I incorrectly predicted that there's no violation of human rights in TRAJKOVSKI v. "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA" and 1 other application.
Information
- Judgment date: 2025-08-28
- Communication date: 2016-04-18
- Application number(s): 53205/13;63320/13
- Country: MKD
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 8, 8-1, 8-2
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6-1 - Access to court) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.536589
- Prediction: No violation
Inconsistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
Applications nos 53205/13 and 63320/13Jovče TRAJKOVSKI against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniaand Dimitar ČIPOVSKI against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonialodged on 16 August 2013 and 4 October 2013 respectively The applicant in the first case, Mr Jovče Trajkovski, was born in 1982 and the applicant in the second case, Mr Dimitar Čipovski, in 1979.
Both applicants live in Skopje.
They are Macedonian nationals and they are represented before the Court by Ms N. Boškova, a lawyer practising in Skopje.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1.
Application no.
53205/13 The applicant is a former drug addict.
On 11 February 2010 two police officers approached him while he was walking on a street in Skopje and questioned him about a steering wheel lock which he was holding at the time.
He answered that he had found it on the street.
He was taken to a police station where police officers continued to question him about any thefts that he might have committed.
A certificate for items that were seized by the police (regarding the steering wheel lock) was issued to the applicant.
Without any further information being given to him, a mouth swab was taken from the applicant in order for his DNA profile to be determined.
He was then taken to Skopje Hospital for his regular methadone therapy.
On 25 March 2010 the applicant lodged an application with the Personal Data Protection Directorate (“the Directorate”) for a finding that the police officers had violated his right to privacy.
He contended that they had taken cellular material from his mouth unlawfully, without a court order and without his consent.
He argued that there was no statutory basis for the police to take and retain DNA material.
By a decision of 12 April 2010, the Directorate dismissed his application, finding that the police officers “had taken [the applicant’s] DNA sample and processed it in order to detect any criminal and minor offences, that is, to establish the identity of a person suspected of having committed any crime punishable by law”.
Relying on section 5(1)(1) and (2) of the Personal Data Protection Act, sections 14 and 66 of the Police Act and section 6 of the Rules on Police Conduct (see “Relevant domestic law” below), the Directorate found that the police had been authorised to take, retain and process the personal data of an individual when there was a reasonable suspicion that he or she had committed a punishable crime.
Such actions were aimed at the prevention and detection of crime.
Furthermore, the police were authorised to establish the identity of a person on the basis, inter alia, of a DNA sample.
The applicant challenged that decision before the Administrative Court, arguing that there were no statutory provisions regarding the collection, storage and processing of DNA material.
In that connection he submitted that the storage of DNA material had not been limited in time.
Furthermore, given that his identity had been known to the authorities at the relevant time, there had been no justification to take a DNA sample from him.
It could have been used for “any future investigations which mark out [the applicant]”.
On 6 June 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint.
In addition to the arguments given in the Directorate’s decision, the court referred to section 69 of the Police Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below) and held that the police had been authorised to collect and process personal data, including genetic data, for the purposes of “the detection and prevention of criminal and minor offences and for the detection and apprehension of perpetrators, i.e.
regarding an individual about whom there was a reasonable suspicion that he or she has committed or participated in the planning, financing or execution of a criminal offence, as was the case with [the applicant].” On 24 January 2013 the Higher Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decision, finding no grounds to depart from the reasons given therein.
Using the DNA sample taken from the applicant in order to identify him in other criminal proceedings, which had led to a conviction for aggravated theft (the theft of a car radio, committed on 30 November 2009), did not mean that there had been a violation of his right to privacy.
2.
Application no.
63320/13 The applicant is a former drug addict.
On 8 October 2009 he was arrested in his home and taken to a police station, where he was interrogated in relation to allegations of theft.
An identity parade was organised and a mouth swab was taken from the applicant.
He was not informed of the purpose of taking the mouth swab, nor was the collection and processing of the sample ordered by an investigating judge.
On 26 May 2010 the applicant applied to the Directorate for a finding to establish that the police had violated his right to privacy by taking and processing his DNA material.
He stated that there was no legislative regulation for the collection, storage and processing of DNA material.
A DNA sample had been taken from him without a court order and without his consent.
