal offences and sentenced him to 17 years’ imprisonment.
That decision became final on 9 February 2007 following the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the applicant’s lawyer’s appeal.
On an unspecified date the applicant was extradited to Albania.
On 3 May 2007 the Gjirokastër District Court accepted the applicant’s request to appeal out of time.
Consequently, the applicant lodged an appeal against his conviction in absentia.
By a final decision of 7 October 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s conviction, ruling that it had become res judicata and that the facts and law of the case had been previously examined.
On 9 May 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court’s decision to dismiss his appeal.
B.
Relevant domestic law and practice 1.
The Constitutional Court Act The relevant provision of the Constitutional Court Act (Law on organisation and operation of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania no.
8577 dated 10 February 2000) reads as follows: Section 30 “1.
The lodging of an appeal before the Constitutional Court shall be subject to the time-limits set out in this law.
2.
An individual’s appeal claiming a violation of his constitutional rights may be submitted no later than two years from the occurrence of such violation.
If the law provides a remedy, the individual may lodge an appeal with the Constitutional Court after having exhausted all legal remedies for the protection of his rights.
In such cases, the time-limit for the lodging of the appeal is two years from the notification of the decision of the last instance body”.
Constitutional Court’s practice as regards the calculation of the two-year time-limit In its decision no.
30 of 26 November 2009 (no.
30/09) the Constitutional Court examined an appellant’s request regarding the unfairness of the proceedings and his conviction in absentia, after his application for leave to appeal out of time had been rejected as time-barred by the Tirana District Court, the appellant not having appealed against that court’s decision.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court did not examine the question of the calculation of the two-year time-limit for filing a constitutional appeal in respect of the unfairness of the proceedings.
It would appear that the starting date was the day on which the appellant had been notified of his conviction in absentia, namely 4 June 2008.
The applicant had been convicted in absentia by a final court decision of 24 March 2000.
2.
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (a) Leave to appeal out of time The relevant provisions of the CCP concerning an application for leave to appeal out of time are as follows: Article 48 – Counsel appointed by the defendant “1.
The defendant has the right to appoint no more than two counsel.
2.
The appointment is made by means of a statement before the proceeding authority or by a document given or sent by registered mail to the counsel.
3.
The appointment of a counsel for a person detained, arrested or sentenced to imprisonment, unless he has appointed a counsel of his own choosing, may be carried out by his relatives in accordance with the procedure stipulated in paragraph 2 above”.
Article 147 – Leave to appeal out of time “1.
The prosecutor, the defendant, the private parties and the defence counsel may request the reopening of the time if they establish that they had no possibility to comply with the time-limit owing to unforeseen events or force majeure.
2.
In the event of conviction in absentia, the accused may request the reopening of the time allowed for appeal against the judgment where he can establish that he had no effective knowledge.
3.
A request for the reopening of the time allowed for appeal must be lodged within ten days of the date of the cessation of unforeseen events or force majeure [in respect of paragraph 1], and in respect of paragraph 2 [within ten days] of the date on which the defendant effectively acquires knowledge of the decision.
(...) ... 5.
The decision on the reopening of the time allowed for appeal [against a judgment] may be appealed against in conjunction with the decision on the merits of the case.
6.
An appeal may be lodged with the Court of Appeal against the decision refusing an application for leave to appeal out of time”.
Article 410 – The defendant’s appeal “... 2.
The defence counsel may lodge an appeal against a conviction in absentia in so far as he has been provided with a power of attorney issued in accordance with the law.
...” Article 420 – Dismissal of the appeal 1.
An appeal is rejected: (a) if it is lodged by a person who does not have locus standi; (b) if the decision cannot be appealed against; (c) if there has been a disregard of the provisions concerning the form, submission, mailing, notification and time-limits; (d) if the appeal has been revoked.
...” Domestic courts’ practice concerning proceedings in absentia In its unifying decision no.
2 of 14 October 2002 the Supreme Court Joint Benches ruled that, having regard to its strictly personal character, an application for leave to appeal out of time should be lodged only by the defendant or a lawyer appointed by him, within ten days of the date on which the defendant was effectively informed of the decision given in absentia.
This right could not be exercised by the defendant’s family members if the defendant was not realistically aware of the decision in absentia.
The application for leave to appeal out of time should be examined by the District Court, sitting in a three-judge formation.
