I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in RADMILLI v. MALTA.
Information
- Judgment date: 2022-01-13
- Communication date: 2020-03-20
- Application number(s): 28711/19
- Country: MLT
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 6, 6-1, 13, P1-1, P1-1-2
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)
Violation of Article 13+P1-1-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property
Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.50989
- Prediction: Violation
Consistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
The applicant, Ms Alessandra Radmilli, is a Maltese national, who was born in 1948 and lives in Sliema.
She is represented before the Court by Dr M. Camilleri and Dr E. Debono, lawyers practising in Valletta.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant owns a property, Orchid, Wilġa Street, Paceville, St. Julian’s which she acquired (partly by inheritance and partly by contract of division and donation) in 1989 and 1997 respectively.
On 20 April 1963, the applicant’s father rented (under title of temporary emphyteusis) the property to a third party, for seventeen years, at 96 Maltese liras (MTL) (approximately 233 euros (EUR)) per year.
The contract expired on 19 April 1980 however, the tenant relied on Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta, the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) to retain the property under title of lease, at a rent of MTL 180.50 (approximately EUR 420) per year until April 1995.
Thereafter the rent payable per year according to law was MTL 313.35 (approximately EUR 730) until April 2010 when the rent payable became (rounded up to the closest euro) EUR 1,073.
With the introduction of Act X of 2009 the rent payable as of January 2013 became EUR 1,142 per year and later, as of 2016, EUR 1,190 per year.
The tenant died on 10 January 2017 and his successor continued to reside in the property on the basis of the same law.
In 2017 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings claiming that the provisions of the Ordinance as amended by Act XXIII of 1979 ‐ which granted tenants the right to retain possession of the premises under a lease ‐ imposed on her as owner a unilateral lease relationship for an indeterminate time without reflecting a fair and adequate rent, in breach of, inter alia, Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 to the Convention.
She requested the court to award compensation for the damage suffered.
The applicant argued that prior to 1979 the owners had had no other option than to rent the property under title of temporary emphyteusis, in order to avoid it being requisitioned as was common at the time.
According to the court-appointed expert the sale value in 2017 was EUR 365,000 and the annual rental value was estimated as being in 1980 EUR 1,045, in 1985 EUR 1,466, in 1990 EUR 2,056, in 1995 EUR 2,883, in 2000 EUR 4,044, in 2005 EUR 5,672, in 2010 EUR 7,956, in 2015 EUR 11.158 and in 2017 EUR 12,775.
By a judgment of 15 February 2018 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a violation of the applicant’s property rights, awarded EUR 31,000 in compensation (EUR 30,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 in non-pecuniary damage) and declared that the tenant could no longer rely on the impugned law to maintain title to the property.
No costs were to be paid by the applicant.
For the purposes of compensation, the court considered: that this was the direct result of the law; that the State had persistently failed to remedy this imbalance arising from a structural issue resulting from laws which were in breach of human rights and yet remained in place; the discrepancy in the rent received and the market value, as of 1995 but particularly as of 2008; the uncertainty as to when the applicant would recover her property and the lack of any procedural safeguards.
By a judgment of 14 December 2018 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals lodged by both parties.
It confirmed the first-instance judgment but reduced the non-pecuniary award to EUR 25,000, having considered that it should not depart from the limits of compensation usually awarded in similar cases.
The applicant was ordered to pay 1⁄4 of the costs of the appeal proceedings.
Despite the order of the constitutional jurisdictions to the effect that the tenant could no longer rely on the relevant law, the applicant was unable to institute eviction proceedings due to the introduction of Act No.
XXVII of 2018 which provided that despite a judgment in his favour, it shall not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing himself of the new procedure provided by that law.
The relevant domestic law is set out in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no.
47045/06, § 19-22, 15 September 2009).
Section 12B of the Ordinance introduced by Act No.
