I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in BOBYLEV v. RUSSIA.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2020-10-08
  • Communication date: 2013-02-18
  • Application number(s): 45477/11
  • Country:   RUS
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 3, 5, 5-1-c, 13
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 10 - Freedom of expression-{general} (Article 10-1 - Freedom of expression)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.733283
  • Prediction: Violation
  • Consistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

The applicant, Mr Roman Anatolyevich Bobylev, is a Russian national who was born in 1965 and lives in Volzhskiy, the Volgograd Region.
He is currently serving the sentence of imprisonment in correctional labour colony IK-5 of Lepley, the Republic of Mordoviya.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
A.
The applicant’s arrest and alleged ill-treatment At about 9 p.m. on 9 April 2010 the applicant and his three-year-old son went to a shop near their place in Volzhskiy, the Volgograd Region.
Once in the shop, the applicant was apprehended by the officers of the Volzhskiy Office of the Volgograd Regional Department of the Federal Drug Control Service (“the Drug Control Service”).
The policemen handcuffed him.
A salesperson and two passers-by in the shop, as well as the applicant’s son, witnessed the apprehension.
The applicant submits that the son, threatened by the events, started crying.
According to the applicant, he did not resist the policemen.
The policemen searched his pockets in the absence of lay witnesses and planted the sachet of sachet of heroine on him.
Then they waited for about thirty minutes for the lay witnesses to arrive on him.
The lay witness did not sign the seizure record on the spot but only at some point later on the same date According to the officers’ depositions (see below), as well the report dated 9 April 2010 by Drug Control officer D, the applicant violently resisted the arrest and the officers had to use force and handcuff him.
The applicant was searched in the presence of two lay witnesses, and the drugs were discovered on him by the policemen.
Then the applicant was brought to the Drug Control Office premises.
He submits that he was severely beaten by the policemen there.
He was several times hit in the ribs, face and groin.
He submits that they ill-treated him in order to obtain his authorisation for a search in his flat.
According to the applicant, S. and I., apparently lay persons, eye-witnessed the beatings.
The applicant’s son remained at the Drug Control Office’s building until 4 a.m. on 10 April 2010.
Then he was transferred to the applicant’s spouse.
It appears from the crime scene examination record («протокол осмотра места происшествия») dated 10 April 2010 that between 3.40 a.m. and 4.20 a.m. officer G. searched the applicant’s flat in the presence of two lay witnesses (A. and B.)
At 10 a.m. on 10 April 2010 an unspecified Drug Control officer drew up an apprehension record in respect of the applicant.
It appears that thereafter the applicant was placed transferred to the temporary detention centre of Volzhskiy (“the IVS”).
The applicant submits that he was examined upon his arrival to the IVS and an officer recorded his injuries, as well as the applicant’s submissions as regards their origin.
At some point he was placed in remand prison no.5 of Volzhskiy and examined by the medical personnel of the facility.
He does not provide further details in this respect.
B.
Medical documents It appears that at some point the applicant received a “direction” («направление») for a medical examination from an unspecified authority.
According to the medical certificate of 12 April 2010 (referred to in the decision of 9 June 2010, see below), the applicant was examined by an unspecified doctor who established that he had bruises on the left shoulder and the left axilliary crease.
On 14 May 2010 a medical expert examination was held in respect of the applicant on the basis of the existing medical documents.
The expert confirmed the existence of bruises on the applicant’s left shoulder and axillary crease and concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted by a blunt object of unknown origin and that they had not caused harm to the applicant’s health.
The expert concluded that the injuries had been inflicted on different dates: the bruise of the axillary crease could have been inflicted within 1 to 3 days preceding the medical examination on 9 [sic] April 2010, whilst the hematoma on the left shoulder could have appeared “within five to ten days before the date of the [medical] examination”.
C. Refusal to open criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment On 12 April 2010 the applicant requested criminal proceedings to be brought on account of his unlawful apprehension and ill-treatment by police as well as, apparently, in respect of psychological pressure on his minor son.