In reply to the applicant’s application, the Ministry of the Interior submitted several documents.
It stated that on the basis of, inter alia, an Instruction on the manner and methods for forensic registration and identification dated 25 February 2009, the Forensics Bureau within the Ministry of the Interior had requested that a DNA sample be taken from the applicant.
Attempts by the applicant to obtain a copy of the Instruction were to no avail because the Ministry of the Interior stated that it “is not of a public nature, i.e.
the Instruction is an internal act ... and has no effect outside the Ministry ...” On 21 July 2010 the Directorate dismissed the applicant’s request.
It established that the applicant had been arrested without a court order on account of a reasonable suspicion of theft.
In the identity parade the victim had identified him as the perpetrator.
The police had taken a DNA sample from the applicant’s mouth and submitted a criminal complaint against him.
Relying on section 5(1)(1) and (2) of the Personal Data Protection Act, sections 14 and 66 of the Police Act and sections 6 and 7 of the Rules on Police Conduct (see “Relevant domestic law” below), the Directorate found that the police had undertaken investigative measures in respect of the applicant, who had been suspected of having committed an aggravated theft.
The police had therefore acted in accordance with the law and had not breached the Personal Data Protection Act.
The applicant challenged that decision, arguing that there was no legislative regulation of the collection, storage and processing of DNA material as a specific category of personal data that contained information about individuals, including information about their health and genetic make-up.
Furthermore, there was no legislation on the use of DNA or on time-limits for storing it.
As there had been other means to establish his identity, the applicant maintained that the collection and processing of his DNA had not been justified or necessary in his case.
On 6 June 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the Ministry of the Interior had been authorised and had a statutory duty to collect and process personal data, including genetic material, in order to prevent and detect criminal and minor offences and to find and apprehend the perpetrators of such crimes.
The applicant appealed.
He submitted that his identity had been known to the police.
Since the criminal complaint against him had pre-dated the analysis of his DNA, the relevant material had been unlawfully taken from him and stored.
The criminal complaint concerned charges of aggravated theft and the Ministry of the Interior had confirmed in similar proceedings that no DNA analysis had ever been carried out in respect of suspected crimes of theft and aggravated theft.
In that connection, the applicant referred to a decision of the Directorate, no.09-30/7, (see “Relevant domestic practice” below).
Lastly, the applicant submitted that in the absence of specific domestic legislation regarding the collection, storing and processing of DNA material, the Administrative Court had been obliged to apply the relevant international legal instruments, including the Convention and the Court’s practice.
As to the latter, he referred to the case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos.
30562/04 and 30566/04, ECHR 2008).
On 12 March 2013 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision.
Relying on the legislation specified above, the court held that the police had taken and processed the DNA material because the applicant had been suspected of having committed a crime.
The genetic material had been taken and processed by authorised police officers in a procedure specified in the Police Act and the Rules on Police Conduct in order to establish the applicant’s identity.
On an unspecified date, the applicant was convicted of theft and given a suspended prison term (K.br.3163/10).
The analysis of his DNA make-up was not submitted in evidence against him.
B.
Relevant domestic law and practice 1.
Relevant domestic law a) Personal Data Protection Act of 2005 Section 5(1)(1) and (2) of the Personal Data Protection Act provides that personal data is processed in accordance with the law and is collected for specific and clear aims specified by law.
It is processed in a manner suitable to those aims.
b) Police Act of 2006 Section 14 of the Police Act provides that a police officer can take investigative measures in relation to a person who is suspected of having committed a crime.
Under section 66(1) the police are authorised to collect, store, process, examine, transfer and delete personal data under conditions specified by law and administer a database of personal data for the prevention and detection of criminal and minor offences and in order to uncover the perpetrators of such acts.
Section 69 provides for the police to administer a database of persons for whom DNA profiles have been compiled.
c) Rules on Police Conduct Sections 6 and 7 of the Rules set out the powers of the police to establish the identity of a person who is suspected of having committed a crime.
The identity of an individual can be established, inter alia, on the basis of a DNA sample.
2.
Relevant domestic practice By a decision of 11 June 2010, the Directorate dismissed an application by a former drug addict who alleged, similarly to the present cases, that police officers had taken a mouth swab for compiling his DNA profile in violation of his privacy.
