I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in OLIYNYK v. UKRAINE.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2019-07-23
  • Communication date: 2015-10-06
  • Application number(s): 41415/13
  • Country:   UKR
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 3, 5, 5-1-b, 5-3
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.612844
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

The applicant, Mr Stanislav Fedorovych Oliynyk, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1982 and lives in Dnipropetrovsk.
He is represented before the Court by Mr S.M.
Doroshenko, a lawyer practising in Dnipropetrovsk.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 7 April 2013 the applicant’s uncle Mr Ch.
was found dead in his house.
He had died as a result of a severe head injury (a skull fracture and intracerebral haemorrhage).
The investigation found out that the applicant had been seen drinking with the victim and having beaten him up in the evening on 6 April 2013.
As indicated in the summary of the police officers’ statements provided in the prosecutor’s ruling of 21 June 2013 (see below), at about 9 p.m. on 10 April 2013 a senior official of the Dnipropetrovsk city police department decided that the applicant should be brought to the police station for questioning.
On 11 April 2013, at about 6.30 a.m., the applicant was taken by a police car from his home to the police station.
He did not object.
The applicant’s arrival at the police station and his stay there till 7.20 p.m. (see below) remained undocumented.
As explained by the police in the course of the investigation into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint, this was due to the fact that his arrival had coincided with the shifts’ take-over when all the record books had been on the chief’s desk.
The police officers also subsequently explained that, as a matter of coincidence, on 11 April 2013 the video cameras on the ground floor and the first floor, where the applicant was held, were out of order.
According to the applicant, it was suggested to him to confess to having inflicted the fatal injuries on Mr Ch., but he refused.
Thereafter he was allegedly taken to a different room, where four police officers beat him up.
More specifically, the applicant alleges that they were punching him on his head and torso for about an hour.
The applicant succumbed and confessed.
The report of his questioning as a suspect does not specify the time when he was questioned.
It contains a note that the applicant waived his right to legal assistance.
At 6.07 p.m. on 11 April 2013 the applicant was formally notified of the suspicion against him (see the “Relevant domestic law” section below).
From 6.15 p.m. to 7 p.m. the investigator carried out the crime reconstruction with the applicant’s participation.
The applicant did not, however, sign the report to that effect.
At 7.20 p.m. on that day the applicant’s arrest was documented.
As it follows from the arrest report, the applicant still had no lawyer.
On 12 April 2013 the investigator applied to the investigating judge for the applicant’s pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial.
As noted in the application, there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, and the possible penalty for it was a term of imprisonment of over seven years.
The investigator also noted that the applicant was unemployed and lived at an address different from his official domicile.
Furthermore, it was considered that he might abscond if at liberty given that he had left the crime scene.
The application also mentioned that the applicant was married, had three minor children and no criminal record in the past.
On the same day the investigating judge allowed the aforementioned application and ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention till 10 June 2013.
The judge further held that the applicant would be released if he put up bail in the amount of 80,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (at the time equal to about 7,400 euros).
On 17 April 2013 the applicant (at that stage represented by a lawyer of his choice, Mr Doroshenko, who is now representing him in the proceedings before the Court) appealed submitting that in ordering his detention the investigating judge had not taken into account his personal circumstances, namely, the fact that he was well integrated socially, had had no criminal record and had three small children to take care of.
The applicant further contended that there was no evidence showing the risk of his absconding.
He noted that his confession had been extracted by ill-treatment and psychological pressure, and that there were witnesses who could confirm his alibi.
Lastly, he complained that the bail amount was excessive making his release on bail unrealistic.
On 19 April 2013 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) rejected the applicant’s appeal.
It found that the detention order was compliant with the criminal procedural legislation.
On 29 April 2013 the applicant requested the Dnipropetrovsk City Court (“the City Court”) to release him subject to an undertaking not to abscond.
He submitted, in addition to his earlier arguments, that the witnesses who had ostensibly seen him beating up the victim had lied pursuing their own interests and that there were other witnesses who could confirm his alibi.
On 30 April 2013 the applicant’s father complained to the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police following his arrest on 11 April 2013.
More specifically, four police officers had allegedly beaten him up with a view to coercing him into confessing to the incriminated crime.
