I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in TEPLITSKAYA v. RUSSIA and 1 other application.
Information
- Judgment date: 2022-09-20
- Communication date: 2021-03-04
- Application number(s): 23506/15;38211/16
- Country: RUS
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 5, 5-1-c, 11, 11-1, 11-2, 14
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)
Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 - Positive obligations
Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly)
Violation of Article 14+11 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association
Positive obligations
Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly)
Violation of Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly)
No violation of Article 14+11 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association
Article 11-1 - Freedom of peaceful assembly) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.793224
- Prediction: Violation
Consistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
Applications nos.
23506/15 and 38211/16Yana Igorevna TEPLITSKAYA against Russiaand Yekaterina Anatolyevna BOGACH against Russialodged on 25 March 2015 and 19 May 2016 respectively The applicant in the first case, Ms Yana Igorevna Teplitskaya (“first applicant”), is a Russian national, who was born in 1991 and lives in St Petersburg.
The applicant in the second case, Ms Yekaterina Anatolyevna Bogach (“second applicant”), is a Russian national, who was born in 1976 and lives in St Petersburg.
The applicants are represented before the Court by Ms K.A.
Mikhaylova, a lawyer practising in St Petersburg.
1.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
2.
On 12 October 2013 an LGBTI public event (Coming Out Day) was planned to take place from 2 p.m. until 3.30 p.m. at the Field of Mars (Марсово поле), a large square in the city centre where assemblies were allowed.
The event in the form of a gathering was authorised by St Petersburg authorities.
3.
On 12 October 2013 shortly before 2 p.m. the applicants arrived at the site to take part in the above gathering.
However, they could not proceed to the venue because it was blocked by a group of counter-demonstrators.
They acted in a very aggressive manner, insulted the participants in the gathering, pushed and punched them.
4.
The police was present at the venue but did not make any efforts to secure safety of participants in the gathering and exercise of their right to freedom of assembly, despite being asked by the organisers to intervene.
5.
At 1.55 p.m. police officers surrounded a group of twelve demonstrators, including the applicants, and ordered them to proceed to a police bus.
The applicants were not informed of the reasons for their arrest.
6.
At 2.30 p.m. the applicants were brought to the police station where the first applicant was detained until 8.30 p.m., the second applicant – until 7.15 p.m. of the same day.
According to the first applicant, the reason for her lengthy detention at the police station was the lack of an ID document, even though she presented an electronic copy of her passport.
7.
Police officers started drawing up administrative-arrest, administrative-escort and administrative-offence records in respect of the first applicant at 7.50 p.m. and second applicant at 7.07 p.m.
The first document stated that the applicants were arrested at 2 p.m. on 12 October 2013 and taken to the police station to ensure the “prompt and proper examination of the case”.
The second document specified that the applicants had been arrested on account of their disorderly conduct in public.
8.
According to the administrative-offence records, the applicants committed an offence punishable under Article 20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
It stated that they had used foul language during the public gathering and had ignored repeated warnings to refrain from doing so.
9.
On 21 November 2013 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg terminated the administrative proceedings against the second applicant for lack of evidence of her guilt.
10.
On 18 December 2013 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court terminated the administrative proceedings against the first applicant for lack of elements of an administrative offence in her acts.
11.
On 24 February 2014 the first applicant lodged a civil claim with the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg against the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Main Department of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, the Central District of St Petersburg Department of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, the chief of central police station no.
28 in St Petersburg and two police officers involved in her transfer to the police station and her detention there.
She challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and detention at the police station.
12.
On 24 April 2014 the Primorskiy District Court examined the merits of the first applicant’s claim and dismissed it.
The court considered that the applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been lawful because she had refused to show her ID documents to the police.
13.
On 3 July 2014 the first applicant appealed against the above decision to the St Petersburg City Court.
She alleged that her arrest and transfer to the police station had been unlawful.
14.
On 6 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the first‐instance judgment on appeal.
The court stressed that there had been tension between the participants of the gathering and counter-demonstrators during the event on 12 October 2013 as well as breach of public order.
Police officers had been unable to draft the administrative-arrest records on site.
The first applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had therefore been justified for the purposes of facilitating subsequent administrative proceedings.
The fact that these proceedings had later been terminated had not invalidated the lawfulness of the first applicant’s arrest.
15.
The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal challenging the judgment of 24 April 2014 and the appeal decision of 6 October 2014.
On 6 February 2015 the judge of the St Petersburg City Court dismissed her cassation appeal.
16.
