I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in ARSHAKYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA.

Judgment

FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF ARSHAKYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA
(Application no. 23705/15)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11 September 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Arshakyan and Others v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Kateřina Šimáčková, President, María Elósegui, Gilberto Felici, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 23705/15) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 May 2015 by fourteen Armenian nationals whose relevant details are listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), and who were represented by Mr M. Shushanyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 10 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case primarily concerns the application of a statutory limitation period to the applicants’ financial claims against the authorities. The applicant relied on Articles 6 § 1 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 2. The applicants’ official place of residence was registered at 4/22 Amiryan Street, in the centre of Yerevan. It appears that this address was shared by several property owners and numerous residents. 3. On 5 October 2001 the Government issued Decree no. 950-N, establishing the procedure for taking plots of land and immovable property within designated expropriation zones in Yerevan. Section 8 of the decree provided that individuals registered as residents within the expropriation zones and their minor children were entitled to 2,000,000 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 4,000 euros) each in financial support. In addition, such individuals were entitled to receive a further financial incentive in the amount of AMD 1,000,000 (approximately 2,000 euros), provided that certain conditions relating to the signing of contracts and vacating the area within a specified time were fulfilled. The mayor of Yerevan (“the mayor”) was tasked with implementing the expropriation process. 4. On 1 August 2002 the Government designated certain areas of central Yerevan, including Amiryan Street, as expropriation zones for development projects. 5. On 17 June 2004 the Government authorised the mayor to grant building rights to M.G., a private developer, for construction in an area adjacent to Amiryan Street. It appears that M.G. was subsequently authorised to act on behalf of both the mayor and the State in connection with the planned expropriation process. 6. Between 1 April and 5 September 2005 the State and M.G. entered into a number of contracts for the purchase of apartments and other immovable property, and for payment of compensation, with several owners of property at and numerous residents of 4/22 Amiryan Street. No such contract was entered into with any of the applicants. 7. On 1 July 2008 the applicants lodged claims with the Civil Court of Yerevan against the Minister of Finance and the mayor, seeking AMD 3,000,000 each in financial support and incentives under Government Decree no. 950-N (see paragraph 3 above), together with statutory interest. That court dismissed the applicants’ claims. However, following an appeal by the applicants, the case was remitted for fresh examination and, on 8 June 2009, was taken over by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”). 8. On 18 March 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicants’ claims. It considered that the claims lacked any legal basis. In any event, the court found that the applicants had missed the time-limit for lodging their claims as the three-year statutory limitation period prescribed by the Civil Code had commenced on 1 May 2005 at the latest, and had expired by 1 May 2008. The court noted that the contracts for the purchase of property in the residential area in question had been entered into on 1 April 2005 and, under section 23 of the Law on the State Registration of Property Rights, had to be registered within thirty days. It also referred to section 14 § 1 of the same Law, under which all persons were presumed to be aware of registered property rights regardless of whether or not they actually were. The court also referred to the fact that, according to certificates issued by the State Real Estate Registry, the residential area in question was registered in M.G.’s name. Lastly, it cited Article 337 § 1 of the Civil Code, under which the statutory limitation period starts to run from the day on which the person concerned becomes aware or ought to have become aware of the violation of his or her rights. 9. The applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 March 2014, challenging the application of the limitation period and the court’s findings on the merits. 10. On 3 July 2014 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal, essentially endorsing the District Court’s reasoning that their claims had been lodged outside the statutory limitation period. It also referred to a letter sent by the mayor’s office to Ms Arshakyan (the first applicant), which in turn referred to an earlier letter dated 30 March 2005 that Ms Arshakyan had sent to the President of Armenia, allegedly concerning the expropriation process. The court did not see a need to address the other grounds of the appeal concerning the merits of the applicants’ claims. 11. The applicants subsequently lodged an appeal on points of law. 12. On 22 October 2014 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. The decision was notified on 5 November 2014. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
13. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their right to a court had been breached as a result of the incorrect and unforeseeable application of the statutory limitation period. 14. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 15. The general principles concerning access to a court, including the superior courts, have been summarised in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-99, 5 April 2018). 16. The Court observes that, although the District Court considered that the applicants’ claims had no legal basis, it ultimately dismissed those on the grounds that the statutory limitation period had expired. Furthermore, the Civil Court of Appeal based its decision exclusively on the expiry of the limitation period and did not examine the remaining grounds of the applicants’ appeal, which concerned the merits of their claims. Thus, the application of the statutory limitation period effectively prevented the applicants from having their case determined on the merits. 17. The Court reiterates that the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the Convention. What the Court needs to ascertain in a given case is whether the nature of the time-limit in question and the manner in which it was applied are compatible with the Convention. This means, among other things, that the application of the statutory limitation periods must have been foreseeable to the applicants, having regard to the relevant legislation and case-law and the particular circumstances (see Kamenova v. Bulgaria, no. 62784/09, § 48, 12 July 2018; Kurşun v. Turkey, no. 22677/10, § 95, 30 October 2018; and Çela v. Albania, no. 73274/17, § 28, 29 November 2022). 18. In the present case, the restriction on the right of access to a court was based on the general three-year limitation period under the Civil Code. The applicants have consistently maintained that this limitation period was not applicable to their claims, which were based on Government Decree no. 950‐N rather than the Civil Code. Notably, the decree itself did not contain any provisions regarding limitation periods or any reference to the applicability of the Civil Code in that regard. However, neither the domestic courts nor the Government provided any explanation as to why they considered the provisions of the Civil Code to be applicable, thus casting doubt on the foreseeability of the application of those provisions. 19. Even assuming that the three-year statutory limitation period under the Civil Code was applicable, the manner in which it was applied is in issue. The domestic courts calculated that limitation period as running from 1 May 2005, referring to the fact that certain contracts for the purchase of properties in the same residential area had been entered in on 1 April 2005 and to the statutory thirty-day time-limit for their registration in the State Real Estate Registry (see paragraphs 6, 8 and 10 above). However, the available material does not show any connection between the applicants and those property owners or their properties, aside from sharing the same address. 20. Furthermore, no explanation was provided as to why those particular contracts, among others entered into between April and September 2005, were used to determine the starting-point of the limitation period. Nor was any explanation given as to why the applicants’ presumed knowledge of the registration of those contracts – even assuming that such knowledge could be inferred in accordance with domestic law – was considered to correspond to the moment when they ought to have become aware of a violation of their rights, triggering the start of the limitation period under Article 337 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 8 above). 21. Moreover, the courts appear to have presumed that registration must have occurred by 1 May 2005, without any direct evidence confirming the actual registration date. In those circumstances, the applicants could not reasonably have been expected to know about those contracts or their State registration, let alone to foresee that they would be used to determine the starting-point of the limitation period. 22. Lastly, the Court is not convinced by the Civil Court of Appeal’s indirect reference to the first applicant’s letter of 30 March 2005 (see paragraph 10 above), which the court apparently made without having any information about the exact nature of that letter or its contents, thus making it impossible to make an adequate assessment of its relevance to the case. 23. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the application of the statutory limitation period in respect of the applicants’ claims was unforeseeable and amounted to a disproportionate restriction impairing the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to a court. 24. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 25. The applicants also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the civil proceedings had been excessive. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that the complaint discloses a violation of Articles 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings in the light of its findings in Fil LLC v. Armenia (no. 18526/13, §§ 52-58, 31 January 2019). 26. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the above-mentioned violations of their right to a fair trial had deprived them of their legitimate expectation of receiving the financial support and incentives to which they were entitled, together with statutory interest. 27. As this complaint is directly connected with the one examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and the Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the case would have been if the applicants had had effective access to a court, it does not consider it necessary to examine this complaint separately (see Yanakiev v. Bulgaria, no. 40476/98, § 82, 10 August 2006). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicants each claimed 5,317.70 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding to the amount of financial support and incentives sought, and EUR 1,500 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In addition, they jointly claimed EUR 8,862 for the costs of their legal representation, relying on a legal services agreement between Ms Arshakyan (the first applicant) and their lawyer. 29. The Government contested those claims. 30. The Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings would have been had the applicants enjoyed effective access to a court, and it does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged (see Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, § 147, 23 January 2025). Accordingly, the Court rejects the applicants’ claims in respect of pecuniary damage. 31. Furthermore, Article 419 § 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows for the reopening of the domestic proceedings following a finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention. While the reopening of the proceedings would be the most appropriate form of redress, should the applicants so request (ibid., § 148), it cannot fully compensate for the distress that the applicants must have experienced as a result of the violation of their right of access to a court and the excessive length of the civil proceedings. Accordingly, ruling on an equitable basis, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants EUR 4,700 jointly, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 32. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award Ms Arshakyan EUR 2,500 for the costs of legal representation incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 4,700 (four thousand seven hundred euros) to the applicants jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) to Ms Arshakyan, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 September 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina Keller Kateřina Šimáčková Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX
List of applicants:
No. Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Place of residence
1. Laura ARSHAKYAN
1947
Yerevan
2. Albert ARUSHANYAN
1996
Karabukhino village
3. Svetlana ARUSHANYAN
1998
Yerevan
4. Edgar DASHTOYAN
1997
Yerevan
5. Murad DASHTOYAN
1967
Yerevan
6. Ruslan DASHTOYAN
1990
Yerevan
7. Vahe DASHTOYAN
1994
Yerevan
8. Alina HAMBARDZUMYAN
1980
Yerevan
9. Lilia HAMBARDZUMYAN
1970
Yerevan
10. Marine HAMBARDZUMYAN
1969
Yerevan
11. Naira HAMBARDZUMYAN
1975
Yerevan
12. Artsruni TOROSYAN
1991
Yerevan
13. Zhora TOROSYAN
1994
Yerevan
14. Heghine VARDANYAN
2002
Yerevan

FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF ARSHAKYAN AND OTHERS v. ARMENIA
(Application no. 23705/15)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
11 September 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Arshakyan and Others v. Armenia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Kateřina Šimáčková, President, María Elósegui, Gilberto Felici, judges,and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 23705/15) against the Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 5 May 2015 by fourteen Armenian nationals whose relevant details are listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), and who were represented by Mr M. Shushanyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Armenian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 10 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case primarily concerns the application of a statutory limitation period to the applicants’ financial claims against the authorities. The applicant relied on Articles 6 § 1 of the Convention and on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 2. The applicants’ official place of residence was registered at 4/22 Amiryan Street, in the centre of Yerevan. It appears that this address was shared by several property owners and numerous residents. 3. On 5 October 2001 the Government issued Decree no. 950-N, establishing the procedure for taking plots of land and immovable property within designated expropriation zones in Yerevan. Section 8 of the decree provided that individuals registered as residents within the expropriation zones and their minor children were entitled to 2,000,000 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 4,000 euros) each in financial support. In addition, such individuals were entitled to receive a further financial incentive in the amount of AMD 1,000,000 (approximately 2,000 euros), provided that certain conditions relating to the signing of contracts and vacating the area within a specified time were fulfilled. The mayor of Yerevan (“the mayor”) was tasked with implementing the expropriation process. 4. On 1 August 2002 the Government designated certain areas of central Yerevan, including Amiryan Street, as expropriation zones for development projects. 5. On 17 June 2004 the Government authorised the mayor to grant building rights to M.G., a private developer, for construction in an area adjacent to Amiryan Street. It appears that M.G. was subsequently authorised to act on behalf of both the mayor and the State in connection with the planned expropriation process. 6. Between 1 April and 5 September 2005 the State and M.G. entered into a number of contracts for the purchase of apartments and other immovable property, and for payment of compensation, with several owners of property at and numerous residents of 4/22 Amiryan Street. No such contract was entered into with any of the applicants. 