I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in MKHITARYAN v. ARMENIA and 3 other applications.
Information
- Judgment date: 2025-09-30
- Communication date: 2020-10-06
- Application number(s): 4693/12;5728/17;39583/17;45189/18
- Country: ARM
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 5, 5-1, 5-1-c, 5-3, 5-4
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)
Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to education - {general} (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 - Right to education) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.76999
- Prediction: Violation
Consistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
The applicants are Armenian nationals.
They are represented before the Court by Mr L. Simonyan, Ms S. Aghvanyan, Ms S. Poghosyan and Ms N. Rshtuni, lawyers practising in Yerevan.
The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
On 13 May 2009 the first applicant, who was in hiding, was charged with negligent homicide.
On 26 November 2010 police officers found and arrested the first applicant.
On 28 November 2010 the Shirak Regional Court, upon the investigator’s application, ordered the first applicant’s detention for two months, concluding that his past behaviour indicated that he was a flight risk.
His detention was then twice extended on 20 January and 21 March 2011 on the same grounds, on each occasion by two months.
On an unspecified date the investigation was completed and the case was referred to court.
It appears that on 26 April 2011 the Shirak Regional Court, through a written procedure, decided to set the case down for trial stating, inter alia, that the first applicant’s detention was “to remain unchanged”.
It further appears that on 16 May 2011 the first applicant made a request to be released on bail which was rejected by the Regional Court.
On an unspecified date the first applicant lodged an application with the Shirak Regional Court arguing, inter alia, that when deciding to leave his detention unchanged the court had failed to address his request for bail and had not set any time-limit for his detention.
The first applicant asked the court to replace his detention with bail.
On 28 June 2011 the Shirak Regional Court found that the application should be refused since a similar request had already been examined and decided by the court on 16 May 2011 and that there were no new grounds to replace the detention with bail.
On 17 October 2011 the first applicant lodged another application with the Shirak Regional Court requesting release on bail.
The first applicant also argued that the court’s decision leaving his detention unchanged was unlawful and was incompatible with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention since no time-limit had been set for his detention, thereby leaving him in a state of uncertainty.
On 25 October 2011 the Shirak Regional Court rejected the first applicant’s request for bail on the grounds that the reasons justifying his detention still persisted.
The court further noted that the domestic law did not require a time-limit to be set when leaving detention unchanged, which implied that it should remain unchanged until the end of the trial.
At the time of introduction of the application on 14 January 2012 the applicant was still in detention.
(a) Pre-trial detention On 24 November 2015 a criminal case was instituted in respect of the second, third and fourth applicants (hereafter, the applicants) who were suspected of having been part of a criminal gang and having illegally acquired arms and ammunition.
On 25 November 2015 the second and third applicants were arrested and later charged.
On 27 November 2015 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, upon the investigator’s application, ordered their detention for a period of two months on the grounds that they could hide from the investigating authority, commit a new act prohibited by criminal law as well as obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings.
On 2 December 2015 the second applicant lodged an appeal against that decision arguing, inter alia, that the District Court had failed to consider that he had a permanent place of residence and a job, and was married with three minor children who were dependent on him.
The second applicant further contended that the court had failed to substantiate that he would obstruct the investigation or fail to appear before the investigating authority.
On 3 December 2015 the fourth applicant was arrested and later charged.
It appears that on 4 December 2015 the District Court ordered the fourth applicant’s detention, upon the investigator’s application.
On 11 December 2015 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court in the second applicant’s case.
In particular, the Court of Appeal relied on the following reasons: there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had been involved in the imputed acts, which were punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment; besides, considering the extent of possible investigatory measures to be carried out for establishing the truth, there was a high risk of his hiding from the investigating authority, obstructing the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and concealing or falsifying materials vital for the case.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal also stressed the nature and the degree of social danger of the imputed act as well as the manner of its commission and the degree of carrying out the criminal intent.
As regards the second applicant’s personality and his personal situation, the Court of Appeal deemed those insufficient to rule out possible unlawful conduct.
On 20 January, 18 March, 18 May, 20 July and 20 September 2016 the District Court extended the second applicant’s detention on the same grounds, on each occasion for a period of two months, taking into account the seriousness of the charges and the necessity to conduct a number of investigative measures.
The second applicant lodged appeals against these decisions which were dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 10 February, 5 April, 9 June, 6 September and 14 October 2016 respectively, which found those decisions to be well-founded.
It appears that the third and fourth applicants’ pre-trial detention was also periodically extended, each time for two months.
(b) The applicants’ detention during trial On 10 November 2016 the prosecution confirmed the bill of indictment and on an unspecified date the criminal case was transmitted to the District Court to be examined on the merits.
On 14 November 2016 the second applicant filed an application with the District Court arguing, inter alia, that the court decisions extending his detention were stereotyped and couched in general terms.
The second applicant pointed out that the investigation had already been completed and it was no longer possible to justify his detention on the grounds of exerting unlawful influence on the participants in the proceedings.
Nothing in the case file could indicate that he would commit a new offence.
As regards the risk of his absconding, the second applicant submitted that he did not possess a valid passport since it had expired.
In the alternative he asked the court to release him on bail, noting that his identity was known, he had a permanent place of residence, he was married with three minor children and he had no prior convictions.
On 24 November 2016 the judge, to whom the case was assigned, decided, through a written procedure, to set the case down for trial.
By the same decision the judge, after having examined the materials of the criminal case and the second applicant’s application of 14 November 2016, found that: “... [the application] is unsubstantiated and should be rejected since the grounds for imposing on [the applicant] detention as a preventive measure continue to persist; therefore ... the detention is to remain unchanged since the necessity for the said preventive measure has not ceased to exist.” In the case of the third and fourth applicants, this decision stated: “Having examined the preventive measure imposed on the [applicant], [namely] detention, I find that it is to remain unchanged since its necessity has not ceased to exist.” On 20 January 2017 the second applicant applied to the District Court and, relying on Article 5 of the Convention, argued that his detention was unlawful since the court, when setting the case down for trial, had decided on his detention in the absence of an application filed by the investigator.
