I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in MANUKYAN v. ARMENIA.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2022-06-21
  • Communication date: 2015-10-06
  • Application number(s): 2303/12
  • Country:   ARM
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 2, 2-1, 13
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect)
    Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.685249
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

The applicant, Ms Lamara Manukyan, is an Armenian national who was born in 1960 and lives in Gyumri.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In June 2008 the applicant’s son, Sergey Manukyan, was drafted into the Armenian army.
He was assigned to military unit no.
20666 (‘the military unit’) situated in Noravan village, Armenia.
It appears that on 14 May 2009 chief lieutenant V.G., the platoon commander, humiliated, verbally abused and punched Sergey Manukyan who was on duty in the sentry post, for having lied earlier to a fellow serviceman about not having any cigarettes.
Immediately after the incident Sergey Manukyan left the sentry post and tried to commit suicide by making two cuts on his left wrist with a razor blade.
At that point, one of his fellow servicemen saw him and took him back to the sentry post, where V.G.
put a bandage on the wound and ordered the soldiers on duty not to tell anyone about what had happened.
The next day captain M.S., the commander of the tank company of the military unit, learnt about the incident but did not report it to his superiors.
It further appears that on 10 November 2009 at around 10 to 12 a.m., when Sergey Manukyan was on duty in the sentry post, an argument started between him and V.G.
when the latter refused to give him a cigarette, saying that he ‘did not deserve one’.
At that point V.G.
insulted Sergey Manukyan and punched him a number of times.
At around 3.50 p.m. on the same day G.A., the commander of the military unit, stopped his personal car for about twenty to twenty-five seconds in front of the gates of the sentry point, waiting for them to be opened for him to pass.
Sergey Manukyan ran towards the gates and opened them.
However, G.A.
stepped out of the car and punched Sergey Manukyan in the face for having been late with opening the gates.
About ten minutes later Sergey Manukyan was found dead with a gunshot injury to the head, close to the gates of the sentry point, in between the walls of the storehouse and the loading station of the military unit.
On the same day the police carried out an examination of the scene of the incident.
According to the record of the examination, traces of blood were found by the metal fence of the loading station and on the ground at a distance of about sixteen metres from where Sergey Manukyan’s body had been found.
Samples were taken from the blood stains found.
On 11 November 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 110 of the Criminal Code in relation to Sergey Manukyan’s suicide with the gun attributed to him.
On 11 December 2009 an expert conclusion was received which stated that the samples taken from the blood discovered on the fence of the loading station and on the ground belonged to the same blood type as that of Sergey Manukyan so they could originate from him.
It appears that on 17 December 2009 V.A., the forensic medical expert who had conducted a post-mortem examination of Sergey Manukyan’s body, delivered his opinion.
The opinion stated, inter alia, that the cause of Sergey Manukyan’s death was a perforating ballistic trauma to the head with the bullet entry in the mouth cavity in the area of the palate and its exit from the area of the occiput.
The opinion further stated that other injuries had been discovered on Sergey Manukyan’s body, namely a bruise on the left side of the chin which had been inflicted with a blunt object shortly before death, which had no link to the death, abrasions in the area of the left glenohumeral joint, the right scapula, the right radiocarpal joint and the fifth digit of the right hand which had also been inflicted with blunt objects while he was still alive, not long before death, with the exception of the abrasion on the fifth digit of the right hand which had been inflicted about five to seven days before death.
It further appears that a posthumous forensic psychiatric and psychological examination was assigned at some point during the investigation, the conclusion of which was delivered on 1 March 2010.
According to the experts’ conclusion, Sergey Manukyan had been in a critical condition of mental stress before committing suicide.
V.G.’s actions had significantly affected Sergey Manukyan’s psychological condition before the suicide and it could be assumed that there was a causal link between them.
The opinion further stated that the information in the materials of the case file was not sufficient to conclude whether there was a causal link between Sergey Manukyan’s psychological condition before the suicide and the actions of G.A.
or to determine conclusively whose actions specifically had resulted in Sergey Manukyan’s suicide.
On 15 April 2010 V.G.
was charged with abuse of power under Article 375 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code for having provoked extremely intense psychological stress which had resulted in Sergey Manukyan committing suicide.
V.G.
was also charged for a different episode of having physically abused another soldier at various times in September 2009.
On the same day V.G.
was detained, based on the decision of the Syunik Regional Court (the Regional Court).
On 22 April 2010 M.S.
was charged under 375 § 1 of the Criminal Code for not having informed the superior military command about the incident of 14 May 2009 for fear of being reprimanded for the lack of discipline and the unstable mental state of conscripts in the subdivision under his leadership.
As a result, it had not been possible to investigate the incident in a timely manner and hold the guilty person responsible.
On the same day M.S.
was put under an undertaking to remain on site.
It appears that an additional posthumous forensic psychological examination was assigned.
Its conclusion was delivered on 5 May 2010 and stated, inter alia, that Sergey Manukyan had committed suicide as a result of the extreme emotional stress caused first by V.G.’s actions and then by the unlawful actions of G.A.
