I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in H.A. AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY.

Judgment

FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF H.A. AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 39498/18)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 June 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of H.A. and Others v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, President, Gilberto Felici, Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,and Sophie Piquet, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 39498/18) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 21 August 2018 by six Iraqi nationals, whose relevant details are listed in the appended table, (“the applicants”) who were represented by Ms I. Bieber, a lawyer practising in Budapest;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed;
the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicants are an Iraqi family of six (two parents and their four minor children who were, at the relevant time, twelve, six, ten and less than one year old). They fled Iraq in September 2016. They travelled through Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia and entered the Hungarian transit zone bordering Serbia on 10 July 2018. They immediately submitted an asylum application. 2. On the same day the asylum authority ordered the transit zone in Tompa to be the applicants’ “designated place of stay”. 3. On 22 August 2018, upon the applicants’ request, the Court decided to apply a measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It indicated to the Hungarian Government to ensure that the environment where the applicants are placed complies with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention and that the family be kept together, or otherwise to transfer them to the Balassagyarmat reception center. The Government was also requested to keep the Court informed of any developments in the applicants’ situation. 4. On the same day the asylum authority rejected the applicants’ asylum application as inadmissible and found that the principle of non-refoulement did not apply. The asylum authority also expelled the applicants to Serbia. 5. On 14 September 2018 the Government informed the Court that its interim measure has been fully complied with within the transit zone. The family members had been accommodated together there. The Government alleged that the applicants had not signalled any need for assistance in caring for the wheelchair-bound fifth applicant and the community areas for children were accessible by wheelchair. They further argued that the transit zone provided more services, including medical care and social worker assistance, than any in-land reception centre. They also submitted that the fifth applicant was examined by a paediatrician on 11 July 2018, a child neurologist on 7 August 2018 and had an appointment for a special diagnostic examination scheduled for 4 October 2018. 6. Pursuant to the first applicant’s request for the judicial review of the authority’s decision on their application for asylum, on 16 January 2019 the Szeged Administrative and Labour Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the authority. It also quashed the asylum authority’s decision designating the Tompa transit zone as the applicants’ place of accommodation and remitted the issue to the asylum authority. The court referred to Article 43(2) of the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, on the basis of which asylum-seekers may only stay in a transit zone for four weeks. 7. On 23 January 2019, in the resumed proceedings, the asylum authority placed the applicants to the Balassagyarmat reception center. According to the applicants, they stayed in the transit zone until 24 January 2019. They then left the reception centre for Germany where they applied for asylum on 15 February 2019. 8. During their stay in the Tompa transit zone the applicants were accommodated in the family sector. Besides the general conditions which have been described in R.R. and Others v. Hungary (no. 36037/17, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31, 2 March 2021) the applicants complained about the situation of the fifth applicant, a ten-year-old who had restricted mobility since her birth and whose condition was allegedly deteriorating. She had reportedly not received any treatment in Iraq, nor had she been diagnosed. As she could not use her limbs, she used a wheelchair and was dependent on her parents to use the bathroom or to move around in any other way in the transit zone. On 7 August 2018 she was examined at a hospital, where the doctor concluded that she most likely suffered from spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) but an accurate diagnoses could not have been made yet. The applicants alleged that she had not received adequate medical care, including diagnoses and physiotherapy. Furthermore they complained that even though the Government put a wooden threshold ramp in the doorway of the applicants’ container, the premises of the transit zone had not been accessible and that the first applicant had to carry the fifth applicant to the bathroom. 9. The applicants complained about these conditions and the lack of an effective remedy in this respect under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13. They also complained about their confinement to the transit zone under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. Lastly, they complained under Article 34 of the Convention about the lack of measures taken by the Government in response to the Court’s indication of 22 August 2018 under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
