I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in ATTARD AND OTHERS v. MALTA.
Information
- Judgment date: 2025-05-13
- Communication date: 2021-09-15
- Application number(s): 19853/20
- Country: MLT
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 13, P1-1, P1-1-2
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings
Article 6-1 - Access to court) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.599679
- Prediction: Violation
Consistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
Published on 4 October 2021 A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.
They were represented before the Court by Dr M. Camilleri and Dr K. Micallef, lawyers practising in Valletta as well as Dr F. Cassar a lawyer practising in Gżira.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
The case concerns a unilaterally imposed lease under Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) affecting the applicants’ property in Sliema (which they inherited in 2017) as of 8 September 1999.
At that time the rent payable was EUR 382, which as of 2013 increased to EUR 529 and as of 2016 to EUR 540.
Its annual market rental value in 1999 according to the court-appointed expert was EUR 5,217, in 2004 EUR 5,943, in 2009 EUR 6,744, in 2014 EUR 7,384 and in 2018 EUR 8,400.
In 2014 the applicants and/or their predecessor in title, lodged proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board (hereinafter “the RRB”) requesting it to declare that the tenant breached the obligations imposed by the lease and that he was not using the premises as his ordinary residence.
They asked the RRB to order that the property be returned to them.
By a judgment of 12 December 2017, the RRB rejected their request.
It considered that the damage to the property had not been due to the tenant and that the property had not been abandoned by him, despite evidence that there had been no water and electricity services as a result of unpaid bills.
The judgment was appealed but the appeal was withdrawn after the below-mentioned judgment became final.
On 12 April 2018 the applicants lodged constitutional redress proceedings claiming that the provisions of the Ordinance, as amended by Act XXIII of 1979 which granted tenants the right to retain possession of the premises under a lease, imposed on them as owners a unilateral lease relationship for an indeterminate time without reflecting a fair and adequate rent, in breach of, inter alia, Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention.
They asked the court to award compensation for the damage suffered and an appropriate remedy including the eviction of the tenant.
By a judgment of 21 November 2019, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1, as of 8 September 1999, bearing in mind that the applicants were receiving around 5% of the market rent according to the valuations of the court‐appointed expert which were accepted by the court.
It awarded EUR 20,000 in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage combined.
Noting that the evidence had shown that the property was in dilapidated state and clearly not being used as a residence by the tenant, the court ordered his eviction within six months and that he pay a rent of EUR 700 per month until he vacates the property.
No costs were to be paid by the applicants.
In these proceedings, the tenant who had been duly notified did not appear and did not make any submissions in his defence.
None of the parties appealed.
The relevant domestic law is set out in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no.
47045/06, § 19-22, 15 September 2009).
COMPLAINTS The applicants complain that they were still victims of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention found by the domestic court as a result of the low amount of compensation awarded.
For the same reason they considered that they had no effective remedy under Article 13 in connection with their complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES 1.
Has there been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention (see Amato Gauci v. Malta, no.
47045/06, 15 September 2009)?
2.
Did the applicants have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy for their complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?
APPENDIX No.
Applicant’s Name Year of birth Nationality Place of residence 1.
George Olof ATTARD 1952 Maltese Sliema 2.
Martin Fredereck ATTARD 1954 Maltese Sliema 3.
Wilhelmina SOTTILE ATTARD 1949 Maltese Sliema Published on 4 October 2021 A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.
They were represented before the Court by Dr M. Camilleri and Dr K. Micallef, lawyers practising in Valletta as well as Dr F. Cassar a lawyer practising in Gżira.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
The case concerns a unilaterally imposed lease under Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) affecting the applicants’ property in Sliema (which they inherited in 2017) as of 8 September 1999.
At that time the rent payable was EUR 382, which as of 2013 increased to EUR 529 and as of 2016 to EUR 540.
Its annual market rental value in 1999 according to the court-appointed expert was EUR 5,217, in 2004 EUR 5,943, in 2009 EUR 6,744, in 2014 EUR 7,384 and in 2018 EUR 8,400.
In 2014 the applicants and/or their predecessor in title, lodged proceedings before the Rent Regulation Board (hereinafter “the RRB”) requesting it to declare that the tenant breached the obligations imposed by the lease and that he was not using the premises as his ordinary residence.