On an unspecified date expert V.A.
was questioned in relation to his opinion of 17 December 2009 and stated that it could not be ruled out that the bruise on the left side of the chin discovered on Sergey Manukyan’s body had been inflicted on 10 November 2009 at around 3.50 p.m. when G.A.
punched him.
It appears that at some point during the investigation, one of Sergey Manukyan’s fellow servicemen, G.M., was questioned and stated, inter alia, that he had seen G.A.
punching Sergey Manukyan in the face in front of the gates, presumably for having opened the gates late.
On 5 June 2010 G.A.
was charged under Article 375 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code for not having reported the incidents of physical abuse of soldiers by V.G.
which had taken place in the military unit under his command, in order to maintain the impression of a highly disciplined military unit and receive a positive attitude on the part of the superior military command.
Also, by exceeding his official powers, and contrary to internal military service regulations, he had issued unlawful orders to soldiers to open the gate of the sentry point without the permission of the sentry post leader or without the latter accompanying them.
On another such occasion when this happened, namely on 10 November 2009, he punched Sergey Manukyan in the face for having kept him waiting in front of the gates for about twenty to twenty-five seconds before he opened them.
This caused light damage to Sergey Manukyan’s health but also brought about a grave consequence in that several minutes after that, he committed suicide by shooting himself with the gun attributed to him.
On 2 June 2010 G.A.
was arrested.
On 5 June 2010 the Regional Court made a decision to authorise G.A.’s detention for a period of two months.
By the same decision the Regional Court found G.A.’s release on bail permissible.
On an unspecified date G.A.
was released on bail.
It appears that in June 2010 the investigator made a decision to terminate G.A.’s service temporarily.
The relevant decision stated, inter alia, that it had been established during the investigation that G.A.
had used his official capacity in order to exert undue influence on the participants in the proceedings.
On 20 July 2010 the case, along with an approved bill of indictment, was sent to the Regional Court to be examined on the merits.
On 25 August 2010 the applicant sent a complaint to the Minister of Defence claiming that in reality her son had been killed.
She referred to the conclusion of the forensic medical examination of 17 December 2009 which had confirmed that, apart from the gunshot wound, there were a number of other injuries on Sergey Manukyan’s body which had been inflicted before his death.
The applicant argued that this proved that before the incident there had been a fight, which fact was not being disclosed.
She also complained that the proceedings before the Regional Court were not being conducted in an impartial manner and that the participants in the proceedings constantly failed to appear before the court to testify, without any proper reasons.
On 15 November 2010 the applicant lodged a motion with the Regional Court requesting G.A.’s detention.
She argued that there was ample evidence in the materials of the case file showing that, being at large, he could influence the participants in the proceedings.
She referred to witness statements according to which, after the incident, G.A.
had told the officers under his command to state that Sergey Manukyan had killed himself because of family issues when asked about the reasons for committing suicide.
However, it had been established that there were no such problems.
She finally argued that the proceedings concerning the examination of Sergey Manukyan’s death could not be properly conducted while G.A.
was still at large.
In particular, the court had failed to undertake necessary measures in order to eliminate the risk of G.A.
and witness G.M.
colluding with each other.
Also, the court had failed to secure the appearance of G.M.
at trial.
Thus, at the first hearing the court had stated that G.M.
could not attend; at the second hearing it stated that, according to a certificate delivered by the head of the village community, G.M.
could not appear, and at the next two hearings the court stated that G.M.
was abroad and it was not possible to summon him.
However, Sergey Manukyan’s father had found out that G.M.
had not left the country.
On 16 November 2010 the applicant filed a complaint with the Council of Justice seeking to have disciplinary measures taken in respect of Judge D. of the Regional Court on the ground that he had failed to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings.
She mainly reiterated the submissions in her motion of 15 November 2010 to argue that, by letting G.A.
remain at liberty, Judge D. had failed to minimise the risk of his being able to influence witnesses and especially G.M.
On 17 November 2010 the applicant sent a request to the Minister of Defence asking him to take measures to reduce the risk of G.A.
colluding with the officers and conscripts under his command who had testified or still had to testify as witnesses in the proceedings.
On 19 November 2010 the applicant lodged another motion with the Regional Court seeking G.A.’s detention.
In addition to her arguments submitted in the motion lodged on 15 November 2010, the applicant also relied on the investigator’s decision of June 2010 whereby G.A.’s official duties were temporarily terminated.
On the same date the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s motion.
In doing so, the Regional Court stated the following: “Given that accused G.A.
had properly attended all the court hearings, there is no evidence of him trying to influence the participants in the proceedings; therefore the court finds that there is no need whatsoever to change or annul bail as the preventive measure applied in his respect.” At the hearing of 3 December 2010 the applicant lodged a further motion seeking to have G.A.
detained, to which the Prosecutor did not object.
