I incorrectly predicted that there's no violation of human rights in SHIPS WASTE OIL COLLECTOR B.V. v. THE NETHERLANDS.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2009-11-10
  • Communication date: 2018-12-14
  • Application number(s): 2799/16
  • Country:   NLD
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 8, 8-1, 8-2, 13
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.654994
  • Prediction: No violation
  • Inconsistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

1.
The applicant company, Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V., is a limited liability company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid) incorporated under Netherlands law having its seat in Rotterdam.
It was initially represented by Mr G. van der Wal, then by Ms L.Y.M.
Parret, and currently by Ms M.C.
van Heezik; all are lawyers practising in Brussels.
2.
The applicant company is active in the Rotterdam port region.
It is one of several companies in that area whose business is the collection of waste liquids (or “slops”) from seagoing ships for disposal.
A.
The circumstances of the case 3.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant company, may be summarised as follows.
1.
Background to the case 4.
The Information and Investigation Service (Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst) of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) began an investigation into another collector of waste liquid from ships, I., suspected of mixing polluted waste liquids with bunker oil in contravention of legislation for the protection of the environment.
5.
Between 28 January 2007 and 8 May 2007 telephone conversations made by the management of I. were intercepted, recorded and then either transcribed or summarised in the course of these investigations.
Among the conversations so recorded were conversations between I.’s managing director and the managing director of the applicant company from which it appeared that the two companies were engaged in price-fixing.
2.
The transfer of criminal data 6.
An official record dated 21 April 2008 by an official of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment records several of these telephone conversations.
It is stated that that record is to be forwarded to the Netherlands Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, “NMA”) through the intervention of the public prosecutor (officier van justitie).
7.
On 21 October 2008 the public prosecutor gave permission for the official record to be forwarded to the NMA by adding “transfer to NMA approved (akkoord verstrekking aan NMA)”, dated and signed, in handwriting.
8.
The official record was transferred to the NMA on 29 June 2009.
The NMA subsequently sent the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment a request for complete sound recordings to be transferred to it.
9.
On 29 and 30 June 2010 a team of NMA investigators visited the applicant company’s premises.
They questioned the managing director of the applicant company under caution and took PDF scans of the company’s accounts.
In addition, they questioned members of the applicant company’s management, in the course of which they played back a sound recording of an intercepted telephone conversation.
10.
On 2 July 2010 the applicant company’s counsel wrote to the NMA protesting against the interception of the telephone conversations, their transfer to the NMA and their use in the investigation against the applicant company, relying on Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention.
11.
With the permission of the public prosecutor, further transcripts and recordings of intercepted telephone conversations were forwarded to the NMA on 26 November 2009, 7 July 2010 and 2 September 2010.
Transcripts of telephone conversations to which a member of the management of the applicant company was a party were added to the NMA’s case file.
3.
The decision by the NMA to impose fines and the administrative review proceedings 12.
An NMA report of 28 December 2010 found that the applicant company, together with the company I. and a third company (not an applicant), was accountable for an infringement of section 6(1) of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet).
This report quoted extensively from transcripts of telephone conversations.
13.
On 1 April 2011 the applicant company’s counsel submitted written comments (zienswijze) in advance of a hearing to be held on 15 April 2011.
As a preliminary issue, it protested against the use made of intercepted telephone conversations recorded in an investigation not directed against the applicant company itself.
There had been no judicial decision authorising such use; the telephone conversations should therefore not be admitted as evidence.
In addition, the applicant company offered an alternative explanation for its behaviour, based on section 6(3) of the Competition Act – namely, that it promoted efficiency without harming competition.
14.
A hearing took place before the Governors (Raad van Bestuur) of the NMA on 15 April 2011 in which the applicant company, the company I. and another company were represented.
The applicant company again protested against the use made of the recorded telephone conversations and stated that its behaviour served purposes of efficiency.
15.
The Governors of the NMA gave their decision on 16 November 2011.
As relevant to the case, they found that the transcripts and recordings had been lawfully forwarded to them by decision of the public prosecutor under the authority of the Board of Procurators General (College van procureurs-generaal).