On an unspecified date in 2014 the second applicant brought civil proceedings against the State.
She claimed that her arrest at the venue of the gathering and transfer to the police station were unlawful.
The second applicant further alleged that the police had failed to ensure public order during the gathering on 12 October 2013 and safety of its participants.
She claimed non-pecuniary damage in the amount 225,000 Russian roubles (RUB; approximately 3,100 euros (EUR)).
17.
On 16 December 2014 the Petrogradskiy District Court of St Petersburg partly granted the claim.
Relying on the judgment of 21 November 2013 (see paragraph 9 above), the court found that the second applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been unlawful.
It awarded her RUB 2,000 (about EUR 28 at the time).
18.
The second applicant appealed, claiming that the first-instance court ignored the arguments about breach of her right to freedom of peaceful assembly and discrimination as an LGBTI activist.
She also claimed that the amount of non-pecuniary damage awarded to her was much lower than that awarded by the Court in similar cases.
19.
On 20 May 2015 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed the appeal.
It rejected the defendant’s arguments that the unlawfulness of the police officers’ actions had never been established by a judicial decision delivered in terms of administrative proceedings.
20.
The second applicant lodged a cassation appeal challenging the judgment of 19 December 2014 and the appeal decision of 20 May 2015.
On 8 December 2015 the judge of the St Petersburg City Court dismissed her cassation appeal and upheld the lower courts’ findings.
21.
Later the second applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of Russia.
On 22 January 2016 a judge of that court refused to refer the appeal for consideration by the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court.
22.
The relevant provisions of the domestic law as well as judicial practice concerning the administrative arrest and transfer to the police station, judicial review under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, tort actions under the Civil Code and police powers have been summarised in Tsvetkova and Others v. Russia (nos.
54381/08 and 5 others, §§ 60-75, 10 April 2018).
COMPLAINTS The applicants complain under Article 5 of the Convention that their arrest, transfer to the police station and subsequent detention there for several hours had been unlawful.
They further complain under Article 11 that the authorities failed to enable the public gathering to proceed peacefully and that their interference with the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly had been arbitrary.
Relying on Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention, the applicants complain that the police arrested only the participants in the LGBTI public event and disregarded the breaches of public order by their opponents.
Judgment
THIRD SECTIONCASE OF TEPLITSKAYA AND BOGACH v. RUSSIA
(Applications nos. 23506/15 and 38211/16)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 September 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Teplitskaya and Bogach v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Georgios A. Serghides, President,
Anja Seibert-Fohr,
Peeter Roosma, judges,and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the two applications against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 25 March 2015 and 19 May 2016 respectively by two Russian nationals, Ms Yana Igorevna Teplitskaya (“the first applicant”) and Ms Yekaterina Anatolyevna Bogach (“the second applicant”), who were both represented before the Court by Ms K.A. Mikhaylova, a lawyer practising in St Petersburg;
the decision to give notice of the applications to the Russian Government (“the Government”), represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by his successor in this office, Mr M. Vinogradov;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 30 August 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicants attempted to participate in a public event in support of LGBTI people that was authorised to take place on 12 October 2013 in St Petersburg. The facts related to that event were examined by the Court in Berkman v. Russia (no. 46712/15, 1 December 2020). The event was disrupted by violent counter‐demonstrators. The police present at the spot arrested a group of participants in the event, including the applicants who were then transferred to a police station and charged with disorderly misconduct (use of foul language), an offence under Article 20.1 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (see Berkman, cited above, §§ 5‐11). On 21 November 2013 and 18 December 2013 respectively, the courts terminated the administrative proceedings against the second and first applicant for the lack of elements of an administrative offence in their acts. 2. On 24 February 2014 the first applicant lodged a civil claim against police and other authorities with the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and detention at the police station and alleging that those infringed, among others, her rights to freedom of assembly and not to be discriminated against. On 24 April 2014 the Primorskiy District Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. The court considered that the first applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been lawful because she had refused to show her ID documents to the police. On 6 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that judgment on appeal. The court stressed that there had been tension between the participants of the gathering and counter-demonstrators during the event on 12 October 2013 as well as breach of public order and that the first applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been justified for the purposes of facilitating subsequent administrative proceedings. The fact that these proceedings had later been terminated had not invalidated the lawfulness of the first applicant’s arrest. On 6 February 2015 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the judgment of 24 April 2014 and the appeal decision of 6 October 2014. 