I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in BUROBIN v. RUSSIA.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2020-12-10
  • Communication date: 2013-03-18
  • Application number(s): 17418/08
  • Country:   RUS
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 3, 5, 5-1, 5-1-c, 5-3, 5-5, 6
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings
    Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)
    Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial
    Article 6-1 - Reasonable time)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.892512
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

The applicant, Mr Igor Vladimirovich Burobin, is a Russian national, who was born in 1970 and lives in Ryazan.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1.
The applicant’s arrest and placement in custody On 26 May 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Oktyabrskiy District of Ryazan opened criminal proceedings into the kidnapping and murder of Mr C. On 27 April 2007 the applicant was summoned for questioning.
When he came to the prosecutor’s office, he was arrested on suspicion of kidnapping and robbery of Mr C. On 28 April 2007 the investigator petitioned the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ryazan for the applicant’s remand.
On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected the investigator’s petition, finding that the applicant’s arrest had not been in compliance with Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see below).
In particular, the investigator had not submitted any materials justifying a reasonable suspicion against the applicant or confirming the risks of him absconding, re-offending, threatening witnesses, destroying evidence or otherwise interfering with the investigation.
The court noted, in particular, that the applicant had no criminal record, had a permanent place of residence and employment and had appeared for questioning without delay when summoned by the investigator.
On 15 May 2007 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal.
On 25 May 2007 the applicant was formally charged with kidnapping, robbery and murder of Mr C., offences under Articles 105 § 2, 126 § 2 and 162 § 2 of the Criminal Code.
On 15 June 2007 Ms A., the applicant’s friend, testified to the investigator that on the night of Mr C.’s disappearance she had stayed in the applicant’s flat.
The applicant was at home.
On 28 June 2007 another person, Mr Ch., was convicted of kidnapping Mr C. The judgment against Mr Ch.
stated that he had acted together with unidentified persons.
It can be seen from a report dated 4 September 2007, that on that day Mr A., Ms A.’s son, was questioned by the investigator Mr K. He told to the investigator that several months before the applicant and his mother had visited Ms A. and had brought a cake.
He did not know of what they had talked about.
On 17 December 2007 the charge of murder was dropped.
On 25 December 2007 the Oktyabrskiy District Court ordered the applicant’s placement in custody for the following reasons: “The investigation of this case is particularly complex and exceptional, because the offences against [Mr C.] were committed by [the applicant] and his accomplices in unobvious circumstances and were carefully planned and prepared.
[The applicant] is charged with especially serious offences, one of which is punishable by eight to twenty years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment.
Some of the members of that organised criminal group have been placed on the list of wanted persons and new factors have emerged showing that [the applicant], alone or together with them, might re-offend, threaten witnesses or other participants to the proceedings or interfere with the investigation in some other way.” The applicant appealed, submitting that the District Court’s finding that he might abscond, re-offend or interfere with the investigation had not been supported by evidence.
No new factors justifying his placement in custody had emerged after the decision of 28 April 2007.
He continued to live at his address and to work for the same employer.
He had not absconded or threatened witnesses.
He had come to the investigator without delay when summoned.
He was not in contact with the other persons accused of the same offence because he was not on good terms with them.
On 17 January 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld the remand order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, sufficiently reasoned and justified.
2.
The alleged ill-treatment and the investigation At about 3.15 p. m. on 31 January 2008 the applicant was transported from the detention facility to the Ryazan Investigations Committee where he was questioned by the investigator Mr K. The questioning ended at about 4.30 p. m. The applicant was put in a police car together with three police officers, Mr Kn.
and two other officers whose names the applicant did know.
They were driving about the town for about an hour.
During all that time Mr Kn.
urged the applicant to confess to the murder of Mr C. and to other murders.
As the applicant refused to confess and protested his innocence, Mr Kn.
took out an electroshock gun and administered seventeen electric shocks to his hips.
Mr Kn.
then said that they were going back to the Investigations Committee and urged the applicant to make a confession to the investigator Mr K. Mr Kn.
threatened that if the applicant did not confess, he would be tortured again.
After they arrived at the Investigations Committee, the investigator Mr K. told the applicant that he had two weeks to confess.
If he had not confessed by that time, he would be convicted to a long prison term.
Mr K. also said that it was useless to complain about ill-treatment because his complaints would not be investigated.
The applicant was then transported back to the detention facility where he arrived at about 7.30 p. m. He later discovered injuries on the inside of his left hip and the outside of his right hip.
