I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in E.D. v. RUSSIA.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2022-01-11
  • Communication date: 2018-10-22
  • Application number(s): 34176/18
  • Country:   RUS
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 8, 8-1
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.58251
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

The applicant, Mr E.D., is a national of Israel and Russia, who was born in 1987 and lives in Haifa, Israel.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1.
Background of the case On 1 October 2010 in Moscow the applicant married Ms M.K.
On 2 November 2011 their son S. was born.
On 4 June 2013 the applicant and M.K.
moved from Moscow to Haifa.
On 29 July 2013 their second son, B.I., was born.
All members of the applicant’s family are nationals of Russia and Israel.
In January 2015 the applicant and M.K.
separated.
Following the applicant’s request, in March 2015 a court in Israel ordered that the children’s travel outside Israel could only take place if authorised by it.
On 7 June 2015 the applicant and M.K.
divorced.
A temporary child rearing and contact arrangement provided that the children were to stay with the applicant every Tuesday until 7 p.m., every Wednesday until Thursday morning, every second weekend from Friday morning to Sunday morning, and half of all public holidays.
The parties fully complied with this interim arrangement.
On several occasions M.K.
sought and received from the court permission to travel outside Israel with the children.
On each occasion M.K.’s parents, also residing in Israel, guaranteed the children’s return by an obligation to pay 30,000 US dollars for non-return of each child.
In July 2016 M.K.
informed the applicant that she wished to travel to Moscow with their younger son in August 2016.
The applicant did not object, since the older son remained with him in Israel.
M.K signed a notarised declaration in which she undertook to travel with B.I.
outside Israel from 2 August to 31 August 2016 and return the child to Israel on the latter date.
She confirmed to have been aware of the fact that the non-return of the child on the mentioned date would amount to abduction contrary to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the 1980 Hague Convention”).
However, M.K.
did not bring B.I.
back on the agreed date.
She stayed in Russia.
2.
The proceedings pursued by the applicant to obtain his younger son’s return to Israel In September 2016 the applicant applied to the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, through the Israeli State Attorney’s Office, with a request to have B.I.
returned to Israel, in accordance with the Hague Convention, to which both Russia and Israel are parties.
In March 2017 the applicant lodged an application with the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”), seeking the child’s return to Israel on the basis of the 1980 Hague Convention.
M.K.
objected.
She argued that the child suffered from retarded speech development and emotional problems and that his return to Israel would expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm.
M.K.
supported her objections with reports by medical specialists confirming the child’s condition and showing its positive dynamics between August 2016 and March 2017 as a result of the treatment underway in Russia.
The child was attending a centre of medical pedagogy since October 2016 and a Montessori kindergarten since December 2016, where he was monitored by a speech therapist.
The latter considered that a change in the child’s language environment would affect the rhythm of his speech development and his overall psycho-emotional state.
Pursuant to the conclusion of a psychologist (April 2017), any change in the child’s environment, separation from significant close people, first of all the mother, any rough change in the child’s routine, alteration of cultural or educational environment could affect the child’s emotional state.
The psychologist therefore recommended to preserve the stability of the child’s usual environment and, in particular, considered that the child should continue living in the family of his mother, M.K.
with whom the child had close emotional bonds.
In March 2017 the childcare authority assessed M.K.’s living conditions and found them suitable for raising a child.
In April 2017 the childcare authority considered that it was opportune to refuse the applicant’s claim for the child’s return to Israel.
On 24 April 2017 the District Court noted that the child had Russian nationality, that his removal from Israel and retention in Russia had not been wrongful, that the applicant agreed to the child’s departure to Russia, that M.K.
had created all the necessary conditions for the child’s life and development in Russia, and that the child was undergoing treatment in Russia and, with reference to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, rejected the applicant’s claim for the child’s return to Israel.
On 12 July 2017 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the above judgment on appeal.
The City Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that, in the absence of a judicial act limiting M.K.’s right to leave Israel with the child or determining the child’s residence as being with the applicant and requiring the latter’s consent for the child’s leaving the territory of Israel, there had been no grounds to believe that the child’s removal from Israel had been wrongful.
On 25 September 2017 and 28 February 2018 the applicant’s cassation appeals were rejected by a judge of the City Court and a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”), respectively.
3.
The proceedings for determination of the children’s residence On an unspecified date M.K.
instituted proceedings seeking that the children’s residence be determined as being with her and that child maintenance be recovered from the applicant.