Raising the same arguments as before, the applicant submitted the following: “...today, during the hearing... the prosecutor made a statement that he found out today that accused G.A.
visited the investigator a month ago and stated that witness G.M.
had been abducted so that he could not appear in court and testify.
Taking accused G.A.’s behaviour into account ... he could obstruct the court proceedings by influencing the participants in the criminal proceedings or by other means...”.
On the same day the Regional Court granted the applicant’s motion and ordered G.A.’s detention from the courtroom.
In doing so, the Regional Court stated that, taking into account the Prosecutor’s statement and the arguments submitted by the applicant, it considered that the accused, while at large, could commit an offence, avoid the body conducting the proceedings and obstruct the examination of the case by exerting undue influence on the participants in the criminal proceedings.
It appears that on the same day the applicant lodged another motion seeking the recusal of Judge D. She claimed, inter alia, that during the previous hearing, when V.G.
stated his wish that his lawyer be present during the proceedings, Judge D. announced a five-minute recess.
Thereafter, Judge D. and V.G.
left the courtroom and when they returned five minutes later V.G.
announced that he agreed that the case be examined in the absence of his lawyer.
It followed that an agreement favourable for V.G.
had been reached between him and Judge D., otherwise the accused would not have agreed to being unrepresented during his trial.
By a decision made on the same day Judge D. rejected this motion, finding that the applicant’s conclusions were unsubstantiated and based on mere assumptions.
Before the Regional Court M.S.
stated, inter alia, that he had not heard that Sergey Manukyan had committed suicide because of family problems.
He had heard, however, that Sergey Manukyan had a mobile telephone which the police officers had found, broken, in his pocket.
He had also heard that V.G.
had broken the telephone, but he was not aware of the reasons for this.
M.S.
also stated that he did not remember who exactly, whether the commander or one of his deputies, had told the soldiers to say that Sergey Manukyan had problems with his girlfriend if asked about the reason for his committing suicide.
On 7 December 2010 the applicant lodged a civil claim within the framework of the criminal proceedings seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, including compensation for Sergey Manukyan’s mobile telephone which had been broken by V.G., as established during the investigation, transport costs for attending the court hearings and compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the loss of their son.
On 9 December 2010 the applicant sent a request to the Minister of Defence asking him, inter alia, to find out whether the former commander of the military unit, G.A., had taken any measures to reinforce the military personnel with additional officers and if so, why those measures were not followed up and the persons responsible identified.
In this regard she referred to G.A.’s statement made at the hearing of 7 December 2010 when the latter had indirectly blamed the Ministry of Defence for the death of her son.
He claimed that, although he had no such right, he had been obliged to put V.G.
in charge of the sentry post so often, despite the fact that the latter was a weak officer and had been reprimanded three times for not respecting discipline, because there were no other officers.
He had further stated that for several months he had applied to the Ministry of Defence with requests to reinforce the military unit with new personnel, but his requests had received no follow-up and he had therefore been obliged to put V.G.
in charge of the sentry post three times in one week.
On 20 December 2010 the applicant submitted a written pleading to the Regional Court.
In her pleading the applicant argued, inter alia, that the investigation into Sergey Manukyan’s death had been ineffective since during the entire investigation and during a part of the court proceedings G.A.
had remained at large, which gave him ample opportunity to collude with the witnesses who were the officers and conscripts of the military unit under his command.
She further complained that a number of important circumstances concerning her son’s death, such as the position of his body when shot, the trajectory of the bullet, the presence of traces of his blood sixteen metres away from where the body was found, were not properly investigated.
The applicant submitted that the entire investigation had concentrated on the version of a suicide and no measures had been undertaken to find out whether Sergey Manukyan had been murdered.
On the same day, the Regional Court delivered a judgment finding V.G., M.S.
and G.A.
guilty as charged and sentenced them to imprisonment for six, two and seven years respectively.
M.S.
was exempted from serving his sentence by application of the Amnesty Act of 2009.
The Regional Court partially granted the applicant’s civil claim for compensation for pecuniary damage and left the claim for non-pecuniary damage unexamined, entitling her to lodge a separate claim in civil proceedings.
V.G.
and G.A.
lodged appeals against the Regional Court’s judgment.
The applicant also lodged an appeal mainly complaining that the sentences imposed on the accused by the Regional Court had not been adequate.
She complained, inter alia, that the Regional Court had failed to assess properly all the circumstances of the case, and in particular the fact that in the aftermath of the incident M.S.
had stated that Sergey Manukyan had committed suicide because of his girlfriend, G.A.
had told the officers to state that he had committed suicide because of family problems and V.G.
had broken Sergey Manukyan’s mobile telephone and its card.
On 14 February 2011 the applicant submitted a written reply to G.A.’s appeal in which she mainly argued that the Regional Court had failed to exclude G.M.’s statements from the evidence for being unreliable.
She stated, inter alia, that in the course of the proceedings G.A.
had tried to influence the witnesses, including G.M.
While at large during the entire investigation and a part of the court proceedings, G.A.
had exerted undue influence on the officers and conscripts of the military unit under his former command.