On 1 February 2008 the applicant was examined by a detention facility doctor who recorded numerous petechiae (red or purple spots on the body, caused by minor hemorrhages, which may be caused, among others, by prolonged straining, certain medical conditions, some types of injuries and some medications) on his hips and high blood pressure.
The applicant was diagnosed with contact dermatitis.
On 7 February 2008 the applicant complained of ill-treatment to the Ryazan Investigations Committee.
The Ryazan Investigations Committee opened a preliminary inquiry.
The investigator Mr Sh.
questioned the applicant who described his ill-treatment in detail.
Mr Sh.
then questioned the investigator Mr K. who had questioned the applicant on 31 January 2008 and the police officers Mr Kn.
and Mr E. who had escorted the applicant from the detention facility to the Ryazan Investigations Committee and back on that day.
They all stated that on the way back to the detention facility the applicant had expressed an intention to confess and had been therefore brought back to Mr K. to whom he repeated his wish to make a confession.
Mr K. had explained to him that under Russian law his confession could serve as an attenuating circumstance in the criminal proceedings against him.
The applicant had been then transported to the detention facility.
Mr K., Mr Kn.
and Mr E. all denied possessing an electroshock gun or ill-treating the applicant.
On 20 February 2008 the investigator Mr Sh.
of the Ryazan Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.
He found that there was no evidence of ill-treatment.
By complaining about ill-treatment, the applicant attempted to escape criminal responsibility for the offences imputed to him.
The applicant challenged that decision before the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ryazan.
On 3 March 2008 a deputy head of the Ryazan Investigations Committee annulled the decision of 20 February 2008 and ordered a further inquiry.
It ordered, in particular, that Mr G., the third escorting officer, be questioned, that the times of the applicant’s departure from and return to the detention facility be established, his medical record studied and the doctor who had examined the applicant questioned.
On the same day the investigator Mr Sh.
questioned a forensic expert who, after studying the applicant’s medical records, stated that the medical data indicated in the records was insufficient.
It was therefore impossible to establish whether the skin eruptions on the applicant’s hips were caused by an injury or by some disease, such as dermatitis.
Mr G. was also questioned and gave the same testimony as Mr Kn.
and Mr E. On 12 March 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings on the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 20 February 2008 because that decision had been annulled.
On 13 March 2008 the investigator Mr Sh.
of the Ryazan Investigations Committee refused, for a second time, to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.
He found no evidence of ill-treatment.
The applicant challenged that decision before the Oktyabrskiy District Court, complaining, in particular, about the failure to perform an expert medical examination to establish the causes of his injuries.
On 28 March 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court quashed the investigator’s decision of 13 March 2008, finding that the inquiry had been incomplete.
In particular, the investigator had not taken the investigative measures enumerated in the decision of 3 March 2008.
During the resumed inquiry, it was established that the applicant had left the detention facility at 2.30 p.m. on 31 January 2008 and had returned there at 7.20 p.m. on the same day.
On 24 April 2008 the investigator Mr T. of the Ryazan Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.
He found no evidence of ill-treatment.
The applicant challenged that decision before the Oktyabrskiy District Court.
On 20 May 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court quashed the decision of 24 April 2008, finding that the inquiry had been incomplete.
In particular, the deficiencies in the inquiry identified in the District Court’s decision of 28 March 2008 had not been corrected.
On 28 May 2008 a deputy head of the Zheleznodorozhniy Interdistrict Investigations Committee annulled the decision of 24 April 2008 and ordered a further inquiry.
On 6 June 2008 the investigator Mr T. questioned the doctor who had examined the applicant on 1 February 2008.
She confirmed that she had examined the applicant and had diagnosed him with dermatitis and high blood pressure.
She explained that dermatitis could be caused by many factors, such as exposure to chemicals or allergens or lack of personal hygiene.
There is a low probability of it being caused by an electric shock.
On 6 June 2008 the investigator Mr T. of the Ryazan Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.
He found no evidence of ill-treatment.
The applicant challenged that decision before the Zheleznodorozhniy Interdistrict Investigations Committee and before the Oktyabrskiy District Court.
He asked, in particular, for an expert medical examination of his injuries.
On 10 July 2008 the Zheleznodorozhniy Interdistrict Investigations Committee rejected his complaint, finding that the decision not to open a criminal investigation had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified.
On 21 July 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court found that the decision of 6 June 2008 had been unlawful.
