I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in ELCHIN HASANOV v. AZERBAIJAN.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2018-05-22
  • Communication date: 2012-03-09
  • Application number(s): 39919/07
  • Country:   AZE
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 5, 5-1, 6, 6-1, 10, 10-1, 11, 11-1
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings
    Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.920334
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

Applications nos.
39919/07 and 56947/10Elchin HASANOVagainst Azerbaijanlodged on 21 August 2007 and22 September 2010 respectively THE FACTS The applicant, Mr Elchin Hasanov, is an Azerbaijani national who was born in 1977 and lives in Sumgayit.
His applications, nos.
39919/07 and 56947/10, were lodged with the Court on 21 August 2007 and 22 September 2010 respectively.
He was represented before the Court by Mr I. Aliyev and Mrs N. Aliyeva, lawyers practising in Azerbaijan.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1.
The applicant’s arrest and “administrative detention” The applicant worked as a reporter for two newspapers.
On 23 November 2006 a number of members of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan held a picket in front of the building housing the former editorial office of the opposition-orientated Azadliq newspaper in Baku in order to protest against the recent eviction of that newspaper’s office from that building.
The applicant, who was not a member of the Popular Front Party, participated in the picket as a journalist.
The picket was considered an unauthorised public assembly by the authorities and was dispersed by the police, who allegedly used force against the participants.
At around 2.30 p.m. several dozen persons were arrested, including the applicant.
No reasons were given for their arrest.
The applicant attempted to explain to the police officers arresting him that he was a journalist by pointing to the journalist’s badge he was wearing round his neck.
However the policemen tore the badge off and threw it away.
According to the applicant, during the arrest he was struck several times with a truncheon.
The applicant and other arrested persons were taken by bus to Police Station no.
8 of the Sabayil District Police Office.
After spending some time there, the applicant and several other arrested persons were taken to Police Station no.
9 of the Sabayil District Police Office.
They arrived at Police Station no.
9 at around 4 p.m.
The applicant was held in the internal yard of the police station for several hours, despite the cold weather.
He was then taken into the office of a police investigator and was asked to write a note of apology for participating in an unauthorised public assembly.
The applicant refused and attempted to state in writing his own version of the events, but was precluded from doing so and was taken back to the yard.
At around 7.30 p.m. the Head of the Police Station informed the applicant orally that he was being taken to prison.
Then the applicant and about twenty other arrested persons were put into a minibus and taken to the Sabayil District Court.
After arriving at the court building they were kept inside the bus for two hours.
Thereafter the applicant and several other arrested persons were taken inside the court building into a judge’s office.
According to the applicant, the judge asked them for their names.
The applicant gave the judge his version of the events, to which the judge did not respond.
The applicant was then taken back to the bus.
Following this hearing, the judge sentenced the applicant to ten days’ “administrative detention”.
The decision, in its entirety, read as follows: “I, judge [I.A.]
of the Sabayil District Court, having examined the administrative report drawn up in accordance with Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences concerning ... [the applicant] HAVE DETERMINED: At around 2.45 p.m. on 23 November 2006 [the applicant] held an unauthorised picket in front of the Baki Soveti metro station and refused to comply with lawful orders from the police.
In doing so, the applicant committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the CAO [Code of Administrative Offences].
Having regard to the above, in accordance with Articles 357, 360, 362-365, 425, and 430-432 of the CAO, [I] HAVE DECIDED: [that the applicant] is to be found guilty under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced to ten days’ detention under the administrative procedure.
The term of detention is to be calculated from 23 November 2006.
This decision can be appealed against within ten days.” The applicant was not informed of the decision and was not able to obtain a copy of it until months later (see below).
It appears that similar decisions were given in respect of a number of other arrested persons.
After about half an hour, a police officer holding a list approached the bus and announced the names of those who should remain in the bus.
Except for two persons, everyone’s name was on the list; the two who were not in the list were released.
At around 10 p.m. the bus took the applicant, together with the other detained persons, to a temporary detention facility.
On the same evening the detainees were visited by Mr E. Behbudov, head of the Azerbaijani Committee against Torture.