On 20 April 2010 the case file was forwarded to the Investigative Department of the Investigation Committee of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation of the Volgograd Region (“the investigative department”).
1.
Decision of 30 April 2010 and its quashing On 30 April 2010 investigator L. of the investigative department found no criminal offence in the officers’ actions and refused to bring criminal proceedings against them.
The investigator reached that conclusion relying on the information provided by two police officers involved in the applicant’s apprehension and questioning (G. and K.).
The officers indicated, in particular, that they had apprehended the applicant when he had been attempting to sale heroin, that he had resisted the arrest and they had been obliged to use force, as well as to handcuff him.
Otherwise, they denied any duress in the applicant’s respect.
The decision also contained a summary of the applicant’s account of the events in so far as it concerned the arrest.
The decision further read that the applicant had been questioned at the Drug Control office and that he had chosen to remain silent.
The investigator concluded that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment were a part of his defence strategy and were aimed at avoiding criminal liability for his illicit actions.
The applicant appealed against the decision.
It appears that at some point before 18 May 2010, apparently on 30 April 2010, the Head of the investigative department quashed the decision and ordered an additional inquiry.
On 18 May 2010 the Volzhskiy Town Court of the Volgograd Region disallowed the applicant’s complaint, since the decision appealed against had been set aside in the meantime.
2.
Refusal to bring criminal proceedings of 9 June 2010 On 9 June 2010 L. decided that there was no reason to bring criminal proceedings against the police officers concerned.
The decision referred to the following information and documents: - the applicant’s account of the events of 9 April 2010, including a description of the alleged ill-treatment at the Drug Control office; - the statements by the policemen (K. and G.) who reiterated their position as regards the use of force during the arrest.
They also submitted that they had not searched the applicant before the lay witnesses’ arrival on the date of his apprehension.
They confirmed that two salespersons had eye‐witnessed the events in the shop.
They indicated that they had questioned the applicant on the Drug Control premises in the presence of B., another policeman.
They denied any allegations of ill-treatment; - the testimony by officer B, who had seen the applicant handcuffed.
He confirmed that the applicant had not been beaten on 9 April 2010; - the submissions of salespersons Kh.
and P., who confirmed that the applicant had been handcuffed and searched in the presence of the lay witnesses and the drugs had been discovered on him.
They had not seen the policemen planting the sachet on the applicant.
They submitted that the applicant had not resisted and the officers had not beaten him up; - the testimonies of lay witnesses B. and A. who confirmed that the drugs had been found on the applicant in their presence; - report by G. on the use of physical force and handcuffs as a result of the applicant’s resistance to the police officers; - medical documents of 12 April and 14 May 2010.
The investigator found that the bruise of the shoulder had been inflicted at some point before the apprehension and the bruise of the axillary crease could have been caused during the arrest.
The use of force had been lawful, since the applicant had resisted the policemen.
Furthermore, no injuries of the face, ribs and groin had been established, contrary to the applicant’s submissions.
Furthermore, officers G., K. and B. denied any duress against the applicant during his interview at the office of the Drug Control Service.
The investigator considered that the applicant’s account of the events, taken alone, could not serve as a basis for brining criminal proceedings against the policemen, since it was not corroborated by any other items of evidence.
The investigator found it impossible to establish beyond reasonable doubt whether or not the applicant’s injuries were caused by the police, and concluded that the applicant was attempting to avoid being held criminally liable for the offence he was charged with.
3.
The applicant’s appeal against the decision of 9 June 2010 and the respective court proceedings The applicant challenged the decision of 9 June 2010 in court under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (“Complains about the authorities’ unlawful acts or omissions”).
He submitted, in particular, that: - the testimonies of the policemen concerning the applicant’s violent resistance contradicted to the salespersons’ submissions that the applicant had not resisted the arrest; - the investigators had failed to interview either the IVS officers or the remand prison personnel, as well as to obtain and study the respective records of the applicant’s injuries made at those detention facilities immediately after the events; - witnesses S. and I. had not been questioned; - the forensic medical examination had not been conducted; - the investigation department failed to examine his allegations of psychological pressure exercised on his son who had remained at the Drug Control Service’s office until 4 a.m. on 10 April 2010 and had been deeply traumatised by the events of that night.