XXVII of 2018 published on 10 July 2018 and which entered into force on 1 August 2018 reads as follows: “(1) Where a person is in occupation of a dwelling house under title of lease created by virtue of a previous title of emphyteusis or sub-emphyteusis which commenced before the 1st June 1995 through the application of article 5, 12, or 12A the following conditions shall, insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of the said articles of this Ordinance apply in respect of such lease as from, the 10th April 2018 notwithstanding the provisions of the said articles of the Ordinance or of any other law.
(2) The owner shall be entitled to file an application before the Rent Regulation Board demanding that the rent be revised to an amount not exceeding two percent per annum of the open market freehold value of the dwelling house on the 1st January of the year during which the application is filed and that new conditions be established in respect of the lease.
(3) The procedure applicable to the hearing of applications before the Rent Regulation Board shall apply to the hearing of an application made under sub‐article (1): Provided that: (i) the Housing Authority shall be notified with the application and shall have a right to fully participate as amicus curiae in the proceedings; and (ii) the tenant and the landlord shall always be entitled to the benefit of legal aid in proceedings filed in terms of this article if they are not in full-time gainful employment; and (iii) at the initial stage of the proceedings the Board shall conduct a means test of the tenant which shall be based on the means test provided for in the Continuation of Tenancies (Means Testing Criteria) Regulations issued under articles 1531F and 1622A of the Civil Code or any regulations from time to time replacing them.
The means test shall be based on the income of the tenant between the 1st January and the 31st December of the year preceding the year when the proceedings are commenced and the capital of the tenant on the 31st December of the said year.
The means test shall be conducted with particular reference, inter alia, to regulations 4 to 8 of the said regulations which shall apply mutatis mutandis.
(4) Where the tenant does not meet the income and capital criteria of the means test the Board shall, after hearing any evidence and submissions produced by the parties, give judgement allowing the tenant a period of five years to vacate the premises.
The compensation for occupation of the premises payable to the owner during the said period shall amount to double the rent which would have been payable in terms of articles 5, 12 or 12A.
(5) Where the tenant meets the income and capital criteria of the means test the Board shall proceed according to the following subarticles.
(6) In establishing the amount of rent payable in accordance with sub-article (1) the Board shall give due account to the means and age of the tenant and to any disproportionate burden particular to the landlord and it may determine that any increase in rent shall be gradual.
The Board, after briefly hearing the parties and examining any evidence which it considers relevant, may also order that an increased amount of rent be paid whilst the hearing of an application filed in terms of sub‐article (1) is pending.
(7) Where an amount of rent is established in terms of sub article (1) that rent shall apply in respect of the lease of the dwelling house, unless the lease is previously terminated, for a period of six years, after which it shall be subject to being revised in accordance with sub-article (1) unless an agreement is reached between the parties.
(8) (a) Upon the happening of a material change in circumstances during the continuance of a lease established in accordance with article 5, 12 or 12A the owner shall be entitled to file an application before the Board demanding that the conditions of the lease be revised on account of their causing a disproportionate burden upon him.
(b) The owner may also demand the dissolution of the lease if he can prove through unequivocal evidence that the tenant is not a person in need of the social protection provided by articles 5, 12 or 12A and by this article: Provided that: (i) the provisions of paragraph (a) of this sub-article shall not apply where the hearing of an application under subarticle (1) is pending or has been determined for less than three years; (ii) the tenant shall always be deemed to be a person not in need of the social protection provided by articles 5, 12, 12A and by this article if the Housing Authority or the landlord offer alternative accommodation suitable to the tenant and guarantees the availability of such accommodation to the tenant for at least ten years for a rent which is not in excess of that which would have been payable by the tenant had the tenant continued the lease under articles 5, 12 or 12A.
(9) (a) Any person who has a right to be recognised as a tenant in terms of the proviso to the definition "tenant" in article 2 shall, unless the said is a person referred to in paragraph (a) of the said definition, only acquire a right to occupy the dwelling house for a period of five years upon the expiration of which he shall vacate the said dwelling house.