Thereafter, one police officer had handed him a glass of water allegedly containing some psychotropic substance rendering the applicant weak and sleepy.
In substantiation of his allegations the applicant’s father referred to the video record of the crime reconstruction of 11 April 2013.
According to him, it showed that the applicant had been barely conscious and had had to lean against various objects not to fall.
Nor had he been able to write or put his signature in the crime reconstruction report.
The applicant’s father also alleged that the investigator had tried to extort a bribe from him in exchange of the applicant’s release.
On 2 May 2013 an entry was made in the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations in respect of the above complaints, marking the beginning of the investigation.
On 14 May 2013 the applicant himself complained to the City Court about his ill-treatment.
On the same day the City Court rejected the applicant’s request for release.
It noted that that issue had already been duly examined when the preventive measure in respect of the applicant had been chosen.
On 5 June 2013 the investigator applied to the investigating judge for the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months.
He explained it by the necessity to carry out some additional investigating measures.
The applicant submitted his objections to the aforementioned application.
According to him, it had never been established why any less intrusive preventive measure would have been insufficient in his case.
On 10 June 2013 the Dnipropetrovsk City Court allowed the investigator’s application and upheld its reasoning.
As regards the applicant’s arguments in favour of his release, the court noted that they had already been examined and dismissed when the preventive measure had been chosen.
The applicant’s detention was therefore extended till 8 July 2013.
The applicant appealed.
He submitted, in particular, that there had been no reassessment of the reasonableness of his continued detention with the passage of time.
On 14 June 2013 the Court of Appeal found against the applicant.
It held that the initially identified risk of his absconding had not diminished with the passage of time.
Furthermore, it stated that there were objective reasons for prolonging the investigation.
On 21 June 2013 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office terminated the criminal investigation into the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint on the ground that there was no indication of a criminal offence.
On 1 July 2013 the applicant was indicted.
On 5 July 2013 the City Court held a preparatory hearing before the trial.
It rejected the applicant’s request for a replacement of his pre-trial detention by a house arrest.
The court noted that the issue had already been examined before and that any less severe preventive measure would be insufficient given the seriousness of the charges against the applicant.
The applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended to 5 September 2013.
On 19 August 2013 the applicant challenged the prosecutor’s ruling of 21 June 2013 on the termination of the criminal investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment.
He submitted, in particular, that he had never been examined by a forensic medical expert with a view to establishing his injuries.
According to him, one such injury, namely a bruise on his neck, was visible on the video record of the crime reconstruction of 11 April 2013, which had remained without assessment.
On 28 August 2013 the City Court quashed the impugned ruling of 21 June 2013 as based on an incomplete and superficial investigation.
The court pointed out, in particular, the following omissions: there remained inconsistencies in the police officers’ statements as regards the time when the applicant had been taken to the investigator (dealing with the applicant’s criminal case); the video record of the crime reconstruction of 11 April 2013 had not been assessed with a view to verifying the applicant’s submission that his injuries were visible on that video; the investigator (in charge of the investigation of the applicant’s ill-treatment complaint) had not requested the results of the applicant’s medical examination from the pre-trial detention centre; and the information that the video cameras in the police station had been out of order on 11 April 2013 had never been verified.
Accordingly, the court ordered additional investigation into the matter.
On 4 September 2013 the City Court replaced the applicant’s pre-trial detention by a house arrest, with the reference to the Court’s case-law concerning the right to liberty.
B.
Relevant domestic law The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2012 (as worded at the material time) read as follows: “Article 42.
A suspect and an accused.
“1.
A suspect is the person who has been notified of suspicion against him/her as prescribed in Articles 276 to 279 of this Code, or the person who has been arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence.
... 3.
A suspect [...] shall have the following rights: (1) to know of which criminal offence he/she is suspected [...]; (2) to be informed, expressly and promptly, of his/her rights as laid down in this Code and, where need be, to have those rights explained; ...
Article 176.
General provisions on preventive measures “1.
Preventive measures are: (1) personal commitment; (2) personal warranty; (3) bail; (4) house arrest; and (5) pre-trial detention.
2.
Arrest of a person on the grounds and under the procedure defined by this Code is a provisional preventive measure.
3.