In the decision, the Directorate referred to a statement of a representative of the Ministry of the Interior that cellular material had never been taken in relation to suspected crimes of theft and aggravated theft (decision no.09-30/7).
COMPLAINTS The applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that the collection, storage and processing of their DNA material violated their right to respect for their private life.
In that connection they allege that there was no legislative framework to clearly regulate the taking, storing, use, processing and deletion of DNA material.
The legislation on which the authorities relied in their cases did not meet the “quality of law” requirement under Article 8 of the Convention.
Judgment
FIFTH SECTIONCASE OF KIRYEYEV AND LIMAN v. UKRAINE
(Applications nos. 56234/16 and 27010/24)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 August 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kiryeyev and Liman v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Andreas Zünd, President, Diana Sârcu, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in applications against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table. 2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the applications. THE FACTS
3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. THE LAW
4. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 5. The applicants complained of the denial of access to higher courts. They relied, expressly or in substance, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 6. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights or obligations brought before a court or tribunal. That right of access is not absolute and it is subject to limitations, which, however, must not restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 36, Series A no. 18; Ponomarenko v. Ukraine, no. 13156/02, § 36, 14 June 2007; Matsyuk v. Ukraine, no. 1751/03, § 28, 10 December 2009; and Kuzmenko v. Ukraine, no. 49526/07, § 25, 9 March 2017). Article 6 of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. However, where such courts do exist, the guarantees of Article 6 must be complied with, for instance in that it guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of their civil rights and obligations. Furthermore, it is not for this Court to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. On the other hand, the risk of any mistake made by a State authority must be borne by the State, and errors must not be remedied at the expense of the individual concerned (see, among other authorities, Gavrilov v. Ukraine, no. 11691/06, §§ 23-25, 16 February 2017, with further references). 7. In the leading cases of Kreuz v. Poland (no. 28249/95, §§ 52-67, ECHR 2001‐VI), and Mushta v. Ukraine (no. 8863/06, §§ 40-47, 18 November 2010), the Court already found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the issues similar to those in the present case. 8. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the limitations in question impaired the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to higher courts. 9. These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 10. In application no. 56234/16, the applicant also complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention about his dismissal and the courts’ reasoning related to his challenge of that measure, including when rejecting his appeals. 11. Having regard to its findings in paragraphs 7-9 above, the Court considers that it has already addressed the main legal issue raised by the case and that there is no need to pursue the examination of the aforementioned complaints (see, for a similar approach, Lorenzo Bragado and Others v. Spain, no. 53193/21 and 5 others, § 150, 22 June 2023). 12. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‐law (see, in particular, Gavrilov, cited above, § 36), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table to the applicant in application no. 27010/24. As concerns the applicant in application no. 56234/16, the Court makes no award since he did not submit his just satisfaction claims in accordance with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant in application no. 27010/24, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 August 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Viktoriya Maradudina Andreas Zünd Acting Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of applications raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(denial of access to higher courts)
No. Application no. Date of introduction
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Representative’s name and location
Specific irregularity complained of
Case-law
Facts and relevant information
Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage per applicant
(in euros)[1]
Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application
(in euros)[2]
56234/16
20/09/2016
Rodion Volodymyrovych KIRYEYEV
1980
Vak Volodymyr Ivanovych
Yagotyn
unforeseeable and/or excessively formalistic application of the relevant procedural regulations
Melnyk v. Ukraine, no. 23436/03, 28 March 2006;
Mushta v. Ukraine, no. 8863/06,
18 November 2010;
Kravchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 46673/06,
30 June 2016
