I incorrectly predicted that there's no violation of human rights in BURANDO HOLDING B.V. v. THE NETHERLANDS.
Information
- Judgment date: 2009-09-29
- Communication date: 2018-12-14
- Application number(s): 3124/16
- Country: NLD
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 8, 8-1, 8-2, 13
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.638074
- Prediction: No violation
Inconsistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
1.
The applicant, Burando Holding B.V., is a limited liability company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid), with its seat in Rotterdam.
It is represented before the Court by Mr M.A.D.
Bol and Mr H.A.
Bravenboer, lawyers practising in Rotterdam.
2.
The applicant company is active in the Rotterdam port region.
It is one of several companies in that area whose business includes the collection of waste liquids (or “slops”) from seagoing ships for disposal.
A.
The circumstances of the case 3.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant company, may be summarised as follows.
1.
Background to the case 4.
The Information and Investigation Service (Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst) of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer) began an investigation into another collector of waste liquid from ships, I., suspected of mixing polluted waste liquids with bunker oil in contravention of legislation for the protection of the environment.
5.
Between February 2007 and April 2007 telephone conversations made by the management of I. were intercepted, recorded and then either transcribed or summarised in the course of these investigations.
Among the conversations so recorded were conversations between I.’s managing director and the managing director of the company Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V. (applicant in case no.
2799/16) from which it appeared that the two companies were engaged in price-fixing.
2.
The transfer of criminal data 6.
An official record dated 21 April 2008 by an official of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment records several of these telephone conversations.
It is stated that that record is to be forwarded to the Netherlands Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, “NMA”) through the intervention of the public prosecutor (officier van justitie).
7.
There being indications that companies other than I. and Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V. were involved, the NMA transmitted a set of search terms to the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment with which to identify telephone conversations relevant to the investigation to be undertaken by the NMA.
8.
On 21 October 2008 the public prosecutor gave permission for the official record to be forwarded to the NMA by adding “transfer to NMA approved (akkoord verstrekking aan NMA)”, dated and signed, in handwriting.
9.
The official record was transferred to the NMA on 29 June 2009.
The NMA subsequently sent the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment a request for complete sound recordings to be transferred to it.
10.
Further transcripts and recordings of intercepted telephone conversations were forwarded to the NMA on 26 November 2009, 7 July 2010 and 2 September 2010.
On each occasion the public prosecutor gave permission in summary form without reasoning for transmission to take place.
3.
The decision by the NMA to impose fines and the administrative review proceedings 11.
An NMA report of 28 December 2010 found that the applicant company, together with the company I., Port Invest B.V. and others, was accountable for an infringement of section 6(1) of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet).
This report quoted extensively from transcripts of telephone conversations.
12.
Following an exchange of arguments in writing and a hearing held on 15 April 2011, the Governors (Raad van Bestuur) of the NMA gave a decision on 16 November 2011.
As relevant to the case, they found that the transcripts and recordings had been lawfully forwarded to them by decision of the public prosecutor under the authority of the Board of Procurators General (College van procureurs-generaal).
In terms of Article 8 of the Convention, it was “in accordance with the law” in that it had a statutory basis and was foreseeable, and it met a “pressing social need”, to wit, the enforcement of competition law.
There was no suggestion that the interceptions themselves had been unlawful, or that the competing interests had been wrongly weighed by the public prosecutor.
They found the applicant company and the other companies involved in the proceedings to have violated the prohibition set out in section 6 of the Competition Act (Mededingingswet).
They imposed a collective fine on the company I., Port Invest B.V. and the applicant company in an amount of 1,861,000 euros, the applicant company being jointly and severally liable for EUR 621,000 of this.
13.
The company I., the applicant company and Port Invest B.V. lodged a joint written objection (bezwaarschrift).
They protested against the lack of any judicial control of the transfer to the NMA of the telephone interceptions in issue, arguing that the authority of the public prosecutor, even if delegated by the Board of Procurators General, could not substitute for that of an independent court.