The investigating judge or the court shall reject an application for a preventive measure if the investigator or the prosecutor does not prove the existence of sufficient grounds to believe that none of the more lenient preventive measures would be sufficient for the prevention of the established risk or risks.
The most lenient preventive measure is a personal commitment, whereas the most severe one is a pre-trial detention.
4.
Preventive measures shall be applied: during the investigation – by the investigating judge following an application from the investigator approved by the prosecutor or following such an application the prosecutor from himself; and during the trial – by the court following the prosecutor’s application to that effect.
Article 177.
Purpose and grounds for the application of preventive measures 1.
The purpose of a preventive measure is to ensure the compliance of a suspect or an accused with the procedural obligations, as well as to prevent attempts to: (1) abscond from the pre-trial investigation authorities and/or the court; (2) destroy, conceal or spoil any of the objects or documents that have an essential importance for establishing the circumstances of the criminal offence; (3) exert an unlawful influence on the victim, the witnesses, or on other suspects, accused, the expert or the specialist in the same proceedings; (4) obstruct the criminal proceedings in any other way; (5) commit another criminal offence or continue the criminal offence of which he/she is suspected or accused.
2.
A preventive measure shall be applied on the ground of a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offence and subject to the existence of risks providing sufficient grounds for the investigating judge or the court to believe that the suspect, the accused or the convict can commit actions specified in part one of this Article.
The investigator or the prosecutor may not apply for a preventive measure without grounds provided in this Code.
Article 178.
Circumstances to be taken into account in choosing a preventive measure 1.
When choosing a preventive measure, in addition to assessing the risks indicated in Article 177 of this Code, the investigating judge or the court must give a cumulative assessment to all the circumstances brought to his/her/its knowledge by the parties.
These circumstances include the following: (1) the weight of the available evidence showing that the suspect or the accused has committed the criminal offence; (2) the severity of the potential penalty; (3) the age and the health condition of the suspect or the accused; (4) the level of the social integration of the suspect or the accused by the place of his/her permanent residence, including whether he/she has a family and dependants; (5) whether the suspect or the accused has a permanent employment or studies; (6) the reputation of the suspect or the accused; (7) the property status of the suspect or the accused; (8) whether the suspect or the accused had criminal convictions in the past; (9) if a preventive measure was already applied to the suspect or the accused, whether he/she complied with it; (10) whether the person has been served a notice of suspicion in respect of another criminal offence; and (11) the amount of the pecuniary damage, of causing which the person is suspected or accused, or the amount of proceeds, which the person is suspected, or accused, to have received as a result of a criminal offence.
Article 183.
Pre-trial detention 1.
Pre-trial detention is an exceptional preventive measure applied exclusively if the prosecutor proves that none of the less strict preventive measures can prevent the risks specified in Article 177 of the present Code.
2.
Pre-trial detention as a preventive measure shall not apply except as follows: ... (4) in respect of a person without a prior criminal conviction – if he/she is suspected of, or charged with, a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment of more than five years; ...
Article 207.
Lawful arrest 1.
Nobody may be arrested without a ruling of the investigating judge or the court, except for in cases envisaged in this Code.
...
Article 208.
Arrest by a competent official 1.
A competent official shall be entitled to arrest a person suspected of having committed a crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, only in the following cases: (1) if the person was caught whilst committing a crime or attempting to commit it; or (2) if immediately after a criminal offence the statements of an eye-witness, including the victim, or the totality of obvious signs on the body, clothes or the scene indicate that this individual has just committed the crime.
... 4.
A competent official, who has carried out the arrest, shall immediately inform the arrested person, in an understandable language, of the grounds for the arrest and of the commission of what crime he/she is suspected.
The official shall also explain to the arrested person his/her rights: to be legally represented; to be provided with medical assistance; to make statements or to remain silent; to inform [third] persons [...] of his/her arrest and whereabouts; to claim verification of the validity of the arrest; as well as the other procedural rights specified in this Code.
5.
A report shall be drawn in respect of an individual’s arrest containing, [in particular,] the following information: the place, the date and the exact time (the hour with minutes) of the arrest according to Article 209 of this Code; the grounds for the arrest; results of the personal search; requests, statements or complaints of the arrested person, if any; and the comprehensive list of his/her procedural rights and duties.