10. The Government submitted that the applicants’ living conditions in the transit zone were in full compliance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. The health problem of the fifth applicant was taken care of. Furthermore, the community rooms and the learning rooms in the applicants’ sector were accessible for children in wheelchairs. 11. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 12. The general principles concerning the confinement and living conditions of asylum-seekers have been summarised in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 16483/12, §§ 158-69, 15 December 2016) and with respect to the confinement of minors in R.R. and Others (cited above, § 49), S.F. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 8138/16, §§ 78-83, 7 December 2017) and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, nos. 15670/18 and 43115/18, §§ 183-186, 18 November 2021). 13. The Court notes that the general conditions in which the minor applicants had to live in the Tompa transit zone were very similar to that of the Röszke transit zone (R.R. and Others, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31). At the time of their stay the applicant children were twelve, six, ten and less than one year old. The Court finds that their case is similar to that of R.R. and Others. In that case the Court, emphasising the primary significance of the passage of time for the application of Article 3 in situations such as the present one, found a violation of this provision on account of the conditions to which the applicant children were subjected during their almost four‐months-long stay in the Röszke transit zone (cited above, §§ 58-60 and 63‐65). Having regard to the evidence before it, especially the minor applicants’ age and the fifth applicant’s physical condition and vulnerability, the Court sees no reasons to find otherwise in the present case in which the applicant children stayed in the Tompa transit zone for more than six months (compare H.M. and Others v. Hungary, no. 38967/17, § 17, 2 June 2022 and A.A.A. and Others v. Hungary [Committee], no. 37327/17, § 7, 9 June 2022). 14. Therefore, the Court finds that the situation complained of subjected the applicant children to treatment which exceeded the threshold of severity required to engage Article 3 of the Convention (see R.R. and Others, cited above, § 65). There has accordingly been a violation of that provision with regards to them. 15. The Court has already considered that the living conditions in the transit zones in terms of accommodation, hygiene and access to food and medical care were generally acceptable for holding asylum-seekers for a limited period of time (as regards the Röszke transit zone see R.R. and Others, cited above, § 52 and Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, §§ 186-94, 21 November 2019 and as regards the close similarities between the Röszke and Tompa transit zones see H.M. and Others v. Hungary, no. 38967/17, § 17, 2 June 2022). 16. Although the adult applicants in the present case stayed in the transit zone for more than six months, the evidence in the file does not show that they were more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker confined to the transit zone or that the otherwise acceptable conditions in the transit zone were particularity ill-suited in their circumstances. 17. The first and second applicants mainly relied on the effect the conditions of the fifth applicant’s confinement had on them, in particular the difficulties they experienced while caring for her and the mental pain they suffered while worrying about her medical condition. The Court has examined a similar issue in Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium (no. 41442/07, § 64, 19 January 2010), Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178/03, § 61, ECHR 2006-XI; and Popov v. France (nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, § 104, 19 January 2012). In those cases the Court concluded that the issue whether a parent qualifies as a “victim” of the ill-treatment of his or her child will depend on the existence of special factors which give the applicant’s suffering a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation. Relevant elements will include the proximity of the family tie – in that context, a certain weight will attach to the parent-child bond –, the particular circumstances of the relationship and the way in which the authorities responded to the parent’s enquiries. The essence of such a violation lies in the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention. 18. The Court takes note of the adult applicants’ claim that the fifth applicant’s condition and the uncertainty about the nature of her illness caused them considerable emotional distress. However, in view of the evidence before it, the Court sees no grounds to find that the domestic authorities failed to pay sufficient attention to the fifth applicant’s medical condition (see paragraph 5 above). As regards the alleged lack of accessibility in the transit zone, in view of the Government’s statement disputing the applicants’ allegations in this regard, the measures taken by them to make the family’s living container accessible (see paragraphs 10 and above) and the lack of evidence that the applicants sought any assistance from the staff of the transit zone as suggested by the Government (see paragraph 5 above) or articulated any special need, including the need for any bathing aids, the Court cannot conclude that the authorities’ attitude was objectionable in such a way that a violation of Article 3 can be established in relation to the parent applicants. 19. Therefore, in view of other above-mentioned circumstances, the Court finds that the threshold of severity required for Article 3 to come into play has not been attained. This part of the application with regards to the first and second applicants is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. 