3. On an unspecified date in 2014 the second applicant brought civil proceedings against the State. She claimed that her arrest at the venue of the gathering and transfer to the police station had been unlawful and that the police had failed to ensure public order during the gathering on 12 October 2013 and safety of its participants. She claimed non-pecuniary damage in the amount 225,000 Russian roubles (RUB; approximately 3,100 euros at the time (EUR)). On 16 December 2014 the Petrogradskiy District Court of St Petersburg partly granted the claim. The court found that the second applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been unlawful and awarded her RUB 2,000 (about EUR 28 at the time). The court dismissed the remainder of the second applicant’s claims concerning police inaction for the lack of evidence. The second applicant’s subsequent appeals against the judgment of 16 December 2014 were dismissed, with the final decision being delivered by the Supreme Court of Russia on 22 January 2016. 4. The applicants complained under Article 5 of the Convention that their arrest, transfer to the police station and subsequent detention there for several hours had been unlawful. They further complained under Article 11, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, that the authorities had failed to enable the public gathering to proceed peacefully, that their interference with the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly had been arbitrary, and that the police arrested only the participants in the LGBTI public event and disregarded the breaches of public order by their opponents. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
5. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 6. The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of all her complaints by lodging a cassation appeal against the judgment of 6 February 2015 by the St Petersburg City Court with the Supreme Court of Russia. They further submitted that both applicants had lost their victim status with regards to their Article 5 § 1 complaint because the courts discontinued their administrative offence cases (see paragraph 1 above) and the second applicant, in addition, was awarded compensation for her unlawful detention (see paragraph 3 above). 7. The Court observes that the first applicant lodged her application with the Court on 25 March 2015, that is (i) within six months after the appeal decision of 6 October 2014; and (ii) before the Court examined the amended two-layer cassation procedure in Abramyan and Others v. Russia ((dec.), nos. 38951/13 and 59611/13, §§ 76-96, 12 May 2015) in May 2015 and made available that decision to the public in June 2015. Thus, the first applicant has complied with the six-month rule in view of the state of the applicable and consistent case-law at the time (see, among many others, Uzbyakov v. Russia, no. 71160/13, § 72, 5 May 2020). She was not therefore required to lodge the first cassation appeal, which she did, however, out of prudence but to no avail. Yet it cannot be held against her – in terms of the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies – that she did not lodge the second cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Russia. In any event, the Government have not specified whether, as of June 2015, the applicable time-limit for lodging such an appeal did not expire and whether the first applicant could therefore still avail herself of the remedy in question (see Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, no. 16899/13, §§ 67-68, 29 March 2016). Lastly, other demonstrators did lodge similar complaints before the Supreme Court but without any success. It would be excessive to require the first applicant to do the same in the circumstances of the case (see Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia, no. 38004/12, § 247, 17 July 2018). The Government’s objection to this effect should therefore be dismissed. 8. As regards the Government’s argument about the loss by the applicants of their victim status under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court observes the following. First, the courts, when discontinuing the administrative offence cases against the applicants, had only established the lack of elements of an administrative offence in their acts, but did not acknowledge the unlawfulness of their detention (see paragraph 1 above). The Court is not therefore satisfied that, absent such acknowledgment, discontinuation of the administrative offence proceedings against the applicants constituted adequate and sufficient redress in respect of the interference with their rights under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, among many others, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 180, ECHR 2006‐V, and Blyudik v. Russia, no. 46401/08, §§ 49-50, 25 June 2019). Secondly, with respect to the second applicant the Court notes that even though the domestic courts in civil proceedings found that her deprivation of liberty on 12 October 2013 had been unlawful (see paragraph 3 above), the amount of EUR 28 awarded to her in respect of non‐pecuniary damage cannot be considered appropriate and sufficient redress for the alleged breach of the Convention (see, for example, Gremina v. Russia, no. 17054/08, § 66, 26 May 2020, with further references). Both applicants can therefore still claim to be victims of the alleged violation of Article 5 § 1 the Convention. The Government’s objection to this effect should be dismissed. 9. The Court finds that the applicants’ complaints under Articles 5 § 1, 11 and 14 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, they must be declared admissible. 10. The Court notes that the issues arising in the present case under Articles 11 and 14 of the Convention have been already considered and ruled upon by the Court in Berkman (cited above) that concerned the same public event. Having examined all the material before it, the Court does not see any reason to resolve the present case differently. It therefore finds, for the reasons advanced in Berkman (ibid., §§ 50-63), that there has been, in respect of both applicants, a violation of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 11 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, a violation of the respondent State’s negative obligations under Article 11 of the Convention, and no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with negative obligations under Article 11 of the Convention. 11. The applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention about their unlawful arrest falls under the well-established case-law of the Court. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that it discloses a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in the light of its findings in Butkevich v. Russia (no. 5865/07, §§ 61-65, 13 February 2018). Having reached this conclusion, in the circumstances of this case the Court does not consider necessary to examine the merits of the applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention concerning their delayed release from the police station (see Berkman, cited above, § 38, with further references). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