The arrest report shall be signed by the official, who drew it up, and by the arrested person.
Its copy shall be immediately served on the arrested person against his/her signature [...] .
Article 209.
The moment of arrest 1.
An individual is considered to be arrested if he/she is obliged, by coercion or by an order, to stay next to a competent official or in premises prescribed by a competent official.
Article 276.
Cases in which a notification of suspicion is made 1.
Notification of suspicion shall be made ... in the following cases: (1) if an individual is arrested in flagrante delicto or immediately after the commission of a criminal offence; (2) if one of the preventive measures is applied to an individual as prescribed in the present Code; [or] (3) if there is sufficient evidence to suspect a person of having committed a criminal offence.
... 2.
... the investigator, the prosecutor or other competent official (entitled to carry out the arrest) shall immediately advise the suspect of his/her rights under Article 42 of this Code.
3.
Once [this has been done], the investigator, the prosecutor or other competent official must explain to the suspect each of the aforementioned rights if requested.
COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that he was ill-treated by the police and that there has been no effective domestic investigation into the matter.
He further complains, with the reference to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, that his placement in police custody was unlawful and that his pre-trial detention was not based on sufficient and relevant reasons.

Judgment

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF SHVETS v. UKRAINE

(Application no.
22208/17)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

23 July 2019

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Shvets v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Paul Lemmens, President,Carlo Ranzoni,Péter Paczolay, judges,and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 2 July 2019,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.
The case originated in an application (no. 22208/17) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Mykola Petrovych Shvets (“the applicant”), on 14 March 2017. 2. The applicant was represented by Ms I. Koval, a lawyer practising in Kyiv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr I. Lishchyna. 3. The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to ensure his access to his granddaughter. 4. On 11 May 2017 notice of the application was given to the Government. 5. The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee, but provided no reasons. After having considered the Government’s objection, the Court rejects it. THE FACTS
6.
The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Cherkasy. 7. The applicant is the paternal grandfather of V., who was born in 2011 and lived in Kyiv until her parents separated in late 2014. Following enquiries by him and V.’s father, they found out that V. and her mother (D.) had moved to Kherson (around 550 km from Kyiv). The applicant’s attempts to see V. in Kherson were unsuccessful. 8. On 23 June 2015 the applicant applied to the Svyatoshynskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the first-instance court”) seeking an order requiring D. to allow him access to his granddaughter V. and to immediately return her to Kyiv. The applicant also requested that the court arrange a schedule of regular meetings with his granddaughter in Kyiv. 9. On 18 April 2016 the first-instance court partly allowed the application. It found that under domestic law (see paragraph 23 below) the applicant had been entitled to keep contacts with his granddaughter and participate in her upbringing and the child’s mother could not prevent him from exercising that right. Having examined the facts, the court ruled that the applicant should have contact with his granddaughter from 10 until 5 p.m. on the first and third Saturday of the month. The court specified that the meetings should take place at D.’s home and in her presence. It noted that in January 2016 the court which had been dealing with disputes between the parents regarding V.’s place of residence had determined that V. should live with her mother. There were therefore no grounds to order the return of the child to Kyiv where she had been living previously. 10. The applicant appealed, arguing, among other things, that even though a meetings schedule had been established, the court had failed to resolve the principal issue, which was the mother’s refusal to allow the applicant access to the child. The applicant contended that the obligation of the child’s mother not to prevent him from communicating with the child had not been determined by the first-instance court. 11. On 8 June 2016 the Kyiv Court of Appeal noted that the first‐instance court had properly addressed the scope of the case given that the applicant had amended and developed his claims during the proceedings. The court of appeal then amended the first-instance court’s decision and reasoned that the meetings between the applicant and the child should not take place in the presence of the child’s mother. The court considered that the applicant and D. did not have a good relationship and that D.’s presence during the meetings would negatively affect the applicant’s communication with the child. The court added that the applicant had developed a very close connection with his granddaughter. He was well aware of her health problems and needs and could take care of her. There were therefore no obstacles preventing him from communicating with the child alone. Following the appellate court’s ruling, the decision of 18 April 2016 (see paragraph 9 above), as amended, became binding. 