It also protested against the apparent absence of any weighing of competing interests.
Relying on, inter alia, section 6(3) of the Competition Act, they further denied any wrongdoing.
14.
With the consent of the NMA, the objection (bezwaar) phase was bypassed and the applicant companies submitted their objection directly to the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) by way of appeal (beroep).
4.
Appeal proceedings before the Rotterdam Regional Court 15.
The NMA lodged a written defence statement.
16.
As relevant to the case before the Court, the NMA stated that the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment had intercepted telephone conversations from which it appeared that the company I. and the applicant company were engaged in illegal price fixing; summary transcripts of these were transferred to the NMA, through the intermediary of the public prosecutor.
Further summary transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations had been transferred to the NMA at its request with the permission of the public prosecutor.
These had been existing summary transcripts; the NMA had had no involvement in the criminal investigation carried out by the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment under the guidance of the public prosecution service (openbaar ministerie).
The extensive transcripts had been elaborated by the NMA itself, not by the public prosecution service at the NMA’s request.
The legal basis for such transfer was section 39f of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act (Wet justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens), which so permitted in pursuance of a “compelling general interest” – an expression which encompassed “national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as referred to in Article 8 of the Convention.
The public prosecutor was a functionary eminently suited to that responsibility.
As to the telephone interceptions themselves, there was neither information to suggest nor reason to believe that they had been unlawful; in this matter, the NMA was dependent on the public prosecution service.
As regards the substance of the case against the applicant company, the telephone conversations themselves were relied on (with other items of evidence) as proof of price-fixing.
17.
Having held a hearing, the Regional Court gave a decision on 11 July 2013 deciding the appeal of the applicant company jointly with the appeals of three other ships’ waste disposal companies (Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V., Port Invest B.V. and the company I.)
suspected of price-fixing.
As relevant to the case before the Court, its decision included the following: “13.
It follows from [the Regional Court’s own] decision of 13 June 2003 [ECLI:NL:RBROTT:2013;CA3079][1] that the transfer of criminal data requires a weighing of interests by the public prosecutor in person that is knowable and can be reviewed by the court, that has led to the conclusion that there is a need for the provision of criminal data because of a compelling public interest.
In addition, the public prosecutor must consider whether such provision is in accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
In this connection, the Regional Court has stressed the need to respect the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, on the ground of which everyone has the right to respect for his or her private life.
Section 39 [the Court takes this to mean section 39f] of the Judicial Information and Criminal Records Act, which provided a statutory basis for the provision of criminal data to third parties, guarantees that these requirements are met.” Since the public prosecutor had merely granted permission for the transfer of the transcripts to the NMA, in handwriting on the official record of 28 October 2010 and on pre-printed forms without reasoning subsequently, the Regional Court found that no reviewable weighing of interests had been recorded.
From this it followed that the transcripts were to be excluded as evidence.
Since the NMA had previously had no indication of price-fixing and would not have begun an investigation without the information given by the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, and since the NMA’s decision depended entirely on the intercepted telephone conversations and on documents handed over or statements made by persons after they had been confronted with these telephone conversations, the Regional Court quashed the NMA’s decision in its entirety.
5.
Further appeal proceedings before the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry 18.
The Consumer and Market Authority (Autoriteit Consument en Markt, “ACM”), the successor body to the NMA by this time, lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) with the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven).
As relevant to the case before the Court, it argued that the transfer of criminal data by the public prosecution service to another entity would only be contrary to domestic law or to Article 8 of the Convention if it could not be considered necessary with a view to a compelling general interest or if it did not comply with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.
That assessment fell to be made, according to the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act, by the civil courts in the shape of an ex post facto judicial review, as had taken place in the case [leading to application no.
2800/16].
In addition, the transfer of criminal data to a third party on the basis of section 39f(1) of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act was a factual act, not a decision within the meaning of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht), and therefore not amenable to judicial review by the administrative courts.