The District Court’s decision could be appealed to the Court of Appeal and, thereafter, to the Supreme Court.
In response to a referral request by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Articles 48 § 3 and 410 § 2 of the CCP, by way of decision no.
30 of 17 June 2010, the Constitutional Court decided that the appointment of a lawyer or counsel by a family member should be accepted by the domestic courts in so far as it can be established that this constituted an explicit manifestation of the defendant’s intention not to attend the proceedings.
The same reasoning applied to a request for leave to appeal out of time made by counsel appointed by the defendant’s family members.
The authorities should establish that the defendant did not have effective knowledge of his conviction in absentia and whether the defendant had effective knowledge of the appointment of counsel by his family members.
In its unifying decision no.
1 of 20 January 2011, the Supreme Court Joint Benches examined three issues concerning an application for leave to appeal out of time.
The appellant had been convicted in absentia.
His lawyer, who had been appointed by family members, was granted leave to appeal out of time against the District Court’s judgment.
The lawyer’s appeals to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court were rejected.
Upon extradition, the appellant was granted leave to appeal out of time against the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
He was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing.
In the first place, the Supreme Court Joint Benches ruled that, when an appeal had been previously examined and rejected by a criminal bench of the Supreme Court, in proceedings in absentia, neither the defendant nor his lawyer could lodge an application for leave to appeal out of time against a Court of Appeal’s judgment on the grounds that the defendant had not been informed of that judgment (me pretendimin se i pandehuri nuk është vënë në dijeni të vendimit).
The same reasoning would apply to an application for leave to appeal out of time against a District Court’s judgment when the appeal has already been examined by the Court of Appeal.
Secondly, the Supreme Court Joint Benches held that only when a higher court dismissed an appeal as having been time-barred, without examining the merits or the lawfulness of complaints raised in the appeal, would the parties have a right to lodge an application for leave to appeal out of time in accordance with Article 147 § 1 of the CCP.
The third finding concerned the effect of an appeal lodged by a defendant, in the absence of a co-defendant’s appeal, on the latter’s application for leave to appeal out of time.
The judgment, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “The CCP ... provides for and allows the joint trial of several defendants by the same bench, within the same set of proceedings, in order to ensure judicial economy and increased judicial efficiency.
Upon completion of judicial examination, the court delivers one single judgment in respect of all defendants.
This does not imply collective responsibility, but, within the meaning of Article 383 the CCP, ‘[the judgment] contains a summary of facts and evidence on which it is based, as well as the reasons for which the court dismisses the remainder of evidence’ as regards each defendant.
In this context, despite the existence of one single judgment, its content consists of “several decisions”, which describe the circumstances and evidence on the basis of which the court qualified the criminal offence attributed to each defendant and identified the applicable articles.
The general rules concerning [the right to] appeal, as laid down in Article 408 onwards of the CCP, define, inter alia, the parties who could lodge an appeal as well as the scope of the examination of the case.
They consider the appeal to be of an individual nature and to result in defined consequences only in respect of the person that files the appeal.
In the event of a number of [co]defendants, the individual character of the appeal continues to prevail.
However, owing to the specificity of the court’s judgment, domestic law provides for an exception to the general rule, as laid down in Article 416 of the CCP, which states that, ‘the appeal lodged by a defendant, if it is not grounded on personal motives, is also valid for the co-defendants’.
The above provision favours the position of a defendant who has not lodged an appeal, since he could benefit from the appeal lodged by a co-defendant, as a result of which the court, depending on the circumstances, may quash the judgment irrespective of the lack of appeal by the [concerned] defendant.
... On the basis of the above provision, the [defendant’s] appeal which has been examined by the court, strips the co-defendant, who did not lodge an appeal of his own motion or through his lawyer, of the opportunity to seek leave to appeal out of time, as it shall be considered that he availed himself of the right to appeal.
Consequently, when a court is seized to examine a [defendant’s] appeal and decides on the lawfulness of complaints raised therein, the [co]defendant does not have a right to seek leave to appeal out of time (i pandehuri nuk legjitimohet të kërkojë rivendosje në afat).
Only when a [defendant’s] appeal has been declared inadmissible on the strength of Article 420 of the CCP, can a co-defendant, who did not lodge an appeal, seek leave to appeal out of time against a court’s judgment.” (b) Summary procedure The relevant provisions as regards the conduct of the summary procedure have been described in Cani v. Albania, no.