The compensation for occupation of the dwelling house payable to the owner during the said period shall, unless the occupier meets the income and capital criteria of the means test referred to in paragraph (iii) of sub-article (3), amount to double the rent which would have been payable in terms of articles 5, 12 or 12A.
(b) Any dispute as to whether the occupier meets the criteria of the means test may be referred by either party to the Board by application and the provisions of sub‐article (3) shall apply.
(10) The provisions of article 1555A of the Civil Code shall apply in respect of any lease which came into effect by virtue of articles 5, 12, 12A or this article.
(11) The provisions of this article shall also apply in all cases where any emphyteusis, sub-emphyteusis or tenancy in respect of a dwelling house regulated under articles 5, 12, or 12A has lapsed due to a court judgment based on the lack of proportionality between the value of the property and the amount receivable by the landlord and the person who was the emphyteuta or the sub-emphyteuta or the tenant still occupies the house as his ordinary residence on the 10th April 2018.
In such cases it shall not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing himself of the provisions of this article.” COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention that she is still a victim of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 upheld by the domestic court given the low amount of compensation awarded as well as the fact that there had been no order to evict the tenants.
She also considers that constitutional redress proceedings were not an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13.
This was even more so given the introduction of Act No.
XXVII of 2018 which impeded the execution of the judgment in her favour, as a result of which the applicant considers that she has been suffering a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Judgment
FIRST SECTIONCASE OF RADMILLI v. MALTA
(Application no. 28711/19)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Radmilli v. Malta,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President, Erik Wennerström, Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 28711/19) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 May 2019 by a Maltese national, Ms Alessandra Radmilli, born in 1948 and living in Sliema (“the applicant”) who was represented by Dr M. Camilleri and Dr E. Debono, lawyers practising in Valletta;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Maltese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, Dr C. Soler, State Advocate, and Dr J. Vella, Advocate at the Office of the State Advocate;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 30 November 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicant’s property had been rented out to a third party (under title of temporary emphyteusis) by her ancestors. The contract expired in 1980, however, as a result of Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta the tenant retained the property under title of lease, at a rent of approximately 420 euros (EUR) per year with slight increases over the years. 2. On 15 February 2018 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a violation of the applicant’s property rights, noting in particular a decreasing legitimate aim since 1995 when the large majority of the property market had been liberalised. Bearing in mind the discrepancy in the rent received and the market value, particularly as of 2008, it awarded EUR 30,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 in non-pecuniary damage and declared that the tenant could no longer rely on the impugned law to maintain title to the property. No costs were to be paid by the applicant. On appeal by the State and the tenant, on 14 December 2018 the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment but reduced the pecuniary award to EUR 25,000, having considered that it should not depart from the limits of compensation usually awarded in similar cases. The applicant was ordered to pay 1⁄4 of the costs of the appeal proceedings. 3. Act No. XXVII of 2018 entered into force on 1 August 2018 and its Article 12B provided, inter alia, that despite a judgment in the owner’s favour, it shall not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing himself of the new procedure provided by that law. On an unspecified date before 8 May 2020 the applicant regained possession of the vacant property. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
4. The applicant complained that she is still a victim of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, despite the findings by the domestic courts, given the low amount of compensation awarded as well as the fact that there had been no order to evict the tenants. 5. The Court observes that the domestic courts have acknowledged the violation and awarded EUR 26,000 in compensation for both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary damage. The Court refers to its general principles concerning victim status and its established case‐law in cases similar to the present one (see, among many other authorities, Apap Bologna v. Malta, no. 46931/12, §§ 41, 43, 48 and 82, 30 August 2016). Bearing in mind that the property had a rental value of, for example, EUR 12,775 in 2017, the Court considers that the compensation awarded for a violation persisting over decades was not adequate and that the redress provided by the domestic courts did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant, who thus retains victim status for the purposes of this complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Portanier v. Malta, no. 55747/16, § 24, 27 August 2019). The Government’s objection to this effect is therefore dismissed. 