They asked the RRB to order that the property be returned to them.
By a judgment of 12 December 2017, the RRB rejected their request.
It considered that the damage to the property had not been due to the tenant and that the property had not been abandoned by him, despite evidence that there had been no water and electricity services as a result of unpaid bills.
The judgment was appealed but the appeal was withdrawn after the below-mentioned judgment became final.
On 12 April 2018 the applicants lodged constitutional redress proceedings claiming that the provisions of the Ordinance, as amended by Act XXIII of 1979 which granted tenants the right to retain possession of the premises under a lease, imposed on them as owners a unilateral lease relationship for an indeterminate time without reflecting a fair and adequate rent, in breach of, inter alia, Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention.
They asked the court to award compensation for the damage suffered and an appropriate remedy including the eviction of the tenant.
By a judgment of 21 November 2019, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1, as of 8 September 1999, bearing in mind that the applicants were receiving around 5% of the market rent according to the valuations of the court‐appointed expert which were accepted by the court.
It awarded EUR 20,000 in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage combined.
Noting that the evidence had shown that the property was in dilapidated state and clearly not being used as a residence by the tenant, the court ordered his eviction within six months and that he pay a rent of EUR 700 per month until he vacates the property.
No costs were to be paid by the applicants.
In these proceedings, the tenant who had been duly notified did not appear and did not make any submissions in his defence.
None of the parties appealed.
The relevant domestic law is set out in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no.
47045/06, § 19-22, 15 September 2009).
COMPLAINTS The applicants complain that they were still victims of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention found by the domestic court as a result of the low amount of compensation awarded.
For the same reason they considered that they had no effective remedy under Article 13 in connection with their complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.
Judgment
SECOND SECTIONCASE OF RUMINAS v. LITHUANIA
(Application no. 3181/22)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 May 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ruminas v. Lithuania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Anja Seibert-Fohr, President, Davor Derenčinović, Gediminas Sagatys, judges,and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 3181/22) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 January 2022 by a Lithuanian national, Mr Žilvinas Ruminas (“the applicant”), who was born in 1986, lives in Vilnius and was represented by Mr K. Rugys, a lawyer practising in Vilnius;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Lithuanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė-Širmenė,
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 22 April 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the domestic courts’ refusal to reimburse costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in administrative offence proceedings in which he successfully challenged an administrative-law violation for driving under the influence of alcohol. 2. On 6 February 2016 during a stop and search (policijos reidas), the applicant was stopped by the police while driving his car in Vilnius and asked to take a breathalyser test. The test detected 1.38 per mille of alcohol (the legal limit for driving was 0.4 per mille). The applicant denied having consumed any alcohol, and asked the police officer to be tested again, which the police officer refused to do. The police drew up a report of an administrative-law violation under Article 126 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations (hereinafter – “the CALV”). The applicant refused to sign that police report; he stated that he had not consumed any alcohol in the last three days. 3. Within one hour of being stopped by the police the applicant went to a hospital where a blood test was performed (this being a requirement under domestic law so that the medical examination result would be valid); no alcohol whatsoever was detected in his blood. 4. On 7 November 2016 the Vilnius City District Court established that it was for the police to prove the applicant’s guilt of drunk-driving, and that any discrepancies should be interpreted in favour of the person against whom the administrative-law violation proceedings were brought. In the applicant’s case, according to the forensic expert’s report, it was impossible for no trace of alcohol to remain in the applicant’s blood within an hour of testing positive with the police breathalyser. The forensic expert who testified in court also stated that it would be impossible to artificially reduce the alcohol level to zero from 1.38 per mille within one hour. The court concluded that there remained a real possibility that the breathalyser used had shown incorrect data. The District Court also noted that although the breathalyser test had been taken at 02:42:31 on 6 February 2016, the report of the administrative violation “somehow” indicated that the applicant had been driving the car under the influence of alcohol at 2.25 a.m. The court discontinued the administrative-law violation proceedings against the applicant, holding that no administrative-law violation had been committed (nenustačius pažeidimo įvykio ir sudėties). 