The second applicant, inter alia, argued that the impugned decision had been taken without ensuring his or his lawyer’s presence.
On 21 July 2017 the District Court rejected the second applicant’s application, finding that the reasons for his detention still persisted.
Notably, the court reasoned that the applicant had been charged with a serious offence which was punishable by six to ten years’ imprisonment, in which circumstances the risk of his absconding, if at liberty, was high.
As regards the personal circumstances of the second applicant, the court found these insufficient to conclude that he would not abscond or exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings.
On the same date the fourth applicant requested the District Court to release him on bail.
In particular, he argued that his identity was known and he had never tried to hide from the investigation.
The fourth applicant drew the court’s attention to his poor state of health – he was second-group disabled and suffered from several diseases, and at the time of applying to the court, he was under dispensary supervision.
The fourth applicant also pointed out that he had obtained several State medals for courage and was described positively by his friends and neighbours.
On the same date the District Court dismissed the fourth applicant’s request with similar reasoning to its decision of 21 July 2017.
At the time of introduction of his application on 23 May 2017 the third applicant was still in detention.
It also follows from the second applicant’s most recent submissions of 8 June 2018 that he was in detention on that date.
On 16 February 2018 the fourth applicant’s lawyer lodged a new application with the Court of General Jurisdiction of Yerevan asking it to replace his detention with another measure of restraint or release him on bail.
The fourth applicant argued, inter alia, that the court’s decision of 24 November 2016 leaving his detention unchanged was broadly worded and standard.
He further argued that, even if there had been legal grounds to remand him in pre-trial detention, this could no longer be sufficient for his deprivation of liberty.
No reasons could justify his further detention since, after the completion of the investigation, all the relevant investigatory measures had been carried out and all the co-accused had been provided with the materials of the criminal case.
In the alternative, the fourth applicant contended that his proper conduct could be ensured by bail.
He pointed out that his identity was known, he had a permanent place of residence, he was married with three children, he was second-group disabled, he was a war veteran, he had no citizenship other than Armenian and his passport was in the possession of the investigating authority.
The application also underlined the fourth applicant’s poor state of health and his recent admission to hospital.
On 16 March 2018 the Court of General Jurisdiction of Yerevan refused the fourth applicant’s request for bail since the reasons justifying his detention still persisted.
In particular, the risk of his absconding if at large was high, having regard to the seriousness of the imputed offence, which was punishable by six to ten years’ imprisonment.
As regards the fourth applicant’s personal situation, the court deemed it insufficient to preclude the risk of flight.
On an unspecified date the fourth applicant filed another application with the court seeking to have his detention replaced with another measure of restraint or be released on bail.
He relied on similar grounds to those mentioned in his application of 16 February 2018.
On 22 June 2018 the court decided to grant the application by replacing the detention with a written undertaking not to leave his place of residence, having regard to the fourth applicant’s health problems, his being second-group disabled and the length of his detention pending trial.
On the same date the fourth applicant was released.
COMPLAINTS 1.
The applicants complain that the decision of 26 April 2011 of the Shirak Regional Court, as regards the first applicant, and the decision of 24 November 2016 of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, as regards the other applicants, were incompatible with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention because they contained no reasons and authorised their detention for an unlimited period of time.
2.
The second applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that the courts failed to provide relevant and sufficient reasons for his detention.
The fourth applicant raises the same complaint with respect to the refusal of the Court of General Jurisdiction of Yerevan to allow his application for release on 16 March 2018.
3.
The second and third applicants complain under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention that their right to be heard either in person or through a lawyer was infringed since they could not attend the court session setting the case down for trial.
Judgment
SECOND SECTIONCASE OF GÜR AND BEDİR v. TÜRKİYE
(Applications nos. 58806/18 and 2153/19)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30 September 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Gür and Bedir v. Türkiye,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Tim Eicke, President, Jovan Ilievski, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, judges,and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”) on the various dates indicated therein;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Mr Abdullah Aydın, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to the examination of the applications by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 9 September 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The present applications concern the cancellation of the passports of the applicants, who were dismissed from their posts at universities on the basis of legislative decrees which had been adopted in the context of the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016. They mainly raise issues under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 2. At the material time the first applicant, Ali Deniz Gür (application no. 58806/18), was a research assistant in the Department of Sociology at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University. On 20 April 2018 he was accepted into a doctoral programme at Georgia State University in Atlanta, for which he was awarded a one-year graduate research assistantship. 3. The second applicant, Yasin Bedir (application no. 2153/19), was a research assistant in the Department of Administrative Law at the Dicle University Faculty of Law in Diyarbakır. In 2018 he was accepted into a doctoral programme at Nantes University in France, for which he received a scholarship. 4. The applicants were also among the signatories of the “Academics for Peace” petition (for further background information about the “Academics for Peace” petition, see Telek and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 66763/17 and 2 others, §§ 4-7, 21 March 2023). 5. The applicants were dismissed from their posts at their universities by section 1(1) of Legislative Decree no. 689, which entered into force on 29 April 2017 and was adopted in the context of the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016 (for further background information on the state of emergency, see Telek and Others, cited above, §§ 8-12). Section 1(1) of the Legislative Decree no. 689 provided that “The persons named in the appended List (l), who are in membership, affiliation, connection or contact with terrorist organisations or structures/entities or groups established by the National Security Council as engaging in activities against the national security of the State, have been dismissed from public service without need for any further procedure...”. Section 1(2) of the same Decree stated that “... The relevant Ministry or institutions shall immediately notify the relevant passport authority as regards these persons. Upon notification, the passports shall be cancelled by the passport units”. Pursuant to section 1(2) of the said Decree, the passport of the first applicant was cancelled on 9 May 2017 and the passport of the second applicant was cancelled on 26 April 2018. In addition, an administrative annotation was entered into the applicants’ passport records, preventing them from obtaining new passports. 6. The applicants lodged applications with the State of Emergency Commission against their dismissals from public service. While the examination before the State of Emergency Commission was ongoing, on 8 November 2018 they each lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court against the cancellation of their passports, alleging that their right to respect for private and family life and their right to education had been violated. 