20. In their observations of 24 November 2022, the applicants also referred to the alleged mental health issues of the second applicant and the lack of assistance provided to her in this respect, but this part of their complaint failed to comply with the six-month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must also be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. 21. The applicants’ complaint that they had been confined to the transit zone in violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention is similar to the one examined in the case R.R. and Others, where the Court found that the applicants’ stay for almost four months in the transit zone amounted to a de facto deprivation of liberty (cited above, §§ 74-83). The Court, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, does not consider that the present case warrants a different conclusion. Article 5 is therefore applicable (see also H.M. and Others v. Hungary, no. 38967/17, § 30, 2 June 2022, and A.A.A. and Others, cited above, § 13). This part of the application, which is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other grounds, must therefore be declared admissible. 22. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that the above complaints disclose a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention in the light of its findings in R.R. and Others (cited above, §§ 87‐92 and 97-99). 23. The applicants also complained under Article 8 and Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions of detention and the lack of an effective remedy in this regard and under Article 34 of the Convention about the Government’s failure to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine these remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicants claimed 42,000 euros (EUR), jointly, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage and EUR 3,300 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 25. The Government contested these claims as being excessive. 26. The Court awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 17,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. 27. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,500 covering costs under all heads for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, jointly, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 17,500 (seventeen thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 June 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Sophie Piquet Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström Acting Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX
List of applicants:
Application no. 39498/18

No. Applicant’s Name
Year of birth
Nationality
Place of residence
1. H.A. 1985
Iraqi
Magdeburg
2. R.A.
1986
Iraqi
Magdeburg
3. R.E.H. 2006
Iraqi
Magdeburg
4. R.N.H. 2012
Iraqi
Magdeburg
5. R.I.H. 2008
Iraqi
Magdeburg
6. S.H. 2018
Iraqi
Magdeburg

FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF H.A. AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 39498/18)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 June 2025

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of H.A. and Others v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, President, Gilberto Felici, Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,and Sophie Piquet, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 39498/18) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 21 August 2018 by six Iraqi nationals, whose relevant details are listed in the appended table, (“the applicants”) who were represented by Ms I. Bieber, a lawyer practising in Budapest;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed;
the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 28 May 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applicants are an Iraqi family of six (two parents and their four minor children who were, at the relevant time, twelve, six, ten and less than one year old). They fled Iraq in September 2016. They travelled through Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia and entered the Hungarian transit zone bordering Serbia on 10 July 2018. They immediately submitted an asylum application. 2. On the same day the asylum authority ordered the transit zone in Tompa to be the applicants’ “designated place of stay”. 3. On 22 August 2018, upon the applicants’ request, the Court decided to apply a measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. It indicated to the Hungarian Government to ensure that the environment where the applicants are placed complies with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention and that the family be kept together, or otherwise to transfer them to the Balassagyarmat reception center. The Government was also requested to keep the Court informed of any developments in the applicants’ situation. 4. On the same day the asylum authority rejected the applicants’ asylum application as inadmissible and found that the principle of non-refoulement did not apply. The asylum authority also expelled the applicants to Serbia. 5. On 14 September 2018 the Government informed the Court that its interim measure has been fully complied with within the transit zone. The family members had been accommodated together there. The Government alleged that the applicants had not signalled any need for assistance in caring for the wheelchair-bound fifth applicant and the community areas for children were accessible by wheelchair. They further argued that the transit zone provided more services, including medical care and social worker assistance, than any in-land reception centre. They also submitted that the fifth applicant was examined by a paediatrician on 11 July 2018, a child neurologist on 7 August 2018 and had an appointment for a special diagnostic examination scheduled for 4 October 2018. 