He also sought leave to appear before the court.
On 28 December 2010 the Volzhskiy Town Court examined the applicant’s action.
The court observed that the applicant had been detained in a correctional labour colony, found that it was not under obligation to ensure the applicant’s presence in the court room and decided to examine the case in the applicant’s absence.
The applicant was not represented.
Investigator L., as well as Deputy Town Prosecutor of Volzhskiy, was present and made submissions.
The court dismissed the applicant’s action on the ground that his grievances had been adequately examined and assessed by the investigator on 9 June 2010 and, in any event, the court was not competent under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash a refusal to bring criminal proceedings and to forward a case to an investigation authority for an additional inquiry or for a decision to open criminal proceedings.
The applicant appealed.
He submitted, in particular, that he had not been present at the first-instance hearing and had been unable to make submissions before the court.
On 15 March 2011 the Volgograd Regional Court dismissed his complaint and upheld the lower court’s findings.
It found that the first‐instance decision was lawful, that the applicant had been informed of the date and time of the hearing in his case and the first instance court had rejected his request for participation in the hearing in accordance with law.
D. Criminal proceedings against the applicant At some point the applicant was charged with two counts of attempted illicit sale of narcotic drugs performed by an organised group.
On 10 August 2010 he confronted lay witness A. who testified that on 9 April 2010 he was present at the applicant’s search in the shop and confirmed that a policeman had seized a sachet of heroin from the applicant.
A. had not completed any documents on the spot, but he had only signed the seizure record some time later.
He was also present at the examination at the applicant’s place but had not seen any documents being completed in respect of that investigative activity.
Salespersons Kh.
and P testified in open court that on 9 April 2010 the applicant had not resisted the arrest, that his minor son had been with him at the shop at the moment of the apprehension and they had heard him crying, and that at some point the applicant screamed that the police had been planting drugs on him.
On 24 November 2010 the Volzhskiy Town Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment.
It appears that the court admitted, inter alia, a testimony of a witness nicknamed “buyer no.2” who submitted to the court that he had not bought drugs on 9 April 2012.
On 15 February 2011 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal.
The applicant did not submit copies of the respective court decisions and of his statement of appeal.
E. Other developments 1.
Proceedings concerning the injury inflicted before the apprehension It follows from the Volzhskiy Town Court’s decision of 28 December 2010 that on 27 December 2010 an inquiry concerning the bruise on the applicant’s shoulder inflicted before the apprehension had been disjoined in a separate case and sent to the local Department of Interior, for follow-up.
The case-file does not contain any further details or documents in this respect.
2.
Court proceedings of 29 March 2010 and the applicant’s appeal At some point applicant complained to a court about the investigative authorities’ failure to examine his grievance in respect of the Drug Control Service’s officers’ actions in respect of his minor son and to provide the applicant with any information on the matter.
On 19 October 2011 the investigative department informed the applicant that his complaint concerning unlawful actions in respect of his son had been joined to the inquiry concerning the allegations of the applicant’s ill‐treatment and unlawful apprehension.
On 29 March 2012 the Volzhskiy Town Court examined the case in the applicant’s absence and decided that there had been no breach of the applicant’s rights since the investigative authorities had issued a lawful refusal to bring criminal proceedings on 9 June 2010, as upheld by the domestic courts on 15 March 2011.
On 21 June 2012 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld these findings on appeal.
3.
Additional information on the applicant’s son’s whereabouts on 9‐10 April 2010 On 22 August 2010 the prosecutor’s office of Volzhskiy informed the applicant that his new complaint about his son’s and his own apprehension had been examined.
It was established that on 10 April 2010 the applicant and his son had been brought to the Drug Control Service’s office.