It found that the inquiry had been thorough and complete and the decision of 6 June 2008 had been well reasoned and justified.
Given that the applicant’s injuries had been cured, it was not necessary to order an expert examination of his person or of his medical records.
In any event, a forensic expert had already given his opinion on the basis of the applicant’s medical records.
However, there were discrepancies in the text of the decision of 6 June 2008 which made it unlawful.
On 21 August 2008 the Zheleznodorozhniy Interdistrict Investigations Committee annulled the decision of 6 June 2008.
On 22 August 2008 the investigator Mr N. of the Zheleznodorozhniy Interdistrict Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment.
He found no evidence of ill-treatment.
On 12 September 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 July 2008 for procedural defects and remitted the case for a new examination before the Oktyabrskiy District Court.
On 29 September 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings, finding that the decision of 6 June 2008 had been meanwhile annulled.
3.
Decisions concerning the extension of a custodial measure On 18 February 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 27 April 2008, finding that that the grounds for detention mentioned in the remand order of 25 December 2007 persisted.
The case was complex and voluminous and it was necessary to conduct further investigative measures.
The applicant appealed, submitting that the District Court had not referred to any facts in support of its findings that he might abscond, re-offend or interfere with the proceedings.
Nor had it considered alternative “preventive measures”.
It had disregarded his arguments, in particular those relating to his permanent place of residence and good conduct.
On 6 March 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified.
On 18 April 2008 Mr A. told the applicant that his signature on the questioning report of 4 September 2007 had been falsified and his statements distorted.
On 24 April 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 27 August 2008.
It referred to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the investigation.
It noted that the investigator had submitted evidence, namely written statements by Mr A., showing that the applicant had attempted to put pressure on witnesses.
The applicant’s arguments about his alibi and about the investigator’s alleged pressure on Mr A. could not be examined in the framework of the present proceedings.
They would be examined by the trial court.
The court concluded that the applicant might abscond, threaten witnesses or interfere with the investigation in some other way.
The applicant appealed, submitting, in particular, that the investigation had been completed on 12 March 2008 and he could therefore no longer put pressure on witnesses.
On 4 May 2008 the applicant asked the investigator to order an expert examination of Mr A.’s signature on the report of 4 September 2007.
He also asked for his release.
On 5 May 2008 the investigator Mr K. rejected his request as unsubstantiated.
The applicant challenged the investigator’s decision before Mr K.’s hierarchical superior, the head of the Ryazan Investigations Committee.
He submitted that Mr A. had stated that his signature on the report of 4 September 2007 had been falsified, which had been orally confirmed by an expert.
On 6 May 2008 the head of the Ryazan Investigations Committee rejected his complaint as unsubstantiated.
The applicant challenged that decision before the Oktyabrskiy District Court, submitting that an expert examination was necessary to establish whether Mr A.’s signature on the report of 4 September 2007 had been authentic.
On 15 May 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld the extension order of 24 April 2008 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified.
On 21 May 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court declared inadmissible the complaint against the decision of 6 May 2008, finding that it had no competence to examine it.
All evidence would be assessed by the trial court.
On 26 June 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a new examination before the Oktyabrskiy District Court.
There is no information about the new examination.
On 7 July 2008 the applicant lodged an application for release before the Oktyabrskiy District Court.
He submitted, in particular, that the investigation had been completed and he had started to study the case file.
He could no longer put pressure on witnesses.
On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court rejected his application, finding that the grounds for detention mentioned in the extension order of 24 April 2008 persisted.
In particular, it had been established that the applicant had attempted to put pressure on a witness.
The court could not question that finding or examine whether it had been supported by evidence.
On 29 July 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld that decion on appeal.
On 26 August 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 27 November 2008 for the same reasons as before.
The applicant appealed, complaining, in particular, that the District Court’s findings that he might put pressure on witnesses had been based on statements by Mr A.
However, that witness had not been question by the District Court and the applicant’s requests to have him questioned had been rejected.
Moreover, his request to study the materials submitted by the investigator in support of his request for an extension had been also rejected.
On 16 September 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court quashed the extension order on appeal.
It found that the District Court had unlawfully rejected the applicant’s request for access to the materials submitted by the investigator.
On 18 September 2008 the applicant complained to the prosecutor’s office of the Ryazan Region that his continued detention had not been based on a court order.
On 22 September 2002 the Oktyabrskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 27 November 2008 for the same reasons as before.