7. On 1 July 2008 the applicants lodged claims with the Civil Court of Yerevan against the Minister of Finance and the mayor, seeking AMD 3,000,000 each in financial support and incentives under Government Decree no. 950-N (see paragraph 3 above), together with statutory interest. That court dismissed the applicants’ claims. However, following an appeal by the applicants, the case was remitted for fresh examination and, on 8 June 2009, was taken over by the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”). 8. On 18 March 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicants’ claims. It considered that the claims lacked any legal basis. In any event, the court found that the applicants had missed the time-limit for lodging their claims as the three-year statutory limitation period prescribed by the Civil Code had commenced on 1 May 2005 at the latest, and had expired by 1 May 2008. The court noted that the contracts for the purchase of property in the residential area in question had been entered into on 1 April 2005 and, under section 23 of the Law on the State Registration of Property Rights, had to be registered within thirty days. It also referred to section 14 § 1 of the same Law, under which all persons were presumed to be aware of registered property rights regardless of whether or not they actually were. The court also referred to the fact that, according to certificates issued by the State Real Estate Registry, the residential area in question was registered in M.G.’s name. Lastly, it cited Article 337 § 1 of the Civil Code, under which the statutory limitation period starts to run from the day on which the person concerned becomes aware or ought to have become aware of the violation of his or her rights. 9. The applicants lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 March 2014, challenging the application of the limitation period and the court’s findings on the merits. 10. On 3 July 2014 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeal, essentially endorsing the District Court’s reasoning that their claims had been lodged outside the statutory limitation period. It also referred to a letter sent by the mayor’s office to Ms Arshakyan (the first applicant), which in turn referred to an earlier letter dated 30 March 2005 that Ms Arshakyan had sent to the President of Armenia, allegedly concerning the expropriation process. The court did not see a need to address the other grounds of the appeal concerning the merits of the applicants’ claims. 11. The applicants subsequently lodged an appeal on points of law. 12. On 22 October 2014 the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible for lack of merit. The decision was notified on 5 November 2014. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
13. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that their right to a court had been breached as a result of the incorrect and unforeseeable application of the statutory limitation period. 14. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 15. The general principles concerning access to a court, including the superior courts, have been summarised in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-99, 5 April 2018). 16. The Court observes that, although the District Court considered that the applicants’ claims had no legal basis, it ultimately dismissed those on the grounds that the statutory limitation period had expired. Furthermore, the Civil Court of Appeal based its decision exclusively on the expiry of the limitation period and did not examine the remaining grounds of the applicants’ appeal, which concerned the merits of their claims. Thus, the application of the statutory limitation period effectively prevented the applicants from having their case determined on the merits. 17. The Court reiterates that the existence of a limitation period per se is not incompatible with the Convention. What the Court needs to ascertain in a given case is whether the nature of the time-limit in question and the manner in which it was applied are compatible with the Convention. This means, among other things, that the application of the statutory limitation periods must have been foreseeable to the applicants, having regard to the relevant legislation and case-law and the particular circumstances (see Kamenova v. Bulgaria, no. 62784/09, § 48, 12 July 2018; Kurşun v. Turkey, no. 22677/10, § 95, 30 October 2018; and Çela v. Albania, no. 73274/17, § 28, 29 November 2022). 18. In the present case, the restriction on the right of access to a court was based on the general three-year limitation period under the Civil Code. The applicants have consistently maintained that this limitation period was not applicable to their claims, which were based on Government Decree no. 950‐N rather than the Civil Code. Notably, the decree itself did not contain any provisions regarding limitation periods or any reference to the applicability of the Civil Code in that regard. However, neither the domestic courts nor the Government provided any explanation as to why they considered the provisions of the Civil Code to be applicable, thus casting doubt on the foreseeability of the application of those provisions. 19. Even assuming that the three-year statutory limitation period under the Civil Code was applicable, the manner in which it was applied is in issue. The domestic courts calculated that limitation period as running from 1 May 2005, referring to the fact that certain contracts for the purchase of properties in the same residential area had been entered in on 1 April 2005 and to the statutory thirty-day time-limit for their registration in the State Real Estate Registry (see paragraphs 6, 8 and 10 above). However, the available material does not show any connection between the applicants and those property owners or their properties, aside from sharing the same address. 