In terms of Article 8 of the Convention, it was “in accordance with the law” in that it had a statutory basis and was foreseeable, and it met a “pressing social need”, to wit, the enforcement of competition law.
There was no suggestion that the interceptions themselves had been unlawful, or that the competing interests had been wrongly weighed by the public prosecutor.
They found the applicant company and the other companies involved in the proceedings to have violated the prohibition set out in section 6 of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet) and fined the applicant company 834,000 euros (EUR).
16.
The applicant company lodged a written objection (bezwaarschrift).
It protested against the lack of any judicial control of the transfer to the NMA of the telephone interceptions in issue, arguing that the authority of the public prosecutor, even if delegated by the Board of Procurators General, could not substitute for that of an independent court.
It also protested against the apparent absence of any weighing of competing interests.
Relying on, inter alia, section 6(3) of the Competition Act, it further denied any wrongdoing.
17.
With the consent of the NMA, the objection (bezwaar) phase was bypassed and the applicant company submitted its objection directly to the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) by way of appeal (beroep).
4.
Appeal proceedings before the Rotterdam Regional Court 18.
The NMA lodged a written defence statement.
19.
As relevant to the case before the Court, the NMA stated that the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment had intercepted telephone conversations from which it appeared that the company I. and the applicant company were engaged in illegal price fixing; summary transcripts of these were transferred to the NMA, through the intermediary of the public prosecutor.
Further summary transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations had been transferred to the NMA at its request with the permission of the public prosecutor.
These had been existing summary transcripts; the NMA had had no involvement in the criminal investigation carried out by the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment under the guidance of the public prosecution service (openbaar ministerie).
The extensive transcripts had been elaborated by the NMA itself, not by the public prosecution service at the NMA’s request.
The legal basis for such transfer was section 39f of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act (Wet justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens), which so permitted in pursuance of a “compelling general interest” – an expression which encompassed “national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as referred to in Article 8 of the Convention.
The public prosecutor was a functionary eminently suited to that responsibility.
As to the telephone interceptions themselves, there was neither information to suggest, nor reason to believe that they had been unlawful; in this matter, the NMA was dependent on the public prosecution service.
As regards the substance of the case against the applicant, the telephone conversations themselves were relied on (with other items of evidence) as proof of price-fixing.
20.
Having held a hearing, the Regional Court gave a decision on 11 July 2013 deciding the appeal of the applicant company jointly with the appeals of three other ships’ waste disposal companies (Burando Holding B.V., Port Invest B.V. and the company I.)
suspected of price-fixing.
As relevant to the case before the Court, its decision included the following: “13.
It follows from [the Regional Court’s own] decision of 13 June 2003 [ECLI:NL:RBROTT:2013;CA3079][1] that the transfer of criminal data requires a weighing of interests by the public prosecutor in person that is knowable and can be reviewed by the court, that has led to the conclusion that there is a need for the provision of criminal data because of a compelling public interest.
In addition, the public prosecutor must consider whether such provision is in accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
In this connection, the Regional Court has stressed the need to respect the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, on the ground of which everyone has the right to respect for his or her private life.
Section 39 [the Court takes this to mean section 39f] of the Judicial Information and Criminal Records Act, which provided a statutory basis for the provision of criminal data to third parties, guarantees that these requirements are met.” Since the public prosecutor had merely granted permission for the transfer of the transcripts to the NMA, in handwriting on the official record of 28 October 2010 and on pre-printed forms without reasoning subsequently, the Regional Court found that no reviewable weighing of interests had been recorded.
From this it followed that the transcripts were to be excluded as evidence.
Since the NMA had previously had no indication of price-fixing and would not have begun an investigation without the information given by the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, and since the NMA’s decision depended entirely on the intercepted telephone conversations and on documents handed over or statements made by persons after they had been confronted with these telephone conversations, the Regional Court quashed the NMA’s decision in its entirety.
5.
Further appeal proceedings before the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 21.
The Consumer and Market Authority (Autoriteit Consument en Markt, “ACM”), the successor body to the NMA by this time, lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) with the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven).