The present case mainly concerns the applicant’s lack of access to a higher court in relation to his dismissal from the post of a judge pursuant to the President’s Decree of 18/01/2016. The applicant challenged his dismissal before the courts, but on 02/03/2016 the High Administrative Court (“HAC”) dismissed his claim as unsubstantiated finding that the President had lawfully exercised his relevant powers. On 04/04/2016 the Supreme Court (“SC”) rejected the applicant’s appeal of 18/03/2016 against the HAC’s judgment of 02/03/2016 as lodged out of time and refused his request for an extension of the statutory ten-day time-limit, in which he claimed that he had received the full text of the contested judgment only on 12/03/2016. The SC noted that the applicant’s lawyer had been present at the hearing of 02/03/2016 during which the introductory and operative parts of the contested judgment had been pronounced and that the time-limit in question had started to run on that date. -
-
27010/24
11/09/2024
Nadiya Sergiyivna LIMAN
1962
Nykytyuk Oleksandr Ivanovych
Vinnytsa
unforeseeable and/or excessively formalistic application of the relevant procedural regulations
Melnyk v. Ukraine, no. 23436/03, 28 March 2006; Mushta v. Ukraine, no. 8863/06,
18 November 2010;
Kravchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 46673/06,
30 June 2016
On 16/01/2024 a local court found that the applicant had violated customs rules and had to be held liable. According to the Unified State Registry of the Courts Decisions, the decision of 16/01/2024 was published on 12/04/2024. The applicant appealed on 24/04/24 arguing that she had only obtained a copy of the above decision on 16/04/2024. By a final decision of 10/07/2024, the Kyiv Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as lodged out of time as well as her request for an extension of the applicable ten-day time limit, reasoning that the applicant’s representative was present at the hearing of 16/01/2024. 1,500
250
[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. [2] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF KIRYEYEV AND LIMAN v. UKRAINE
(Applications nos. 56234/16 and 27010/24)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 August 2025
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kiryeyev and Liman v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Andreas Zünd, President, Diana Sârcu, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 3 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in applications against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table. 2. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the applications. THE FACTS
3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. THE LAW
4. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 5. The applicants complained of the denial of access to higher courts. They relied, expressly or in substance, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 6. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights or obligations brought before a court or tribunal. That right of access is not absolute and it is subject to limitations, which, however, must not restrict or reduce a person’s access in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (see Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 36, Series A no. 18; Ponomarenko v. Ukraine, no. 13156/02, § 36, 14 June 2007; Matsyuk v. Ukraine, no. 1751/03, § 28, 10 December 2009; and Kuzmenko v. Ukraine, no. 49526/07, § 25, 9 March 2017). Article 6 of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. However, where such courts do exist, the guarantees of Article 6 must be complied with, for instance in that it guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of their civil rights and obligations. Furthermore, it is not for this Court to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. On the other hand, the risk of any mistake made by a State authority must be borne by the State, and errors must not be remedied at the expense of the individual concerned (see, among other authorities, Gavrilov v. Ukraine, no. 11691/06, §§ 23-25, 16 February 2017, with further references). 7. In the leading cases of Kreuz v. Poland (no. 28249/95, §§ 52-67, ECHR 2001‐VI), and Mushta v. Ukraine (no. 8863/06, §§ 40-47, 18 November 2010), the Court already found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the issues similar to those in the present case. 8. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the limitations in question impaired the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to higher courts. 9. These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 10. In application no. 56234/16, the applicant also complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention about his dismissal and the courts’ reasoning related to his challenge of that measure, including when rejecting his appeals. 11. Having regard to its findings in paragraphs 7-9 above, the Court considers that it has already addressed the main legal issue raised by the case and that there is no need to pursue the examination of the aforementioned complaints (see, for a similar approach, Lorenzo Bragado and Others v. Spain, no. 53193/21 and 5 others, § 150, 22 June 2023). 12. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‐law (see, in particular, Gavrilov, cited above, § 36), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table to the applicant in application no. 27010/24. As concerns the applicant in application no. 56234/16, the Court makes no award since he did not submit his just satisfaction claims in accordance with Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant in application no. 27010/24, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 August 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Viktoriya Maradudina Andreas Zünd Acting Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of applications raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(denial of access to higher courts)