In this regard she referred to V.G.’s statement that after the incident G.A.
had told the officers to state that Sergey Manukyan had committed suicide because of family problems.
Also, some of the witnesses avoided testifying before the court by saying that they did not remember what had happened.
As regards in particular G.M., he had given quite a detailed account of the events before the court but once asked about G.A., he stated that he stood by his pre-trial statement, which proved that he was afraid to testify in front of G.A.
in the courtroom.
Moreover, as for G.M.’s alleged absence from the country, it was also the result of G.A.’s pressure on him, since he had to come up with different justifications in order to avoid testifying before the court.
On 6 May 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal fully upheld the Regional Court’s judgment of 20 December 2010.
In doing so, it found that the Regional Court had made a correct assessment of witness G.M.’s statements, which were supported by other evidence.
The Court of Appeal also found that V.G.
and G.A.
could have foreseen the consequences of their unlawful conduct, including the possibility of Sergey Manukyan committing suicide, in view of the fact that they were both aware of the events of 14 May 2009 when the latter had cut his wrist with a razor blade.
Nevertheless, they had not stopped using violence against Sergey Manukyan, including on the day of the incident, which had resulted in his suicide.
On 6 June 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, mainly reiterating her arguments submitted before the Court of Appeal.
V.G.
and G.A.
also lodged appeals on points of law.
On 12 July 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the appeals on points of law lodged by the applicant, V.G.
and G.A.
inadmissible for lack of merit.
It appears that on 20 October 2011 the applicant lodged a separate civil claim seeking recognition of the violation of Article 2 of the Convention and compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of her son’s death.
B.
Relevant domestic law The Criminal Code (in force since 1 August 2003) According to Article 110, causing somebody to commit suicide or make an attempt at suicide by indirect intention or by negligence by means of threat, cruel treatment or regular humiliation of one’s dignity shall be punishable by imprisonment for up to three years.
Article 375 § 1 provides that abuse of authority or public position, exceeding public authority, as well as omission by a superior or public official, if such acts were committed for selfish ends, personal interest or interests of a group and resulted in grave damage, shall be punishable by imprisonment from two to five years.
According to Article 375 § 2, the same offence which has negligently caused severe consequences shall be punishable by imprisonment from three to seven years.
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention that the authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into her son’s death.
She complains, in particular, that a number of important circumstances concerning his death were never clarified.
She further complains that the entire investigation was focused on the suicide hypothesis and no investigation was carried out into the possibility that he was murdered.
The applicant further complains under Article 8 that the courts, including the Criminal Court of Appeal which allowed her to make final submissions, failed to address adequately the issues raised by her as the victim party in the proceedings.

Judgment

FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF MANUKYAN v. ARMENIA
(Application no.
2303/12)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
21 June 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Manukyan v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Jolien Schukking, President, Armen Harutyunyan, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,and Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no.
2303/12) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 19 December 2011 by an Armenian national, Ms Lamara Manukyan, born in 1960 and living in Gyumri (“the applicant”), who was represented before the Court by Mr T. Muradyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the death of the applicant’s son to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, and subsequently by Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 31 May 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last‐mentioned date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The applicant is the mother of S. Manukyan who died at the age of 19 during his compulsory military service. 2. On 10 November 2009, when S. Manukyan was on duty in the sentry post, an argument started between him and Chief Lieutenant V.G., the platoon commander, when the latter insulted and punched S. Manukyan a number of times. Later that day, G.A., the commander of the military unit, punched S. Manukyan in the face because he had been late opening the gates for G.A.’s car. About ten minutes later S. Manukyan was found dead with a gunshot wound to the head. During the examination of the scene of the incident on the same day, traces of blood were found at a distance of about sixteen metres from the body. 3. Criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 110 of the Criminal Code (incitement to suicide). The investigation concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide using his service gun. It was established that on 14 May 2009 S. Manukyan had already tried to commit suicide after V.G. had humiliated, verbally abused and punched him. V.G. had then ordered the other soldiers not to tell anyone about what had happened. The next day Captain M.S., the commander of the tank company, learnt about the incident but did not report it. 4. According to an autopsy report, the cause of S. Manukyan’s death was a perforating ballistic trauma to the head. A number of other injuries were discovered on the body, such as a bruise on the left side of the chin and abrasions in the areas of the left glenohumeral joint, the right scapula, the right radiocarpal joint and the fifth digit of the right hand. During questioning, the forensic medical expert stated that it could not be