7. In its judgments dated 11 June 2020 (for the first applicant) and 9 September 2020 (for the second applicant), the Constitutional Court ruled that the applicants’ complaints regarding the violation of their right to respect for private life were inadmissible because of their failure to exhaust the administrative and judicial remedies offered by the legal system, without specifying which remedies these were. 8. In the meantime, the first applicant had brought an action before the Muğla Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the administrative decision to cancel his passport. On 16 October 2019 the Muğla Administrative Court dismissed the case on the grounds that it had not been lodged within the prescribed time-limit. His appeal against that decision was rejected by the İzmir Regional Administrative Court. He lodged an individual application with the Constitution Court, alleging, inter alia, that his right to respect for private and family life, his right to education and his right to a fair trial had been violated. In its decision dated 3 September 2020 the Constitutional Court, examining the applicant’s complaints solely under the right to a fair trial, declared the application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded on the grounds that there was clearly no appearance of a violation. 9. In addition, on 10 November 2021, the State of Emergency Commission rejected the first applicant’s application concerning his dismissal from public service. At the applicant’s request for the annulment of that decision, on 15 March 2023 the Ankara Nineteenth Administrative Court decided to annul the impugned decision of the commission. The appellate review in respect of that decision is still pending before the Ankara Regional Administrative Court. 10. The second applicant brought an action before the Diyarbakır Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the administrative decision to cancel his passport and requesting compensation. On 13 September 2019 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court decided to annul the administrative decision to cancel his passport but rejected the compensation claim. That decision was upheld by the Gaziantep Regional Administrative Court. 11. Moreover, on 10 November 2021 the State of Emergency Commission dismissed the second applicant’s application concerning his dismissal from public service. On 28 November 2022 the Ankara Twenty‐Fourth Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s request for the annulment of the commission’s decision. The appellate review in respect of that decision is pending before the Supreme Administrative Court. 12. On 29 May 2020 the administrative annotation in the first applicant’s passport record was removed by the Passport Administrative Decision Commission following the entry into force of Additional section 7 of Law no. 5682 on Passports (for this provision, see Telek and Others, cited above, § 46). On 1 November 2019 the administrative annotation in the second applicant’s passport record was removed following the decision of the Diyarbakır Administrative Court (see paragraph 10 above). Following those decisions, the applicants’ passports became valid again. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
13. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 14. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants submitted that the cancellation of their passports had amounted to an infringement of their right to respect for their private life. 15. The applicants further complained that the cancellation of their passports had amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. 16. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the second applicant also complained about the lack of reasoning in the decisions of the national authorities. Furthermore, he complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, alleging that domestic law did not provide for any remedy of which he could avail himself in order to enforce his complaint concerning the withdrawal of his passport. 17. The Court reiterates that it is not bound by the legal grounds adduced by an applicant under the Convention and its Protocols, and has the power to decide on the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint by examining it under Articles or provisions of the Convention that are different from those relied upon by the applicant (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). In the present case, the Court notes that the applicants’ complaints essentially concern allegations of a breach of their right to respect for their private life on account of the cancellation of their passports pursuant to the legislative decree adopted in the context of the state of emergency (see Telek and Others, cited above, § 77). Accordingly, it considers that the complaints must be solely examined from the point of view of Article 8 of the Convention. 18. The Government raised a series of objections of inadmissibility. They argued firstly that the applicants’ complaints had to be examined from the point of view of the right to freedom of movement protected under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention and be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione materiae with the provision of the Convention, since that Protocol has not been ratified by Türkiye. 19. In addition, the Government argued that the applicants had lost their victim status. They submitted that the restrictions on the applicants’ passports had been lifted and their passports had become valid again. 20. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicants had not exhausted effective domestic remedies. In that regard, they first stated that the applicants had applied directly to the Court rather than to the competent national courts, which was contrary to the subsidiary nature of the protection mechanism of the Convention. Furthermore, the Government argued that the cancellation of the applicants’ passports had been a direct consequence of their dismissals from public service. In that connection, they contended that the applicants’ cases to challenge their dismissals were still pending before the administrative courts. In addition, as regards the first applicant, they alleged that the applicant’s case before the Muğla Administrative Court had been rejected because he had failed to lodge his application within the prescribed time-limit. In that connection, they asserted that, if the applicant had brought an action within the time-limit, his complaints could have been examined in detail by the administrative court. Moreover, the Government submitted that the applicants could have lodged an application for a new passport pursuant to section 22 of Law no. 5682 on Passports (for this provision see Telek and Others, cited above, § 45). 21. The applicants contested the objections raised by the Government. In summary, they stated that Government objections similar to those raised in the present case had already been examined and rejected in Telek and Others (ibid.) and that they therefore requested for the objections in the present case to also be rejected. 22. As regards the objection of incompatibility ratione materiae, the Court reiterates that it has already examined and dismissed a similar objection in Telek and Others (ibid., § 91). It therefore dismisses this objection on the same grounds. 23. With regard to the plea of inadmissibility based on the absence of victim status, the Court notes that it has previously dealt with and rejected similar objections (ibid., §§ 96-97). In the present case, the Court observes that the applicants were subjected to a measure which cancelled their passports at the same time as they were dismissed from the civil service, that an annotation concerning the restriction was entered into their passport records pursuant to that measure and that this measure remained in force for approximately three years for the first applicant and one year and six months for the second applicant. Although the administrative annotation placed on the applicants’ passports was removed and their passports became valid again, the authorities did not acknowledge, explicitly or in substance, the existence of a violation of the Convention arising from the fact that the applicants had been deprived of their passports for a considerable period of time, nor did they grant the applicants redress for an infringement of the rights protected by the Convention (ibid.). Accordingly, the Government’s objection concerning the absence of victim status must be rejected. 24. Regarding the pleas of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court rules as follows. 