As relevant to the case before the Court, it argued that the transfer of criminal data by the public prosecution service to another entity would only be contrary to domestic law or to Article 8 of the Convention if it could not be considered necessary with a view to a compelling general interest or if it did not comply with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.
That assessment fell to be made, according to the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act, by the civil courts in the shape of an ex post facto judicial review, as had taken place in the case [leading to application no.
2800/16].
In addition, the transfer of criminal data to a third party on the basis of section 39f(1) of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act was a factual act, not a decision within the meaning of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht), and therefore not amenable to judicial review by the administrative courts.
Such a transfer by a public prosecutor required neither reasoning nor an ex ante review of its lawfulness.
According to the ACM, use in evidence of the criminal data received was admissible as there were no indications that the data had been obtained unlawfully or that, even if it that were the case, the manner of that obtainment ran counter to the proper behaviour expected of authorities to such an extent that its use could not be considered permissible under any circumstances (verkregen op een wijze die zozeer indruist tegen hetgeen van een behoorlijk handelende overheid mag worden verwacht dat het gebruik hiervan onder alle omstandigheden ontoelaatbaar moet worden geacht).
22.
The ACM’s further appeal was joined by the Board of Procurators General.
23.
Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V., Burando Holding B.V., Port Invest B.V. and the company I. lodged a cross-appeal, presenting a joint position.
They submitted that the intercepted telephone conversations fell outside the scope of the criminal investigation and therefore were not properly in the case file.
They further argued, inter alia, that data, obtained in a criminal investigation and by means of an interference with the right to private life, could not be transferred to third persons without a balancing of interests – set out in a reasoned manner – having taken place prior to any such transfer.
On the basis of a set of search terms transmitted to the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, the NMA had listened electronically to intercepted telephone conversations, which could not be considered as the provision of data within the meaning of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act.
Moreover, it was for the administrative courts to examine, in proceedings against the imposition of a fine, the lawfulness of the manner in which evidence, on the basis of which that fine had been imposed, had been obtained.
24.
Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V., Burando Holding B.V., Port Invest B.V. and the company I. maintained their prior position as to the merits of the case.
25.
On 14 April 2014 the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry gave a decision (ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:151) rejecting the appeal of the Board of Procurators General.
It found that since the merits of the case concerned not criminal law but the enforcement under administrative procedure of competition law, the Board of Procurators General had no legal interest of its own and hence no locus standi.
26.
Having held a hearing on 20 November 2014, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry gave its decision on 9 July 2015 (ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:192).
Holding that the appeal of the ACM was well-founded, it quashed the decision of the Regional Court and remitted the case to it for rehearing.
It dismissed the applicant company’s cross-appeal.
As relevant to the case before the Court, its reasoning included the following: “4.6.
The first matter to be decided in this connection is whether the provision of criminal data, consisting in the present case of intercepted telephone conversations, based on section 39f of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act is contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
An interference with the right to privacy is only permitted under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention in so far as it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of, among other things, the economic well-being of the country.
The starting point in considering this issue is that the interception of the telephone conversations from which the intercepted data were obtained took place after the investigating judge gave permission to do so.
The arguments presented by the company I., Port Invest B.V. and Burando Holding B.V. do not constitute grounds to find that the intercepted telephone conversations have not been obtained in accordance with the requirements of criminal procedure in force by the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.
The public prosecutor’s competence to provide the intercepted telephone conversations is statutorily grounded in the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act.
Moreover, as regards the lawfulness of this obtainment, the law provides for a judicial procedure attended by sufficient guarantees, both under civil law within the framework of the provision of the data and under administrative law within the framework of the review of the decision to impose the fine for which these data have served as a basis.
It appears from the report in these cases that the ACM has extensively reviewed the evidence, including the intercepted telephone conversations, within the framework of establishing whether there has been a transgression of section 6(1) of the Competition Act.
After the report was issued and before a decision was taken by the ACM to impose a fine, the appellants were offered the opportunity to submit their views in writing of that report, of which opportunity they have availed themselves.
Finally, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry finds that a sufficient case has been made out that the information about the alleged price-fixing arrangements could not in reason have been obtained by the ACM in a different, less intrusive way, since such arrangements are not, as a rule, committed to paper.