5. By the same ruling, the court left unexamined the applicant’s request to be compensated for costs – EUR 500 for assistance by a lawyer and EUR 29 for the blood test at the hospital – holding that neither Article 279 nor other provisions of the CALV or of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter – “the CCP”), which were applied mutatis mutandis in cases of administrative law violations, foresaw a possibility of compensation for costs which a person had incurred in connection with the examination of a case regarding an administrative-law violation. The court noted that the applicant, if he considered that he had sustained damage because of the law‐enforcement authorities’ actions, could initiate court proceedings for compensation of such damage, in accordance with the law on civil proceedings or other legislation. The court referred to Article 6.249 § 1 of the Civil Code, and noted that costs which the applicant had sustained in connection with the hearing of the case on an administrative law violation, potentially could be considered as a constitutive part of pecuniary damage sustained. The court ruling was not appealed against either by the applicant or by the police authorities and became final. 6. The applicant then brought administrative court proceedings, claiming EUR 529 for pecuniary damage (lawyer’s fee and blood test fee) and EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage, amounts he claimed to have sustained as a result of the administrative-law violation proceedings. 7. In a decision of 24 October 2017 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court considered that the applicant’s claim fell to be examined not only under the rules of the Law on Administrative Law Proceedings, but also under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code (see for the content of that provision Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, no. 42180/19, § 20, 13 February 2024), and dismissed the applicant’s claim, having held that no unlawful actions on the part of the police officers, when drawing up the administrative-law violation report, had been established. The court also rejected as unwarranted the applicant’s request to refer the question of compatibility of the legal regulation, under which legal costs were not awarded in administrative-law violation cases, to the Constitutional Court for interpretation (see also paragraph 9 below). 8. By a final and non-appealable ruling of 29 October 2019 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court’s decision of 24 October 2017. 9. On 19 March 2021, having examined the applicant’s constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court concluded that the fact that Article 3021 (wording of 18 November 2010) of the CALV did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by a person in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued on the grounds that no such violation had been committed was not consistent with the right of access to a court guaranteed by the Constitution. In particular, that legal regulation meant that a person who had successfully challenged an administrative fine with the help of a lawyer might find himself or herself in a worse situation than he or she would have been in without having defended his or her rights, which amounted to an unjustifiable burden on the exercise of the right of access to a court. The Constitutional Court also concluded that, similarly, Article 106 of the CCP (as amended on 26 June 2020) did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by an acquitted person and that that regulation was not in compliance with the Constitution either (see for the content of that ruling also Jakutavičius, cited above, §§ 42-46). 10. Afterwards, referring to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the applicant asked the Supreme Administrative Court to re-open the administrative proceedings for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 11. By a non-appealable ruling of 27 October 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant’s request to re-open the administrative proceedings. Firstly, during the administrative proceedings for compensation of damage it had not relied on the provisions of the CALV and CCP which the Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional. Secondly, none of the grounds on which the applicant had based his request to re-open the proceedings existed (essential circumstances, which could not have been known when hearing the case, came to light; an essential breach of material legal norms occurred in their application, which could have led to the adoption of an unlawful court decision; it was necessary to guarantee a uniform practice of the administrative courts). 12. The applicant complained that the fact that his costs and expenses had not been reimbursed had violated his right to effectively defend himself, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
13. At the outset, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicability of which was not contested by the Government (see, also for the general principles, Jakutavičius, cited above, §§ 54-60). 14. The Government argued that the applicant should have appealed against the Vilnius City District Court’s ruling of 7 November 2016 and should have asked that court for a referral to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the provisions of the CALV. The Government further stated that after the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 March 2021, the applicant should have requested to re-open (on the basis of Article 658 of the Code of Administrative Offences, by lodging a request to the Supreme Court) the proceedings in the case of the administrative law violation that had ended with the Vilnius City District Court’s ruling of 7 November 2016, rather than addressing the Supreme Administrative Court. The Government also suggested that the applicant should have lodged a claim for damages based on unlawful actions of the State (in this case, the inaction of the Seimas). 