Such a transfer by a public prosecutor required neither reasoning nor an ex ante review of its lawfulness.
According to the ACM, use in evidence of the criminal data received was admissible as there were no indications that the data had been obtained unlawfully or that, even if it that were the case, the manner of that obtainment ran counter to the proper behaviour expected of authorities to such an extent that its use could not be considered permissible under any circumstances (verkregen op een wijze die zozeer indruist tegen hetgeen van een behoorlijk handelende overheid mag worden verwacht dat het gebruik hiervan onder alle omstandigheden ontoelaatbaar moet worden geacht).
19.
The ACM’s further appeal was joined by the Board of Procurators General.
20.
Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V., Burando Holding B.V., Port Invest B.V. and the company I. lodged a cross-appeal.
In these further appeal proceedings, they presented a joint position.
They submitted that the intercepted telephone conversations fell outside the scope of the criminal investigation and therefore were not properly in the case file.
They further argued, inter alia, that data, obtained in a criminal investigation and by means of an interference with the right to private life, could not be transferred to third persons without a balancing of interests – set out in a reasoned manner – having taken place prior to any such transfer.
On the basis of a set of search terms transmitted to the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, the NMA had listened electronically to intercepted telephone conversations, which could not be considered as the provision of data within the meaning of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act.
Moreover, it was for the administrative courts to examine, in proceedings against the imposition of a fine, the lawfulness of the manner in which evidence, on the basis of which that fine had been imposed, had been obtained.
21.
Ships Waste Oil Collector B.V., Burando Holding B.V., Port Invest B.V. and the company I. maintained their prior position as to the merits of the case.
22.
On 14 April 2014 the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry gave a decision (ECLI:NL:CBB:2014:151) rejecting the appeal of the Board of Procurators General.
It found that since the merits of the case concerned not criminal law but the enforcement under administrative procedure of competition law, the Board of Procurators General had no legal interest of its own and hence no locus standi.
23.
Having held a hearing on 20 November 2014, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry gave its decision on 9 July 2015 (ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:192).
Holding that the appeal of the ACM was well‐founded, it quashed the decision of the Regional Court and remitted the case to it for rehearing.
It dismissed the applicant company’s cross‐appeal.
As relevant to the case before the Court, its reasoning included the following: “4.6.
The first matter to be decided in this connection is whether the provision of criminal data, consisting in the present case of intercepted telephone conversations, based on section 39f of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act is contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
An interference with the right to privacy is only permitted under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention in so far as it is in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of, among other things, the economic well-being of the country.
The starting point in considering this issue is that the interception of the telephone conversations from which the intercepted data were obtained took place after the investigating judge gave permission to do so.
The arguments presented by the company I., Port Invest B.V. and Burando Holding B.V. do not constitute grounds to find that the intercepted telephone conversations have not been obtained in accordance with the requirements of criminal procedure in force by the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment.
The public prosecutor’s competence to provide the intercepted telephone conversations is statutorily grounded in the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act.
Moreover, as regards the lawfulness of this obtainment, the law provides for a judicial procedure attended by sufficient guarantees, both under civil law within the framework of the provision of the data and under administrative law within the framework of the review of the decision to impose the fine for which these data have served as a basis.
It appears from the report in these cases that the ACM has extensively reviewed the evidence, including the intercepted telephone conversations, within the framework of establishing whether there has been a transgression of section 6(1) of the Competition Act.
After the report was issued and before a decision was taken by the ACM to impose a fine, the appellants were offered the opportunity to submit their views in writing of that report, of which opportunity they have availed themselves.
Finally, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry finds that a sufficient case has been made out that the information about the alleged price-fixing arrangements could not in reason have been obtained by the ACM in a different, less intrusive way, since such arrangements are not, as a rule, committed to paper.
In the judgment of the Provisional Measures Judge of the Regional Court of The Hague of 26 June 2009 (ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2009:BJ0047), to which the parties also refer, the Provisional Measures Judge in a matter comparable with that here in issue gave a provisional decision on the legality of the provision of intercepted telephone conversations by the public prosecution service to the ACM and came to the same finding as regards the proportionality of such provision.