In the judgment of the Provisional Measures Judge of the Regional Court of The Hague of 26 June 2009 (ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ0047), to which the parties also refer, the Provisional Measures Judge in a matter comparable with that here in issue gave a provisional decision on the legality of the provision of intercepted telephone conversations by the public prosecution service to the ACM and came to the same finding as regards the proportionality of such provision.
In view of the above, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry sees no reason to find that the provision of the intercepted telephone conversations to the ACM based on section 39f of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act is contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
4.7 Within the framework of the care to be taken under section 3.2 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) in preparing a decision, the ACM is obliged to consider the lawfulness of the evidence to be used by it.
In paragraphs 180 and following of the decision imposing the fine the ACM has gone into the use of the intercepted telephone conversations in evidence.
It considered in so doing whether in obtaining the intercepted telephone conversations the principles of due process had been violated, or whether the rights of the defence had been disregarded.
In this connection the ACM stressed that the legislature limited the (active) powers of the ACM to collect data, but not the data which the ACM might receive.
The ACM came to the conclusion that there was no ground for it to find that the intercepted telephone conversations provide to the ACM by the public prosecution service should not be used in evidence.
4.8 The arguments presented by [the applicant companies] do not constitute a reason for the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry to find that this conclusion by the ACM is wrong.
It should be stressed in this connection that the ACM was entitled to assume, based on the [Provision of Criminal Records for Purposes Other than Criminal Law Enforcement (Designation) Order (Aanwijzing verstrekking van strafvorderlijke gegevens voor buiten de strafrechtstoepassing gelegen doeleinden (aanwijzing wet justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens), that the evidence concerned had been provided to it lawfully.
In the present case it concerns provision to an administrative organ.
Provisions to administrative organs with a view to the exercise of supervision of compliance with legislation are considered to be standard cases of provision pursuant to chapter IV.4.c of that Order.
...
The circumstance that the ACM itself does not have the competence to intercept telephone conversations does not constitute ground for the finding that the use of the intercepted telephone conversations by the ACM should be considered unacceptable.
The Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act provides precisely for the possibility that such data, obtained using coercive measures under criminal procedure (strafvorderlijke dwangmiddelen) may be provided to, among others, administrative organs that do not themselves have the competence to make use of such coercive measures.
Contrary to the argument made by the company I., Port Invest B.V. and Burando Holding B.V., the circumstance that the ACM – in consultation with the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment – had, after having [taken cognisance of transcripts and recordings of intercepted telephone conversations], made a selection from the bulk of the data that were available and provisionally considered relevant by the Information and Investigation Service, does not, in the given situation, lead the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry to find that the provision took place contrary to the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act.” B.
Relevant domestic law, Council of Europe instruments and European Union law 27.
Reference is made to the statement of facts in Janssen de Jong Groep B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, no.
2800/16, for a summary of the relevant domestic statutes, delegated legislation and case-law (the latter including the decisions given in that particular case), and the relevant Council of Europe instruments and European Union law.
COMPLAINTS 28.
The applicant company complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the exchange between authorities of information obtained by the interception of telephone conversations which was not relevant to the criminal investigation for the purpose of which those telephone conversations were intercepted was not in accordance with the law.
In particular, the applicant company complains that: (a) It was not foreseeable that the NMA was in a position to receive such information; (b) It was not foreseeable that the NMA could select the information which it wished to receive; (c) It was not foreseeable that the information could be transmitted to the NMA without any prior knowable weighing of interests; (d) It was not foreseeable that such weighing of interests could be effected ex post facto by the courts; (e) There was no provision in law for any weighing of interests by an independent authority prior to transmission (at least, not in the case of information irrelevant to the investigation for the purpose for which it was obtained).
29.
The applicant company complains under Article 13 of the Convention that there was no effective remedy available to it capable of preventing the transmission of the information in question to the NMA

Judgment

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF LANDGREN v. FINLAND

(Application no.