15. The Court observes, however, that, when leaving the applicant’s request for costs unexamined by its ruling of 7 November 2016, the Vilnius City District Court pointed out that the applicant had a right to initiate court proceedings for compensation of damage (see paragraph 5 above). The Court also notes that, under Lithuanian law, the parties’ request to a court of general jurisdiction or administrative court to make a referral to the Constitutional Court for interpretation does not bind the court of general jurisdiction or administrative court (see paragraph 7 above). It further observes that the right to an individual constitutional complaint came into effect only on 1 September 2019 (see Ancient Baltic religious association “Romuva” v. Lithuania, no. 48329/19, § 39, 8 June 2021). Article 65 § 2 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a person shall have the right to file a petition with the Constitutional Court for an investigation into the compliance of laws or other acts of the Seimas, the acts of the President of the Republic, or the acts of the Government with the Constitution or laws if: 1) a decision adopted on the basis of these acts has violated the constitutional rights or freedoms of the person, and 2) the person has exhausted all remedies provided for by law for defending his constitutional rights or freedoms, including the right to apply to a court, and, after all possibilities established by law for filing a complaint against the decision of the court have been exhausted, the final and non-appealable decision is adopted by the court, and 3) not more than four months have passed from the day that the court decision referred to in Item 2 of this paragraph came into force. In this regard the Court notes that the Vilnius City District Court’s ruling of 7 November 2016 was not appealed against (see paragraph 5 above). The Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant’s individual constitutional complaint for examination after the Supreme Administrative Court’s final and non-appealable ruling of 29 October 2019, wherein the applicant’s claim for damage was dismissed (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). In the Court’s assessment, the above sequence of events in a present case could have given the applicant reasonable grounds to perceive that the proceedings in the Constitutional Court were the continuation of his litigation in the administrative courts, rather than in the court of general jurisdiction, where the decision had been reached on 7 November 2016, and that, therefore, when seeking compensation for damage, he should request the re-opening of the administrative court proceedings, which he did (see paragraphs 10-11 above). 16. Lastly, given that the applicant had pursued proceedings for damages as a remedy (see paragraph 6 above) the Court rejects the Government’s suggestion that the applicant should have alternatively pursued separate court proceedings seeking compensation, based on alleged inaction of the Seimas. In this respect, the Court recalls that, where several remedies are available, the applicant is not required to pursue more than one (see Karakó v. Hungary, no. 39311/05, § 14, 28 April 2009). 17. In the light of the above, and having regard to the material in its possession and the parties’ arguments, the Court thus dismisses the Government’s objection that the applicant had failed to properly raise the Article 6 § 1 complaint in the domestic courts. 18. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 19. The general principles on the right of access to a court were summarised in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-79, 5 April 2018, and the cases cited therein). In particular, limitations to the right of access to court must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (ibid., § 78). 20. The Court considers that the obligation for the applicant to bear the costs of his legal defence and his other expenses incurred in the proceedings, despite having obtained a court decision in his favour, amounted to a restriction on his right of access to a court, which pursued the legitimate aim to limit State expenses (compare also Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, nos. 73579/17 and 14620/18, §§ 68-69, 18 February 2020, and Jakutavičius, cited above, §§ 76-79). 21. As to the proportionality of that interference with the right of access to court, the Court firstly finds that the circumstances of the present case are to be distinguished from those in Jakutavičius (cited above, §§ 6 and 84), where the Court found that the applicant’s own actions had substantially contributed to the decision of the police to fine him (see paragraphs 2-4 above). In the present case the applicant was stopped in a stop and search context, rather than having attracted the police officers’ attention by seemingly unorderly behaviour; he had consistently refuted the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (contrast Jakutavičius, cited above, § 7). 22. Secondly, in the applicant’s case, the Court takes into account the expert’s testimony that it was impossible for the blood alcohol level to be reduced to zero within the time the applicant had reached the hospital for medical examination, as well as the District Court’s finding that there had been a real possibility that the breathalyser had shown incorrect data. Likewise, the Court does not turn a blind eye to the District Court’s finding that “somehow” the report of the applicant’s alleged administrative law violation specified an incorrect time when he had allegedly been driving under the influence of alcohol (see paragraph 4 above). At the same time, no blame for any suspicious actions or behaviour when driving or communicating with the police officers could be laid on the applicant in the present case; rather, he had consistently refuted the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. 23. Thirdly, the Court notes the applicant’s argument that the lengthy legal process caused him stress and had an impact on his reputation, as he was accused of a particularly serious violation of the law. The Government, for their part, did not plead that the court proceedings to contest the alleged administrative law violation had been pointless. Besides, the sum claimed by the applicant for his legal defence in the administrative proceedings was not excessive. 