ruled out that the bruise on the left side of the chin had been inflicted when G.A. had punched S. Manukyan. According to the ballistic report, no identifiable fingerprints were found on S. Manukyan’s service gun or on the bullets. An initial psychiatric and psychological post-mortem examination concluded that S. Manukyan had suffered extreme mental stress before committing suicide. V.G.’s actions had significantly affected S. Manukyan’s psychological condition and it could be assumed that there had been a causal link between them. The information available was not sufficient to conclude whether there had been a causal link between S. Manukyan’s psychological condition before the suicide and the actions of G.A. or to determine precisely whose actions had caused S. Manukyan to commit suicide. An additional psychological post-mortem examination concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide as a result of extreme emotional stress initially caused by V.G.’s unlawful actions and then exacerbated by the unlawful actions of G.A. The forensic examination of the blood samples, which had been discovered at a distance of about sixteen metres from the body (see paragraph 2 above), confirmed that they were of the same blood type as that of S. Manukyan, so they could have come from him. 5. In April 2010 V.G. was charged with abuse of power for having provoked extremely intense psychological stress, causing S. Manukyan to commit suicide. V.G. was also charged for having physically abused another soldier several times in September 2009. M.S. was charged with abuse of power for not having informed the superior military command about the incident of 14 May 2009 out of fear of being reprimanded and for the lack of discipline and the unstable mental state of the conscripts in the unit under his leadership. 6. In June 2010 G.A. was charged with abuse of power for not having reported the incidents of physical abuse of soldiers by V.G. and having issued unlawful orders to soldiers to open the gate of the sentry point without the permission of the sentry post leader or without the latter accompanying them. G.A. was also charged with punching S. Manukyan on 10 November 2009, which had not caused severe damage to his health, but had brought about a grave consequence, in that several minutes afterwards, S. Manukyan had committed suicide. G.A. was released on bail, after which he was dismissed from the post of commander of the military unit and moved to another position. Later, the investigator decided to suspend G.A.’s service on the basis of evidence that he had used his official capacity to exert undue influence on the participants in the proceedings. During the trial, which started in July 2010, the applicant lodged several requests seeking to have G.A. detained. Eventually the Syunik Regional Court placed G.A. under detention on 3 December 2010. 7. By a judgment of 20 December 2010, which was fully upheld on appeal, the Regional Court found V.G., M.S. and G.A. guilty as charged (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) and sentenced them to imprisonment for six, two and seven years respectively. M.S. was exempted from serving his sentence following the application of an amnesty. 8. Relying on Articles 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the death of her son during military service and that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the matter. She alleged that her son had been murdered. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
9.
The applicant relied on Articles 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention. Since it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114, 124 and 126, 20 March 2018), the Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicant’s complaints solely under Article 2 of the Convention. 10. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other ground. It must therefore be declared admissible. 11. The applicable general principles have been summarised in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey ([GC], no. 24014/05, §§ 169‐82, 14 April 2015). 12. Notably, the investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of inquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and, where appropriate, the identity of those responsible (ibid., § 175). 13. The authorities conducted a prompt investigation. They sought forensic evidence and witnesses were heard (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above). The investigation led to the prosecution and conviction of S. Manukyan’s hierarchical military supervisors albeit one of them received an amnesty (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). 14. However, the investigation failed to elucidate a number of important circumstances surrounding S. Manukyan’s death. No proper explanation was given in relation to the several other injuries (apart from the ballistic injury) which had been discovered during the autopsy. The investigator questioned the forensic expert only in relation to the chin injury and concluded that it had been inflicted by G.A. when he had punched S. Manukyan, whereas the expert had merely not ruled out that that had been the case (see paragraph 4 above). Nor was any explanation provided in respect of the presence of the traces of blood, which had been found to correspond to S. Manukyan’s blood type (ibid. ), about sixteen metres away from where his body had been found. Although the investigation concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide using his service gun, his fingerprints were not found on the weapon (ibid.). In these circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to conclude that the findings of the investigation were based on a thorough analysis of all the relevant elements (see paragraph 12 above). 15. Despite the fact that the investigation led to the conviction of S. Manukyan’s superiors, it failed to shed full light on all the circumstances surrounding his death, thereby leaving a number of important questions unanswered (see paragraph 14 above). The Court therefore finds that the authorities failed to carry out an adequate and effective investigation. It is thus unnecessary to examine the other aspects of the investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, Magnitskiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 32631/09 and 53799/12, § 272, 27 August 2019, and Anahit Mkrtchyan v. Armenia, no. 3673/11, § 101, 7 May 2020). 16. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural limb. 17. The Court will examine the matter in the light of the relevant general principles, as summarised in Mosendz v. Ukraine (no. 52013/08, §§ 90-93, 17 January 2013), Perevedentsevy v. Russia (no. 39583/05, §§ 91-94, 24 April 2014), Malik Babayev v. Azerbaijan (no. 30500/11, §§ 64-68, 1 June 2017) and most recently in Boychenko v. Russia (no. 8663/08, §§ 76-80, 12 October 2021, with further references). 18. Notably, the primary duty of a State is to put in place rules geared to the level of risk to life or limb that may result not only from the nature of military activities and operations, but also from the human element that comes into play when a State decides to call up ordinary citizens to perform military service. Such rules must require the adoption of practical measures aimed at the effective protection of conscripts against the dangers inherent in military life and appropriate procedures for identifying shortcomings and errors liable to be committed in that regard by those in charge at different levels (see Mosendz, cited above, § 91). Furthermore, States are required to secure high professional standards among regular soldiers, whose acts and omissions – particularly vis-à-vis conscripts – could, in certain circumstances, engage their responsibility, inter alia, under the substantive limb of Article 2 (see Abdullah Yılmaz v. Turkey, no. 21899/02, §§ 56-57, 17 June 2008, see also, mutatis mutandis, Stoyanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 42980/04, § 61, 9 November 2010). 19. Having regard to the significant shortcomings in the investigation identified earlier (see paragraph 14 above), the Court views its findings with caution. At the same time, and due to the authorities’ own failure to conduct an adequate investigation into the matter, the material before the Court does not allow it to support the hypothesis that S. Manukyan’s life was taken intentionally (contrast Beker v. Turkey, no. 27866/03, §§ 45-54, 24 March 2009, and Lapshin v. Azerbaijan, no. 13527/18, §§ 110-20, 20 May 2021; see also, mutatis mutandis, Mižigárová v. Slovakia, no. 74832/01, § 89, 14 December 2010). Thus, any allegation that the applicant’s son was murdered would be purely speculative (see, mutatis mutandis, Abdullah Yılmaz, cited above, § 59, and Durdu v. Turkey, no. 30677/10, §§ 59-61, 3 September 2013). 20. The Court will therefore examine whether the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk that S. Manukyan would commit suicide and, if so, whether they did all that could reasonably have been expected of them to avoid that risk from materialising (see Kurt v. Austria [GC], no. 62903/15, §§ 157-60, 15 June 2021). 21. It was established during the investigation that on 14 May 2009, that is, six months before the incident, S. Manukyan had attempted to commit suicide as a result of his ill-treatment by V.G. However, there is nothing to indicate that those in charge of the military unit, including G.A., were aware of S. Manukyan’s ill-treatment or his past suicide attempt considering that V.G. and M.S. had failed to report the incident (see paragraph 3 above). In any event, V.G., the platoon commander in charge of the sentry post while S. Manukyan was on duty, as well as M.S., the commander of the tank company, were clearly aware of S. Manukyan’s previous suicide attempt. 22. Despite that, and instead of taking appropriate measures to avoid the risk to S. Manukyan’s life, V.G., his superior, verbally and physically abused him on the day of the incident which, as clarified later, significantly affected his psychological condition. In particular, it was established in the forensic psychological expert’s additional conclusion (see paragraph 4 above) that S. Manukyan committed suicide as a result of the extreme emotional stress initially caused by V.G.’s unlawful actions and then exacerbated by the unlawful actions of G.A. 23. It follows that the domestic authorities knew at that time of the existence of a real and immediate risk that S. Manukyan could commit suicide but failed to take appropriate measures to prevent that risk from materialising (see, for a similar example, Perevedentsevy, § 100; Boychenko, §§ 88-96; and compare and contrast, Malik Babayev, § 75, all cited above), thereby failing to comply with their positive obligation to protect his life. Furthermore, contrary to their obligation to adopt practical measures to effectively protect conscripts against the dangers inherent in military life (see paragraph 18 above), those in charge of the military unit, including its commander G.A., failed to ensure that incidents of ill-treatment of conscripts were effectively reported. What is more, G.A. himself mistreated S. Manukyan which in its turn also affected his psychological condition (see paragraphs 4 and 22 above). 24. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to protect S. Manukyan’s right to life while he was under their control. 25. There has therefore been a violation of Article 2 in its substantive limb. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26.
The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‐pecuniary damage and EUR 2,900 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 27. The Government contested the applicant’s claims. 28. In view of the nature of the violation found, the Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 29. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 30. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 June 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Ilse Freiwirth Jolien Schukking Deputy Registrar President

FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF MANUKYAN v. ARMENIA
(Application no.
2303/12)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
21 June 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Manukyan v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Jolien Schukking, President, Armen Harutyunyan, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, judges,and Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no.