During their meeting, the applicant was informed, for the first time, that he had been sentenced to ten days’ “administrative detention” by the Sabayil District Court.
2.
Appeals against the decision on “administrative detention” While the applicant was in detention, on 24 November 2006 E.Q., an advocate, lodged an appeal against the Sabayil District Court’s decisions of 23 November 2006 on behalf of several of the members of the Popular Front Party who had been detained, including the applicant.
However, according to the applicant, the appeal had been lodged on his behalf unbeknownst to him and without his authorisation.
On 27 November 2006 the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal.
Following his release from detention, the applicant requested the Sabayil District Court to provide him with a copy of its decision of 23 November 2006, but to no avail.
On 8 January 2007 the applicant sent a formal written request to the Sabayil District Court asking for a copy of the decision.
Having received no reply to this request for twenty-two days, on 7 February 2007 the applicant was finally able to obtain a copy of the decision after personally visiting the court.
On 12 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Sabayil District Court’s decision of 23 November 2006.
At the same time, he lodged a request for restoration of the missed appeal time-limit, which was granted on 14 February 2007.
In his appeal, he complained, inter alia, that the hearing of 23 November 2006 by the Sabayil District Court had not complied with several guarantees of a fair trial.
On 2 March 2007 the Court of Appeal refused to admit the applicant’s appeal on the ground that on 24 November 2006 he had already lodged an appeal against the Sabayil District Court’s decision of 23 November 2006 (the appeal lodged by E.Q.
on the applicant’s behalf) and that that appeal had been examined on 27 November 2006.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had already exercised his right of appeal and that it was not possible to lodge more than one appeal against the same decision.
The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal’s inadmissibility decision of 2 March 2007.
By a letter of 1 May 2007, the registry of the Supreme Court notified the applicant that his appeal could not be admitted because, in accordance with the CAO, no appeal lay against the Court of Appeal’s inadmissibility decisions.
The applicant attempted to lodge further appeals with the Plenum of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, but these appeals were not admitted for the same or similar reasons.
3.
Civil action for compensation On 5 February 2007 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Sabayil District Court against the Sabayil District Police Office, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the applicant’s allegedly unlawful arrest and deprivation of liberty on 23 November 2006.
By a decision of 27 February 2007 the Sabayil District Court refused to admit the action as it did not comply with the requirements concerning the form and content of a civil claim.
The applicant appealed against that inadmissibility decision.
On 29 March 2007 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision and remitted the case for examination on the merits.
Subsequently, despite numerous enquiries by the applicant, he was given no information by the Sabayil District Court concerning the state of proceedings.
After the applicant had written numerous complaint letters to various authorities, by a letter of 11 April 2008 a judge of the Sabayil District Court sent him a copy of the Sabayil District Court’s decision of 5 June 2007.
According to that decision, the case had been “left without examination” owing to the parties’ failure to appear at hearings scheduled for 31 May and 5 June 2007.
On 22 April 2008 the applicant sent a letter to the Sabayil District Court, claiming that he had not been informed about, and had not been summoned to, the hearings of 31 May and 5 June 2007.
He requested the court to provide him with copies of documents proving that the summons had been sent to him.
According to the applicant, he was provided with documents constituting insufficient proof that he had been summoned to those hearings.
On 24 April 2008 the applicant lodged an application for “renewal” of the civil proceedings.
On 12 June 2008 the Sabayil District Court examined the applicant’s civil claim of 5 February 2007 and dismissed it (the applicant has not made a copy of this judgment available to the Court).
The applicant appealed.
On 21 October 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal rejected his appeal, finding, inter alia, that the police had arrested the applicant lawfully and that his detention for several hours prior to the court decision on “administrative detention” had been lawful because the CAO authorised detention of persons pending an administrative sanction for a period of up to twenty-four hours.
The applicant intended to lodge a cassation appeal against that judgment.
The domestic law required a plaintiff lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court to be represented by an advocate who was a member of the Bar Association.
On 23 December 2008 the applicant lodged applications with the Bar Association, the Baku Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, claiming that he had no financial means to pay an advocate and requesting to be provided with an advocate at the State’s expense.