11006/06, § 34, 6 March 2012.
The Supreme Court’s practice concerning summary procedure The Supreme Court Joint Benches’ unifying decision no.
2 of 29 January 2003 stated, inter alia, that the application of the summary procedure could not be granted in respect of a defendant who was being tried in a set of proceedings which was also directed against other co-defendants who had not sought the use of the summary procedure.
Only when the disjoinder of cases was allowed in accordance with the law, could the use of the summary procedure be granted in respect of the defendant who had sought its application.
3.
Code of Civil Procedure Articles 151 and 458 provides for the parties’ right to seek leave to appeal out of time, when, under reasonable grounds, they failed to lodge an appeal within the prescribed time-limit.
The application for leave to appeal out of time is lodged with the court that delivered the judgment.
An appeal lies against the court’s decision as regards the application for leave to appeal out of time.
COMPLAINTS 1.
Application no.
33158/11: The applicant complains under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that he was denied access to the Constitutional Court and that his trial in absentia breached Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention.
He also complains that there has been a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention since the Court of Appeal refused the motion filed by the lawyer chosen by his father.
2.
Application no.
48717/08: The applicant complains about his trial in absentia.
3.
Application no.
33158/11: The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 about his trial in absentia.
4.
Application no 57456/11: The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about his trial in absentia and about a lack of impartiality of the bench of the District Court of 4 November 2005 and of the Court of Appeal of 29 September 2006.
5.
Application no.
72359/11: The applicant complains under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention about his trial in absentia.
He also complains that he had no right to question witnesses or request the examination of evidence in the re-hearing proceedings and that the Supreme Court’s decision lacked reasons.
6.
Application no.
72361/11: The applicant complains under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention about his trial in absentia.

Judgment

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF TOPI v. ALBANIA

(Application no.
14816/08)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 May 2018

FINAL

22/08/2018

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Topi v. Albania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Robert Spano, President,Paul Lemmens,Ledi Bianku,Işıl Karakaş,Nebojša Vučinić,Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, judges,and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 April 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.
The case originated in an application (no. 14816/08) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Arben Topi (“the applicant”), on 14 February 2008. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr A. Kasapi, a lawyer practising in Tirana. The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their then Agent, Ms L. Mandia of the State Advocate’s office. 3. The applicant alleged that he had been denied access to the Constitutional Court and that his trial in absentia had breached Article 6 of the Convention. 4. On 26 June 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. 5. The Government implicitly objected to the examination of the case by a Committee (Article 28 § 1 (b)), arguing that it included issues that were not the subject of the Court’s well-established case-law. The Court accepts that objection. THE FACTS
I.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6.
The applicant was born in Peqin in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. In 1998 the applicant was implicated in the commission of the criminal offence of setting up and being a member of an armed gang and of other criminal offences. 8. On 4 February 1999 the prosecutor charged him with the offences of membership of an armed gang, attempted intentional murder and other crimes. The notification of the prosecutor’s charges was acknowledged by the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer. 9. It appears that throughout the investigation proceedings the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer. 10. On 12 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court ordered the applicant’s arrest. However, the order could not be enforced as the applicant could not be traced. 11. On 19 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court declared the applicant a fugitive from justice after unsuccessful attempts to locate him. The decision stated that it was impossible to find him as it appeared that he had escaped to an unknown destination (këto kërkime nuk kanë bërë të mundur kapjen e të pandehurit pasi ai rezulton të ketë ikur në drejtim të paditur). 12. On an unspecified date the prosecutor decided to commit the applicant for trial. 13. On 28 May 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case for examination to the Durrës District Court. 14. On 2 June 1999 the applicant’s father appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts. 15. The trial proceedings against the applicant were conducted in absentia and he was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family in accordance with Article 48 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”). 16. On 15 February 2000 the Durrës District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of establishing and participating in an armed gang and attempted intentional murder. He was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The decision was based on evidence from documents and witness testimony. 17. The applicant’s family-appointed lawyer and the other co-accused appealed against the conviction to the Durrës Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). On 19 April 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that the applicant’s family had not given any express authority to the lawyer for such a procedure. However, the Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s case as part of its overall examination, having regard to the appeals of the other defendants. It convicted the applicant of the same offences as before and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. 18. On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and other co-accused against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 19 April 2000. 19. On 16 September 2005 the applicant was arrested by the Czech authorities on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Albania. 20. On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania. 21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia. 22. On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia. 23. On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, declared the appeal time-barred as the two-year time-limit had started to run on 7 December 2000. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning stated that throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a court‐appointed lawyer or a family-appointed lawyer and that accordingly he had had the opportunity to become acquainted with the proceedings brought against him. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
24.