The applicant brought a counter claim.
On 17 July 2017 the Odintsovo Town Court of the Moscow Region granted M.K.’s claims and rejected the applicant’s claims.
The case file contains no further documents relating to these proceedings.
B.
Relevant international and domestic law 1.
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) entered into force between Russia and Israel on 1 March 2012.
For the relevant provisions of the Hague Convention seeatvia [GC], no.
27853/09, § 34, ECHR 2013.
In the present context reference is made to the following provisions of the Hague Convention: Article 3 “The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where – a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.” Article 12 “Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.
...” Article 13 “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that – a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
...” Article 19 “A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” Article 20 “The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
...” 2.
Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation The procedure for the examination of requests for the return of children unlawfully removed to, or retained in, the Russian Federation, and for securing protection for rights of access in respect of such children in accordance with the international treaty of the Russian Federation, is governed by Chapter 22.2 of the Code.
The Code provides that the return request is to be submitted to a court by a parent or other individual who believes that his/her custody or access rights have been violated, or by a prosecutor (Section 244.11).
The return request must be examined by the court, with the mandatory participation of a prosecutor and the childcare authority, within forty-two days of its receipt, including the time for the preparation of the hearing and the drawing up of the judgment (Section 244.15).
The judgment handed down in a case concerning the return of a child unlawfully removed to, or retained in, Russia must contain the reasons why the child must be returned to the State of his/her habitual residence ‒ in accordance with the international treaty of the Russian Federation ‒ or the reasons for refusing the request for return in accordance with the international treaty of the Russian Federation (Section 244.16).
An appeal may be lodged against the judgment within ten days.
The appeal must be examined within one month of its receipt by the appeal court (Section 244.17).
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the refusal of his application for the return of his son to Israel amounted to a violation of his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 of the Convention.
He further complains under Article 13 of the Convention of the absence of an effective remedy in Russia against the alleged violation.

Judgment

THIRD SECTION
CASE OF E.D.
v. RUSSIA
(Application no.
34176/18)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
11 January 2022

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of E.D. v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Georgios A. Serghides, President, Anja Seibert-Fohr, Frédéric Krenc, judges,and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no.
34176/18) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 June 2018 by E.D., holding Israeli and Russian citizenship, born in 1987 and living in Haifa (“the applicant”) who was represented by Mr D.N. Trunin, a lawyer practising in Odintsovo;
the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention to the Russian Government (“the Government”), represented initially by Mr M. Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
the comments submitted by Ms M.K., who was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;
the decision to reject the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 30 November 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The case concerns allegation of international child abduction and the domestic courts’ decisions, under Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant and his former wife M.K. have two sons, the first one born in 2011 in Russia and the second one, B.I., born in 2013 in Israel, where the family moved earlier in 2013. All four are nationals of Russia and Israel. In 2015 the couple divorced. Both former spouses exercised custody rights in respect of the children. 2. In August 2016, with the applicant’s consent, M.K. and the younger son went to Russia to spend a month of holidays there. Before going, M.K. signed a notarised declaration in which she undertook to travel with B.I. outside Israel from 2 August to 31 August 2016 and return the child to Israel on the latter date. She confirmed to have been aware of the fact that the non‐return of the child on the mentioned date would amount to abduction contrary to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). 3. Meanwhile, on 21 August 2016 the Family Court in Haifa issued an interim custody order in respect of the children in favour of M.K. 4. On the agreed date M.K. failed to return B.I. to Israel. 5. In September 2016 the applicant applied to the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, through the Israeli State Attorney’s Office, with a request to have B.I. returned to Israel, in accordance with the Hague Convention, to which both Russia and Israel were parties and which entered into force between Russia and Israel on 1 March 2012. 6. In March 2017 he lodged an application with the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”), seeking the child’s return to Israel on the basis of the Hague Convention. 7. M.K. objected arguing that the child suffered from retarded speech development and emotional problems and that his return to Israel would expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm. M.K. supported her objections with reports by medical specialists confirming the child’s condition and showing its positive dynamics between August 2016 and March 2017 as a result of the treatment underway in Russia. The child was attending a centre of medical pedagogy since October 2016 and a Montessori kindergarten since December 2016, where he was monitored by a speech therapist. The latter considered that a change in the child’s language environment would affect the rhythm of his speech development and his overall psycho-emotional state. Pursuant to the conclusion of a psychologist (April 2017), any change in the child’s environment, separation from significant close people, first of all the mother, any rough change in the child’s routine, alteration of cultural or educational environment could affect the child’s emotional state. The psychologist therefore recommended to preserve the stability of the child’s usual environment and, in particular, considered that the child should continue living in the family of his mother, M.K. with whom the child had close emotional bonds. 8. On 24 April 2017 the District Court noted that the child had Russian nationality, that his removal from Israel and retention in Russia had not been wrongful, that the applicant agreed to the child’s departure to Russia, that M.K. had created all the necessary conditions for the child’s life and development in Russia, and that the child was undergoing treatment in Russia and, with reference to Article 13 of the Hague Convention, rejected the applicant’s claim for the child’s return to Israel. 9. On 12 July 2017 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the above judgment on appeal. The City Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that, in the absence of a judicial act limiting M.K.’s right to leave Israel with the child or determining the child’s residence as being with the applicant and requiring the latter’s consent for the child’s leaving the territory of Israel, there had been no grounds to believe that the child’s removal from Israel had been wrongful. 10. On 25 September 2017 and 28 February 2018 the applicant’s cassation appeals were rejected by a judge of the City Court and a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, respectively. 11. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the refusal of his application for the return of his son to Israel amounted to a violation of his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
12.