In view of the above, the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry sees no reason to find that the provision of the intercepted telephone conversations to the ACM based on section 39f of the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act is contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
4.7 Within the framework of the care to be taken under section 3.2 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht) in preparing a decision, the ACM is obliged to consider the lawfulness of the evidence to be used by it.
In paragraphs 180 and following of the decision imposing the fine the ACM has gone into the use of the intercepted telephone conversations in evidence.
It considered in so doing whether in obtaining the intercepted telephone conversations the principles of due process had been violated, or whether the rights of the defence had been disregarded.
In this connection the ACM stressed that the legislature limited the (active) powers of the ACM to collect data, but not the data which the ACM might receive.
The ACM came to the conclusion that there was no ground for it to find that the intercepted telephone conversations provide to the ACM by the public prosecution service should not be used in evidence.
4.8 The arguments presented by [the applicant companies] do not constitute a reason for the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry to find that this conclusion by the ACM is wrong.
It should be stressed in this connection that the ACM was entitled to assume, based on the [Provision of Criminal Records for Purposes Other than Criminal Law Enforcement (Designation) Order (Aanwijzing verstrekking van strafvorderlijke gegevens voor buiten de strafrechtstoepassing gelegen doeleinden (aanwijzing wet justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens), that the evidence concerned had been provided to it lawfully.
In the present case it concerns provision to an administrative organ.
Provisions to administrative organs with a view to the exercise of supervision of compliance with legislation are considered to be standard cases of provision pursuant to chapter IV.4.c of that Order.
...
The circumstance that the ACM itself does not have the competence to intercept telephone conversations does not constitute ground for the finding that the use of the intercepted telephone conversations by the ACM should be considered unacceptable.
The Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act provides precisely for the possibility that such data, obtained using coercive measures under criminal procedure (strafvorderlijke dwangmiddelen) may be provided to, among others, administrative organs that do not themselves have the competence to make use of such coercive measures.
Contrary to the argument made by the company I., Port Invest B.V. and Burando Holding B.V., the circumstance that the ACM – in consultation with the Information and Investigation Service of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment – had, after having [taken cognisance of transcripts and recordings of intercepted telephone conversations], made a selection from the bulk of the data that were available and provisionally considered relevant by the Information and Investigation Service, does not, in the given situation, lead the Administrative High Court for Trade and Industry to find that the provision took place contrary to the Judicial Information and Criminal Data Act.” B.
Relevant domestic law, Council of Europe instruments and European Union law 24.
Reference is made to the statement of facts in Janssen de Jong Groep B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, no.
2800/16, for a summary of the relevant domestic statutes, delegated legislation and case-law (the latter including the decisions given in that particular case), and the relevant Council of Europe instruments and European Union law.
COMPLAINTS 25.
The applicant company complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the exchange between authorities of information obtained by the interception of telephone conversations which was not relevant to the criminal investigation for the purpose of which those telephone conversations were intercepted was not in accordance with the law.
In particular, the applicant company complains that: (a) It was not foreseeable that the NMA was in a position to receive such information; (b) It was not foreseeable that the NMA could select the information which it wished to receive; (c) It was not foreseeable that the information could be transmitted to the NMA without any prior knowable weighing of interests; (d) It was not foreseeable that such weighing of interests could be effected ex post facto by the courts; (e) There was no provision in law for any weighing of interests by an independent authority prior to transmission (at least, not in the case of information irrelevant to the investigation for the purpose for which it was obtained).
26.
The applicant company complains under Article 13 of the Convention that there was no effective remedy available to it capable of preventing the transmission of the information in question to the NMA.