Between 1.10 a.m. and 1.15 a.m. on that date the applicant had been interviewed by an officer and the applicant’s and the child’s place of residence had been established.
The child had been transferred to his mother on 4 a.m. on the same date, when the officers had conducted the flat’s examination.
The domestic law did not contain a reference to a specific time-limit for transferring the minors to their parents in such situations.
With reference to G.’s testimony the prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the son “had remained with [the applicant] all the time, no complaints [had been] received”.
The prosecutor’s office concluded that the situation did not call for any action.
4.
Defamation proceedings On 5 May 2011 the Volzhskiy department of the interior informed the applicant that unspecified actions of G. on 1 October 2010 “contained elements of criminal libel as defined in Article 129 § 1 of the Criminal Code”, and advised the applicant on the procedure of bringing criminal proceedings in case he insisted on G.’s criminal prosecution.
The applicant does not submit any further details on the proceedings.
COMPLAINTS By letter of 22 June 2011 the applicant complains, without further details, that Articles 3, 6 and 13 were violated in his case as a result of unfair criminal proceedings against him.
In the application form of 27 August 2011 the applicant raises the following complaints: (1) he submits under Article 3 that on 9-10 April 2010 he was beaten up by the Drug Control Service officers and under Article 13 that the investigation into his ill-treatment complaint was ineffective; (2) he complains under Article 5 § 1 (c) that his apprehension on 9 April 2010 was unlawful and, in particular, that the arrest record was only drawn up on 10 April 2010 in the morning; (3) he alleges, under Article 6, that criminal proceedings against him were unfair, that certain items of evidence were forged, that the domestic courts admitted that evidence and incorrectly assessed the existing evidence in the case, that they incorrectly established the facts and wrongfully applied domestic law, as well as disregarded the authoritative interpretations provided by the Plenary Supreme Court of Russia on the matter.
He submits that the trial court refused to order unspecified expert examinations on the request of the defence.
With reference to his conviction of two counts of attempted sale of drugs he alleges, without further details, that the police was under obligation to arrest the unspecified offenders once the first episode had been completed, but the officers incited them to commit another offence.
(4) he complains under Article 8 that he was ill-treated in order to obtain his permission for an examination/search of his home and therefore the examination was unlawful.
By letter of 24 October 2011 the applicant complains that the testimony of the witness nicknamed “buyer no.
2” were forged by the investigation authorities.

Judgment

FIRST SECTION
CASE OF GELEVSKI v. NORTH MACEDONIA

(Application no.
28032/12)

JUDGMENT

Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Criminal conviction for defamation of a member of the press after criticising a journalist in an opinion piece • Plaintiff well-known to the public • Professional actions and opinions of the plaintiff as a journalist and media editor-in-chief subject to close scrutiny by public and other journalists • Applicant’s disagreement with Government policies as such contributing to an ongoing political debate on a matter of public interest • Limits of critical and investigative journalism a matter of legitimate public interest • Domestic courts limiting their analysis to the general impact of the article on the plaintiff • Language used not exceeding the acceptable limits of criticism • Criminal conviction capable of having chilling effect on political debate between members of the media on matters of importance • Interference disproportionate

STRASBOURG
8 October 2020

FINAL

08/01/2021

This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Gelevski v. North Macedonia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Ksenija Turković, President,Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,Aleš Pejchal,Armen Harutyunyan,Pere Pastor Vilanova,Tim Eicke,Jovan Ilievski, judges,and Abel Campos, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia, Mr Nikola Gelevski (“the applicant”), on 21 November 2012;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”);
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 1 September 2020,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1.
The applicant, a columnist, was criminally convicted for defamation for having criticised a journalist in an opinion piece. He complains that the conviction, which included imposition of a fine and a prison sentence in the event he defaulted on the payment, violated his freedom of expression protected under Article 10 of the Convention. THE FACTS
2.
The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Skopje. He is represented by Mr F. Medarski, a lawyer practising in Skopje. The Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) were represented by their former Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov, succeeded by their current Agent, Ms D. Djonova. 3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. I. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE
4.