The applicant appealed.
He repeated his arguments advanced in his previous appeal submissions.
He also complained that his detention between 16 and 22 September 2008 had not been based on a court order and had been therefore unlawful.
On 26 September 2008 the prosecutor’s office of the Ryazan Region rejected the applicant’s complaint of 18 September 2008, finding that his detention had been extended by a court on 22 September 2002.
His continued detention was therefore lawful.
On 21 October 2008 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld the extension order of 22 September 2002 on appeal.
It found, in particular, that the extension order of 26 August 2008 had been quashed on 16 September 2008 for procedural defects.
The fact that the applicant had remained in custody after that had not breached his rights.
On 13 November 2008 the applicant lodged an application for release before the Oktyabrskiy District Court.
He asked to be released on bail.
On the same day Oktyabrskiy District Court ordered the applicant’s release on bail.
It found that the investigation had been completed and the witnesses questioned.
The applicant could no longer put pressure on them.
On the same day the applicant paid the bail and was released.
4.
Discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and compensation proceedings On 25 February 2010 the Investigations Committee of the Ryazan Region discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant, finding that there was no evidence of his involvement in the kidnapping and robbery of Mr C. The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred as a result of the unjustified criminal prosecution.
He claimed 438,826.71 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of pecuniary damage, representing legal fees, loss of salary, medical and food expenses and bail expenses.
He also claimed RUB 6,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
On 22 April 2010 the Moskovskiy District Court declared his claims inadmissible.
It found that it had no competence to examine the claims in respect of pecuniary damage because they were to be examined in criminal proceedings.
As regards the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, they were to be examined in civil proceedings.
However, the Moskovskiy District Court had no territorial jurisdiction to examine them.
On 26 May 2010 the Ryazan Regional Court upheld that decision on appeal.
The applicant resubmitted the claims in respect of pecuniary damage in accordance with the criminal procedural rules.
On 7 September 2010 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ryazan allowed in part his claims in respect of pecuniary damage.
It awarded the applicant RUB 240,531.14 (approximately 6,090 euros) for legal fees, loss of salary, medical expenses and bail expenses.
On 14 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, acting on supervisory review, quashed the decisions of 22 April and 26 May 2010 as unlawful and remitted the case for a new examination before the Moskovskiy District Court.
It appears that the applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage has not been examined to date.
B.
Relevant domestic law The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an investigating authority, an investigator or a prosecutor has the right to arrest a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence which is punishable by imprisonment if that person has been caught committing a crime or immediately after having committed a crime; if victims or eyewitnesses have identified that person as the perpetrator of a criminal offence; or if obvious traces of a criminal offence have been discovered on that person’s face or body, his or her clothes, or in his or her house.
If there are other circumstances giving reasons to suspect a person of having committed a crime, that person may be arrested if he or she has attempted to hide, or does not have a permanent place of residence, or if the person’s identity has not been established, or if the investigator has submitted to the court a request for the application of a custodial measure in respect of that person (Article 91).
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Articles 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention that he was ill-treated by the police and that the investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment was ineffective.
He also complains about the allegedly inhuman conditions of his detention.
He further complains that he was detained despite the absence of a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the imputed offences, that his detention from 16 to 22 September 2008 was not based on a court order and that the entire period of his detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons.
His claims for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage were not examined.
He finally complains that the criminal proceedings against him were unfair.

Judgment

FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF PARINOV v. UKRAINE
(Application no.
48398/17)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
10 December 2020

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Parinov v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, President,Ganna Yudkivska,Lado Chanturia, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 12 November 2020,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.
The case originated in an application (no. 48398/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Borys Mytrofanovych Parinov (“the applicant”), on 30 June 2017. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr Y.L. Boychenko, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna of the Ministry of Justice. 3. The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that the length of proceedings related to his share in a company had been excessive, and also complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that as a result of those proceedings, he could not recover his share in a company. 4. On 27 March 2018 notice of the complaints concerning the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the duration of the proceedings in his case was given to the Government, and the complaint about the alleged lack of impartiality of the liquidation manager raised under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. 5. The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee, but provided no reasons. Having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it (see, in respect of a similar approach, Lada v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 32392/07, § 4, 6 February 2018; Geletey v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 23040/07, § 4, 24 April 2018; and Braylovska v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 14031/09, § 5, 6 June 2019). THE FACTS
6.