The Bar Association responded that the applicant should apply with the relevant request, supported by documents certifying his personal financial situation, to the relevant court.
It appears that, at the same time as lodging the above-mentioned applications for free legal aid, the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, via the Court of Appeal (under the domestic law, an appeal to be lodged with a higher court had first to be submitted to the lower court in order for that court to verify the appeal’s compliance with the formal requirements prior to transmitting the appeal to the higher court).
On 19 January 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s request for a State-appointed advocate and refused to transmit his cassation appeal to the Supreme Court since it did not comply with the formal requirements for lodging a cassation appeal (the applicant has not made a full copy of this decision available to the Court).
The applicant attempted to appeal against the decision of 19 January 2009.
On 24 February 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal refused admit the cassation appeal against its decision of 19 January 2009 on the ground that the applicant had missed the time-limit for appeal, and on 27 February 2009 it refused to admit a new cassation appeal against its judgment of 21 October 2008 on the ground that the applicant was not represented by an advocate.
The applicant appealed again, this time against the decision of 24 February 2009.
On 19 June 2009 the Supreme Court granted his appeal and ordered the Baku Court of Appeal to re-examine the issue of the missed appeal time-limit.
On 14 September 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal restored the time-limit for appeal against its decision of 19 January 2009 and transmitted the applicant’s cassation appeal against that decision to the Supreme Court.
On 24 December 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the Baku Court of Appeal’s decision of 19 January 2009 and ordered that court to re-examine the applicant’s request to be provided with a State-appointed advocate in order to lodge a cassation appeal against the Baku Court of Appeal’s judgment of 21 October 2008.
On 18 February 2010 the Baku Court of Appeal, having re-examined the applicant’s request, rejected it again, finding that the applicant had failed to provide any supporting documents showing that he lacked the financial means to appoint a lawyer.
The applicant appealed against that decision.
On 31 May 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the decision and agreed with the Baku Court of Appeal’s finding that the applicant’s application for free legal aid had not been supported by any relevant documents.
B.
Relevant domestic law Article 310.1 of the CAO provides that failure to follow lawful orders given by the police or military personnel carrying out their duty to protect public order constitutes an administrative offence punishable by a fine or by “administrative detention” for a period of up to fifteen days.
According to Article 67.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”), a cassation appeal can be admitted for examination only of it has been drafted by an advocate.
Parties to the case can participate in cassation hearings only if they are represented by an advocate.
According to Article 67.2 of the CCP, in cases where legal representation is compulsory, parties who have insufficient means to retain an advocate may lodge an application for free legal aid with the court, whose decision will be subject to a cassation appeal.
In such cases, the advocate’s legal fees are paid from the State budget; if the opposing party loses the civil case, it may be ordered to reimburse these costs to the State budget in full or in part (Article 121.2 of the CCP).
According to Article 406 of the CCP, a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court against an appellate court’s judgment or decision must be lodged via the relevant appellate court.
According to Article 407.3 of the CCP, a cassation appeal must be signed by the advocate who drafted it.
According to Article 407.4, the cassation appeal must be accompanied by a document certifying the retention of the advocate.
According to Article 408.1 of the CCP, a cassation appeal shall not be admitted if, inter alia, it has not been signed by an advocate or is not accompanied by a document certifying the retention of the advocate.
COMPLAINTS 1.
The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that he was ill-treated during the arrest and that his conditions of detention amounted to ill-treatment.
2.
The applicant complains under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his detention prior to the court decision on “administrative detention” was unlawful, because the authorities did not comply with the formal legal requirements and because the period of his administrative detention without a court decision exceeded the time-limit of three hours set by the CAO.
He further complains under Article 5 § 2 of the Convention that he was not promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest.
3.
In respect of the proceedings on the administrative offence, relying on Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 and Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complains that he was convicted and sentenced to ten days’ imprisonment without a proper judicial hearing and that throughout the first-instance and appeal proceedings he was deprived of the basic guarantees of a fair trial, such as the right to a public hearing and to adversarial proceedings, and other criminal defence rights.
4.
In respect of the civil proceedings concerning his compensation claim against the police, relying on Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention, the applicant complains that the proceedings in the first-instance and appeal courts were unfair and did not comply with the “reasonable time” requirement.