24. In the light of all the above-mentioned considerations, the Court finds that, in the circumstances of the present case, the fact that the applicant had to cover the costs himself in the administrative-law violation proceedings restricted his right of access to a court to such an extent that impaired the very essence of that right. 25. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26. The applicant claimed 529 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, namely the sum he had claimed in the administrative court proceedings, and EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage incurred in connection with the domestic court’s decision not to award those costs. 27. The Government disputed the claim for non-pecuniary damage as unreasonable. 28. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court awards the applicant EUR 529 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. It further considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 529 (five hundred and twenty-nine euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 May 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Dorothee von Arnim Anja Seibert-Fohr Deputy Registrar President
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF RUMINAS v. LITHUANIA
(Application no. 3181/22)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 May 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ruminas v. Lithuania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Anja Seibert-Fohr, President, Davor Derenčinović, Gediminas Sagatys, judges,and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 3181/22) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 January 2022 by a Lithuanian national, Mr Žilvinas Ruminas (“the applicant”), who was born in 1986, lives in Vilnius and was represented by Mr K. Rugys, a lawyer practising in Vilnius;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Lithuanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė-Širmenė,
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 22 April 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the domestic courts’ refusal to reimburse costs and expenses incurred by the applicant in administrative offence proceedings in which he successfully challenged an administrative-law violation for driving under the influence of alcohol. 2. On 6 February 2016 during a stop and search (policijos reidas), the applicant was stopped by the police while driving his car in Vilnius and asked to take a breathalyser test. The test detected 1.38 per mille of alcohol (the legal limit for driving was 0.4 per mille). The applicant denied having consumed any alcohol, and asked the police officer to be tested again, which the police officer refused to do. The police drew up a report of an administrative-law violation under Article 126 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations (hereinafter – “the CALV”). The applicant refused to sign that police report; he stated that he had not consumed any alcohol in the last three days. 3. Within one hour of being stopped by the police the applicant went to a hospital where a blood test was performed (this being a requirement under domestic law so that the medical examination result would be valid); no alcohol whatsoever was detected in his blood. 4. On 7 November 2016 the Vilnius City District Court established that it was for the police to prove the applicant’s guilt of drunk-driving, and that any discrepancies should be interpreted in favour of the person against whom the administrative-law violation proceedings were brought. In the applicant’s case, according to the forensic expert’s report, it was impossible for no trace of alcohol to remain in the applicant’s blood within an hour of testing positive with the police breathalyser. The forensic expert who testified in court also stated that it would be impossible to artificially reduce the alcohol level to zero from 1.38 per mille within one hour. The court concluded that there remained a real possibility that the breathalyser used had shown incorrect data. The District Court also noted that although the breathalyser test had been taken at 02:42:31 on 6 February 2016, the report of the administrative violation “somehow” indicated that the applicant had been driving the car under the influence of alcohol at 2.25 a.m. The court discontinued the administrative-law violation proceedings against the applicant, holding that no administrative-law violation had been committed (nenustačius pažeidimo įvykio ir sudėties). 5. By the same ruling, the court left unexamined the applicant’s request to be compensated for costs – EUR 500 for assistance by a lawyer and EUR 29 for the blood test at the hospital – holding that neither Article 279 nor other provisions of the CALV or of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter – “the CCP”), which were applied mutatis mutandis in cases of administrative law violations, foresaw a possibility of compensation for costs which a person had incurred in connection with the examination of a case regarding an administrative-law violation. The court noted that the applicant, if he considered that he had sustained damage because of the law‐enforcement authorities’ actions, could initiate court proceedings for compensation of such damage, in accordance with the law on civil proceedings or other legislation. The court referred to Article 6.249 § 1 of the Civil Code, and noted that costs which the applicant had sustained in connection with the hearing of the case on an administrative law violation, potentially could be considered as a constitutive part of pecuniary damage sustained. The court ruling was not appealed against either by the applicant or by the police authorities and became final. 6. The applicant then brought administrative court proceedings, claiming EUR 529 for pecuniary damage (lawyer’s fee and blood test fee) and EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage, amounts he claimed to have sustained as a result of the administrative-law violation proceedings. 