The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Lugansk. He died on 16 September 2018. His son and wife expressed their wish to pursue the application in his stead (see paragraphs 40-43 below). 7. On 26 April 2000 the applicant became a shareholder in a limited liability company (“the company”). On 30 May 2005 the applicant withdrew from that company. However, the other shareholder in the company did not return the applicant’s share of the company’s funds to him, contrary to the law in force. 8. On 10 December 2007 the applicant lodged proceedings with the domestic courts, seeking an acknowledgment that he had withdrawn from the company. On 20 December 2007 the Bryankivskyy Local Court of the Lugansk Region allowed the applicant’s claim and acknowledged that he had withdrawn from the company. On 23 April 2008, by a final ruling, the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court. 9. Meanwhile, on 25 December 2007 and 22 January 2008 the company had sold two of its commercial buildings to company B., which had sold them to company K. on 10 January 2008 and 25 February 2008 respectively. 10. On 19 June 2008 the applicant lodged a claim for reimbursement of the value of his share. 11. On 19 June 2008 the Lugansk Regional Commercial Court (hereinafter “the Commercial Court”) opened the proceedings and ordered the seizure of the company’s assets, in order to guarantee the repayment of the applicant’s share. After learning that the other shareholder had sold the company’s immovable property to third parties, on 9 December 2009 the applicant changed his claim and sought reimbursement of the value of his share, as well as an acknowledgment that the above sale contracts of 25 December 2007, 22 January 2008, 10 January 2008 and 25 February 2008 were invalid. 12. On 2 February 2010 the Commercial Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. On 27 April 2010 the Lugansk Commercial Court of Appeal amended the above-mentioned decision in part. On 18 November 2010 the Higher Commercial Court quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case for fresh examination. 13. As a result of the case being examined afresh, on 29 December 2011, by a final decision, the Higher Commercial Court terminated the proceedings with respect to the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of the value of his share in the company, as that issue had been examined in the course of the insolvency proceedings (see the “Insolvency proceedings” section below). The applicant’s claim for an acknowledgment that the sale agreements relating to the company were invalid was rejected on account of his lack of standing. 14. On 6 October 2010, upon the application of a fourth company, company P., the Commercial Court started insolvency proceedings against the company, imposing a moratorium on debt payments. 15. In December 2010 the applicant lodged his creditor’s claim with the Commercial Court. 16. On 28 February 2011 the Commercial Court adjourned the proceedings until 7 April 2011, as the applicant had failed to provide evidence for his monetary claim. 17. On 11 April 2011, by a final decision, the Commercial Court recognised the applicant’s entitlement, as a creditor, to 4,100,439 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – around 356,560 euros (EUR) at the material time), an amount that corresponded to his share in the company. 18. On 28 April 2011 the Commercial Court allowed an application by the applicant’s representative to suspend the proceedings until the outcome of the other related proceedings was known. 19. On 5 January 2012 the Commercial Court resumed the proceedings. 20. On 12 March 2012 the Commercial Court allowed an application by the applicant’s representative to suspend the proceedings until the outcome of the other related proceedings was known. 21. On 17 June 2013 the Commercial Court resumed the proceedings. 22. On 11 November 2013 the Commercial Court adjourned the proceedings until 13 January 2014, as the case-file material was sent to the court of cassation so that the applicant’s objections to two procedural decisions of November 2010 and April 2011 could be considered. 23. On 3 February 2014 the Commercial Court declared the company insolvent, initiated the liquidation procedure, and appointed a liquidator, D.
24.