The relevant domestic law and practice at the material time have been described in detail in the judgments of Shkalla v. Albania (no. 26866/05, §§ 28-35, 10 May 2011), and Izet Haxhia v. Albania, (no. 34783/06, §§ 19-42, 5 November 2013). 25. On 30 March 2017 the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) was amended by Law no. 35/2017 and the new provisions entered into force on 1 August 2017. The relevant new provisions applicable to the present case read as follows:
Article 147 – Leave to appeal out of time (rivendosja në afat) (as amended in 2017)
“1.
The prosecutor, the defendant, the victim or accusing victim, and the private parties are allowed to have the time-limit reset if they establish that they were unable to comply with the time-limit owing to unforeseen events or force majeure. 2. Leave to appeal out of time cannot be granted more than once in respect of each party and of each stage of the proceedings. 3. An application for the resetting of the time-limit for appeal must be lodged within ten days of the date of the cessation of unforeseen events or force majeure. The application shall be examined by the authority seized at the time of its introduction (për kërkesën vendos organi që procedon në kohën e paraqitjes së saj). 4. An appeal against a refusal to grant leave to appeal out of time may be lodged with the court within five days ...”. Article 410 – The defendant’s appeal (as amended in 2017)
“2.
Defence counsel may lodge an appeal against a conviction in absentia in so far as he has been specifically authorised by the defendant, by means of a power of attorney issued in accordance with the law, or a statement made at the hearing”. Article 420 § 1 – Leave to appeal out of time (rivendosja në afatin e ankimit) (added in 2007)
“1.
The parties are allowed to have the time-limit reset if they establish that they were unable to comply with the time-limit owing to unforeseen events or force majeure ...
2.
In the event of trial in absentia [as a result of the defendant’s withdrawal from attending the proceedings], the defendant may request the resetting of the time-limit for appealing against the decision if he can establish that he has not been notified of the decision. 3. An application for the resetting of the time-limit for appeal must be lodged within ten days of the date of the cessation of unforeseen events or force majeure. For the case provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, an application must be lodged within ten days of the date on which the defendant effectively acquires knowledge of the decision. Leave to appeal out of time cannot be granted more than once in respect of each party and of each stage of the proceedings. ...
8.
An appeal against a refusal to grant leave to appeal out of time may be lodged with the court of appeal within five days ...”. Article 450 – Cases for review (as amended in 2017)
“An application for review [of a final decision] may be lodged:
a) if the facts on which the decision was based do not comply with those of another final decision;
(b) if the [court rendering the] decision has relied on a civil or administrative court decision which has subsequently been quashed;
(c) if, subsequent to the decision, new evidence has emerged or has been found which, independently or together with previous evidence, proves that the decision is wrong;
(d) if it is proved that the decision was given as a result of the falsification of judicial acts or another fact that constitutes a criminal offence.
(e) if the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a judgment which makes a review of the case necessary ...
(f) if the extradition of a person convicted in absentia is granted on the explicit assurance that the case will be reviewed.
The application for review shall be lodged within thirty days of the date on which the person is extradited...
(g) if the person is tried in absentia ... and is asking that the case be reviewed.
The application for review should be lodged within thirty days of the date on which the defendant acquired knowledge [of the trial in absentia] ...”. III. COUNCIL OF EUROPE MATERIAL
26.
On 21 September 2017 the Committee of Ministers gave a decision on the execution of the judgment in the case of Shkalla (cited above) concerning, among other matters, the Albanian authorities’ failure to reopen proceedings in absentia. This decision, which was adopted at its 1265th meeting, stated, in so far as relevant:
“The Deputies
1. noted with satisfaction the individual measures taken in these cases, in particular that all the applicants have had an effective possibility to obtain reopening of the impugned proceedings and that, for those applicants who requested it, guarantees were given that the new proceedings either had been or would be conducted in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention and that, pending these proceedings, the applicants could request release; considered accordingly that no further individual measures are required in this group of cases;
...