He further complains that the denial of free legal aid and the refusal to admit his cassation appeal to the Supreme Court for examination on the merits violated his right to be represented by a lawyer and his right of access to court, and constituted discriminatory treatment.
5.
The applicant complains under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that his arrest and detention constituted an unjustified interference with his journalistic activity and right to freedom of peaceful assembly with others.

Judgment

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF MUCA v. ALBANIA

(Application no.
57456/11)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 May 2018

FINAL

22/08/2018

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Muca v. Albania,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Robert Spano, President,Paul Lemmens,Ledi Bianku,Işıl Karakaş,Nebojša Vučinić,Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström, judges,and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 17 April 2018,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.
The case originated in an application (no. 57456/11) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Albanian national, Mr Blerim Muca (“the applicant”), on 25 August 2011. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr V. Muzina, a lawyer practising in Durrës. The Albanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their then Agent, Ms L. Mandia of the State Advocate’s Office. 3. On 25 August 2011 the applicant sent an application to the Court, alleging that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It reached the Court on 31 August 2011. 4. On 21 November 2011 the applicant sent another application to the Court similar to the one already submitted in August 2011. It reached the Court on 24 November 2011. 5. On 26 June 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS
I.
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
6.
The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Tirana. 7. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and two other co-accused on account of premeditated murder. The applicant was subsequently arrested by the authorities. 8. On 21 July 1998 the applicant addressed a letter (kërkesë) to the Kavaja District Court (“the District Court”) and the Kavaja district prosecutor (“the district prosecutor”), stating that he had engaged A., a lawyer, to represent him before the district prosecutor during the investigation and during the trial proceedings. It appears that the applicant wrote this letter while he was in detention. 9. On 1 November 1999 the District Court found the applicant not guilty and ordered his release. He had attended the trial and had been defended by A., his chosen lawyer. The two other co-accused were convicted and sentenced. 10. On an unspecified date the two other co-accused and the prosecutor appealed against the District Court’s decision of 1 November 1999. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant left Albania. It appears that the applicant was not informed of the appeals of the two other co-accused and the prosecutor, but apparently A. was so informed. 12. On 28 February 2000 the Durrës Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the District Court’s decision and remitted the case for re‐examination. The applicant was represented by A. in his absence. 13. On 21 April 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal lodged by A. against the Durrës Court of Appeal decision of 28 February 2000. 14. On 26 December 2000, during the retrial proceedings, the District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of premeditated murder and sentenced him to twenty-three years’ imprisonment. The applicant was represented by lawyer A. (see paragraph 9), the decision stating that A. had been appointed by the court. The two other co-accused appealed. 15. On 10 September 2001 and 14 December 2001 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 26 December 2000. The applicant had been represented in those proceedings by a new, court-appointed lawyer. 16. On 14 April 2004 the applicant’s mother hired another lawyer, K., to make an application for review. It appears from the Supreme Court’s decision of 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 18 below) and the Constitutional Court’s decision of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 21 below) that an application for review was rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no copy of the said Supreme Court decision in the case file. 17. On 8 July 2005 the applicant was informed of his conviction in absentia by his family members. He lodged an application for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of 26 December 2000, arguing that he had never been informed of his conviction in absentia as he had been living abroad. The applicant was represented by K. as his counsel. 18. On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 respectively, the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, and the Supreme Court rejected, his application. The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings as he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A., who had been informed of the prosecutor’s appeal, and as his mother had appointed a lawyer to make an application for review. They also held that the case had already been examined at all instances and that their decisions were still in effect. 19. Judge A.H., who had been a member of the District Court’s bench that had delivered the judgment of 26 December 2000, also sat in the District Court’s bench of 4 November 2005 that dismissed the applicant’s application. Judges V.C. and Sh.M., who had been members of the Court of Appeal’s bench that on 10 September 2001 had upheld the decision of 26 December 2000, also sat in the Court of Appeal’s bench that dismissed his appeal on 29 September 2006. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant, represented by his lawyer, lodged a constitutional complaint in respect of the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and the lack of impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal. 21. On 16 March 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court’s decision of 25 February 2011 to dismiss the applicant’s constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court, noting that A. and the applicant’s mother had had knowledge of the trial proceedings, stated that there had been no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings in person. It did not examine the applicant’s claim about the impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal
II.
RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
22.
The relevant domestic law and practice at the material time are described in detail in the judgments of Shkalla v. Albania (no. 26866/05, §§ 28-35, 10 May 2011) and Izet Haxhia v. Albania (no. 34783/06, §§ 19‐42, 5 November 2013). THE LAW
I.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
23.
The applicant complained of the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and of the lack of impartiality of the judges who took part in the examination of his case after having been involved in the first round of proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in its relevant parts, as follows:
“1.
In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal ...”
24.
The Government denied that there had been any violation of this provision. A. Admissibility
25.
The Government argued that the application had been submitted outside the six-month time-limit provided for in the Convention, the applicant having lodged the application on 24 November 2011. 26. The applicant maintained that the application had been introduced within the six-month time-limit. 27. The Court notes that the applicant sent the application form on 25 August 2011 and it reached the Court by post on 31 August 2011. On the basis of the material before it, the Court sees no reason to find that the application was sent out of time. The second application form sent on 21 November 2011 was an additional document which does not affect the initial application. The Court therefore rejects the Government’s objection. 28. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
1.
Proceedings in absentia
29.
The applicant submitted that he had left Albania after the District Court had acquitted him by its decision of 1 November 1999. He had not been aware of the proceedings against him. The authorities had therefore tried and convicted him in absentia. He further stated that his mother’s knowledge of those proceedings had not made the proceedings fair as long as he had not been aware of them. He also disputed the fact that his family members had lodged an application for review (see paragraphs 16, 18 and 21 above). The domestic courts had not taken into consideration the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 30 of 17 June 2010 (see Izet Haxhia, cited above, § 35). 30. The Government accepted that the applicant had been tried and convicted in absentia. However, they argued that the domestic proceedings had not been unfair. The applicant had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing. He had been present in the proceedings before the District Court, which had declared him not guilty on 1 November 1999. His lawyer, A., had been informed of the appeal lodged against that decision. A. had also been present in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, which on 28 February 2000 had remitted the case for re-examination. A. had also appealed against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 28 February 2000 to the Supreme Court. 31. The Government also submitted that the applicant’s family members had had knowledge of the proceedings. They had regularly been present at the court proceedings or had duly engaged lawyers to represent the applicant. Indeed, his mother had hired a lawyer to make the application for review of the final decision on behalf of the applicant. Furthermore, the engagement of the same lawyer – K. – had shown that the applicant’s will had been the same as his mother’s. 32. In their additional submissions the Government submitted that the applicant had consented to being tried in absentia as he had been aware of the trial against him. The District Court’s decision of 1 November 1999 had not been final and had therefore been amenable to appeal. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal out of time had been dismissed on the grounds that nothing had prevented him from participating in the proceedings. 33. The Court notes that the general principles as regards proceedings in absentia have been set out in Sejdovic v. Italy ([GC], no. 56581/00, §§ 81‐95, ECHR 2006‐II). The Court further notes that although proceedings that take place in the accused’s absence are not of themselves incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention, a denial of justice nevertheless undoubtedly occurs where a person convicted in absentia is unable subsequently to obtain from the court which has heard his case a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact, where it has not been established that he or she has waived his or her right to appear and to defend him or herself (see Sejdovic, cited above, § 82, and Hokkeling v. the Netherlands, no. 30749/12, § 58, 14 February 2017). 34. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant had been present and had been assisted by a lawyer of his own choosing at the first-instance proceedings (contrast Shkalla, cited above, in which the applicant had not been informed of the proceedings at all), at the end of which the trial court declared him not guilty and ordered his release. Upon release, the applicant went abroad. However, following the appeals of the other co-accused and the prosecutor, the applicant was convicted in absentia. The Court notes in this regard that even though his chosen lawyer continued to represent him on appeal, it cannot be inferred that the lawyer was acting on the applicant’s explicit instructions. In fact, in the retrial proceedings, the same lawyer continued to represent the applicant after having been appointed by the court (compare and contrast Medenica v. Switzerland, no. 20491/92, ECHR 2001‐VI). Another court‐appointed lawyer represented the applicant in the subsequent retrial proceedings. The Government did not submit any proof to the contrary. 