17889/07)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

10 November 2009

FINAL

10/02/2010

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Landgren v. Finland,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,Giovanni Bonello,Ljiljana Mijović,David Thór Björgvinsson,Ján Šikuta,Päivi Hirvelä,Mihai Poalelungi, judges,and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 20 October 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.
The case originated in an application (no. 17889/07) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Finnish national, Mr Timo Elias Landgren (“the applicant”), on 25 April 2007. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr Joonia Streng, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 3. On 27 August 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government, insofar as it concerned the length of the proceedings. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3). THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4.
The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Malaga, Spain. 5. The applicant's company was building houses on a plot bordering on parkland in the city of Espoo. On 19 October 2000 the city filed a criminal complaint requesting the police to investigate whether the applicant, or other persons, had committed an offence by cutting down trees on city grounds and removing them without authorisation. 6. On 31 October 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police for the first time in that connection. On 5 July 2001, having questioned the applicant on three further occasions, as well as other suspects and witnesses, and having obtained written evidence, the police referred the investigation report to the public prosecutor. 7. The applicant subsequently requested an additional pre-trial investigation. The prosecutor acceded to the request and referred the case back to the police on 14 November 2001. The report on that investigation was sent to the prosecutor on 13 March 2002. 8. In August 2001 two more criminal complaints were filed and the applicant was questioned on suspicion of having made unauthorised alterations to a listed building situated on the construction site and having used the city grounds as a storage area for soil and building materials. The reports on these investigations were referred to the prosecutor on 19 and 20 June 2002, respectively. 9. The applicant was provided with an opportunity to submit final statements to the investigation reports, which he did. The police referred the last two statements to the prosecutor on 22 August 2002. 10. On 24 September 2002 the prosecutor brought charges against the applicant and three other defendants in the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt). He accused the applicant of damage to the environment, aggravated criminal damage, a building offence and criminal trespass. The city joined most of the charges. After having held preliminary hearings on 8 January 2003, the court held an oral hearing comprising ten sessions between 7 and 22 May 2003. In addition to written evidence the court received testimony from all defendants and nearly 30 witnesses. On 7 May 2003 the court also made an on-site inspection. 11. On 18 June 2003 the court dismissed all the charges. Regarding the applicant, it stated, inter alia, that in cutting down the trees he had acted in good faith, relying on an agreement between the city and the owner of the building plot. According to the said agreement, the constructor was required to trim and tidy up the bordering parkland. The court further found that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the applicant had justifiably believed that no authorisation was needed to renovate the listed building and that he had not used the city grounds in an unlawful manner. In assessing the amount of costs and expenses awarded to defence counsel, the District Court noted that the case material had been extensive and the court's oral hearing had comprised ten long sessions. 12. On 30 June 2003 the prosecutor requested an extension of the time-limit set for an appeal. Having regard to the extent of the case material and the prosecutor's annual leave, the District Court extended the time-limit to 15 September 2003. 13. On that date, the prosecutor lodged his appeal with the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). On 14 November 2003 the letter of appeal was sent to the applicant for comments. On 3 December 2003 the applicant requested an extension of the time-limit set for his reply. The court acceded to the request and extended the time-limit to 30 January 2004. The applicant filed his reply on 22 January 2004. 14. On 12 September 2005 the court held a preliminary hearing. On 14 November 2005 it made an on-site inspection. An oral hearing comprising four sessions was held between 17 and 24 January 2006. In addition to written evidence the court received testimony from all four defendants and 19 witnesses. On 18 May 2006 the court issued its judgment, where it deviated from the lower court's conclusion about the legality of the applicant's actions. It convicted him of damaging the environment and of a building offence. It sentenced him to 80 unit fines and ordered him to pay damages and legal expenses to the city and to reimburse witness fees to the State. 15. On 23 November 2006 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal. THE LAW
I.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
16.
The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
17.
The Government contested that argument. 18. The period to be taken into consideration began on 31 October 2000, when the applicant was first questioned by the police, and ended on 23 November 2006 when the Supreme Court refused him leave to appeal. It thus lasted six years and 24 days for three levels of jurisdiction. A. Admissibility
19.