3. encouraged the authorities rapidly to finalise the ongoing reform of the judicial system to prevent further violations concerning the lack of guarantees surrounding criminal proceedings in absentia, the right to defend oneself in court and the appearance of witnesses; decided to continue their supervision of these measures in the cases of Caka, Cani and Izet Haxhia, and to close the similar cases Berhani and Shkalla”.
27. On 7 December 2017 the Committee of Ministers gave a decision on the execution of the judgment in the case of Izet Haxhia (cited above) concerning, among other matters, the Albanian authorities’ failure to reopen proceedings in absentia. This decision, which was adopted at its 1302nd meeting, stated, in so far as relevant:
“The Deputies
...
2. welcomed the general measures taken, in particular the legislative amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted on 30 March 2017 concerning the guarantees surrounding criminal proceedings in absentia, the right to defend oneself in court and the appearance of witnesses; considered that the adopted general measures are sufficient to prevent similar violations and that these cases can be thus closed”.
28. In the resolution of the same day, the Committee of Ministers stated, in so far as relevant:
“The Deputies
...
Recalling the respondent State’s obligation, under Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention, to abide by all final judgments in cases to which it has been a party and that this obligation entails, over and above the payment of any sums awarded by the Court, the adoption by the authorities of the respondent State, where required:
- of individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum;”
29.
By this resolution, the Committee of Ministers closed the examination of the Izet Haxhia judgment. THE LAW
I.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
30.
The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention that he had been denied access to the Constitutional Court and that his trial in absentia had breached Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 31. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that the above complaints fall to be examined solely under Article 6 § 1 taken alone, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A.
The parties’ submission
1.
The Government’s submissions
32.
The Government submitted that the Albanian State was in the process of judicial reform, with a view to improving legislation and guaranteeing the fundamental rights of individuals. In the framework of the reform programme, the State had made essential amendments to the criminal legislation by means of Law no. 35/2017 of 30 March 2017, namely to Articles 410 and 449-451 of the CCP and the introduction of a new provision, Article 420 § 1. They also submitted that the Committee of Ministers had closed the examination of the judgments in the cases of Shkalla v. Albania (no. 26866/05, 10 May 2011), and Izet Haxhia v. Albania (no. 34783/06, November 2013)
33.
The Government also submitted that the domestic shortcomings identified in the cases of Shkalla and Izet Haxhia (cited above), which also concerned the present case, had been addressed by the general measures adopted in the framework of the judicial reform, in order to prevent similar violations in the future relating to the unfairness of criminal proceedings. 34. In their initial submissions, the Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. He could have lodged a request for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of the District Court in accordance with the then Article 147 of the CCP. 35. The Government accepted that the applicant had been tried and convicted in absentia. The applicant had been impossible to find. As a result, notifications had been sent to his officially appointed lawyer, in accordance with the law. The domestic courts had declared him to be a fugitive from justice and had continued the proceedings in absentia after unsuccessful attempts to trace him. However, they argued that the domestic proceedings had not been unfair. The applicant had been represented either by a family-appointed lawyer or a court-appointed lawyer and the applicant’s defence rights had been respected. 36. The Government also submitted that the applicant had been aware of his prosecution and trial. They had regard to the fact that the events had occurred in a small town where everyone knew each other. They also referred to the fact that there had been wide coverage in the national and local media of the events in question and that the applicant’s relatives had been aware of the trial against him. 37. They finally submitted that the time-limit to bring a constitutional complaint in proceedings held in absentia started to run from the date the final decision was notified to the accused. However, in the present case there had been no denial of access to court as the applicant had been aware of the proceedings against him. 2. The applicant’s submissions
38.
The applicant submitted that the introduction of the general measures addressing the shortcomings identified in the cases of Shkalla and Izet Haxhia (cited above) were certainly welcome, but did not affect his case given that his complaints related to events that happened 10 years ago. 39. The applicant contended that an action for leave to appeal out of time was not an ordinary means of appeal. He further submitted that he had had recourse to the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 131 (f) of the Constitution after the domestic courts had finally ruled on the merits of the case. 40. In his application form the applicant alleged that he had not been notified in person of any acts, nor had he had any information during the criminal investigation and the court proceedings. He had been notified only when he had been extradited to Albania. In his submissions he submitted that he had not been aware of the proceedings against him. Gaining informal knowledge of a prosecution and trial was not in accordance with Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention. 41. The applicant stated in addition that there had been a breach of his right of access to court as a result of the Constitutional Court’s dismissal of his constitutional appeal, as he had only been informed about the proceedings in absentia in March 2006. B. The Court’s assessment
1.