12. The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the courts had failed to compel D. to allow him to have meetings with the child. 13. On 14 September 2016 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded, having concluded that the lower courts had correctly applied the law and provided appropriate reasoning for their decisions. 14. Between October and December 2016 the applicant complained to the police, arguing that D. had committed an offence by failing to comply with the court decision on the applicant’s contact rights. An investigation into those allegations was opened in December 2016. 15. On 12 April 2017 the State bailiffs refused to open enforcement proceedings in respect of the decision of 18 April 2016, noting that the law did not specify the manner in which it could be enforced. 16. On 21 April 2017 the applicant applied to the first-instance court to determine the manner in which the decision of 18 April 2016 could be enforced. The applicant requested that the court formally compel D. to hand over the child to the applicant on the days of the meetings as determined by the court. 17. On 16 June 2017 the first-instance court found that the decision of 18 April 2016 was binding but had not been complied with by D. It therefore ruled that D. had a duty to hand over the child to the applicant in accordance with the meeting schedule. 18. D. appealed against that ruling. 19. On 27 September 2017 the Kyiv Court of Appeal dismissed D.’s appeal as unfounded. The appellate court noted that D. had not complied with the court decision of 18 April 2016 and had prevented the applicant from seeing the child. Meanwhile, the bailiffs could not enforce the decision because the manner of enforcement had not been specified. It had therefore been necessary to adopt an additional court decision and rule that D. had a duty to hand over the child to the applicant in accordance with the meetings schedule. 20. D. appealed on points of law. On 23 October 2017 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters suspended, without providing specific reasons, the enforcement of the decision of 16 June 2017 pending consideration of D.’s appeal on points of law. The Court has not been informed about the outcome of these proceedings. 21. On 24 May 2018, following a claim lodged by V.’s father, the first-instance court decided that the child should live with her father (the applicant’s son) in Kyiv. The court ordered immediate enforcement of that decision. 22. On 30 May 2018 the State Bailiffs ensured the transfer of the child to her father. Since that time the applicant has had all the possibilities of taking part in the upbringing of the child. 23. Article 257 § 1 of Family Code of 2002 provides that grandmother, grandfather, great-grandfather, great-grandmother have the right to communicate with their grandchildren, great-grandchildren and to participate in their upbringing. Article 257 § 2 of the Code provides that parents or other persons with whom the child lives should not interfere with the exercise by grandparents and great-grandparents of their rights in the education of grandchildren or great-grandchildren. The grandparents and great-grandparents have the right to apply to the court with a claim to remove obstacles in exercising such rights. 24. The relevant provisions of domestic law on enforcement proceedings are summarised in the judgment in the case of Vyshnyakov v. Ukraine (no. 25612/12, § 28, 24 July 2018). THE LAW
25.
The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention that the domestic authorities had failed to ensure his access to his granddaughter. 26. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), will examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention alone. 27. This provision reads as follows:
“1.
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
28.
The Government submitted that in the domestic proceedings the applicant was majorly preoccupied with the idea of returning the child to Kyiv and not about his access to the child. The domestic courts had properly examined the applicant’s claims. If the applicant had not been satisfied with the result, he could have applied to the domestic courts once again for protection of his contact rights, seeking removal of obstacles in having contact with the granddaughter. Moreover, the bailiffs were in a position to enforce the contact arrangements after the domestic courts had determined the manner in which the relevant decision had to be enforced. In view of the above, the Government considered that the applicant’s complaint should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and as manifestly ill‐founded. 29. The applicant disagreed. He contended that he had taken all the necessary steps to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to his complaint. 30. The Court notes at the outset that there may be “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention between grandparents and grandchildren where there are sufficiently close family ties between them (see, for example, Kruskic and others v. Croatia (dec.), no. 10140/13, § 108, 25 November 2014, and T.S. and J.J. v. Norway (dec.), no. 15633/15, § 23, 11 October 2016). In the present case, it was not disputed that such family ties existed between the applicant and his granddaughter. Notably, the domestic courts found that the applicant had developed a very close connection with his granddaughter (see paragraph 11 above). The Court therefore accepts that the relationship between them amounted to “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 (see, mutatis mutandis, Mitovi v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 53565/13, § 59, 16 April 2015). This provision is therefore applicable to the present case. 31. As regards the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the applicant’s complaint refers to the alleged failure of the domestic authorities to ensure proper respect to his family life in the course of one set of court proceedings resulting in a binding judgment and its further enforcement. During those proceedings the domestic authorities were dealing with the question of whether or not obstacles had been caused to the applicant in getting access to his granddaughter. Therefore, the possibility of opening a new set of proceedings, as suggested by the Government, is not relevant for the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, M.R. and D.R. v. Ukraine, no. 63551/13, §§ 46 and 47, 22 May 2018). Accordingly, the Government’s objection is dismissed. 