6. Pursuant to the first applicant’s request for the judicial review of the authority’s decision on their application for asylum, on 16 January 2019 the Szeged Administrative and Labour Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the authority. It also quashed the asylum authority’s decision designating the Tompa transit zone as the applicants’ place of accommodation and remitted the issue to the asylum authority. The court referred to Article 43(2) of the Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, on the basis of which asylum-seekers may only stay in a transit zone for four weeks. 7. On 23 January 2019, in the resumed proceedings, the asylum authority placed the applicants to the Balassagyarmat reception center. According to the applicants, they stayed in the transit zone until 24 January 2019. They then left the reception centre for Germany where they applied for asylum on 15 February 2019. 8. During their stay in the Tompa transit zone the applicants were accommodated in the family sector. Besides the general conditions which have been described in R.R. and Others v. Hungary (no. 36037/17, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31, 2 March 2021) the applicants complained about the situation of the fifth applicant, a ten-year-old who had restricted mobility since her birth and whose condition was allegedly deteriorating. She had reportedly not received any treatment in Iraq, nor had she been diagnosed. As she could not use her limbs, she used a wheelchair and was dependent on her parents to use the bathroom or to move around in any other way in the transit zone. On 7 August 2018 she was examined at a hospital, where the doctor concluded that she most likely suffered from spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) but an accurate diagnoses could not have been made yet. The applicants alleged that she had not received adequate medical care, including diagnoses and physiotherapy. Furthermore they complained that even though the Government put a wooden threshold ramp in the doorway of the applicants’ container, the premises of the transit zone had not been accessible and that the first applicant had to carry the fifth applicant to the bathroom. 9. The applicants complained about these conditions and the lack of an effective remedy in this respect under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 13. They also complained about their confinement to the transit zone under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. Lastly, they complained under Article 34 of the Convention about the lack of measures taken by the Government in response to the Court’s indication of 22 August 2018 under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
10. The Government submitted that the applicants’ living conditions in the transit zone were in full compliance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. The health problem of the fifth applicant was taken care of. Furthermore, the community rooms and the learning rooms in the applicants’ sector were accessible for children in wheelchairs. 11. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 12. The general principles concerning the confinement and living conditions of asylum-seekers have been summarised in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 16483/12, §§ 158-69, 15 December 2016) and with respect to the confinement of minors in R.R. and Others (cited above, § 49), S.F. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 8138/16, §§ 78-83, 7 December 2017) and M.H. and Others v. Croatia, nos. 15670/18 and 43115/18, §§ 183-186, 18 November 2021). 13. The Court notes that the general conditions in which the minor applicants had to live in the Tompa transit zone were very similar to that of the Röszke transit zone (R.R. and Others, §§ 10-12, 14-17 and 30-31). At the time of their stay the applicant children were twelve, six, ten and less than one year old. The Court finds that their case is similar to that of R.R. and Others. In that case the Court, emphasising the primary significance of the passage of time for the application of Article 3 in situations such as the present one, found a violation of this provision on account of the conditions to which the applicant children were subjected during their almost four‐months-long stay in the Röszke transit zone (cited above, §§ 58-60 and 63‐65). Having regard to the evidence before it, especially the minor applicants’ age and the fifth applicant’s physical condition and vulnerability, the Court sees no reasons to find otherwise in the present case in which the applicant children stayed in the Tompa transit zone for more than six months (compare H.M. and Others v. Hungary, no. 38967/17, § 17, 2 June 2022 and A.A.A. and Others v. Hungary [Committee], no. 37327/17, § 7, 9 June 2022). 14. Therefore, the Court finds that the situation complained of subjected the applicant children to treatment which exceeded the threshold of severity required to engage Article 3 of the Convention (see R.R. and Others, cited above, § 65). There has accordingly been a violation of that provision with regards to them. 15. The Court has already considered that the living conditions in the transit zones in terms of accommodation, hygiene and access to food and medical care were generally acceptable for holding asylum-seekers for a limited period of time (as regards the Röszke transit zone see R.R. and Others, cited above, § 52 and Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, §§ 186-94, 21 November 2019 and as regards the close similarities between the Röszke and Tompa transit zones see H.M. and Others v. Hungary, no. 38967/17, § 17, 2 June 2022). 16. Although the adult applicants in the present case stayed in the transit zone for more than six months, the evidence in the file does not show that they were more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker confined to the transit zone or that the otherwise acceptable conditions in the transit zone were particularity ill-suited in their circumstances. 