Admissibility
(a) As regards the new remedies introduced in 2017
42.
The Court reiterates that the assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with it. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (see, for example, Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001‐V (extracts). In this light, the Court will examine whether the Government in 2017 introduced any new effective remedy which the applicant could make use of, taking account of the Government’s explicit reference to those provisions, which the Court considers appropriate to treat as a preliminary objection. 43. Firstly, the Court notes that leave to appeal out of time introduced under new Article 420 § 1 of the CCP provides that such an application must be lodged within ten days of the date on which the defendant effectively “acquires knowledge” of the decision. Furthermore, leave to appeal out of time cannot be granted more than once in respect of each party and of each stage of the proceedings. The Court therefore concludes that as the applicant was informed of his conviction in absentia on 1 March 2006 (see paragraph 21 above), he cannot use such a remedy. 44. Secondly, the Court notes that under Article 450, subparagraphs (f) and (g) as amended, an application for review of a final decision must be submitted within thirty days of the date on which the person is extradited, or of the date on which the defendant became aware of the trial in absentia. Accordingly, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that the applicant cannot use that remedy either. 45. Thirdly, the Court notes that there is no new provision in the CCP allowing the domestic courts to examine without any time-limit old cases in which the trial was held in absentia. 46. Fourthly, the Court notes that the Government did not submit any domestic case-law where the new provisions of the CCP had been applied in circumstances similar to those in the present case. 47. Lastly, the Court notes that the Committee of Ministers considered that the general measures adopted were sufficient to prevent similar violations. However, in so far as the matter did not arise in the cases of Shkalla and Izet Haxhia (cited above), the Committee of Ministers did not decide that the general measures adopted would prevent similar violations in respect of old cases in which the trial had been held in absentia, where the time-limits for the use of remedies introduced under the new provisions of the CCP had already expired. In addition, the Court makes reference to the importance of the individual measures to put an end to violations established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum (see paragraph 28 above). 48. For all the above reasons, the Court concludes that the new remedies introduced in 2017, which may be effective in cases introduced after the entry into force of the new provisions of the CCP, are not applicable to the present case. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s preliminary objection. (b) As regards the Government’s remaining objections raised in their initial submissions
49.
As regards the Government’s objection concerning the admissibility of the complaint that the proceedings were unfair, the Court reiterates the conclusions in Izet Haxhia (cited above, §§ 54-55):
“54.
The Court observes that under Article 147 § 2 of the CCP an accused may lodge an application for leave to appeal out of time on condition that the conviction was given in absentia and that the accused was not notified of the conviction. The application for leave to appeal out of time must be lodged within ten days of the notification of the conviction in absentia with the court which convicted the accused (see paragraph 36 above). Under domestic case-law, the ten-day time-limit begins to run from the date on which the accused is handed over to the Albanian authorities, at which point he is supposed to be notified of the conviction in absentia (see the District Court’s decision in paragraphs 25-26 above). Once leave to appeal out of time is granted, the accused has the opportunity of appealing against the conviction in absentia, by submitting factual and legal arguments he considers necessary for his defence in the course of the appeal proceedings. 55. The Court further observes that, under the recent case-law of the Supreme Court, an accused’s application for leave to appeal out of time will not be granted where the family-appointed lawyer had previously and unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court and where a co-accused had appealed against the decision and the merits of the case had been examined as a whole (see paragraphs 28-34 above)”. 50. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that not only did the applicant’s family-appointed lawyer previously and unsuccessfully appeal to the Supreme Court, but that the other co-accused also appealed unsuccessfully against all the courts’ decisions. In those circumstances, an application for leave to appeal out of time was doomed to failure (ibid., § 56). 51. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objections. (c) Conclusion
52.
The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded. It further finds that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. 2. Merits
(a) Conduct of the proceedings in absentia
53.