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
20.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II). 21. The Government argued that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings, firstly by requesting an additional investigation and secondly by requesting an extension of the time-limit set for his written reply to the Court of Appeal. This had caused delays of some four months and one month, respectively. In the Government's view all stages of the proceedings, excluding the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, had been completed swiftly. The Government pointed out that the case had not been considered urgent by the Court of Appeal, which had partly contributed to the time taken by that court. The Government further submitted that the case had been complex. In conclusion, the Government argued that the overall length of the proceedings had not exceeded reasonable time. 22. The applicant contested the Government's arguments. In his view, the case had not been complex. He had admitted to the conduct described in the prosecutor's indictment and the trial courts had mainly been called upon to make a judicial assessment of his criminal liability in that connection. Some of the oral evidence produced by the prosecution had been unnecessary. Moreover, the proceedings would have been conducted more speedily had the different charges against the applicant been dealt with in separate proceedings. 23. The Court finds no reason to question the District Court's view on the extent of the case material (see paragraph 11 above). It also takes note of the number of defendants and alleged offences as well as the number of witnesses heard before the domestic courts. However, there is nothing to suggest that the case presented any particular difficulty. Thus, the length of the proceedings cannot, in the Court's view, be explained by the complexity of the case alone. 24. The Court observes that, as far as the applicant was concerned, the pre-trial investigation and the consideration of charges lasted one year, 11 months and 13 days, which can be considered reasonable under the circumstances of the case. The Court is not convinced by the Government's argument that the applicant was partly responsible for the length of the pre-trial stage by requesting an additional investigation. It notes that at the time of the request, the police were still investigating other offences allegedly committed by the applicant, and those investigations were closed later than the one conducted at the applicant's request. In any case, the Court finds that making full use of the various procedures available to pursue his defence cannot be held against the applicant. There is nothing to suggest that the applicant attempted to impede the proceedings in any way. 25. The Court further observes that the case was pending before the District Court for eight months and 23 days, which can also be considered reasonable. Nor do the leave to appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court, some six months, appear excessively long. 26. However, the Court finds no justification for the length of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. After the delivery of the District Court's judgment, it took two years and eleven months until the Court of Appeal issued its judgment. This delay cannot be explained by the oral hearing, nor the on-site inspection, having regard, in particular, to the fact that the same procedural measures were taken by the lower court in a much shorter time. In the Court's view, the applicant's request for an extension of the time-limit set for his written reply did not significantly contribute to the total time taken before the Court of Appeal. By contrast, the Court notes that the Government have failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for the period of inactivity of almost one year and eight months which elapsed between the receipt of the applicant's written reply and that court's preliminary hearing. 27. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Pélissier and Sassi, cited above). 28. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. II. REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION
29.
The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention that the presumption of innocence had been breached at the pre-trial investigation stage in that the police had taken into account mainly material submitted by the city, including a document containing false information. The presumption had also been breached by the Court of Appeal when convicting the applicant without grounds. 30. The Court notes that the applicant has not even alleged that he or his counsel were in any way prevented from adducing evidence in support of the defence, either during the pre-trial investigation or before the trial courts. He was also fully able to contest any evidence submitted by other parties. Furthermore, the Court finds no indication that the Court of Appeal, contrary to Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, started from the presumption that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. 31. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
32.
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.
Damage
33.
The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage for loss of business opportunities during the proceedings. He further claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 34. The Government contested these claims. In their view, there was no causal link between the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the pecuniary damage claimed. As to the claim for non-pecuniary damage, the Government found it excessive as to quantum. Any award under that head should not exceed EUR 3,000. 35. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis it awards award him EUR 1,000 under that head. B. Costs and expenses
36.
The applicant also claimed EUR 3,385.88 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 37. The Government contested the claim. They pointed out that the Court had invited observations only in respect of the alleged breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The total award for costs and expenses should not exceed EUR 2,500. 38. According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000 (inclusive of value-added tax) for the proceedings before the Court. In this connection the Court notes that only one of the applicant's complaints was communicated to the Government for observations. C. Default interest
39.
The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.
Declares the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.
Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 November 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Lawrence EarlyNicolas BratzaRegistrarPresident