Mr D.P.L. (“the plaintiff”) was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Večer and the news segment of the television channel Sitel. Between December 2008 and March 2009 he published weekly opinion columns on current political events in the above newspaper. The relevant parts of some of his columns, published on 2 and 16 February and 23 March 2009 respectively, read as follows:
“The [construction of the] the Mother Theresa memorial house is important because it sets the stage for a whole array of buildings ...
If someone left the country before the coming to power of Gruevski [the then Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski] and came back several years later, they would see ... a new football stadium, over a hundred new sports halls [спортски сали], a completely different main square [in the capital], a new concert hall [Универзала Сала], a new national theatre, new motorways ...
[B., a journalist,] was caught taking money from SDSM [Социјалдемократски сојуз на Македонија – an opposition political party at the time] to create news more favourable for them.
[B. was] a journalist who ... has tried out with every television station in the city. He has been everywhere, and he has been kicked out of everywhere. Together with seven or eight more, they are attached to SDSM ... If I had any doubts as to the investigation into the criminal liability of Zoran Zaev [the President of SDSM], I have none any more. The man is a liar [тешка лажовчина] rare even by Macedonian standards.”
5.
On 28 March 2009 a group of students from the School of Architecture [Архитектонски факултет] gathered for a peaceful protest, which had been duly declared to the authorities, on the main square in Skopje to express their disagreement with the construction of a church on the square, as had been announced by the Government. Another group, protesting in opposition, gathered at the same time on the square to disrupt the students’ protest. In the 2009 Progress Report regarding the respondent State, the EU Commission stated the following:
“With regard to freedom of assembly and association, the overall situation is satisfactory.
However, there were two occasions when peaceful and legal public events were violently disrupted. One was a student protest in Skopje against the government’s plan to build a church on the main square ...”
6.
On 31 March 2009 in an article published in the daily newspaper Utrinski Vesnik under the title “Megaphones from the Fuhrer’s alley” (Мегафоните од фиреровиот сокак), the applicant, a regular columnist and contributor, commented on the above events. The relevant parts of the article, which was also published on the website of the newspaper, read as follows:
“[The plaintiff and several other journalists] are not problematic in view of their clear political agenda: to transform the country into a totalitarian underdeveloped village [касаба] of little black ‘Grujo’ [referring to the then Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski], his bums and vagrants [гуланфери, гилиптери] and bus-driven bandits [башибозук] that are transported all around as part of the project called ‘Fraternity of cities (bastards)’ [Братимења на г(р)адови][[1]].
[In order] to discipline those who think otherwise (attackers come from Gostivar to beat fifty students gathered on their own city square in order to publicly express their opinion). ... When the battering buses of VMRO [Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација ‐ Демократска партија за македонско национално единство – the political party in power at that time] arrive next time, the people of Skopje will be better organised, at least to protect their children; and the bear of violence will dance in front of the doors of the inciters, such as D.P.L. [and two other journalists]. [One of the journalists above] and others like him, I say, are not problematic only because they have transformed journalism and working for the public into a spin service of a political and mafia-type partnership with the aim of the dissolution of the Republic of Macedonia, but they are problematic because in the most direct and blatant way they violate the highest, and still valid, legal document of this State: the Constitution [the applicant here cites the constitutional provisions which regulate freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and association] ... All this speaks to the fascist nature of the government of Nikola Gruevski and his threatening phalanxes ...”
II.
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT
7.