The Court notes that the general principles as regards proceedings in absentia have been described in Sejdovic v. Italy ([GC], no. 56581/00, §§ 81‐95, ECHR 2006‐II). The Court further notes that although proceedings that take place in the accused’s absence are not of themselves incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention, a denial of justice nevertheless undoubtedly occurs where a person convicted in absentia is unable subsequently to obtain from the court which has heard his case a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact, where it has not been established that he or she has waived his or her right to appear and to defend him or herself (see Sejdovic, cited above, § 82 and Hokkeling v. the Netherlands, no. 30749/12, § 58, 14 February 2017). 54. In the present case it was not disputed by the parties that the applicant was tried and convicted in absentia. The Government disputed the suggestion that the applicant had not been aware of the proceedings brought against him. However, the Court finds that it has not been shown that the applicant had sufficient knowledge of them. In fact, it was established that he was not informed of the conviction in absentia until 1 March 2006, when he was surrendered to the Albanian authorities. Nor has it been shown that he explicitly or implicitly authorised his family members’ appeal or unequivocally waived his right to appear in court by deliberately evading justice. Under the domestic law there was no possibility for the applicant to request a retrial (see paragraphs 51-53 above, and Izet Haxhia, cited above, § 63). 55. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant did not have the opportunity of obtaining a fresh determination of the merits of the charges against him by a court which would have heard him in proceedings compliant with the fairness guarantees of Article 6 § 1. 56. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. (b) Right of access to court
57.
The Court reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law and that it will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature such as time-limits governing the filing of documents or the lodging of appeals (see Jensen v. Denmark, no. 8693/11, § 35, 13 December 2016). 58. The Court notes that the Constitutional Court Act provided at the time for a two‐year time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal. The time‐limit started to run from the date of notification of the decision of the final-instance court. 59. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s constitutional appeal was rejected by the Constitutional Court as out of time on the grounds that the applicant had been aware of the proceedings against him. It therefore calculated the running of the two-year time-limit from the date of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court’s decision on 7 December 2000. However, the Court notes, as already found above, that the applicant’s proceedings and conviction were conducted in absentia. The Court therefore considers that by holding that the period started to run already from a moment when the applicant was not aware of the existence of the judgment of the Supreme Court, with the result that the time period had expired when the applicant became aware of that judgment at the earliest on 1 March 2006, the Constitutional Court made it impossible for the applicant to effectively exercise his right to file a constitutional complaint (see Shkalla, cited above, § 53). 60. The Court considers that the impugned decision amounted to an unjustified denial of the applicant’s right of access to the Constitutional Court. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
61.
In his application form the applicant complained on several grounds under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, namely of a lack of reasons in the domestic courts’ decisions; that he had been arbitrarily convicted by the domestic courts; and that the Supreme Court had not been impartial and independent when it had decided to transfer the case from Elbasan District Court to Durrës District Court. He also complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 that he had been denied access to the Constitutional Court as his case had been examined in camera. He further complained of a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 and of a breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention since the Court of Appeal had refused an application lodged by the lawyer chosen by his father. He finally complained under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention of a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem. 62. The Court has examined the above complaints as submitted by the applicant. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
63.
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
64.
The applicant did not submit a claim in respect of pecuniary or non‐pecuniary damage. 65. The Court reiterates its findings in Shkalla (cited above, §§ 77-79), and Izet Haxhia (cited above, § 70) that when an applicant has been convicted in breach of her or his rights as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, the most appropriate form of redress would be to ensure that the applicant is put as far as possible in the position in which she or he would have been had this provision been respected. The most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be a new trial or the reopening of the proceedings if requested. 66. The applicant claimed euros 5,000 (EUR) for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. 67. The Government contested the applicant’s claim as ill-founded on the basis of the facts and the evidence. They were also not reasonable as to quantum. 68. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Gjyli v. Albania, no. 32907/07, § 72, 29 September 2009). The Court notes that the applicant omitted to itemise particulars of his claims and provide the necessary supporting documents as required by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. 69. The Court finds that the applicant must have incurred some costs and expenses in the proceedings. Accordingly, in the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1.
Declares the complaints concerning the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and a breach of the right of access to court, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the conduct of the criminal proceedings in absentia;

3.
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of an unjustified denial of the applicant’s right of access to the Constitutional Court;

4.
Holds,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,000 plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Albanian Lek at the rate applicable at the date of delivery of this judgment;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 May 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley NaismithRobert SpanoRegistrarPresident