On 17 April 2014 the Commercial Court considered a report prepared by D. which stated, among other things, that in terms of property, the company only had two vehicles, whose location was unknown. Since further actions relating to the liquidation procedure were necessary, the court adjourned the proceedings until 7 July 2014. 25. Between July 2014 and April 2015 the Commercial Court did not operate, owing to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. 26. On 2 April 2015 the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine ordered that the Commercial Court resume its activity in Kharkiv. 27. On 2 July 2015 the Commercial Court reopened the proceedings of its own motion, upon restoring the case file concerning the insolvency proceedings. 28. On 17 August 2015 the liquidator wrote to the Commercial Court, asking to be dismissed from his position. The Commercial Court ordered the creditors’ committee to consider the liquidator’s request. 29. Between 20 October 2015 and 10 September 2019 the Commercial Court noted in several decisions that the creditors’ committee had not decided the issue of the liquidator wishing to withdraw, and on numerous occasions it ordered the liquidator to convene a meeting of the creditors’ committee and have a new liquidator designated by the latter. 30. In this connection, on 17 November 2015 the Commercial Court received a negative reply to an enquiry which it had made as regards selecting the name of a new liquidator via the automatic system, as no appropriate candidate had been found. 31. On 15 June 2018 the Commercial Court asked Y., a potential new liquidator whose name had been found via the automatic system, to submit written consent confirming her willingness or refusal to act as a liquidator. She did not reply. 32. On 23 June 2018 L. informed the Commercial Court that he would be unable to act as a liquidator, as he had a heavy workload. 33. On 20 July 2018 the Commercial Court asked P., a potential liquidator whose name had been found via the automatic system, to submit written consent confirming his willingness or refusal to act as a liquidator. He did not reply. 34. On 9 August 2018 the Commercial Court asked R., a potential liquidator whose name had been found via the automatic system, to submit written consent confirming his willingness or refusal to act as a liquidator. 35. On 30 July 2019 the Commercial Court allowed the applicant’s wife’s application to be admitted to the proceedings in her capacity as a creditor, as she was the applicant’s heir. It also asked R., a potential liquidator whose name had been found via the automatic system, to submit written confirmation of his willingness or refusal to act as a liquidator. The Commercial Court also stated that D., the liquidator (see paragraph 28 above), had provided a report dated 10 July 2019, which stated, among other things, that owing to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine he had changed his place of residence from Lugansk to Odessa, and the liquidation of the company had been suspended. D. had stated that he had asked to be withdrawn from the case on 17 August 2015 owing to objective reasons which impeded the performance of his functions. He had convened a creditors’ committee meeting in Kyiv on 24 July 2019. 36. On 10 September 2019 the Commercial Court asked S., a potential liquidator whose name had been found via the automatic system, to submit written consent confirming his willingness or refusal to act as a liquidator. 37. On 31 October 2019 the Commercial Court adjourned the hearing to 10 December 2019, as D. and the creditors did not attend the hearing. The creditors’ committee did not decide on D.’s application to withdraw from the case, and did not provide a proposal with the name of a new liquidator. 38. On 16 April 2020 the Commercial Court adjourned the hearing to 17 June 2020, as D. and the creditors did not attend the hearing. The creditors’ committee did not decide on the D.’s application to withdraw from the case, and did not provide a proposal with the name of a new liquidator. 39. On 8 September 2011 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against the company’s officials with the Leninskyy district police department of Lugansk, and on the basis of that complaint a criminal fraud case was opened. 40. On 22 February 2014 the criminal case was closed for lack of corpus delicti. In 2014, due to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, the criminal case-file material was left in Lugansk. 41. On 23 September 2016 the Svativ District Court quashed the decision of 22 February 2014. The criminal investigation is currently ongoing. 42. Section 114 of the Law of Ukraine on restoring a debtor’s solvency or declaring insolvency of 14 May 1992 (Закон України “Про відновлення платоспроможності боржника або визнання його банкрутом”) provides, inter alia, that following a liquidator’s request, a commercial court may dismiss a liquidator from the execution of his or her duties. A commercial court may appoint a liquidator following a request from a creditors’ committee, or, in the absence of such a request, may appoint a candidate of its own choice of its own motion. In the absence of written consent from a candidate who has been selected via the automatic system, a commercial court has to appoint a liquidator from the integrated register of arbitration administrators (asset managers, insolvency practitioners, liquidators). 43. The Code of Ukraine on Insolvency Proceedings of 18 October 2018 entered into force on 21 October 2019 and repealed the Law of Ukraine on restoring a debtor’s solvency or declaring insolvency of 14 May 1992. Article 28 § 4 of the Code provides that a commercial court may dismiss an arbitration administrator from executing his or her duties as a liquidator. Article 60 provides that in a decision declaring a debtor insolvent and opening the liquidation procedure, a commercial court has to appoint a liquidator from the integrated register of arbitration administrators. THE LAW
44.