7. In a decision of 24 October 2017 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court considered that the applicant’s claim fell to be examined not only under the rules of the Law on Administrative Law Proceedings, but also under Article 6.271 of the Civil Code (see for the content of that provision Jakutavičius v. Lithuania, no. 42180/19, § 20, 13 February 2024), and dismissed the applicant’s claim, having held that no unlawful actions on the part of the police officers, when drawing up the administrative-law violation report, had been established. The court also rejected as unwarranted the applicant’s request to refer the question of compatibility of the legal regulation, under which legal costs were not awarded in administrative-law violation cases, to the Constitutional Court for interpretation (see also paragraph 9 below). 8. By a final and non-appealable ruling of 29 October 2019 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court’s decision of 24 October 2017. 9. On 19 March 2021, having examined the applicant’s constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court concluded that the fact that Article 3021 (wording of 18 November 2010) of the CALV did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by a person in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued on the grounds that no such violation had been committed was not consistent with the right of access to a court guaranteed by the Constitution. In particular, that legal regulation meant that a person who had successfully challenged an administrative fine with the help of a lawyer might find himself or herself in a worse situation than he or she would have been in without having defended his or her rights, which amounted to an unjustifiable burden on the exercise of the right of access to a court. The Constitutional Court also concluded that, similarly, Article 106 of the CCP (as amended on 26 June 2020) did not provide for the reimbursement of legal costs incurred by an acquitted person and that that regulation was not in compliance with the Constitution either (see for the content of that ruling also Jakutavičius, cited above, §§ 42-46). 10. Afterwards, referring to the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the applicant asked the Supreme Administrative Court to re-open the administrative proceedings for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 11. By a non-appealable ruling of 27 October 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicant’s request to re-open the administrative proceedings. Firstly, during the administrative proceedings for compensation of damage it had not relied on the provisions of the CALV and CCP which the Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional. Secondly, none of the grounds on which the applicant had based his request to re-open the proceedings existed (essential circumstances, which could not have been known when hearing the case, came to light; an essential breach of material legal norms occurred in their application, which could have led to the adoption of an unlawful court decision; it was necessary to guarantee a uniform practice of the administrative courts). 12. The applicant complained that the fact that his costs and expenses had not been reimbursed had violated his right to effectively defend himself, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
13. At the outset, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint falls to be examined under the civil limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicability of which was not contested by the Government (see, also for the general principles, Jakutavičius, cited above, §§ 54-60). 14. The Government argued that the applicant should have appealed against the Vilnius City District Court’s ruling of 7 November 2016 and should have asked that court for a referral to the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of the provisions of the CALV. The Government further stated that after the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 March 2021, the applicant should have requested to re-open (on the basis of Article 658 of the Code of Administrative Offences, by lodging a request to the Supreme Court) the proceedings in the case of the administrative law violation that had ended with the Vilnius City District Court’s ruling of 7 November 2016, rather than addressing the Supreme Administrative Court. The Government also suggested that the applicant should have lodged a claim for damages based on unlawful actions of the State (in this case, the inaction of the Seimas). 15. The Court observes, however, that, when leaving the applicant’s request for costs unexamined by its ruling of 7 November 2016, the Vilnius City District Court pointed out that the applicant had a right to initiate court proceedings for compensation of damage (see paragraph 5 above). The Court also notes that, under Lithuanian law, the parties’ request to a court of general jurisdiction or administrative court to make a referral to the Constitutional Court for interpretation does not bind the court of general jurisdiction or administrative court (see paragraph 7 above). It further observes that the right to an individual constitutional complaint came into effect only on 1 September 2019 (see Ancient Baltic religious association “Romuva” v. Lithuania, no. 48329/19, § 39, 8 June 2021). Article 65 § 2 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a person shall have the right to file a petition with the Constitutional Court for an investigation into the compliance of laws or other acts of the Seimas, the acts of the President of the Republic, or the acts of the Government with the Constitution or laws if: 1) a decision adopted on the basis of these acts has violated the constitutional rights or freedoms of the person, and 2) the person has exhausted all remedies provided for by law for defending his constitutional rights or freedoms, including the right to apply to a court, and, after all possibilities established by law for filing a complaint against the decision of the court have been