25. Firstly, as regards the Government’s objection that the applicants had applied directly to the Court without recourse to the competent national courts, the Court has frequently underlined the need to apply the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism, given the context of protecting human rights (see Ringeisen v. Austria, 16 July 1971, § 89, Series A no. 13; Lehtinen v. Finland (dec.), no. 39076/97, ECHR 1999-VII; and Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, § 87, 9 July 2015). In this context, the Court accepts that the last stage of domestic remedies may be reached after the application has been lodged but before its admissibility has been determined (Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 90, 19 December 2018). The Constitutional Court gave judgment in the first applicant’s case on 11 June 2020 and in the second applicant’s case on 9 September 2020 (see paragraph 7 above). Accordingly, this objection must be rejected. 26. As regards the objection that the procedures introduced by the applicants to challenge their dismissals were still pending before the administrative courts, the Court reiterates that a similar objection was examined and dismissed in Telek and Others (cited above, § 94). In the present case, the Court observes that the judicial proceedings in terms of the applicants’ action for the annulment of their dismissals from the public service remain pending before the national courts (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above), despite the considerable time that has elapsed since their introduction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no reason to depart from its findings in Telek and Others (ibid.) that this remedy was not efficient in the circumstances and dismisses that objection. 27. With regard to the Government’s argument that the first applicant’s case was dismissed by the Muğla Administrative Court owing to a mistake made by the applicant and that his application should therefore be declared inadmissible, the Court refers to its findings in Telek and Others (cited above, § 93) to the effect that the Government had failed to demonstrate that proceedings before the administrative courts were an effective remedy to contest the cancellation of a passport by a legislative decree. It further observes that approximately one year and six months elapsed between the date of the applicant’s acceptance into the doctoral programme, which he could not start on account of the cancellation of his passport, and the date of the decision of the Muğla Administrative Court. The Court further notes that the applicant was prevented from obtaining a new passport during that period owing to the annotation entered into his passport record. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the speed of the procedure for remedial action may also be relevant in determining whether it is practically effective in the particular circumstances of a given case for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Story and Others v. Malta, no. 56854/13 and 2 others, § 80, 29 October 2015). In the circumstances of the instant case, this procedure before the administrative court cannot be deemed effective. In any event, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court did not declare the applicant’s individual application concerning this procedure inadmissible for failure to exhaust that remedy (see paragraph 8 above) and it would be unduly formalistic to require applicants to exercise a remedy which even the highest court of the country had not obliged them to use, but rejected the application as a whole for being manifestly ill-founded (see D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 118, ECHR 2007-IV; and Jalloh v. Germany (dec.), no. 54810/00, 26 October 2004). Accordingly, this objection must also be dismissed. 28. Lastly, as regards the objection that the applicants could have lodged applications for new passports under section 22 of Law no. 5682 on Passports, the Court reiterates that an applicant is required to exhaust only those domestic remedies that were effective and available, both in theory and in practice, at the material time, that is to say, accessible, capable of affording redress and offering a reasonable prospect of success (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 68, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, and Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 Others, §§ 71-77, 25 March 2014). The Court notes that in the instant case the remedy referred to by the Government, namely an application for a passport or travel document on the basis of necessity subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, by virtue of its discretionary and extraordinary nature, cannot be regarded as an effective one (see, among others, Milovanović v. Serbia, no. 56065/10, § 104, 8 October 2019; compare also Telek and Others, cited above, § 93). 29. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 30. Referring to the conclusions reached by the Court in Telek and Others (cited above), the applicants argued that the cancellation of their passports and their inability to obtain new ones had constituted an interference with their right to respect for their private life. They maintained that Legislative Decree no. 689, which the Government regarded as the legal basis for the measure which cancelled their passports, was incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. 31. The Government asserted that there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to private life. If the Court were to find that there had been an interference, the Government submitted that the legal basis for the cancellation of the applicants’ passports was Legislative Decree no. 689 and that these provisions met the requirements of clarity, accessibility and foreseeability. 32. The Court observes that during the period in which the applicants’ passports had been cancelled, they were accepted to Georgia State University in Atlanta and Nantes University in France respectively for their doctoral studies. As a result of the cancellation of their passports pursuant to the legislative decree adopted in the context of the state of emergency, they were prevented from starting their doctoral studies, which undoubtedly had a significant impact on their professional and private lives. The Court therefore considers that the measure at issue amounts to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life (compare also Telek and Others, cited above, §§ 108‐14). 33. As regards the lawfulness of the interference, the Government submitted that the legal basis for the measure cancelling the applicants’ passports was Legislative Decree no. 689. The Court observes that Legislative Decree no. 689, similar to the legislative decrees examined in Telek and Others, follows the general requirement laid down in section 5 of Legislative Decree no. 667 concerning the cancellation of the passports of persons dismissed from public service (ibid., §§ 118 and 43). In Telek and Others (ibid., §§ 115-28) the Court already examined the lawfulness of the interference arising from the cancellation of the passports of the applicants, who had been accepted into doctoral programmes at foreign universities, pursuant to legislative decrees adopted during the state of emergency. In that judgment, the Court noted that neither the legislative decrees nor the domestic authorities had specified at any point during the proceedings to which terrorist organisation the applicants allegedly had links and on the basis of what acts these links were presumed, and observed, in particular, that the applicants had never been subject to criminal investigations linked to the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 (compare ibid., §§ 120-21). Furthermore, the impugned provisions neither set out the modalities for the cancellation of a passport nor its duration (compare ibid., §§ 123 and 125). In the light of these elements, the Court held that the legal basis for the measure at issue against the applicants did not protect against an arbitrary application and was thus incompatible with the condition of “lawfulness” (compare ibid., §§ 116 and 125). Accordingly, the Court considered that the interference at issue had not been “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (compare ibid., § 126). Furthermore, in that judgment, the Court held that the impugned measure could not be regarded as having been strictly required by the particular circumstances of the state of emergency (compare ibid., § 126; see also Pişkin v. Turkey, no. 33399/18, §§ 152, 153 and 229, 15 December 2020). 34. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the merits of the complaint in the present applications, which, in so far as relevant, are comparable on the facts to Telek and Others. 35. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 36. Relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants complained that their right to education had been violated, alleging that the cancellation of their passports had prevented them from starting the doctoral programmes abroad to which they had been accepted. 37. The Government argued that there was no precedent in the Court’s case-law that doctoral studies or education abroad fell within the scope of the right to education. They noted that requiring States to guarantee the possibility of studying abroad would excessively broaden the limits of their obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Accordingly, they asked the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. 38. The applicants disputed the Government’s objection, arguing that the Court had already held in Telek and Others (cited above) that the interference with the right of academics to pursue a doctoral programme abroad was protected by the right to education. 39. The Court notes that a similar objection was examined and rejected in Telek and Others (ibid., §§ 132-38). In the present case, the applicants were equally deprived of the opportunity to travel abroad in order to pursue doctoral studies at foreign higher education institutions, to which they had been accepted in the exercise of their right to education, as a result of the cancellation of their passports for a considerable period of time (ibid., § 138). The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected. 40. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 41. The applicants submitted that the Court had held in Telek and Others (ibid.) that the applicants’ inability to continue their doctoral studies at foreign universities owing to the cancellation of their passports had violated Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They argued that there was no reason to depart from that judgment in the present applications. 42. The Government stated that, at the time of the cancellation of their passports, the first applicant had been pursuing a doctoral programme and the second applicant had been pursuing a master’s degree programme at Turkish universities. In that regard, they argued that, in view of the fact that the applicants had been able to pursue postgraduate programmes at Turkish universities, their inability to pursue the same studies abroad had not encroached on the essence of their right to education. In addition, by referring to the Court’s case-law, they argued that the impossibility of pursuing doctoral studies abroad had been an indirect consequence of the cancellation of their passports, therefore there had been no direct infringement of the applicants’ right to education in the present case. Furthermore, the Government argued that the applicants had not submitted any documents indicating that they had been accepted at the universities abroad. 43. In the above-mentioned Telek and Others judgment (ibid., §§ 149‐54), the circumstances of which were similar to those in the present case, the Court held that the applicants’ inability to pursue doctoral studies at the foreign universities had amounted to a limitation on their right to education. In that case, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Article 8 of the Convention, according to which the legal basis for the withdrawal of the applicants’ passports was liable to arbitrariness and incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness, should also be applied to the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It concluded that the limitation on the applicants’ right to education was not foreseeable for the persons concerned. 44. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the first applicant submitted documents dated 20 April 2018 and 11 May 2018 confirming his admission to a doctoral programme at Georgia State University, and the second applicant submitted a contract dated 28 March 2018 confirming he would be a researcher in doctoral studies at the University of Nantes for a period of one year. Having considered all the facts and arguments submitted to it, the Court finds no reason in the present case to depart from its approach reached in Telek and Others (ibid.). It concludes that the limitation on the applicants’ right to education was not foreseeable for the applicants. 45. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
46. Each applicant claimed 18,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 47. As for costs and expenses, the first applicant claimed 2,187.16 Turkish Liras (TRY – approximately EUR 292 at the relevant time) and the second applicant claimed TRY 530.95 (approximately EUR 55 at the relevant time) for procedural fees before the domestic courts and the Court. They submitted copies of receipts in this regard. Also, in respect of the lawyer’s fees for the procedures before the domestic courts and the Court, the first applicant claimed TRY 50,000 (approximately EUR 8,115 at the relevant date) and EUR 1,700 respectively and the second applicant claimed TRY 39,159 (approximately EUR 6,325 at the relevant time) and EUR 1,400 respectively. The first applicant submitted a contract signed by him and a lawyer dated 2 August 2019, and the second applicant submitted a contract signed by him and a lawyer dated 19 March 2019. 48. The Government contested the applicants’ claims as being unsubstantiated and excessive. 49. The Court considers that the applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage which the mere finding of a violation of the Convention in the present judgment would not be sufficient to compensate. The Court awards each of the applicants EUR 2,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 50. As to costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that under Article 41 of the Convention, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], no. 78630/12, § 128, 11 October 2022). In the present case, having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants the sum of EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,600 (two thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to each of the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 September 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Dorothee von Arnim Tim Eicke Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of cases:
No. Application no. Case name
Lodged on
ApplicantYear of BirthPlace of ResidenceNationality
Represented by
1. 58806/18
Gür v. Türkiye
22/11/2018
Deniz Ali GÜR1985IstanbulTurkish
Benan MOLU
2. 2153/19
Bedir v. Türkiye
21/11/2018
Yasin BEDİR1989IstanbulTurkish
Benan MOLU
SECOND SECTION
CASE OF GÜR AND BEDİR v. TÜRKİYE
(Applications nos. 58806/18 and 2153/19)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
30 September 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Gür and Bedir v. Türkiye,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Tim Eicke, President, Jovan Ilievski, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, judges,and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications against the Republic of Türkiye lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”) on the various dates indicated therein;
the decision to give notice of the complaints concerning Article 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention to the Turkish Government (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Mr Abdullah Aydın, Head of the Department of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Türkiye;
the parties’ observations;
the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to the examination of the applications by a Committee;