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 13. The general principles emerging from the Court’s case-law on the issue of international abduction of children have been summarized in X v. Latvia ([GC], no. 27853/09, §§ 92-108, ECHR 2013), and Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 41615/07, §§ 131-40, ECHR 2010). 14. The examination of whether the applicant’s son was to be returned to Israel depended on whether his retention in Russia by his mother M.K. was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. This required the ascertaining of the following circumstances: (1) the child’s habitual residence immediately before his retention; (2) whether the applicant had custody rights in respect of the child immediately before the retention; and (3) whether the applicant actually exercised his custody rights in respect of the child at the time of the retention. Without giving any consideration to the above circumstances, the domestic courts reached a conclusion that the child’s retention had not been wrongful. Regardless of this conclusion, however, they acted as though the duty to return the child under the Hague Convention had been triggered: having relied on the child’s medical reports and Article 13 of the Hague Convention, they dismissed the return request. No direct mention or assessment of any grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child, or otherwise intolerable situation upon his return, was made by the domestic courts. In so far as they may be understood to have implied the existence of such a risk under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention due to the child’s retarded speech development and behavioural difficulties for which he was undergoing specialist treatment in Russia (see paragraph 7 above), no assessment was made of the availability of the equivalent treatment in Israel, as well as of whether the child’s return would necessarily entail separation from his mother (compare to Vladimir Ushakov v. Russia, no. 15122/17, §§ 84-105, 18 June 2019). 15. The interpretation and application of the provisions of the Hague Convention by the domestic courts failed, therefore, to secure the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention and the respondent State failed to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to secure to the applicant the right to respect for his family life. 16. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
17.
The applicant claimed 65,522.43 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR 100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,351.75 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. 18. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 12,500 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 19. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,250 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 20. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,250 (one thousand two hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 January 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Olga Chernishova Georgios A. Serghides Deputy Registrar President

THIRD SECTION
CASE OF E.D.
v. RUSSIA
(Application no.
34176/18)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG
11 January 2022

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of E.D. v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Georgios A. Serghides, President, Anja Seibert-Fohr, Frédéric Krenc, judges,and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no.