6. The Court also dismisses the Government’s objection of non‐exhaustion of domestic remedies (in so far as the applicant had not appealed against the first-instance judgment of 15 February 2018 to the Constitutional Court) on the basis of its considerations in Cauchi v. Malta (no. 14013/19, §§ 55 and 77, 25 March 2021, relating to domestic proceedings in 2018). The additional domestic cases relied on by the Government in the present case are all dated 2020. Thus, they do not dispel the Court’s earlier conclusions that the Constitutional Court could not be considered an effective remedy at the relevant time (2018). 7. In so far as the Government raised an objection in relation to the applicant’s arguments concerning Article 12B, which had never been brought before the domestic courts, the Court considers that bearing in mind its findings at paragraph 12 below, it is not necessary to deal with this objection. 8. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 9. As to the merits, the Court refers to its general principles as set out, for example, in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, §§ 52-59, 15 September 2009). 10. Having regard to the findings of the domestic courts relating to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court considers that it is not necessary to re‐examine in detail the merits of the complaint. It finds that, as established by the domestic courts, the applicant was made to bear a disproportionate burden. Moreover, as the Court has already found in the context of the objection on victim status (see paragraph 4 above), the redress provided by the domestic courts did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant. 11. The Court observes that, as noted by the Government, it is unclear whether during a certain time after 1980, the rent being received by the applicant was one agreed by both parties, before it was later increased according to law. However, in the absence of any considerations in this respect at the domestic level, the Court will not speculate as to the factual circumstances. 12. Furthermore, the Court considers that – without having to address the effectiveness or otherwise of the procedure introduced by Act XXVII of 2018 for the purposes of this complaint – even assuming that the new Article 12B of the Ordinance provided for any relevant and effective safeguards, these had no bearing on the situation suffered by the applicant until the introduction of these amendments in 2018. It is also unclear whether they had any bearing thereafter given that the tenant vacated the premises on an unspecified date prior to 8 May 2020 (compare, Cauchi, cited above, § 63). 13. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 14. The applicant also raised a complaint under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which is covered by well‐established case-law of the Court. The complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other ground. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, and noting that the Government’s submissions have been rejected by this Court in previous analogous cases, the Court concludes that they disclose a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in the light of its findings in, for example, Apap Bologna (cited above, §§ 89-91) and Portanier (cited above, §§ 55-56). 15. The applicant also raised other complaints under various Convention provisions. The Court has examined that part of the application and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. 16. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
17. The applicant claimed 170,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 15,000 in non-pecuniary damage in the light of all the complaints raised as well as EUR 401 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 3,000 for those incurred before the Court. 18. The Government submitted that there had been no explanation as to the applicant’s calculation in respect of the pecuniary damage, which did not appear to tally with the court-appointed expert’s valuation. Moreover, amongst its various observations, they noted that the applicant only acquired the entirety of the property in 1997 by a contract of division and donation, her having acquired the other half jointly with her brothers on her father’s demise in 1989. The Government also considered that the claim for non-pecuniary damage was excessive. The Government did not dispute the domestic courts costs but submitted that no proof of payment had been put forward in relation to costs before this Court. 19. The Court notes that both before the domestic courts as well as before this Court the applicant premised her application with the fact that she became the full owner in 1997. However, in her domestic application reference is made to the fact that her ancestor also suffered the breach and that she was due compensation also for that period. The latter request was reiterated by the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence and acknowledged by the Government who raised a plea of prescription and of inadmissibility ratione temporis – both of which were rejected. Further the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence examined the rent at issue for the period following 1980 noting that it was low compared to the market value with the discrepancy increasing over time, resulting, together with other factors, in a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Constitutional Court did not alter those conclusions. There is therefore no reason to exclude the years during which the applicant only part-owned the property, or those where it was held by the applicant’s ascendant – bearing in mind, however, that the disproportionality must not have arisen immediately. 20. The Court further notes that, apart from relying generally on the experts’ valuations, the applicant has not explained her calculation. In any event the Court has made all the considerations applicable in this type of cases, as set out in Cauchi (cited above, §§ 102-07). Noting in particular that the award of the Constitutional Court remains payable if not yet paid, the Court awards the applicant EUR 37,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 7,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage. 21. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 401, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, for costs and expenses before the domestic courts. It rejects the unsubstantiated claims for costs and expenses before this Court. 22. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 37,000 (thirty-seven thousand euros), in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 401 (four hundred and one euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Liv Tigerstedt Krzysztof Wojtyczek Deputy Registrar President