Judgment
SECOND SECTIONCASE OF ERKUŞ v. TURKEY
(Application no. 30326/03)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
29 September 2009
FINAL
29/12/2009
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Erkuş v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,Ireneu Cabral Barreto,Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,Danutė Jočienė,Dragoljub Popović,Nona Tsotsoria,Işıl Karakaş, judges,and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 8 September 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 30326/03) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Turkish national, Mr Ergin Erkuş (“the applicant”), on 12 August 2003. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr S. Çetinkaya, a lawyer practising in Izmir. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent. 3. On 20 May 2008 the Court declared the application partly inadmissible and decided to communicate to the Government the complaint concerning the lawfulness and length of the applicant’s detention and the absence of an investigation into his detention. It also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3). THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Izmir. 5. While the applicant was in compulsory military service in Kırklareli, on 19 November 2002 he got ten days’ leave and went to Izmir to see his family. He did not return to his barracks afterwards. 6. On 22 February 2003 at 3 p.m., the applicant was arrested by police officers at the Narlıdere police station during a routine identity check on suspicion of being an army deserter (asker kaçağı). At 4 p.m. he was taken to the Üçkuyular Military Station Command where the officials determined that he had not returned to his army command when his leave had ended. He was questioned, inter alia, about which army command he belonged to, why he had deserted and whether he had committed a crime during this time. 7. On the same day at 8 p.m., the applicant was taken to Şirinyer Military Station Command where he remained in custody. The next day at 11 a.m., he was transferred to the Military Recruitment Office. 8. On 7 March 2003 at 1.30 p.m., the applicant was transferred to his army command in Kırklareli. The verbatim record of this transfer noted that the applicant, having committed the offence of army desertion, was requested to be transferred to his army command. It further indicated that the applicant had entered the “security room” on 23 February 2003 and “exited” on 6 March 2003. 9. On the same day at 2 p.m., the applicant was questioned by two army officials who informed him that he had committed the offence of exceeding his leave. 10. Between 7 March and 11 March 2003, the applicant was held in custody at his army command. 11. On 11 March 2003 he was brought before the Çorlu Military Court, which remanded him in custody. 12. On 12 March 2003 the Çorlu Military Prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant with exceeding his leave (“izin tecavüzü”) under Article 66 § 1 of the Military Criminal Code. 13. On 14 April 2003 the Çorlu Military Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. In its decision the court noted that the applicant had failed to return to his army command at the end of his leave, that he had been apprehended on 22 February 2003 and that he had been held in custody between 7 and 11 March. It deducted the period spent on the road and in custody between 22 February and 11 March 2003 from his prison sentence. 14. On 22 April 2003 the judgment of the Çorlu Military Court became final as neither the military prosecutor nor the applicant appealed. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
15. Article 72 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Law on Military Service stipulate that every male citizen of the Republic of Turkey shall fulfil his military service. 16. Pursuant to section 80 § 1 of the Law on Military Service, those who have deserted their headquarters or who have exceeded their period of leave or medical leave shall be searched for, arrested and placed in the custody of the local military authorities in order to be handed over to their army commands. 17. Section 66 of the Military Criminal Code is entitled “desertion”. Paragraph 1 (b) of this provision makes it a criminal offence to exceed one’s period of leave by six days without authorisation. 18. Under section 80 § 3 of the Law on the Constitution of Military Courts and Criminal Procedure applicable at the time of the events, the period a person can spend in custody shall not exceed forty-eight hours, excluding the time necessary to transfer the detainee to the nearest military court. Under section 80 § 5, if the arrestee cannot be brought before a military court within the time-limit specified in section 80 § 3, he or she shall be taken to the nearest magistrates’ court. No one shall be deprived of his or her liberty beyond this time-limit. 19. On 29 June 2006 section 80 § 3 of the Law on the Constitution of Military Courts and Criminal Procedure was amended by Law no. 5530, which provided that time in custody shall not exceed twenty-four hours, excluding the time necessary to transfer the detainee to the nearest military court, and that the time necessary for transfer could not be more than twelve hours. THE LAW
I. ADMISSIBILITY
20. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5 §§ 1, 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION
21. The applicant complained that his detention had been unlawful and excessively long and that the authorities had failed to initiate an investigation into the matter. He relied on Articles 5 §§ 1 and 3 and 13 of the Convention. 22. The Court considers that these complaints should be examined solely from the standpoint of Article 5 §§ 1 (b), (c) and 3, which provide as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A. The parties’ submissions
23. The Government maintained that the applicant had not been deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention. In this connection, they submitted that he had been kept under surveillance in the Izmir Military Recruitment Office for the sole purpose of ensuring his transfer back to his army command and that he was not subjected to any proceedings or investigation until he was taken to his military unit. They further claimed that this administrative measure had been taken to prevent his escape, since he was a deserter, and that he had immediately been sent to his unit upon the completion of necessary procedures such as the provision of a vehicle, personnel, travel expenses and monetary matters concerning his transfer. Moreover, the Government claimed that the applicant had actually been in military service during that time. The Government admitted that the applicant had been held in custody between 7 and 11 March 2003 for the proper administration of military discipline. They submitted that he had been brought before a judge on the very day the Military Prosecutor filed an indictment. 24. The applicant maintained that he had been held in custody from 22 February 2003 until 11 March 2003, first in Izmir and afterwards in Kırklareli. He further disputed the qualification given by the Government to his detention, noting that it had deprived him of his liberty and restricted his rights to see his lawyer and family. He claimed that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman as he had been threatened, beaten and given food only once a day. Finally, the applicant repeated that, despite the unlawfulness of his detention, the authorities had failed to investigate the matter. B. The Court’s assessment
1. Whether there was deprivation of applicant’s liberty
25. The Court observes that there is no dispute between the parties as regards the applicant’s detention between 7 March and 11 March 2003 in Kırklareli. However, the Government argued that the applicant was not deprived of his liberty between 22 February 2003 and 7 March 2003 in Izmir. 26. The Court reiterates that military service, as encountered in the Contracting States, does not of itself constitute a deprivation of liberty under the Convention, since it is expressly sanctioned in Article 4 § 3 (b). In addition, rather wide limitations upon the freedom of movement of members of the armed forces ensue by reason of the specific demands of military service, so that the normal restrictions accompanying it do not come within the ambit of Article 5 either (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, § 59, Series A no. 22). However, the forms of restriction which clearly deviate from the normal conditions of life in the armed forces of the Contracting States fall within the scope of Article 5. In order to establish whether this is so, account should be taken of a whole range of factors such as the nature, duration, effects and manner of execution of the penalty or measure in question (ibid). 27. In the instant case, the Court observes that on 22 February 2003 the applicant was detained in custody at the Şirinyer Military Station Command. Between 23 February 2003 and 6 March 2003 the applicant was kept in a “security room” at the Izmir Military Recruitment Office. The Court further observes that these periods were subsequently deducted from the applicant’s prison sentence (see paragraph 13 above). Moreover, the Government have not provided any explanation or details as regards what security or other measures were applicable to the applicant and, apart from the statement that he was in military service, no evidence has been adduced to demonstrate that he remained, more or less, within the ordinary framework of his army life during that time. In view of the above, the Court considers that the applicant was also deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention when he was held in Izmir between 22 February 2003 and 6 March 2003. 2. Whether the deprivation in issue was “lawful”
28. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 of the Convention contains a list of permissible grounds of deprivation of liberty which is exhaustive. The applicability of one ground does not necessarily preclude that of another; a detention may, depending on the circumstances, be justified under more than one sub-paragraph (see, for example, Erkalo v. the Netherlands, 2 September 1998, § 50, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‐VI). However, only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (see, inter alia, Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, § 25, Reports 1997‐IV). 29. The Court reiterates that any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a)-(f), be “lawful” and comply with “a procedure prescribed by law”. By the use of these terms the Convention essentially refers back to national law and an obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness (see, for example, Elci and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23145/93 and 25091/94, § 667, 13 November 2003). It is a fundamental principle that no detention which is arbitrary can be compatible with Article 5 § 1 and the notion of “arbitrariness” in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond a lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention (see, for example, Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, §§ 68‐71, ECHR 2008‐... and the cases referred to therein). In particular, to avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5 § 1 (b) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 164, 19 February 2009, and, mutatis mutandis, Saadi, cited above, § 74). 