Having deliberated in private on 9 September 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The present applications concern the cancellation of the passports of the applicants, who were dismissed from their posts at universities on the basis of legislative decrees which had been adopted in the context of the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016. They mainly raise issues under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 2. At the material time the first applicant, Ali Deniz Gür (application no. 58806/18), was a research assistant in the Department of Sociology at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University. On 20 April 2018 he was accepted into a doctoral programme at Georgia State University in Atlanta, for which he was awarded a one-year graduate research assistantship. 3. The second applicant, Yasin Bedir (application no. 2153/19), was a research assistant in the Department of Administrative Law at the Dicle University Faculty of Law in Diyarbakır. In 2018 he was accepted into a doctoral programme at Nantes University in France, for which he received a scholarship. 4. The applicants were also among the signatories of the “Academics for Peace” petition (for further background information about the “Academics for Peace” petition, see Telek and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 66763/17 and 2 others, §§ 4-7, 21 March 2023). 5. The applicants were dismissed from their posts at their universities by section 1(1) of Legislative Decree no. 689, which entered into force on 29 April 2017 and was adopted in the context of the state of emergency declared in the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016 (for further background information on the state of emergency, see Telek and Others, cited above, §§ 8-12). Section 1(1) of the Legislative Decree no. 689 provided that “The persons named in the appended List (l), who are in membership, affiliation, connection or contact with terrorist organisations or structures/entities or groups established by the National Security Council as engaging in activities against the national security of the State, have been dismissed from public service without need for any further procedure...”. Section 1(2) of the same Decree stated that “... The relevant Ministry or institutions shall immediately notify the relevant passport authority as regards these persons. Upon notification, the passports shall be cancelled by the passport units”. Pursuant to section 1(2) of the said Decree, the passport of the first applicant was cancelled on 9 May 2017 and the passport of the second applicant was cancelled on 26 April 2018. In addition, an administrative annotation was entered into the applicants’ passport records, preventing them from obtaining new passports. 6. The applicants lodged applications with the State of Emergency Commission against their dismissals from public service. While the examination before the State of Emergency Commission was ongoing, on 8 November 2018 they each lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court against the cancellation of their passports, alleging that their right to respect for private and family life and their right to education had been violated. 7. In its judgments dated 11 June 2020 (for the first applicant) and 9 September 2020 (for the second applicant), the Constitutional Court ruled that the applicants’ complaints regarding the violation of their right to respect for private life were inadmissible because of their failure to exhaust the administrative and judicial remedies offered by the legal system, without specifying which remedies these were. 8. In the meantime, the first applicant had brought an action before the Muğla Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the administrative decision to cancel his passport. On 16 October 2019 the Muğla Administrative Court dismissed the case on the grounds that it had not been lodged within the prescribed time-limit. His appeal against that decision was rejected by the İzmir Regional Administrative Court. He lodged an individual application with the Constitution Court, alleging, inter alia, that his right to respect for private and family life, his right to education and his right to a fair trial had been violated. In its decision dated 3 September 2020 the Constitutional Court, examining the applicant’s complaints solely under the right to a fair trial, declared the application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded on the grounds that there was clearly no appearance of a violation. 9. In addition, on 10 November 2021, the State of Emergency Commission rejected the first applicant’s application concerning his dismissal from public service. At the applicant’s request for the annulment of that decision, on 15 March 2023 the Ankara Nineteenth Administrative Court decided to annul the impugned decision of the commission. The appellate review in respect of that decision is still pending before the Ankara Regional Administrative Court. 10. The second applicant brought an action before the Diyarbakır Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the administrative decision to cancel his passport and requesting compensation. On 13 September 2019 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court decided to annul the administrative decision to cancel his passport but rejected the compensation claim. That decision was upheld by the Gaziantep Regional Administrative Court. 11. Moreover, on 10 November 2021 the State of Emergency Commission dismissed the second applicant’s application concerning his dismissal from public service. On 28 November 2022 the Ankara Twenty‐Fourth Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s request for the annulment of the commission’s decision. The appellate review in respect of that decision is pending before the Supreme Administrative Court. 12. On 29 May 2020 the administrative annotation in the first applicant’s passport record was removed by the Passport Administrative Decision Commission following the entry into force of Additional section 7 of Law no. 5682 on Passports (for this provision, see Telek and Others, cited above, § 46). On 1 November 2019 the administrative annotation in the second applicant’s passport record was removed following the decision of the Diyarbakır Administrative Court (see paragraph 10 above). Following those decisions, the applicants’ passports became valid again. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
13. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 14. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants submitted that the cancellation of their passports had amounted to an infringement of their right to respect for their private life. 15. The applicants further complained that the cancellation of their passports had amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. 16. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the second applicant also complained about the lack of reasoning in the decisions of the national authorities. Furthermore, he complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, alleging that domestic law did not provide for any remedy of which he could avail himself in order to enforce his complaint concerning the withdrawal of his passport. 17. The Court reiterates that it is not bound by the legal grounds adduced by an applicant under the Convention and its Protocols, and has the power to decide on the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a complaint by examining it under Articles or provisions of the Convention that are different from those relied upon by the applicant (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). In the present case, the Court notes that the applicants’ complaints essentially concern allegations of a breach of their right to respect for their private life on account of the cancellation of their passports pursuant to the legislative decree adopted in the context of the state of emergency (see Telek and Others, cited above, § 77). Accordingly, it considers that the complaints must be solely examined from the point of view of Article 8 of the Convention. 18. The Government raised a series of objections of inadmissibility. They argued firstly that the applicants’ complaints had to be examined from the point of view of the right to freedom of movement protected under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention and be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione materiae with the provision of the Convention, since that Protocol has not been ratified by Türkiye. 19. In addition, the Government argued that the applicants had lost their victim status. They submitted that the restrictions on the applicants’ passports had been lifted and their passports had become valid again. 20. Lastly, the Government argued that the applicants had not exhausted effective domestic remedies. In that regard, they first stated that the applicants had applied directly to the Court rather than to the competent national courts, which was contrary to the subsidiary nature of the protection mechanism of the Convention. Furthermore, the Government argued that the cancellation of the applicants’ passports had been a direct consequence of their dismissals from public service. In that connection, they contended that the applicants’ cases to challenge their dismissals were still pending before the administrative courts. In addition, as regards the first applicant, they alleged that the applicant’s case before the Muğla Administrative Court had been rejected because he had failed to lodge his application within the prescribed time-limit. In that connection, they asserted that, if the applicant had brought an action within the time-limit, his complaints could have been examined in detail by the administrative court. Moreover, the Government submitted that the applicants could have lodged an application for a new passport pursuant to section 22 of Law no. 5682 on Passports (for this provision see Telek and Others, cited above, § 45). 