2303/12) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 19 December 2011 by an Armenian national, Ms Lamara Manukyan, born in 1960 and living in Gyumri (“the applicant”), who was represented before the Court by Mr T. Muradyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning the death of the applicant’s son to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr G. Kostanyan, and subsequently by Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 31 May 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last‐mentioned date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The applicant is the mother of S. Manukyan who died at the age of 19 during his compulsory military service. 2. On 10 November 2009, when S. Manukyan was on duty in the sentry post, an argument started between him and Chief Lieutenant V.G., the platoon commander, when the latter insulted and punched S. Manukyan a number of times. Later that day, G.A., the commander of the military unit, punched S. Manukyan in the face because he had been late opening the gates for G.A.’s car. About ten minutes later S. Manukyan was found dead with a gunshot wound to the head. During the examination of the scene of the incident on the same day, traces of blood were found at a distance of about sixteen metres from the body. 3. Criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 110 of the Criminal Code (incitement to suicide). The investigation concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide using his service gun. It was established that on 14 May 2009 S. Manukyan had already tried to commit suicide after V.G. had humiliated, verbally abused and punched him. V.G. had then ordered the other soldiers not to tell anyone about what had happened. The next day Captain M.S., the commander of the tank company, learnt about the incident but did not report it. 4. According to an autopsy report, the cause of S. Manukyan’s death was a perforating ballistic trauma to the head. A number of other injuries were discovered on the body, such as a bruise on the left side of the chin and abrasions in the areas of the left glenohumeral joint, the right scapula, the right radiocarpal joint and the fifth digit of the right hand. During questioning, the forensic medical expert stated that it could not be ruled out that the bruise on the left side of the chin had been inflicted when G.A. had punched S. Manukyan. According to the ballistic report, no identifiable fingerprints were found on S. Manukyan’s service gun or on the bullets. An initial psychiatric and psychological post-mortem examination concluded that S. Manukyan had suffered extreme mental stress before committing suicide. V.G.’s actions had significantly affected S. Manukyan’s psychological condition and it could be assumed that there had been a causal link between them. The information available was not sufficient to conclude whether there had been a causal link between S. Manukyan’s psychological condition before the suicide and the actions of G.A. or to determine precisely whose actions had caused S. Manukyan to commit suicide. An additional psychological post-mortem examination concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide as a result of extreme emotional stress initially caused by V.G.’s unlawful actions and then exacerbated by the unlawful actions of G.A. The forensic examination of the blood samples, which had been discovered at a distance of about sixteen metres from the body (see paragraph 2 above), confirmed that they were of the same blood type as that of S. Manukyan, so they could have come from him. 5. In April 2010 V.G. was charged with abuse of power for having provoked extremely intense psychological stress, causing S. Manukyan to commit suicide. V.G. was also charged for having physically abused another soldier several times in September 2009. M.S. was charged with abuse of power for not having informed the superior military command about the incident of 14 May 2009 out of fear of being reprimanded and for the lack of discipline and the unstable mental state of the conscripts in the unit under his leadership. 6. In June 2010 G.A. was charged with abuse of power for not having reported the incidents of physical abuse of soldiers by V.G. and having issued unlawful orders to soldiers to open the gate of the sentry point without the permission of the sentry post leader or without the latter accompanying them. G.A. was also charged with punching S. Manukyan on 10 November 2009, which had not caused severe damage to his health, but had brought about a grave consequence, in that several minutes afterwards, S. Manukyan had committed suicide. G.A. was released on bail, after which he was dismissed from the post of commander of the military unit and moved to another position. Later, the investigator decided to suspend G.A.’s service on the basis of evidence that he had used his official capacity to exert undue influence on the participants in the proceedings. During the trial, which started in July 2010, the applicant lodged several requests seeking to have G.A. detained. Eventually the Syunik Regional Court placed G.A. under detention on 3 December 2010. 7. By a judgment of 20 December 2010, which was fully upheld on appeal, the Regional Court found V.G., M.S. and G.A. guilty as charged (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above) and sentenced them to imprisonment for six, two and seven years respectively. M.S. was exempted from serving his sentence following the application of an amnesty. 8. Relying on Articles 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the death of her son during military service and that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the matter. She alleged that her son had been murdered. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION
9.
The applicant relied on Articles 2, 8 and 13 of the Convention. Since it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114, 124 and 126, 20 March 2018), the Court finds it appropriate to examine the applicant’s complaints solely under Article 2 of the Convention. 10. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other ground. It must therefore be declared admissible. 11. The applicable general principles have been summarised in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey ([GC], no. 24014/05, §§ 169‐82, 14 April 2015). 12. Notably, the investigation’s conclusions must be based on thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of inquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation’s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and, where appropriate, the identity of those responsible (ibid., § 175). 13. The authorities conducted a prompt investigation. They sought forensic evidence and witnesses were heard (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above). The investigation led to the prosecution and conviction of S. Manukyan’s hierarchical military supervisors albeit one of them received an amnesty (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). 