The applicant died while the case was pending before the Court. On 30 October 2018 his representative informed the Court that the applicant’s son, Mr Andriy Borysovych Parinov, wished to pursue the application. On 5 December 2019 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant’s wife, Ms Iryna Kostyantynivna Parinova, also wished to pursue the application. 45. The Government submitted that since complaints concerning the length of proceedings and a lack of effective remedies were non-transferable, and since the applicant’s complaint of the violation of his property rights was manifestly ill-founded, the applicant’s son and wife were not victims and lacked a legitimate interest in pursuing this case. 46. The Court reiterates that in a number of cases in which an applicant has died in the course of proceedings it has taken into account statements of the applicant’s heirs or close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court. It has done so most frequently in cases which primarily involved pecuniary and, for this reason, transferable claims. However, the question of whether such claims are transferable to persons seeking to pursue an application is not the exclusive criterion. In fact, human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension, and persons close to an applicant may have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that justice is done even after the applicant’s death (see Horváthová v. Slovakia, no. 74456/01, § 26, 17 May 2005), even where the complaint before the Court concerns the length of proceedings (ibid., §§ 26-27). 47. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court accepts that the applicant’s son and wife have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in the late applicant’s stead. It will therefore continue dealing with the case at his request. However, reference will still be made to the applicant throughout the text. 48. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement as provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
Article 6
“1.
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
49.
The Government submitted that there were three different sets of court proceedings, which should be considered separately. They stated in particular that the first set of proceedings had finished on 23 April 2008 and the second set of proceedings had finished on 29 December 2011. Since the application had been lodged on 30 June 2017, those two sets of proceedings should not count towards the total length of the proceedings, as this would be incompatible with the six-month time-limit. 50. The applicant disagreed and stressed that all three sets of proceedings should be considered together as one set of proceedings, as they were interdependent. 51. The Court agrees with the Government that the subject matter and, consequently, the civil rights to be determined, were different in the three sets of proceedings. Therefore, having regard to the fact that the final judgments in the first and second sets of proceedings dated from 23 April 2008 (see paragraph 8 above) and 29 December 2011 (see paragraph 13 above) and that the present application was submitted on 30 June 2017, more than six months later, the complaints related to these proceedings were submitted out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 52. As regards the insolvency proceedings, since those proceedings are still ongoing, the six-month time-limit set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention has not started running, so it cannot be said that the applicant has failed to comply with that rule. 53. The Government argued that the applicant had not lodged a complaint regarding the liquidator’s inactivity with the Commercial Court. 54. The applicant disagreed, arguing that there had been no effective remedies which he could use. 55. The Court observes that, in the instant case, the question of whether the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies has been satisfied is closely linked to the complaint concerning the existence of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. It therefore considers that this objection, raised by the Government under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, should be joined to the merits of the complaint under Article 13. 56. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 57. The Government maintained that the insolvency proceedings had been complex and that the delays in the proceedings had been caused by the parties – including the applicant, who had challenged two procedural decisions of the national courts in November 2013 – and the liquidator. They further argued that, in insolvency proceedings, the parties and the liquidator were the main actors, while the State authorities had no power to interfere. 58. The applicant disagreed. He submitted that the insolvency proceedings had concerned a company with only two shareholders, and that he had used the procedures available to him in order to protect his rights and not delay the proceedings. Moreover, he argued that he could not be blamed for the behaviour of the other parties, and that he had had no effective remedy against the liquidator’s inactivity. 59. The Court reiterates that according to its case-law, the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in its case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the authorities dealing with the case, and the importance of what was at stake for the applicant in the litigation (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‐VII). 60. The Court notes that the relevant period to be taken into consideration began in December 2010 (see paragraph 15 above) and is ongoing. Thus, so far the insolvency proceedings have lasted nine years, eleven months and fourteen days at one level of jurisdiction. 61. The Court further observes that upon the applicant’s representative’s applications, between 28 April 2011 and 17 June 2013 the Commercial Court stayed the insolvency proceeding two times for the total period of one year, eleven months and fifteen days. Such a delay cannot be attributable to the State, unless the consequent proceedings are unreasonably long (see Finkov v. Russia, no. 27440/03, § 105, 8 October 2009). 62. As to the Government’s arguments that the applicant contributed to the delay in the proceedings in November 2013 by challenging two procedural decisions before the Court of Cassation, the Court takes the view that the applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in the defence of his interest (see Bakiyevets v. Russia, no. 22892/03, § 47, 15 June 2006). 