21. The applicants contested the objections raised by the Government. In summary, they stated that Government objections similar to those raised in the present case had already been examined and rejected in Telek and Others (ibid.) and that they therefore requested for the objections in the present case to also be rejected. 22. As regards the objection of incompatibility ratione materiae, the Court reiterates that it has already examined and dismissed a similar objection in Telek and Others (ibid., § 91). It therefore dismisses this objection on the same grounds. 23. With regard to the plea of inadmissibility based on the absence of victim status, the Court notes that it has previously dealt with and rejected similar objections (ibid., §§ 96-97). In the present case, the Court observes that the applicants were subjected to a measure which cancelled their passports at the same time as they were dismissed from the civil service, that an annotation concerning the restriction was entered into their passport records pursuant to that measure and that this measure remained in force for approximately three years for the first applicant and one year and six months for the second applicant. Although the administrative annotation placed on the applicants’ passports was removed and their passports became valid again, the authorities did not acknowledge, explicitly or in substance, the existence of a violation of the Convention arising from the fact that the applicants had been deprived of their passports for a considerable period of time, nor did they grant the applicants redress for an infringement of the rights protected by the Convention (ibid.). Accordingly, the Government’s objection concerning the absence of victim status must be rejected. 24. Regarding the pleas of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court rules as follows. 25. Firstly, as regards the Government’s objection that the applicants had applied directly to the Court without recourse to the competent national courts, the Court has frequently underlined the need to apply the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism, given the context of protecting human rights (see Ringeisen v. Austria, 16 July 1971, § 89, Series A no. 13; Lehtinen v. Finland (dec.), no. 39076/97, ECHR 1999-VII; and Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, § 87, 9 July 2015). In this context, the Court accepts that the last stage of domestic remedies may be reached after the application has been lodged but before its admissibility has been determined (Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 90, 19 December 2018). The Constitutional Court gave judgment in the first applicant’s case on 11 June 2020 and in the second applicant’s case on 9 September 2020 (see paragraph 7 above). Accordingly, this objection must be rejected. 26. As regards the objection that the procedures introduced by the applicants to challenge their dismissals were still pending before the administrative courts, the Court reiterates that a similar objection was examined and dismissed in Telek and Others (cited above, § 94). In the present case, the Court observes that the judicial proceedings in terms of the applicants’ action for the annulment of their dismissals from the public service remain pending before the national courts (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above), despite the considerable time that has elapsed since their introduction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no reason to depart from its findings in Telek and Others (ibid.) that this remedy was not efficient in the circumstances and dismisses that objection. 27. With regard to the Government’s argument that the first applicant’s case was dismissed by the Muğla Administrative Court owing to a mistake made by the applicant and that his application should therefore be declared inadmissible, the Court refers to its findings in Telek and Others (cited above, § 93) to the effect that the Government had failed to demonstrate that proceedings before the administrative courts were an effective remedy to contest the cancellation of a passport by a legislative decree. It further observes that approximately one year and six months elapsed between the date of the applicant’s acceptance into the doctoral programme, which he could not start on account of the cancellation of his passport, and the date of the decision of the Muğla Administrative Court. The Court further notes that the applicant was prevented from obtaining a new passport during that period owing to the annotation entered into his passport record. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the speed of the procedure for remedial action may also be relevant in determining whether it is practically effective in the particular circumstances of a given case for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Story and Others v. Malta, no. 56854/13 and 2 others, § 80, 29 October 2015). In the circumstances of the instant case, this procedure before the administrative court cannot be deemed effective. In any event, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court did not declare the applicant’s individual application concerning this procedure inadmissible for failure to exhaust that remedy (see paragraph 8 above) and it would be unduly formalistic to require applicants to exercise a remedy which even the highest court of the country had not obliged them to use, but rejected the application as a whole for being manifestly ill-founded (see D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, § 118, ECHR 2007-IV; and Jalloh v. Germany (dec.), no. 54810/00, 26 October 2004). Accordingly, this objection must also be dismissed. 28. Lastly, as regards the objection that the applicants could have lodged applications for new passports under section 22 of Law no. 5682 on Passports, the Court reiterates that an applicant is required to exhaust only those domestic remedies that were effective and available, both in theory and in practice, at the material time, that is to say, accessible, capable of affording redress and offering a reasonable prospect of success (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 68, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, and Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 Others, §§ 71-77, 25 March 2014). The Court notes that in the instant case the remedy referred to by the Government, namely an application for a passport or travel document on the basis of necessity subject to the approval of the President of the Republic, by virtue of its discretionary and extraordinary nature, cannot be regarded as an effective one (see, among others, Milovanović v. Serbia, no. 56065/10, § 104, 8 October 2019; compare also Telek and Others, cited above, § 93). 29. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 30. Referring to the conclusions reached by the Court in Telek and Others (cited above), the applicants argued that the cancellation of their passports and their inability to obtain new ones had constituted an interference with their right to respect for their private life. They maintained that Legislative Decree no. 689, which the Government regarded as the legal basis for the measure which cancelled their passports, was incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. 31. The Government asserted that there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to private life. If the Court were to find that there had been an interference, the Government submitted that the legal basis for the cancellation of the applicants’ passports was Legislative Decree no. 689 and that these provisions met the requirements of clarity, accessibility and foreseeability. 32. The Court observes that during the period in which the applicants’ passports had been cancelled, they were accepted to Georgia State University in Atlanta and Nantes University in France respectively for their doctoral studies. As a result of the cancellation of their passports pursuant to the legislative decree adopted in the context of the state of emergency, they were prevented from starting their doctoral studies, which undoubtedly had a significant impact on their professional and private lives. The Court therefore considers that the measure at issue amounts to an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life (compare also Telek and Others, cited above, §§ 108‐14). 