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF RADMILLI v. MALTA
(Application no. 28711/19)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13 January 2022
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Radmilli v. Malta,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President, Erik Wennerström, Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 28711/19) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 May 2019 by a Maltese national, Ms Alessandra Radmilli, born in 1948 and living in Sliema (“the applicant”) who was represented by Dr M. Camilleri and Dr E. Debono, lawyers practising in Valletta;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Maltese Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, Dr C. Soler, State Advocate, and Dr J. Vella, Advocate at the Office of the State Advocate;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 30 November 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicant’s property had been rented out to a third party (under title of temporary emphyteusis) by her ancestors. The contract expired in 1980, however, as a result of Act XXIII of 1979 amending Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta the tenant retained the property under title of lease, at a rent of approximately 420 euros (EUR) per year with slight increases over the years. 2. On 15 February 2018 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found a violation of the applicant’s property rights, noting in particular a decreasing legitimate aim since 1995 when the large majority of the property market had been liberalised. Bearing in mind the discrepancy in the rent received and the market value, particularly as of 2008, it awarded EUR 30,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 in non-pecuniary damage and declared that the tenant could no longer rely on the impugned law to maintain title to the property. No costs were to be paid by the applicant. On appeal by the State and the tenant, on 14 December 2018 the Constitutional Court confirmed the first-instance judgment but reduced the pecuniary award to EUR 25,000, having considered that it should not depart from the limits of compensation usually awarded in similar cases. The applicant was ordered to pay 1⁄4 of the costs of the appeal proceedings. 3. Act No. XXVII of 2018 entered into force on 1 August 2018 and its Article 12B provided, inter alia, that despite a judgment in the owner’s favour, it shall not be lawful for the owner to proceed to request the eviction of the occupier without first availing himself of the new procedure provided by that law. On an unspecified date before 8 May 2020 the applicant regained possession of the vacant property. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
4. The applicant complained that she is still a victim of the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, despite the findings by the domestic courts, given the low amount of compensation awarded as well as the fact that there had been no order to evict the tenants. 5. The Court observes that the domestic courts have acknowledged the violation and awarded EUR 26,000 in compensation for both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary damage. The Court refers to its general principles concerning victim status and its established case‐law in cases similar to the present one (see, among many other authorities, Apap Bologna v. Malta, no. 46931/12, §§ 41, 43, 48 and 82, 30 August 2016). Bearing in mind that the property had a rental value of, for example, EUR 12,775 in 2017, the Court considers that the compensation awarded for a violation persisting over decades was not adequate and that the redress provided by the domestic courts did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant, who thus retains victim status for the purposes of this complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Portanier v. Malta, no. 55747/16, § 24, 27 August 2019). The Government’s objection to this effect is therefore dismissed. 6. The Court also dismisses the Government’s objection of non‐exhaustion of domestic remedies (in so far as the applicant had not appealed against the first-instance judgment of 15 February 2018 to the Constitutional Court) on the basis of its considerations in Cauchi v. Malta (no. 14013/19, §§ 55 and 77, 25 March 2021, relating to domestic proceedings in 2018). The additional domestic cases relied on by the Government in the present case are all dated 2020. Thus, they do not dispel the Court’s earlier conclusions that the Constitutional Court could not be considered an effective remedy at the relevant time (2018). 7. In so far as the Government raised an objection in relation to the applicant’s arguments concerning Article 12B, which had never been brought before the domestic courts, the Court considers that bearing in mind its findings at paragraph 12 below, it is not necessary to deal with this objection. 8. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 9. As to the merits, the Court refers to its general principles as set out, for example, in Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, §§ 52-59, 15 September 2009). 10. Having regard to the findings of the domestic courts relating to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court considers that it is not necessary to re‐examine in detail the merits of the complaint. It finds that, as established by the domestic courts, the applicant was made to bear a disproportionate burden. Moreover, as the Court has already found in the context of the objection on victim status (see paragraph 4 above), the redress provided by the domestic courts did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant. 11. The Court observes that, as noted by the Government, it is unclear whether during a certain time after 1980, the rent being received by the applicant was one agreed by both parties, before it was later increased according to law. However, in the absence of any considerations in this respect at the domestic level, the Court will not speculate as to the factual circumstances. 12. Furthermore, the Court considers that – without having to address the effectiveness or otherwise of the procedure introduced by Act XXVII of 2018 for the purposes of this complaint – even assuming that the new Article 12B of the Ordinance provided for any relevant and effective safeguards, these had no bearing on the situation suffered by the applicant until the introduction of these amendments in 2018. It is also unclear whether they had any bearing thereafter given that the tenant vacated the premises on an unspecified date prior to 8 May 2020 (compare, Cauchi, cited above, § 63). 13. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 14. The applicant also raised a complaint under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which is covered by well‐established case-law of the Court. The complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other ground. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, and noting that the Government’s submissions have been rejected by this Court in previous analogous cases, the Court concludes that they disclose a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in the light of its findings in, for example, Apap Bologna (cited above, §§ 89-91) and Portanier (cited above, §§ 55-56). 15. The applicant also raised other complaints under various Convention provisions. The Court has examined that part of the application and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. 16. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
17. The applicant claimed 170,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 15,000 in non-pecuniary damage in the light of all the complaints raised as well as EUR 401 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 3,000 for those incurred before the Court. 18. The Government submitted that there had been no explanation as to the applicant’s calculation in respect of the pecuniary damage, which did not appear to tally with the court-appointed expert’s valuation. Moreover, amongst its various observations, they noted that the applicant only acquired the entirety of the property in 1997 by a contract of division and donation, her having acquired the other half jointly with her brothers on her father’s demise in 1989. The Government also considered that the claim for non-pecuniary damage was excessive. The Government did not dispute the domestic courts costs but submitted that no proof of payment had been put forward in relation to costs before this Court. 19. The Court notes that both before the domestic courts as well as before this Court the applicant premised her application with the fact that she became the full owner in 1997. However, in her domestic application reference is made to the fact that her ancestor also suffered the breach and that she was due compensation also for that period. The latter request was reiterated by the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence and acknowledged by the Government who raised a plea of prescription and of inadmissibility ratione temporis – both of which were rejected. Further the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence examined the rent at issue for the period following 1980 noting that it was low compared to the market value with the discrepancy increasing over time, resulting, together with other factors, in a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The Constitutional Court did not alter those conclusions. There is therefore no reason to exclude the years during which the applicant only part-owned the property, or those where it was held by the applicant’s ascendant – bearing in mind, however, that the disproportionality must not have arisen immediately. 20. The Court further notes that, apart from relying generally on the experts’ valuations, the applicant has not explained her calculation. In any event the Court has made all the considerations applicable in this type of cases, as set out in Cauchi (cited above, §§ 102-07). Noting in particular that the award of the Constitutional Court remains payable if not yet paid, the Court awards the applicant EUR 37,000 in pecuniary damage and EUR 7,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage. 21. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 401, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, for costs and expenses before the domestic courts. It rejects the unsubstantiated claims for costs and expenses before this Court. 22. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i) EUR 37,000 (thirty-seven thousand euros), in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 401 (four hundred and one euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 January 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Liv Tigerstedt Krzysztof Wojtyczek Deputy Registrar President