32. The Court further considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 33. The applicant contended that the inactivity of the national courts and the bailiffs, as well as their formalistic approach and reluctance to analyse all the facts of the case, had resulted in violation of his right to maintain a normal relationship with his granddaughter. 34. The Government did not provide any comments on the merits. 35. The general principles concerning the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention in the sphere of family law are described in Ribić v. Croatia (no. 27148/12, §§ 92-95, 2 April 2015, with further references) and Vyshnyakov (§§ 34-37, cited above, with further references). These principles also apply to cases where contact and residence disputes concerning children arise between parents and/or other members of the children’s family (see Mitovi, cited above, § 55; and N.Ts. and Others v. Georgia, no. 71776/12, § 70 in fine, 2 February 2016). However, the Court reiterates that the relationship between grandparents and grandchildren is different in nature and degree from the relationship between parent and child and thus by its very nature generally calls for a lesser degree of protection (see Mitovi, cited above, § 58). 36. In the present case the applicant complained that he could not have access to his granddaughter owing to the conduct of D., the child’s mother, and that the State authorities had failed to take measures to protect his right to communicate with the child. 37. The Court notes that, in response to the applicant’s action against D., the domestic courts found that under the domestic law the applicant had a right of contact with his granddaughter. They determined in the main set of proceedings a schedule for the applicant’s meetings with his granddaughter, taking particular note of the fact that the applicant had developed a very close connection with his granddaughter (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). While acknowledging the necessity of imposing a meetings schedule, the courts did not formally impose any duty on D. in that context, notably the courts did not oblige D. to respect the meetings schedule. However, this technicality prevented subsequently the bailiffs from interfering in any manner (see paragraph 15 above). The applicant had therefore to institute the auxiliary proceedings in which the courts specifically compelled D. to hand over the child to the applicant on the relevant dates. The courts therefore imposed in a separate set of proceedings an obvious duty which indispensably followed from the fact that a meetings schedule had been established. Only that additional ruling – as suggested by the domestic courts (see paragraph 19 above) – eventually made enforcement of the contact arrangements by the bailiffs possible. However, even that court decision could not be enforced given that the higher court suspended the enforcement proceedings (see paragraph 20 above). With that suspension, which was not supported by any specific reasons, the applicant did not have real possibilities of compulsory enforcement of his contact arrangements. 38. Furthermore, even if the enforcement proceedings had been pursued, it is doubtful that they would remedy the applicant’s rights. In this regard the Court refers to its earlier findings in Ukrainian cases that enforcement proceedings in childcare cases disclose structural and systemic deficiencies (see Vyshnyakov, cited above, § 46, and, mutatis mutandis, M.R. and D.R. v. Ukraine, no. 63551/13, § 66, 22 May 2018). 39. The Court further notes that the applicant eventually obtained access to his granddaughter in May 2018 only because his son (the child’s father) succeeded in a separate dispute with D. regarding change of the child’s place of residence (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above). However, by that time the applicant’s attempts to ensure and enforce his right of contact with the child had almost reached a three-year period. The Court notes that the applicant might have partly contributed to the overall length of the proceedings, nevertheless it considers that in the circumstances of the present case the domestic authorities failed to show requisite diligence in treating the applicant’s case (see, mutatis mutandis, Mitovi, cited above, §§ 63-65, and Improta v. Italy, no. 66396/14, § 53, 4 May 2017). 40. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 41. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
42.
The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 43. The Government submitted that the claim was unsubstantiated. 44. The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered anguish and distress on account of the violation found in the present case. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 45. The applicant did not submit any claims under this heading. The Court is therefore not called to make any award under costs and expenses. 46. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 July 2019, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Andrea TamiettiPaul LemmensDeputy RegistrarPresident