On an unspecified date D.P.L. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of defamation and insult regarding the above article published in Utrinski Vesnik. Both crimes were punishable under the Criminal Code applicable at the time. 8. On 10 June 2010 the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) found the applicant guilty on both accounts, imposed on him a fine of 600 euros (EUR), with thirty days’ imprisonment in the event of default, and ordered him to pay the court fee and a further EUR 150 to cover the plaintiff’s trial costs. The court found that the applicant had intentionally put forward untruths and unsubstantiated assertions in his article (see paragraph 6 above), thereby interfering with the plaintiff’s reputation and dignity. By doing this the applicant had presented the public with an image of the plaintiff as dishonest and incompetent. The court dismissed the applicant’s arguments that he had discussed the political views and behaviour of the journalists mentioned, including the plaintiff, which in no way could have been understood as an attack of their reputation and dignity. In this context, according to the applicant, the plaintiff’s public statements had contained hate speech (see paragraph 4 above) and the applicant’s article had been aimed at protecting people from that political “lynching”. His aim had also been to safeguard the constitutional values, including the freedom of assembly and the free association of students. 9. The applicant appealed arguing, inter alia, that his columns had contained his own opinions, which had been value judgments and not statements of fact. According to him, defamation was supposed to be measured against objective criteria and the simple fact that the plaintiff had felt insulted by his column was insufficient for a finding of guilt. 10. On 22 September 2011 the Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје) ruled partly in favour of the applicant and upheld his conviction only in respect of defamation (it found that the applicant could not be held guilty on both accounts for the same article). It reduced the fine to EUR 320, with sixteen days’ imprisonment to be imposed in the event of the applicant defaulted on payment. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument that the article had contained a value judgment. In this connection the court stated:
“In order for a statement to be regarded as a value judgment, it should not be related to a specific event or happening, and it should be made in abstracto.
In the present case, the published text concerns a specific event ... and it contains a factual assertion that is subject to substantiation, proof and determination. The burden of proof is on the ... accused.”
11.
By a decision of 2 May 2012, served on the applicant on 21 May 2012, the Constitutional Court (Уставен суд) dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant, in which he complained of a violation of his freedom of conscience, thought and public expression of thought. The court reproduced the judgments of the courts of general competence and found, inter alia, the following:
“In the present case, through their judgments, the courts punished a publicly expressed opinion of [the applicant], as a necessary measure for the protection of the reputation, dignity and authority of another citizen.
That was because [the applicant], relying on his freedom of public expression, had violated the protected right of another citizen, namely [D.P.L.] ... It is clear that the article articulates the author’s personal opinion about the policies of the ... political party [in power] in the Republic of Macedonia, with which he obviously disagrees. In the impugned parts ... [the applicant] describes [the plaintiff], a journalist and an editor-in-chief, as a spokesperson, affiliate and a ‘megaphone’ of those policies, which, according to the author of the article, are of a fascist nature. ... the court finds that the reasons given by the trial and appeal courts are acceptable and that the State’s interference is proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of the victim ...”
THE LAW
I.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
12.
The applicant complained that his conviction had violated his right to freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1.
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
13.
The Government did not raise any objections as to the admissibility of the application. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. (a) The applicant
14.
The applicant submitted that the only statement of fact contained in the article had pertained to the anti-demonstration protesters who had arrived at the main square in Skopje from Gostivar to disrupt the students’ protest. In the remaining parts of the article he had articulated his opinion, reflecting his dissatisfaction with the policies of the political party in power at the time. The aim of the article had been to stir public debate on the issues of public assembly and freedom of expression in the respondent State, which was evident from him citing the relevant Articles of the Constitution. He claimed that the plaintiff had never argued that he had not been a supporter of the government’s policies, which was sufficient proof that his value judgments had had a sufficient factual basis. 15. The applicant did not deny that he had used provocative language in his article, but taken in the context of a lively public debate, as had been the case in the instant case, this had not been sufficient reason for his conviction. As to the Government’s argument that he had called for violence in the article, he stated that he had simply expressed his disgust at the violence that had occurred, stating that violence could lead to more violence. (b) The Government
16.
The Government conceded that there had been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. However, the interference had been lawful and had served a legitimate aim, namely the protection of reputation of others. 17. In the particular circumstances of the case, the interference had been necessary in a democratic society. This was so since the applicant’s article, which had contained both factual statements and value judgments, had been written in bad faith, and had not been factually supported. They invited the Court not to accept as evidence the columns written by the plaintiff (see paragraph 4 above) as they had neither been submitted in evidence nor taken into consideration by the domestic courts. The applicant’s article had not contributed to a public debate, and there had been no risk of imprisonment since the applicant had paid the fine imposed. Lastly, they stated that the article had contained statements that could be interpreted as a call to violence, making reference here to the passage “the bear of violence will dance in front of the doors of the inciters, such as D.P.L. ...”