35. Lastly, the Court notes from the documents in the case file that it cannot be said that the appointment of a lawyer by family members in order to make an application for review met with the applicant’s approval or had his consent. It cannot be inferred from the fact that the applicant was defended by counsel appointed by his mother that he had prior effective knowledge of the appeal and retrial proceedings. 36. For all the above considerations, the Court finds that it has not been shown that the applicant had sufficient knowledge of the appeal proceedings or that he had sufficient knowledge of the retrial proceedings against him. Further, there is no indication in the case file that the authorities undertook any effort to notify him. Nor has it been shown that he explicitly or implicitly authorised his family members’ subsequent actions or the appointed lawyer’s actions or unequivocally waived his right to appear in court by deliberately evading justice. The Court further notes that the applicant unsuccessfully lodged an application for leave to appeal out of time (see Shkalla, cited above § 75, and Izet Haxhia, cited above, § 63), therefore that remedy turned out to be ineffective. 37. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant did not have the opportunity to obtain a fresh determination of the merits of the charges against him by a court which would have allowed him to put forward his case in proceedings compliant with the fairness guarantees of Article 6. 38. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 2. Impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal
39.
The applicant also complained, under Article 6 § 1, of the lack of impartiality of the benches of the District Court in the proceedings of 4 November 2005 and of the Court of Appeal in the proceedings of 29 September 2006. 40. The Court reiterates that the existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 must be determined according to a subjective test where regard must be had to the personal conviction and behaviour of a particular judge, that is to say whether the judge held any personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and also according to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, § 93, ECHR 2009). 41. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the benches of the District Court of 26 December 2000 and of the Court of Appeal of 10 September 2001 examined the applicant’s case on the merits and convicted him in absentia. The Court further notes that some members of those benches (Judges A.H., V.C. and Sh.M.) also sat on the benches of the District Court in the proceedings of 4 November 2005 and of the Court of Appeal in the proceedings of 29 September 2006, which examined the applicant’s application for leave to appeal out of time. 42. As to the subjective test, the Court notes that the applicant did not dispute the personal impartiality of Judges A. H., V.C. and Sh.M. 43. Under the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judges’ personal conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to their impartiality. The Court notes that the bench of the District Court in the proceedings of 4 November 2005 and of the Court of Appeal in the proceedings of 29 September 2006 did not examine the case on the merits of the conviction. They also did not reach any conclusion as to the applicant’s guilt (see Fey v. Austria, 24 February 1993, § 34, Series A no. 255‐A). 44. In the light of the foregoing, even assuming that Article 6 applies to the leave to appeal proceedings, the Court does not find that such fears as the applicant may have had as to the impartiality of the District Court’s bench of 4 November 2005 and the Court of Appeal’s bench of 29 September 2006 can be held to have been objectively justified. Accordingly, it follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill‐founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
45.
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.
Damage
46.
The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 47. The Government submitted that the applicant’s claims were ill‐founded. 48. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. 49. With regard to the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Court reiterates its findings in Shkalla (cited above, §§ 77-79), and Izet Haxhia (cited above, § 70) that when an applicant has been convicted in breach of her or his rights as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, the most appropriate form of redress would be to ensure that the applicant is put as far as possible in the position in which she or he would have been had this provision been respected. The most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be a new trial or the reopening of the proceedings if requested. The Court, therefore, concludes that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. B. Costs and expenses
50.
The applicant also claimed EUR 20,000 for the costs and expenses incurred. He did not submit supporting documents. 51. The Government rejected the applicant’s claims. 52. According to Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Gjyli v. Albania, no. 32907/07, § 72, 29 September 2009). In the absence of any supporting documents submitted by the applicant, the Court rejects the claim in respect of costs and expenses. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1.
Declares the complaint concerning the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2.
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.
Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant;

4.
Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 May 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Stanley NaismithRobert SpanoRegistrarPresident