63. In relation to the period between July 2014 and April 2015, during which the Commercial Court was not operating owing to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, the Court reiterates that in the case of Khlebik v Ukraine (no. 2945/16, § 79, 25 July 2017) it found that the Ukrainian State authorities had taken all the measures available to them to organise the judicial system in a way that would render the rights guaranteed by Article 6 effective in the specific situation of ongoing conflict, and that finding was later confirmed in the case of Tsezar and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 73590/14 and 6 others, § 55, 13 February 2018). In the absence of any specific element that would indicate that the domestic authorities did not take the steps reasonably expected of them to ensure the proper functioning of the judicial system, the Court sees no reason to depart from that conclusion in the present case. Therefore, the delay in the insolvency proceedings between July 2014 and April 2015 – cannot be attributed to the State. 64. This being so, the Court observes that in August 2015 the liquidator asked the Commercial Court to dismiss him from his position. The proceedings have been blocked ever since, because no new liquidator has been appointed. In this regard, the Court is unable to follow the Government’s argument that the parties to the domestic proceedings are responsible for the delay of at least four and a half years because they have not suggested the name of a prospective liquidator to the Commercial Court. In this context, the Court reiterates that section 114 of the Law of Ukraine on restoring a debtor’s solvency or declaring insolvency provided that a commercial court might dismiss and appoint a liquidator of its own motion, and Article 28 § 4 of the Code on Bankruptcy Proceedings provides that a commercial court may dismiss a liquidator if he applies to withdraw from a case. The commercial court indeed accelerated the procedure for appointing a new liquidator in 2018, but with little success (see paragraphs 29-38 above). Having said that, the Court reiterates that it is for the State to organise its legal system in such a way as to enable its courts to comply with the requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Zavodnik v. Slovenia, no. 53723/13, § 97, 21 May 2015, and De Blasi v. Italy, no. 1595/02, §§ 32-33, 5 October 2006). Therefore, the delay due to the failure to appoint a liquidator is attributable to the respondent State. 65. The Government did not provide any justification for this delay, apart from arguing that the instant case was of particular complexity, referring to its economic nature. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the time spent on appointing a new liquidator – four and a half years at least – was excessive, which added to the total length of proceedings, and the length of the proceedings failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. 66. The applicant complained that he had had no effective remedies against the length of the insolvency proceedings. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
67.
The Government argued that the applicant could have lodged a complaint regarding the liquidator’s inactivity with the Commercial Court. 68. The applicant disagreed, arguing that such a complaint would have had no chances of success, as the national law did not provide for any sanctions for a liquidator’s inactivity. 69. The Court notes that this complaint is closely linked to the complaint examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 65 above) and must likewise be declared admissible. 70. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI). 71. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 13 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case, stating that the current Ukrainian legislation does not provide a remedy for complaints concerning the length of proceedings (see, for instance, Efimenko v. Ukraine, no. 55870/00, §§ 48-50 and § 64, 18 July 2006, and Gutka v. Ukraine, no. 45846/05, § 34, 8 April 2010). 72. In the present case, the Court is not convinced by the Government’s argument that filing a complaint with the Commercial Court regarding the inactivity of a liquidator who had withdrawn from a case would have been an effective remedy to accelerate the proceedings, as the main defect of those proceedings was the absence of any liquidator from August 2015 onwards and the Commercial Court’s procrastination with regard to the appointment of a liquidator. 73. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicant did not have an effective remedy, and that there has been a violation of Article 13. In view of this conclusion, it also rejects the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 74. Referring to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant complained that owing to the excessive length of proceedings, it was now impossible for him to recover his share in the company. 75. The Court finds that the evidence presented does not allow it to establish a causal link between the delayed proceedings and the fact that the applicant’s claim was never satisfied. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 76. The applicant lastly complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the criminal investigation against the company’s former officials had been lengthy and ineffective (see paragraphs 39-41 above). 77. In the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 78. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
79.
The applicant claimed 1,318,884 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, and EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The amount claimed in respect of pecuniary damage comprised the amount awarded to him by the Commercial Court on 11 April 2011 (see paragraph 17 above), indexed in line with inflation, plus statutory interest at 3% per annum as provided for in domestic law. 80. The Government argued that the State could not be held responsible for the debts of a private company, especially when the relevant proceedings were still ongoing. They further argued that the claim in respect of non‐pecuniary damage had not been substantiated. 81. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant’s son and wife EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 82. The applicant also claimed EUR 3,800 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, and EUR 3,800 for those incurred before the Court. 83. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claims were not justified. 84. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 250 for the proceedings before the Court. 85. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant’s son and wife jointly, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 250 (two hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant’s son and wife, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 December 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina Keller Stéphanie Mourou-VikströmDeputy RegistrarPresident