12. The applicants claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‐pecuniary damage. They did not claim costs and expenses. 13. The Government contested the applicants’ claim as excessive. 14. Taking into account the sum already awarded by the domestic courts to the second applicant (see paragraph 3 above), the Court awards the first applicant EUR 9,750 and the second applicant EUR 9,700 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on these amounts. 15. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant EUR 9,750 (nine thousand seven hundred and fifty euros) and the second applicant EUR 9,700 (nine thousand seven hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, within three months, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 September 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Olga Chernishova Georgios A. Serghides Deputy Registrar President
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF TEPLITSKAYA AND BOGACH v. RUSSIA
(Applications nos. 23506/15 and 38211/16)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
20 September 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Teplitskaya and Bogach v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Georgios A. Serghides, President,
Anja Seibert-Fohr,
Peeter Roosma, judges,and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the two applications against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 25 March 2015 and 19 May 2016 respectively by two Russian nationals, Ms Yana Igorevna Teplitskaya (“the first applicant”) and Ms Yekaterina Anatolyevna Bogach (“the second applicant”), who were both represented before the Court by Ms K.A. Mikhaylova, a lawyer practising in St Petersburg;
the decision to give notice of the applications to the Russian Government (“the Government”), represented by Mr M. Galperin, former Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by his successor in this office, Mr M. Vinogradov;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 30 August 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicants attempted to participate in a public event in support of LGBTI people that was authorised to take place on 12 October 2013 in St Petersburg. The facts related to that event were examined by the Court in Berkman v. Russia (no. 46712/15, 1 December 2020). The event was disrupted by violent counter‐demonstrators. The police present at the spot arrested a group of participants in the event, including the applicants who were then transferred to a police station and charged with disorderly misconduct (use of foul language), an offence under Article 20.1 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (see Berkman, cited above, §§ 5‐11). On 21 November 2013 and 18 December 2013 respectively, the courts terminated the administrative proceedings against the second and first applicant for the lack of elements of an administrative offence in their acts. 2. On 24 February 2014 the first applicant lodged a civil claim against police and other authorities with the Primorskiy District Court of St Petersburg challenging the lawfulness of her arrest and detention at the police station and alleging that those infringed, among others, her rights to freedom of assembly and not to be discriminated against. On 24 April 2014 the Primorskiy District Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. The court considered that the first applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been lawful because she had refused to show her ID documents to the police. On 6 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that judgment on appeal. The court stressed that there had been tension between the participants of the gathering and counter-demonstrators during the event on 12 October 2013 as well as breach of public order and that the first applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been justified for the purposes of facilitating subsequent administrative proceedings. The fact that these proceedings had later been terminated had not invalidated the lawfulness of the first applicant’s arrest. On 6 February 2015 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the judgment of 24 April 2014 and the appeal decision of 6 October 2014. 3. On an unspecified date in 2014 the second applicant brought civil proceedings against the State. She claimed that her arrest at the venue of the gathering and transfer to the police station had been unlawful and that the police had failed to ensure public order during the gathering on 12 October 2013 and safety of its participants. She claimed non-pecuniary damage in the amount 225,000 Russian roubles (RUB; approximately 3,100 euros at the time (EUR)). On 16 December 2014 the Petrogradskiy District Court of St Petersburg partly granted the claim. The court found that the second applicant’s arrest and transfer to the police station had been unlawful and awarded her RUB 2,000 (about EUR 28 at the time). The court dismissed the remainder of the second applicant’s claims concerning police inaction for the lack of evidence. The second applicant’s subsequent appeals against the judgment of 16 December 2014 were dismissed, with the final decision being delivered by the Supreme Court of Russia on 22 January 2016. 4. The applicants complained under Article 5 of the Convention that their arrest, transfer to the police station and subsequent detention there for several hours had been unlawful. They further complained under Article 11, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, that the authorities had failed to enable the public gathering to proceed peacefully, that their interference with the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly had been arbitrary, and that the police arrested only the participants in the LGBTI public event and disregarded the breaches of public order by their opponents. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
5. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 6. The Government submitted that the first applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of all her complaints by lodging a cassation appeal against the judgment of 6 February 2015 by the St Petersburg City Court with the Supreme Court of Russia. They further submitted that both applicants had lost their victim status with regards to their Article 5 § 1 complaint because the courts discontinued their administrative offence cases (see paragraph 1 above) and the second applicant, in addition, was awarded compensation for her unlawful detention (see paragraph 3 above). 7. The Court observes that the first applicant lodged her application with the Court on 25 March 2015, that is (i) within six months after the appeal decision of 6 October 2014; and (ii) before the Court examined the amended two-layer cassation procedure in Abramyan and Others v. Russia ((dec.), nos. 38951/13 and 59611/13, §§ 76-96, 12 May 2015) in May 2015 and made available that decision to the public in June 2015. Thus, the first applicant has complied with the six-month rule in view of the state of the applicable and consistent case-law at the time (see, among many others, Uzbyakov v. Russia, no. 71160/13, § 72, 5 May 2020). She was not therefore required to lodge the first cassation appeal, which she did, however, out of prudence but to no avail. Yet it cannot be held against her – in terms of the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies – that she did not lodge the second cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Russia. In any event, the Government have not specified whether, as of June 2015, the applicable time-limit for lodging such an appeal did not expire and whether the first applicant could therefore still avail herself of the remedy in question (see Kocherov and Sergeyeva v. Russia, no. 16899/13, §§ 67-68, 29 March 2016). Lastly, other demonstrators did lodge similar complaints before the Supreme Court but without any success. It would be excessive to require the first applicant to do the same in the circumstances of the case (see Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia, no. 38004/12, § 247, 17 July 2018). The Government’s objection to this effect should therefore be dismissed. 8. As regards the Government’s argument about the loss by the applicants of their victim status under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court observes the following. First, the courts, when discontinuing the administrative offence cases against the applicants, had only established the lack of elements of an administrative offence in their acts, but did not acknowledge the unlawfulness of their detention (see paragraph 1 above). The Court is not therefore satisfied that, absent such acknowledgment, discontinuation of the administrative offence proceedings against the applicants constituted adequate and sufficient redress in respect of the interference with their rights under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see, among many others, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 180, ECHR 2006‐V, and Blyudik v. Russia, no. 46401/08, §§ 49-50, 25 June 2019). Secondly, with respect to the second applicant the Court notes that even though the domestic courts in civil proceedings found that her deprivation of liberty on 12 October 2013 had been unlawful (see paragraph 3 above), the amount of EUR 28 awarded to her in respect of non‐pecuniary damage cannot be considered appropriate and sufficient redress for the alleged breach of the Convention (see, for example, Gremina v. Russia, no. 17054/08, § 66, 26 May 2020, with further references). Both applicants can therefore still claim to be victims of the alleged violation of Article 5 § 1 the Convention. The Government’s objection to this effect should be dismissed. 9. The Court finds that the applicants’ complaints under Articles 5 § 1, 11 and 14 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, they must be declared admissible. 10. The Court notes that the issues arising in the present case under Articles 11 and 14 of the Convention have been already considered and ruled upon by the Court in Berkman (cited above) that concerned the same public event. Having examined all the material before it, the Court does not see any reason to resolve the present case differently. It therefore finds, for the reasons advanced in Berkman (ibid., §§ 50-63), that there has been, in respect of both applicants, a violation of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Article 11 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, a violation of the respondent State’s negative obligations under Article 11 of the Convention, and no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with negative obligations under Article 11 of the Convention. 11. The applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention about their unlawful arrest falls under the well-established case-law of the Court. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that it discloses a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in the light of its findings in Butkevich v. Russia (no. 5865/07, §§ 61-65, 13 February 2018). Having reached this conclusion, in the circumstances of this case the Court does not consider necessary to examine the merits of the applicants’ complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention concerning their delayed release from the police station (see Berkman, cited above, § 38, with further references). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
12. The applicants claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‐pecuniary damage. They did not claim costs and expenses. 13. The Government contested the applicants’ claim as excessive. 14. Taking into account the sum already awarded by the domestic courts to the second applicant (see paragraph 3 above), the Court awards the first applicant EUR 9,750 and the second applicant EUR 9,700 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on these amounts. 15. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the first applicant EUR 9,750 (nine thousand seven hundred and fifty euros) and the second applicant EUR 9,700 (nine thousand seven hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, within three months, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 20 September 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Olga Chernishova Georgios A. Serghides Deputy Registrar President