No. Application no. Date of introduction
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Representative’s name and location
Specific irregularity complained of
Case-law
Facts and relevant information
Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage per applicant
(in euros)[1]
Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application
(in euros)[2]
56234/16
20/09/2016
Rodion Volodymyrovych KIRYEYEV
1980
Vak Volodymyr Ivanovych
Yagotyn
unforeseeable and/or excessively formalistic application of the relevant procedural regulations
Melnyk v. Ukraine, no. 23436/03, 28 March 2006;
Mushta v. Ukraine, no. 8863/06,
18 November 2010;
Kravchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 46673/06,
30 June 2016
The present case mainly concerns the applicant’s lack of access to a higher court in relation to his dismissal from the post of a judge pursuant to the President’s Decree of 18/01/2016. The applicant challenged his dismissal before the courts, but on 02/03/2016 the High Administrative Court (“HAC”) dismissed his claim as unsubstantiated finding that the President had lawfully exercised his relevant powers. On 04/04/2016 the Supreme Court (“SC”) rejected the applicant’s appeal of 18/03/2016 against the HAC’s judgment of 02/03/2016 as lodged out of time and refused his request for an extension of the statutory ten-day time-limit, in which he claimed that he had received the full text of the contested judgment only on 12/03/2016. The SC noted that the applicant’s lawyer had been present at the hearing of 02/03/2016 during which the introductory and operative parts of the contested judgment had been pronounced and that the time-limit in question had started to run on that date. -
-
27010/24
11/09/2024
Nadiya Sergiyivna LIMAN
1962
Nykytyuk Oleksandr Ivanovych
Vinnytsa
unforeseeable and/or excessively formalistic application of the relevant procedural regulations
Melnyk v. Ukraine, no. 23436/03, 28 March 2006; Mushta v. Ukraine, no. 8863/06,
18 November 2010;
Kravchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 46673/06,
30 June 2016
On 16/01/2024 a local court found that the applicant had violated customs rules and had to be held liable. According to the Unified State Registry of the Courts Decisions, the decision of 16/01/2024 was published on 12/04/2024. The applicant appealed on 24/04/24 arguing that she had only obtained a copy of the above decision on 16/04/2024. By a final decision of 10/07/2024, the Kyiv Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as lodged out of time as well as her request for an extension of the applicable ten-day time limit, reasoning that the applicant’s representative was present at the hearing of 16/01/2024. 1,500
250
No. Application no. Date of introduction
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Representative’s name and location
Specific irregularity complained of
Case-law
Facts and relevant information
Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage per applicant
(in euros)[1]
Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application
(in euros)[2]
56234/16
20/09/2016
Rodion Volodymyrovych KIRYEYEV
1980
Vak Volodymyr Ivanovych
Yagotyn
unforeseeable and/or excessively formalistic application of the relevant procedural regulations
Melnyk v. Ukraine, no. 23436/03, 28 March 2006;
Mushta v. Ukraine, no. 8863/06,
18 November 2010;
Kravchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 46673/06,
30 June 2016
The present case mainly concerns the applicant’s lack of access to a higher court in relation to his dismissal from the post of a judge pursuant to the President’s Decree of 18/01/2016. The applicant challenged his dismissal before the courts, but on 02/03/2016 the High Administrative Court (“HAC”) dismissed his claim as unsubstantiated finding that the President had lawfully exercised his relevant powers. On 04/04/2016 the Supreme Court (“SC”) rejected the applicant’s appeal of 18/03/2016 against the HAC’s judgment of 02/03/2016 as lodged out of time and refused his request for an extension of the statutory ten-day time-limit, in which he claimed that he had received the full text of the contested judgment only on 12/03/2016. The SC noted that the applicant’s lawyer had been present at the hearing of 02/03/2016 during which the introductory and operative parts of the contested judgment had been pronounced and that the time-limit in question had started to run on that date. -
-
27010/24
11/09/2024
Nadiya Sergiyivna LIMAN
1962
Nykytyuk Oleksandr Ivanovych
Vinnytsa
unforeseeable and/or excessively formalistic application of the relevant procedural regulations
Melnyk v. Ukraine, no. 23436/03, 28 March 2006; Mushta v. Ukraine, no. 8863/06,
18 November 2010;
Kravchenko v. Ukraine,
no. 46673/06,
30 June 2016
On 16/01/2024 a local court found that the applicant had violated customs rules and had to be held liable. According to the Unified State Registry of the Courts Decisions, the decision of 16/01/2024 was published on 12/04/2024. The applicant appealed on 24/04/24 arguing that she had only obtained a copy of the above decision on 16/04/2024. By a final decision of 10/07/2024, the Kyiv Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal as lodged out of time as well as her request for an extension of the applicable ten-day time limit, reasoning that the applicant’s representative was present at the hearing of 16/01/2024. 1,500
250
[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants. [2] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.