34176/18) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 28 June 2018 by E.D., holding Israeli and Russian citizenship, born in 1987 and living in Haifa (“the applicant”) who was represented by Mr D.N. Trunin, a lawyer practising in Odintsovo;
the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention to the Russian Government (“the Government”), represented initially by Mr M. Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
the comments submitted by Ms M.K., who was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;
the decision to reject the Government’s objection to examination of the application by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 30 November 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The case concerns allegation of international child abduction and the domestic courts’ decisions, under Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant and his former wife M.K. have two sons, the first one born in 2011 in Russia and the second one, B.I., born in 2013 in Israel, where the family moved earlier in 2013. All four are nationals of Russia and Israel. In 2015 the couple divorced. Both former spouses exercised custody rights in respect of the children. 2. In August 2016, with the applicant’s consent, M.K. and the younger son went to Russia to spend a month of holidays there. Before going, M.K. signed a notarised declaration in which she undertook to travel with B.I. outside Israel from 2 August to 31 August 2016 and return the child to Israel on the latter date. She confirmed to have been aware of the fact that the non‐return of the child on the mentioned date would amount to abduction contrary to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). 3. Meanwhile, on 21 August 2016 the Family Court in Haifa issued an interim custody order in respect of the children in favour of M.K. 4. On the agreed date M.K. failed to return B.I. to Israel. 5. In September 2016 the applicant applied to the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, through the Israeli State Attorney’s Office, with a request to have B.I. returned to Israel, in accordance with the Hague Convention, to which both Russia and Israel were parties and which entered into force between Russia and Israel on 1 March 2012. 6. In March 2017 he lodged an application with the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”), seeking the child’s return to Israel on the basis of the Hague Convention. 7. M.K. objected arguing that the child suffered from retarded speech development and emotional problems and that his return to Israel would expose him to a grave risk of psychological harm. M.K. supported her objections with reports by medical specialists confirming the child’s condition and showing its positive dynamics between August 2016 and March 2017 as a result of the treatment underway in Russia. The child was attending a centre of medical pedagogy since October 2016 and a Montessori kindergarten since December 2016, where he was monitored by a speech therapist. The latter considered that a change in the child’s language environment would affect the rhythm of his speech development and his overall psycho-emotional state. Pursuant to the conclusion of a psychologist (April 2017), any change in the child’s environment, separation from significant close people, first of all the mother, any rough change in the child’s routine, alteration of cultural or educational environment could affect the child’s emotional state. The psychologist therefore recommended to preserve the stability of the child’s usual environment and, in particular, considered that the child should continue living in the family of his mother, M.K. with whom the child had close emotional bonds. 8. On 24 April 2017 the District Court noted that the child had Russian nationality, that his removal from Israel and retention in Russia had not been wrongful, that the applicant agreed to the child’s departure to Russia, that M.K. had created all the necessary conditions for the child’s life and development in Russia, and that the child was undergoing treatment in Russia and, with reference to Article 13 of the Hague Convention, rejected the applicant’s claim for the child’s return to Israel. 9. On 12 July 2017 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the above judgment on appeal. The City Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that, in the absence of a judicial act limiting M.K.’s right to leave Israel with the child or determining the child’s residence as being with the applicant and requiring the latter’s consent for the child’s leaving the territory of Israel, there had been no grounds to believe that the child’s removal from Israel had been wrongful. 10. On 25 September 2017 and 28 February 2018 the applicant’s cassation appeals were rejected by a judge of the City Court and a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, respectively. 11. The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the refusal of his application for the return of his son to Israel amounted to a violation of his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
12.
The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 13. The general principles emerging from the Court’s case-law on the issue of international abduction of children have been summarized in X v. Latvia ([GC], no. 27853/09, §§ 92-108, ECHR 2013), and Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 41615/07, §§ 131-40, ECHR 2010). 14. The examination of whether the applicant’s son was to be returned to Israel depended on whether his retention in Russia by his mother M.K. was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. This required the ascertaining of the following circumstances: (1) the child’s habitual residence immediately before his retention; (2) whether the applicant had custody rights in respect of the child immediately before the retention; and (3) whether the applicant actually exercised his custody rights in respect of the child at the time of the retention. Without giving any consideration to the above circumstances, the domestic courts reached a conclusion that the child’s retention had not been wrongful. Regardless of this conclusion, however, they acted as though the duty to return the child under the Hague Convention had been triggered: having relied on the child’s medical reports and Article 13 of the Hague Convention, they dismissed the return request. No direct mention or assessment of any grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child, or otherwise intolerable situation upon his return, was made by the domestic courts. In so far as they may be understood to have implied the existence of such a risk under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention due to the child’s retarded speech development and behavioural difficulties for which he was undergoing specialist treatment in Russia (see paragraph 7 above), no assessment was made of the availability of the equivalent treatment in Israel, as well as of whether the child’s return would necessarily entail separation from his mother (compare to Vladimir Ushakov v. Russia, no. 15122/17, §§ 84-105, 18 June 2019). 15. The interpretation and application of the provisions of the Hague Convention by the domestic courts failed, therefore, to secure the guarantees of Article 8 of the Convention and the respondent State failed to comply with its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to secure to the applicant the right to respect for his family life. 16. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
17.
The applicant claimed 65,522.43 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR 100,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,351.75 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. 18. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 12,500 in respect of non‐pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 19. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,250 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 20. The Court further considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,250 (one thousand two hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 January 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Olga Chernishova Georgios A. Serghides Deputy Registrar President