17. The first and second applicants mainly relied on the effect the conditions of the fifth applicant’s confinement had on them, in particular the difficulties they experienced while caring for her and the mental pain they suffered while worrying about her medical condition. The Court has examined a similar issue in Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium (no. 41442/07, § 64, 19 January 2010), Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no. 13178/03, § 61, ECHR 2006-XI; and Popov v. France (nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07, § 104, 19 January 2012). In those cases the Court concluded that the issue whether a parent qualifies as a “victim” of the ill-treatment of his or her child will depend on the existence of special factors which give the applicant’s suffering a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress which may be regarded as inevitably caused to relatives of a victim of a serious human rights violation. Relevant elements will include the proximity of the family tie – in that context, a certain weight will attach to the parent-child bond –, the particular circumstances of the relationship and the way in which the authorities responded to the parent’s enquiries. The essence of such a violation lies in the authorities’ reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to their attention. 18. The Court takes note of the adult applicants’ claim that the fifth applicant’s condition and the uncertainty about the nature of her illness caused them considerable emotional distress. However, in view of the evidence before it, the Court sees no grounds to find that the domestic authorities failed to pay sufficient attention to the fifth applicant’s medical condition (see paragraph 5 above). As regards the alleged lack of accessibility in the transit zone, in view of the Government’s statement disputing the applicants’ allegations in this regard, the measures taken by them to make the family’s living container accessible (see paragraphs 10 and above) and the lack of evidence that the applicants sought any assistance from the staff of the transit zone as suggested by the Government (see paragraph 5 above) or articulated any special need, including the need for any bathing aids, the Court cannot conclude that the authorities’ attitude was objectionable in such a way that a violation of Article 3 can be established in relation to the parent applicants. 19. Therefore, in view of other above-mentioned circumstances, the Court finds that the threshold of severity required for Article 3 to come into play has not been attained. This part of the application with regards to the first and second applicants is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. 20. In their observations of 24 November 2022, the applicants also referred to the alleged mental health issues of the second applicant and the lack of assistance provided to her in this respect, but this part of their complaint failed to comply with the six-month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must also be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. 21. The applicants’ complaint that they had been confined to the transit zone in violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention is similar to the one examined in the case R.R. and Others, where the Court found that the applicants’ stay for almost four months in the transit zone amounted to a de facto deprivation of liberty (cited above, §§ 74-83). The Court, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, does not consider that the present case warrants a different conclusion. Article 5 is therefore applicable (see also H.M. and Others v. Hungary, no. 38967/17, § 30, 2 June 2022, and A.A.A. and Others, cited above, § 13). This part of the application, which is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other grounds, must therefore be declared admissible. 22. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that the above complaints disclose a violation of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention in the light of its findings in R.R. and Others (cited above, §§ 87‐92 and 97-99). 23. The applicants also complained under Article 8 and Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions of detention and the lack of an effective remedy in this regard and under Article 34 of the Convention about the Government’s failure to comply with the interim measure indicated by the Court. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal questions raised by the case and that there is no need to examine these remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
24. The applicants claimed 42,000 euros (EUR), jointly, in respect of non‐pecuniary damage and EUR 3,300 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 25. The Government contested these claims as being excessive. 26. The Court awards the applicants, jointly, EUR 17,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. 27. Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,500 covering costs under all heads for the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, jointly, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 17,500 (seventeen thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 June 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Sophie Piquet Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström Acting Deputy Registrar President

APPENDIX
List of applicants:
Application no. 39498/18

No. Applicant’s Name
Year of birth
Nationality
Place of residence
1. H.A. 1985
Iraqi
Magdeburg
2. R.A.
1986
Iraqi
Magdeburg
3. R.E.H. 2006
Iraqi
Magdeburg
4. R.N.H. 2012
Iraqi
Magdeburg
5. R.I.H. 2008
Iraqi
Magdeburg
6. S.H. 2018
Iraqi
Magdeburg