exhausted, the final and non-appealable decision is adopted by the court, and 3) not more than four months have passed from the day that the court decision referred to in Item 2 of this paragraph came into force. In this regard the Court notes that the Vilnius City District Court’s ruling of 7 November 2016 was not appealed against (see paragraph 5 above). The Constitutional Court had accepted the applicant’s individual constitutional complaint for examination after the Supreme Administrative Court’s final and non-appealable ruling of 29 October 2019, wherein the applicant’s claim for damage was dismissed (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). In the Court’s assessment, the above sequence of events in a present case could have given the applicant reasonable grounds to perceive that the proceedings in the Constitutional Court were the continuation of his litigation in the administrative courts, rather than in the court of general jurisdiction, where the decision had been reached on 7 November 2016, and that, therefore, when seeking compensation for damage, he should request the re-opening of the administrative court proceedings, which he did (see paragraphs 10-11 above). 16. Lastly, given that the applicant had pursued proceedings for damages as a remedy (see paragraph 6 above) the Court rejects the Government’s suggestion that the applicant should have alternatively pursued separate court proceedings seeking compensation, based on alleged inaction of the Seimas. In this respect, the Court recalls that, where several remedies are available, the applicant is not required to pursue more than one (see Karakó v. Hungary, no. 39311/05, § 14, 28 April 2009). 17. In the light of the above, and having regard to the material in its possession and the parties’ arguments, the Court thus dismisses the Government’s objection that the applicant had failed to properly raise the Article 6 § 1 complaint in the domestic courts. 18. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 19. The general principles on the right of access to a court were summarised in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-79, 5 April 2018, and the cases cited therein). In particular, limitations to the right of access to court must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (ibid., § 78). 20. The Court considers that the obligation for the applicant to bear the costs of his legal defence and his other expenses incurred in the proceedings, despite having obtained a court decision in his favour, amounted to a restriction on his right of access to a court, which pursued the legitimate aim to limit State expenses (compare also Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, nos. 73579/17 and 14620/18, §§ 68-69, 18 February 2020, and Jakutavičius, cited above, §§ 76-79). 21. As to the proportionality of that interference with the right of access to court, the Court firstly finds that the circumstances of the present case are to be distinguished from those in Jakutavičius (cited above, §§ 6 and 84), where the Court found that the applicant’s own actions had substantially contributed to the decision of the police to fine him (see paragraphs 2-4 above). In the present case the applicant was stopped in a stop and search context, rather than having attracted the police officers’ attention by seemingly unorderly behaviour; he had consistently refuted the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol (contrast Jakutavičius, cited above, § 7). 22. Secondly, in the applicant’s case, the Court takes into account the expert’s testimony that it was impossible for the blood alcohol level to be reduced to zero within the time the applicant had reached the hospital for medical examination, as well as the District Court’s finding that there had been a real possibility that the breathalyser had shown incorrect data. Likewise, the Court does not turn a blind eye to the District Court’s finding that “somehow” the report of the applicant’s alleged administrative law violation specified an incorrect time when he had allegedly been driving under the influence of alcohol (see paragraph 4 above). At the same time, no blame for any suspicious actions or behaviour when driving or communicating with the police officers could be laid on the applicant in the present case; rather, he had consistently refuted the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. 23. Thirdly, the Court notes the applicant’s argument that the lengthy legal process caused him stress and had an impact on his reputation, as he was accused of a particularly serious violation of the law. The Government, for their part, did not plead that the court proceedings to contest the alleged administrative law violation had been pointless. Besides, the sum claimed by the applicant for his legal defence in the administrative proceedings was not excessive. 24. In the light of all the above-mentioned considerations, the Court finds that, in the circumstances of the present case, the fact that the applicant had to cover the costs himself in the administrative-law violation proceedings restricted his right of access to a court to such an extent that impaired the very essence of that right. 25. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26. The applicant claimed 529 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, namely the sum he had claimed in the administrative court proceedings, and EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage incurred in connection with the domestic court’s decision not to award those costs. 27. The Government disputed the claim for non-pecuniary damage as unreasonable. 28. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court awards the applicant EUR 529 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. It further considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 529 (five hundred and twenty-nine euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 May 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Dorothee von Arnim Anja Seibert-Fohr Deputy Registrar President