20. Furthermore, no explanation was provided as to why those particular contracts, among others entered into between April and September 2005, were used to determine the starting-point of the limitation period. Nor was any explanation given as to why the applicants’ presumed knowledge of the registration of those contracts – even assuming that such knowledge could be inferred in accordance with domestic law – was considered to correspond to the moment when they ought to have become aware of a violation of their rights, triggering the start of the limitation period under Article 337 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 8 above). 21. Moreover, the courts appear to have presumed that registration must have occurred by 1 May 2005, without any direct evidence confirming the actual registration date. In those circumstances, the applicants could not reasonably have been expected to know about those contracts or their State registration, let alone to foresee that they would be used to determine the starting-point of the limitation period. 22. Lastly, the Court is not convinced by the Civil Court of Appeal’s indirect reference to the first applicant’s letter of 30 March 2005 (see paragraph 10 above), which the court apparently made without having any information about the exact nature of that letter or its contents, thus making it impossible to make an adequate assessment of its relevance to the case. 23. In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the application of the statutory limitation period in respect of the applicants’ claims was unforeseeable and amounted to a disproportionate restriction impairing the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to a court. 24. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 25. The applicants also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the civil proceedings had been excessive. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that the complaint discloses a violation of Articles 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings in the light of its findings in Fil LLC v. Armenia (no. 18526/13, §§ 52-58, 31 January 2019). 26. The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the above-mentioned violations of their right to a fair trial had deprived them of their legitimate expectation of receiving the financial support and incentives to which they were entitled, together with statutory interest. 27. As this complaint is directly connected with the one examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and the Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the case would have been if the applicants had had effective access to a court, it does not consider it necessary to examine this complaint separately (see Yanakiev v. Bulgaria, no. 40476/98, § 82, 10 August 2006). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
28. The applicants each claimed 5,317.70 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding to the amount of financial support and incentives sought, and EUR 1,500 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In addition, they jointly claimed EUR 8,862 for the costs of their legal representation, relying on a legal services agreement between Ms Arshakyan (the first applicant) and their lawyer. 29. The Government contested those claims. 30. The Court cannot speculate as to what the outcome of the proceedings would have been had the applicants enjoyed effective access to a court, and it does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged (see Suren Antonyan v. Armenia, no. 20140/23, § 147, 23 January 2025). Accordingly, the Court rejects the applicants’ claims in respect of pecuniary damage. 31. Furthermore, Article 419 § 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows for the reopening of the domestic proceedings following a finding by the Court of a violation of the Convention. While the reopening of the proceedings would be the most appropriate form of redress, should the applicants so request (ibid., § 148), it cannot fully compensate for the distress that the applicants must have experienced as a result of the violation of their right of access to a court and the excessive length of the civil proceedings. Accordingly, ruling on an equitable basis, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants EUR 4,700 jointly, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 32. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award Ms Arshakyan EUR 2,500 for the costs of legal representation incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 4,700 (four thousand seven hundred euros) to the applicants jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) to Ms Arshakyan, plus any tax that may be chargeable to her, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 September 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina Keller Kateřina Šimáčková Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX
List of applicants:
No. Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Place of residence
1. Laura ARSHAKYAN
1947
Yerevan
2. Albert ARUSHANYAN
1996
Karabukhino village
3. Svetlana ARUSHANYAN
1998
Yerevan
4. Edgar DASHTOYAN
1997
Yerevan
5. Murad DASHTOYAN
1967
Yerevan
6. Ruslan DASHTOYAN
1990
Yerevan
7. Vahe DASHTOYAN
1994
Yerevan
8. Alina HAMBARDZUMYAN
1980
Yerevan
9. Lilia HAMBARDZUMYAN
1970
Yerevan
10. Marine HAMBARDZUMYAN
1969
Yerevan
11. Naira HAMBARDZUMYAN
1975
Yerevan
12. Artsruni TOROSYAN
1991
Yerevan
13. Zhora TOROSYAN
1994
Yerevan
14. Heghine VARDANYAN
2002
Yerevan