30. In the instant case, the Government have not expressly relied on any ground under the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 § 1 to justify the applicant’s detention. The applicant did not express any opinion either. 31. Having regard to the documentary evidence submitted by the parties, the Court considers that the applicant’s detention, when he was held in Izmir, served two different purposes. On the one hand, it had the purpose of ensuring his return to his army command in order to secure the fulfilment of his obligation, prescribed by law, to perform compulsory military service pursuant to section 80 § 1 of Law on Military Service. On the other hand, it also had the purpose of bringing him before a competent authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed the offence of exceeding his leave. On this latter point, the Court observes that section 66 § 1 (b) of the Military Criminal Code makes it a criminal offence to exceed one’s period of leave by six days without authorisation. It further observes that the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being an army deserter and was questioned within a few hours of his arrest about the reasons for his desertion (see paragraph 6 above). Moreover, he was subsequently transferred to his army command in Kırklareli, where he was once again questioned about his desertion. The applicant’s detention thereafter thus served the purpose of bringing him before a competent authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. In this connection, the Court notes that he was subsequently brought before a judge, who remanded him in custody. In sum, the Court considers that the applicant’s detention between 22 February 2003 and 6 March 2003 in Izmir falls to be examined under both sub-paragraph (b) and (c) of Article 5 § 1, whereas his detention in Kırklareli falls to be examined under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1. 32. However, although the applicant was detained on the basis of section 80 § 1 of the Military Service Law and section 80 § 3 of the Law on the Constitution of Military Courts and Criminal Procedure, the Court has serious doubts whether the authorities acted in compliance with “a procedure prescribed by law”. Nevertheless, it does not deem it necessary to determine this question because, in any event, the key issue to be examined is whether the applicant’s detention was free from arbitrariness. In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant was deprived of his liberty between 22 February and 11 March 2003 for seventeen days. The Court finds no reason to doubt that the national authorities acted in good faith in detaining the applicant in conformity with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5 § 1. In this connection, it takes particular note of the Government’s arguments regarding the necessity of securing the necessary material provisions for the applicant’s transfer. However, in the absence of any concrete information or documentation, the Court does not find it convincing that, in order to achieve the aim sought by the applicant’s detention, the authorities needed twelve days to send the applicant to his army unit or that it was necessary to detain him for a total of seventeen days before he could be brought before a judge. Moreover, the Court attaches importance to the fact that no information has been forthcoming from the Government to clarify the place and conditions of the applicant’s detention and the security or other measures which were applicable to him throughout his lengthy detention. 33. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1. 34. The Court does not consider it necessary to examine separately the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in view of its foregoing finding that his detention was not “lawful” under Article 5 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Emrullah Karagöz v. Turkey, no. 78027/01, § 63, ECHR 2005‐X). III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
35. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
36. The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‐pecuniary damage. 37. The Government contested the amount. 38. The Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 6,500 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage. B. Costs and expenses
39. The applicant also claimed reimbursement of his costs and expenses incurred both before the domestic courts and before the Court. These concerned 4,000 Turkish liras (approximately EUR 2,015) for legal fees, 5.50 (approximately EUR 2.50) Turkish liras for postage and EUR 30 for photocopies and other expenses. The applicant submitted documentation as regards his costs and expenses before the Court. 40. The Government contested the amounts. 41. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,503 for the proceedings before the Court. C. Default interest
42. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the remainder of the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 6,500 (six thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,503 (one thousand five hundred and three euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 29 September 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court
Françoise Elens-PassosFrançoise TulkensDeputy RegistrarPresident