14. However, the investigation failed to elucidate a number of important circumstances surrounding S. Manukyan’s death. No proper explanation was given in relation to the several other injuries (apart from the ballistic injury) which had been discovered during the autopsy. The investigator questioned the forensic expert only in relation to the chin injury and concluded that it had been inflicted by G.A. when he had punched S. Manukyan, whereas the expert had merely not ruled out that that had been the case (see paragraph 4 above). Nor was any explanation provided in respect of the presence of the traces of blood, which had been found to correspond to S. Manukyan’s blood type (ibid. ), about sixteen metres away from where his body had been found. Although the investigation concluded that S. Manukyan had committed suicide using his service gun, his fingerprints were not found on the weapon (ibid.). In these circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to conclude that the findings of the investigation were based on a thorough analysis of all the relevant elements (see paragraph 12 above). 15. Despite the fact that the investigation led to the conviction of S. Manukyan’s superiors, it failed to shed full light on all the circumstances surrounding his death, thereby leaving a number of important questions unanswered (see paragraph 14 above). The Court therefore finds that the authorities failed to carry out an adequate and effective investigation. It is thus unnecessary to examine the other aspects of the investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, Magnitskiy and Others v. Russia, nos. 32631/09 and 53799/12, § 272, 27 August 2019, and Anahit Mkrtchyan v. Armenia, no. 3673/11, § 101, 7 May 2020). 16. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention in its procedural limb. 17. The Court will examine the matter in the light of the relevant general principles, as summarised in Mosendz v. Ukraine (no. 52013/08, §§ 90-93, 17 January 2013), Perevedentsevy v. Russia (no. 39583/05, §§ 91-94, 24 April 2014), Malik Babayev v. Azerbaijan (no. 30500/11, §§ 64-68, 1 June 2017) and most recently in Boychenko v. Russia (no. 8663/08, §§ 76-80, 12 October 2021, with further references). 18. Notably, the primary duty of a State is to put in place rules geared to the level of risk to life or limb that may result not only from the nature of military activities and operations, but also from the human element that comes into play when a State decides to call up ordinary citizens to perform military service. Such rules must require the adoption of practical measures aimed at the effective protection of conscripts against the dangers inherent in military life and appropriate procedures for identifying shortcomings and errors liable to be committed in that regard by those in charge at different levels (see Mosendz, cited above, § 91). Furthermore, States are required to secure high professional standards among regular soldiers, whose acts and omissions – particularly vis-à-vis conscripts – could, in certain circumstances, engage their responsibility, inter alia, under the substantive limb of Article 2 (see Abdullah Yılmaz v. Turkey, no. 21899/02, §§ 56-57, 17 June 2008, see also, mutatis mutandis, Stoyanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 42980/04, § 61, 9 November 2010). 19. Having regard to the significant shortcomings in the investigation identified earlier (see paragraph 14 above), the Court views its findings with caution. At the same time, and due to the authorities’ own failure to conduct an adequate investigation into the matter, the material before the Court does not allow it to support the hypothesis that S. Manukyan’s life was taken intentionally (contrast Beker v. Turkey, no. 27866/03, §§ 45-54, 24 March 2009, and Lapshin v. Azerbaijan, no. 13527/18, §§ 110-20, 20 May 2021; see also, mutatis mutandis, Mižigárová v. Slovakia, no. 74832/01, § 89, 14 December 2010). Thus, any allegation that the applicant’s son was murdered would be purely speculative (see, mutatis mutandis, Abdullah Yılmaz, cited above, § 59, and Durdu v. Turkey, no. 30677/10, §§ 59-61, 3 September 2013). 20. The Court will therefore examine whether the authorities knew or should have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk that S. Manukyan would commit suicide and, if so, whether they did all that could reasonably have been expected of them to avoid that risk from materialising (see Kurt v. Austria [GC], no. 62903/15, §§ 157-60, 15 June 2021). 21. It was established during the investigation that on 14 May 2009, that is, six months before the incident, S. Manukyan had attempted to commit suicide as a result of his ill-treatment by V.G. However, there is nothing to indicate that those in charge of the military unit, including G.A., were aware of S. Manukyan’s ill-treatment or his past suicide attempt considering that V.G. and M.S. had failed to report the incident (see paragraph 3 above). In any event, V.G., the platoon commander in charge of the sentry post while S. Manukyan was on duty, as well as M.S., the commander of the tank company, were clearly aware of S. Manukyan’s previous suicide attempt. 22. Despite that, and instead of taking appropriate measures to avoid the risk to S. Manukyan’s life, V.G., his superior, verbally and physically abused him on the day of the incident which, as clarified later, significantly affected his psychological condition. In particular, it was established in the forensic psychological expert’s additional conclusion (see paragraph 4 above) that S. Manukyan committed suicide as a result of the extreme emotional stress initially caused by V.G.’s unlawful actions and then exacerbated by the unlawful actions of G.A. 23. It follows that the domestic authorities knew at that time of the existence of a real and immediate risk that S. Manukyan could commit suicide but failed to take appropriate measures to prevent that risk from materialising (see, for a similar example, Perevedentsevy, § 100; Boychenko, §§ 88-96; and compare and contrast, Malik Babayev, § 75, all cited above), thereby failing to comply with their positive obligation to protect his life. Furthermore, contrary to their obligation to adopt practical measures to effectively protect conscripts against the dangers inherent in military life (see paragraph 18 above), those in charge of the military unit, including its commander G.A., failed to ensure that incidents of ill-treatment of conscripts were effectively reported. What is more, G.A. himself mistreated S. Manukyan which in its turn also affected his psychological condition (see paragraphs 4 and 22 above). 24. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to protect S. Manukyan’s right to life while he was under their control. 25. There has therefore been a violation of Article 2 in its substantive limb. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
26.
The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‐pecuniary damage and EUR 2,900 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 27. The Government contested the applicant’s claims. 28. In view of the nature of the violation found, the Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 29. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 covering costs for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 30. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 June 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Ilse Freiwirth Jolien Schukking Deputy Registrar President