33. As regards the lawfulness of the interference, the Government submitted that the legal basis for the measure cancelling the applicants’ passports was Legislative Decree no. 689. The Court observes that Legislative Decree no. 689, similar to the legislative decrees examined in Telek and Others, follows the general requirement laid down in section 5 of Legislative Decree no. 667 concerning the cancellation of the passports of persons dismissed from public service (ibid., §§ 118 and 43). In Telek and Others (ibid., §§ 115-28) the Court already examined the lawfulness of the interference arising from the cancellation of the passports of the applicants, who had been accepted into doctoral programmes at foreign universities, pursuant to legislative decrees adopted during the state of emergency. In that judgment, the Court noted that neither the legislative decrees nor the domestic authorities had specified at any point during the proceedings to which terrorist organisation the applicants allegedly had links and on the basis of what acts these links were presumed, and observed, in particular, that the applicants had never been subject to criminal investigations linked to the attempted coup of 15 July 2016 (compare ibid., §§ 120-21). Furthermore, the impugned provisions neither set out the modalities for the cancellation of a passport nor its duration (compare ibid., §§ 123 and 125). In the light of these elements, the Court held that the legal basis for the measure at issue against the applicants did not protect against an arbitrary application and was thus incompatible with the condition of “lawfulness” (compare ibid., §§ 116 and 125). Accordingly, the Court considered that the interference at issue had not been “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (compare ibid., § 126). Furthermore, in that judgment, the Court held that the impugned measure could not be regarded as having been strictly required by the particular circumstances of the state of emergency (compare ibid., § 126; see also Pişkin v. Turkey, no. 33399/18, §§ 152, 153 and 229, 15 December 2020). 34. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the merits of the complaint in the present applications, which, in so far as relevant, are comparable on the facts to Telek and Others. 35. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 36. Relying on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicants complained that their right to education had been violated, alleging that the cancellation of their passports had prevented them from starting the doctoral programmes abroad to which they had been accepted. 37. The Government argued that there was no precedent in the Court’s case-law that doctoral studies or education abroad fell within the scope of the right to education. They noted that requiring States to guarantee the possibility of studying abroad would excessively broaden the limits of their obligations under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Accordingly, they asked the Court to declare this complaint inadmissible as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. 38. The applicants disputed the Government’s objection, arguing that the Court had already held in Telek and Others (cited above) that the interference with the right of academics to pursue a doctoral programme abroad was protected by the right to education. 39. The Court notes that a similar objection was examined and rejected in Telek and Others (ibid., §§ 132-38). In the present case, the applicants were equally deprived of the opportunity to travel abroad in order to pursue doctoral studies at foreign higher education institutions, to which they had been accepted in the exercise of their right to education, as a result of the cancellation of their passports for a considerable period of time (ibid., § 138). The Government’s objection must therefore be rejected. 40. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 41. The applicants submitted that the Court had held in Telek and Others (ibid.) that the applicants’ inability to continue their doctoral studies at foreign universities owing to the cancellation of their passports had violated Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They argued that there was no reason to depart from that judgment in the present applications. 42. The Government stated that, at the time of the cancellation of their passports, the first applicant had been pursuing a doctoral programme and the second applicant had been pursuing a master’s degree programme at Turkish universities. In that regard, they argued that, in view of the fact that the applicants had been able to pursue postgraduate programmes at Turkish universities, their inability to pursue the same studies abroad had not encroached on the essence of their right to education. In addition, by referring to the Court’s case-law, they argued that the impossibility of pursuing doctoral studies abroad had been an indirect consequence of the cancellation of their passports, therefore there had been no direct infringement of the applicants’ right to education in the present case. Furthermore, the Government argued that the applicants had not submitted any documents indicating that they had been accepted at the universities abroad. 43. In the above-mentioned Telek and Others judgment (ibid., §§ 149‐54), the circumstances of which were similar to those in the present case, the Court held that the applicants’ inability to pursue doctoral studies at the foreign universities had amounted to a limitation on their right to education. In that case, the Court considered that its conclusion concerning Article 8 of the Convention, according to which the legal basis for the withdrawal of the applicants’ passports was liable to arbitrariness and incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness, should also be applied to the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It concluded that the limitation on the applicants’ right to education was not foreseeable for the persons concerned. 44. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the first applicant submitted documents dated 20 April 2018 and 11 May 2018 confirming his admission to a doctoral programme at Georgia State University, and the second applicant submitted a contract dated 28 March 2018 confirming he would be a researcher in doctoral studies at the University of Nantes for a period of one year. Having considered all the facts and arguments submitted to it, the Court finds no reason in the present case to depart from its approach reached in Telek and Others (ibid.). It concludes that the limitation on the applicants’ right to education was not foreseeable for the applicants. 45. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
46. Each applicant claimed 18,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 47. As for costs and expenses, the first applicant claimed 2,187.16 Turkish Liras (TRY – approximately EUR 292 at the relevant time) and the second applicant claimed TRY 530.95 (approximately EUR 55 at the relevant time) for procedural fees before the domestic courts and the Court. They submitted copies of receipts in this regard. Also, in respect of the lawyer’s fees for the procedures before the domestic courts and the Court, the first applicant claimed TRY 50,000 (approximately EUR 8,115 at the relevant date) and EUR 1,700 respectively and the second applicant claimed TRY 39,159 (approximately EUR 6,325 at the relevant time) and EUR 1,400 respectively. The first applicant submitted a contract signed by him and a lawyer dated 2 August 2019, and the second applicant submitted a contract signed by him and a lawyer dated 19 March 2019. 48. The Government contested the applicants’ claims as being unsubstantiated and excessive. 49. The Court considers that the applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage which the mere finding of a violation of the Convention in the present judgment would not be sufficient to compensate. The Court awards each of the applicants EUR 2,600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 50. As to costs and expenses, the Court reiterates that under Article 41 of the Convention, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], no. 78630/12, § 128, 11 October 2022). In the present case, having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award each of the applicants the sum of EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 2,600 (two thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to each of the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 30 September 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Dorothee von Arnim Tim Eicke Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of cases:
No. Application no. Case name
Lodged on
ApplicantYear of BirthPlace of ResidenceNationality
Represented by
1. 58806/18
Gür v. Türkiye
22/11/2018
Deniz Ali GÜR1985IstanbulTurkish
Benan MOLU
2. 2153/19
Bedir v. Türkiye
21/11/2018
Yasin BEDİR1989IstanbulTurkish
Benan MOLU