18.
The general principles regarding freedom of expression have been reaffirmed by the Court in the case of Bédat v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 56925/08, § 48, 29 March 2016) and more recently in the case of Makraduli v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (nos. 64659/11 and 24133/13, §§ 60 and 62, 19 July 2018). 19. The Court notes that it was not disputed between the parties that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and that it had been prescribed by law. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. 20. The Court is satisfied that the interference in question was aimеd at protecting the reputation of others, as established by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). It therefore remains to be established whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. 21. The Court considers the following elements to be relevant for the examination of the particular circumstances of the present case: the position of the applicant, the position of the plaintiff, the subject-matter of the publication, the language used by the applicant and the penalty imposed (see, for example, Novaya Gazeta and Milashina v. Russia, no. 45083/06, § 58, 3 October 2017). 22. The Court observes that the applicant was a regular opinion writer in a daily newspaper. The interference must therefore be examined in the context of the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society (see Falzon v. Malta, no. 45791/13, § 57, 20 March 2018). 23. The Court reiterates that the role or function of the person concerned and the nature of the activities that are the subject of the report constitute another important criterion, related to the subject-matter of the article. The extent to which an individual has a public profile or is well-known influences the protection that may be afforded to his or her private life (see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 110, ECHR 2012 and Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi Anonymi Etairia v. Greece, no. 72562/10, § 53, 22 February 2018). 24. In the present case, the plaintiff was well-known to the public. As a known journalist and editor-in-chief of a television channel and a daily newspaper, he knowingly exposed himself to a close scrutiny of his professional actions and opinions by both journalists and the general public and must therefore show a greater degree of tolerance (see Katamadze v. Georgia (dec.), no. 69857/01, 14 February 2006 and, mutatis mutandis, Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], no. 17224/11, § 98, 27 June 2017). This is so in particular regarding a discussion whether he complied with the “duties and responsibilities” of a journalist and media editor-in-chief (see Orban and Others v. France, no. 20985/05, § 47, 15 January 2009 regarding the enhanced responsibility of an editor-in-chief) and whether he acted in accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism (see Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 50, 29 March 2016 and Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, § 90, ECHR 2015) and the ethics of journalism (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, § 93, 7 February 2012; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 65, ECHR 1999‐III; and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 78, ECHR 2004‐XI). These considerations play a particularly important role nowadays, given the influence wielded by the media in contemporary society: not only do they inform, they can also suggest by the way in which they present the information how it is to be assessed. In a world in which the individual is confronted with vast quantities of information circulated via traditional and electronic media and involving an ever-growing number of players, monitoring compliance with journalistic ethics takes on added importance (see Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 104, ECHR 2007‐V). 25. As regards the subject matter of the publication, the Court notes that the article written by the applicant was not directed at the plaintiff’s private activities. The Court observes, as held by the domestic courts (see paragraph 10 above), that it was a statement of his disagreement with the policies of the Government and that as such, contrary to the Government’s argument (see paragraph 17 above), it contributed to an ongoing political debate which in itself was a matter of public interest. As part of that debate, the impugned article contained allegations and pointed to different journalists, including the plaintiff, as supporters of Government policies (see paragraph 6 above). In this context the Court reiterates that the limits of critical and investigative journalism are also a matter of legitimate public interest (see Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland, no. 32297/10, § 53, 23 June 2015). 26. The Court observes that the criminal courts established that the applicant’s article contained statements of fact (see paragraph 8 above). However, they did not go beyond that conclusion and failed to identify the specific facts allegedly raised by the applicant. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court qualified the applicant’s statements as opinions, and therefore, value judgments (see paragraph 11 above). Any statements of fact (such as the applicant’s claim regarding the anti-demonstration protesters who had come from another city to Skopje on 28 March 2009, see paragraphs 4 and 13 above) did not directly relate to the plaintiff, but rather to the students’ protest and related events. Furthermore, even assuming that the article contained some statements of fact (such as that the plaintiff was a supporter of the government’s policies, see paragraph 13 above), their veracity was neither disputed by the plaintiff domestically nor were they examined by the criminal courts (see Falzon, cited above, § 63). Instead, the courts limited their analysis to the general impact of the article on the plaintiff (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above). 27. Under this head, the Court finds it important to make a distinction between the applicant’s disagreement with the policies of the Government, which in his opinion, were “fascist”, and his opinion of the plaintiff as a supporter of those policies. 28. The Court notes that the qualification of Government policies as “fascist” carries a clear element of value judgment which is not fully susceptible to proof (see, mutatis mutandis, Brosa v. Germany, no. 5709/09, § 45, 17 April 2014), and has no relevance on its own in the instant case, given that the plaintiff was not a member of the Government. The Court notes that the applicant never stated directly that the plaintiff had been a fascist. The defamatory character of this statement was therefore attributed to the allegation that the plaintiff had been a supporter of those policies. 29. As to the language used by the applicant, the Court reiterates that individuals, and in particular journalists, who take part in a public debate on a matter of general interest are allowed to have recourse to a degree of exaggeration or provocation (see, among many other authorities, Do Carmo de Portugal e Castro Câmara v. Portugal, no. 53139/11, § 43, 4 October 2016 and Katamadze, cited above). Considering that the plaintiff was a well-known journalist and a public and political debate concerning plans for rearrangement of and construction on the Skopje main square and the students’ protest were ongoing, the Court finds that the applicant’s statements did not exceed the acceptable limits of criticism (see, mutatis mutandis, Brosa, cited above, § 51). As to the Government’s argument that the article in question contained hate speech, the Court observes that the domestic courts did not find any elements of hate speech or incitement to violence. Indeed, the relevant passage of the applicant’s article to which the Government referred (see paragraph 17 above) was neither analysed nor relied on by the courts in support of their findings (see paragraph 8, 10 and 11 above). 30. Lastly, the Court considers that the applicant’s criminal conviction could undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the political debate between members of the media on matters of importance (see, mutatis mutandis, Makraduli, cited above, § 83). 31. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the interference in question was disproportionate to the aim pursued and was not “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
32.
Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.
Damage
33.
The applicant claimed 320 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage – the amount that he was fined in the criminal proceedings – and EUR 3,180 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 34. The Government contested those amounts as excessive and unsubstantiated. 35. The Court finds that the applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage is a direct consequence of his criminal conviction, which the Court has found violated his right to freedom of expression. It therefore considers that he should be awarded the full amount claimed under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 36. The Court also considers the applicant’s claim under the head of non-pecuniary damage justified. It therefore awards the applicant EUR 3,180, which is the full amount that he claimed under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable. B. Costs and expenses
37.
The applicant also claimed EUR 1,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, without submitting any documents in support of his claim. 38. The Government contested these claims as excessive and unsubstantiated. 39. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, § 64, ECHR 2004‐IV). The Court points out that under Rule 60 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court, “the applicant must submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents”, failing which “the Chamber may reject the claim in whole or in part” (see Lazoroski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 4922/04, § 88, 8 October 2009). 40. In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant has failed to substantiate his claim with an itemised list of costs or supporting documents. In such circumstances, the Court makes no award. C. Default interest
41.
The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1.
Declares the application admissible;
2.
Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
3.
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 320 (three hundred and twenty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 3,180 (three thousand one hundred and eighty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4.
Dismisses the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses. Done in English, and notified in writing on 8 October 2020, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.signature_p_2}
Abel Campos Ksenija Turković RegistrarPresident

[[1]][1] “Градови” means “cities”, while “гадови” means “bastards”, suggesting a play on words.