I incorrectly predicted that there's no violation of human rights in ŽIC v. CROATIA and 2 other applications.

Information

  • Judgment date: 2022-05-19
  • Communication date: 2018-01-10
  • Application number(s): 54115/15;193/16;398/16
  • Country:   HRV
  • Relevant ECHR article(s): 6, 6-1, P1-1
  • Conclusion:
    Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Enforcement proceedings
    Article 6-1 - Access to court)
    Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions)
  • Result: Violation
  • SEE FINAL JUDGMENT

JURI Prediction

  • Probability: 0.523766
  • Prediction: No violation
  • Inconsistent


Legend

 In line with the court's judgment
 In opposition to the court's judgment
Darker color: higher probability
: In line with the court's judgment  
: In opposition to the court's judgment

Communication text used for prediction

Applications nos.
54115/15, 193/16 and 398/16Seadeta ŽIC against Croatialodged on 27 October 2015, 10 December 2015 and 29 December 2015 respectively The applicant is a Croatian national.
She is represented before the Court by Mr M. Zrilić, a lawyer practising in Rijeka.
A.
The circumstances of the cases The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was employed by a local authority, the Municipality of Rijeka (Općina Rijeka – hereinafter “the Municipality”).
In 1991 she was made redundant.
On 29 July 1992 she obtained a judgment against the Municipality ordering her reinstatement.
The judgment (hereinafter “the principal judgment”) became final on 10 February 1993 and enforceable on 18 March 1993.
Meanwhile, on 30 December 1992, following a reorganisation of the system of local government in Croatia, the Municipality ceased to exist and its powers were transferred to newly-established local government units, namely, Rijeka Township (Grad Rijeka, hereinafter “the Township”) and Primorsko-Goranska County (Primorsko-goranska županija hereinafter “the County”).
1.
Application no.
54115/15 On 8 September 1993 the applicant applied for the enforcement of the principal judgment of 29 July 1992 against the Township.
On 22 July 1994 the Rijeka Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rijeci) issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) ordering the Township to reinstate the applicant.
The Township then instituted civil proceedings against the applicant with a view to declaring the enforcement inadmissible.
On 20 February 2001 the Rijeka Municipal Court declared the enforcement inadmissible, finding that it was the County, and not the Township, which had inherited the obligation to reinstate the applicant.
On 19 November 2002 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) upheld that first-instance judgment.
On 20 February 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts’ findings.
Subsequently, in a submission of 13 September 2005, she relied on a decision of the Constitutional Court rendered on 7 July 2005 in another, related, set of proceedings which she had instituted against the Township (see below the facts relating to application no.
398/16) seeking payment of salary arrears.
By that decision the Constitutional Court had quashed the lower courts’ judgments and expressed the view that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s earlier finding in that case, both the Township and the County had had an obligation to reinstate the applicant.
She therefore argued that the main issue in her case had already been decided by the Constitutional Court and that the domestic courts’ decisions in the present case had contradicted that court’s finding.
On 3 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint.
The decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 8 July 2015.
2.
Application no.
193/16 In 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Township seeking payment of salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994.
In 1995 the domestic courts eventually gave a final judgment in her favour and the applicant, after having that judgment enforced, received the entire amount of salary arrears awarded to her.
However, following an appeal on points of law (revizija) by the Township, on 6 May 1999 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) quashed that judgment and instructed the lower courts to establish whether the applicant had sought enforcement of the principal judgment of 29 July 1992 within the statutory time-limit.
At the same time it expressed the view that if the applicant had indeed applied for enforcement within the time-limit, then the Township would be liable to pay her salary arrears.
Meanwhile, in 1998, the applicant instituted another set of civil proceedings against the Township, seeking payment of salary arrears for the period from 1 September 1997 onwards.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision of 6 May 1999, on 12 April 2000 these proceedings were joined to those instituted in 1993.
By a judgment of 7 December 2007 the Rijeka Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant.
In particular, it declared that the Township had been liable to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994, and furthermore ordered the Township to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 September 1997 and 30 April 2007.
Following an appeal lodged by the Township, on 5 May 2010 the Rijeka County Court reversed the first-instance judgment in part and quashed it in part.
Specifically, it reversed the first-instance judgment in the part ordering the Township to pay the applicant salary arrears for the period between 1 September 1997 and 30 April 2007 and in that part dismissed the applicant’s claim.
It did so having found that in another set of proceedings the enforcement of the principal judgment of 29 July 1992 against the Township had been declared inadmissible (see above the facts relating to application no.
54115/15) and that the Township had therefore not been liable to pay salary arrears to the applicant.
It further quashed the first-instance judgment in the part concerning salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994 and in that part declared the applicant’s claim inadmissible.
It did so having found that the Municipal Court could not have delivered a declaratory judgment after her pecuniary claim had already become enforceable.
On 14 April 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant.
In a constitutional complaint lodged with the Constitutional Court on 2 August 2011 the applicant argued, inter alia, that her employment in the Municipality had never been terminated and that since her employer was preventing her from returning to work she was entitled to salary arrears.
As to which local authority was liable to pay her salary arrears, she relied on the decision of the Supreme Court of 6 May 1999 and the decision of the Constitutional Court of 7 July 2005 confirming the obligation of the Township to reinstate her.
On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint.
That decision was served on her representative on 8 July 2015.
3.
Application no.
398/16 In 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Township and the County seeking payment of her salary arrears for the period between 1 February 1994 and 1 September 1997.
In 1999 the domestic courts eventually gave a final judgment allowing her claim in respect of the Township and dismissing it in respect of the County.
The applicant received the entire amount of salary arrears awarded to her.
On 12 June 2002 the Supreme Court, following an appeal on points of law lodged by the Township, reversed that judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim in respect of the Township.
It found that in fact it was the County which had inherited the obligation to reinstate the applicant and was therefore liable to pay her salary arrears.
On 7 July 2005 the Constitutional Court, following a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant, quashed the lower courts’ judgments and remitted the case to the first-instance court.
It found that contrary to the Supreme Court’s finding, the Township and the County had both had an obligation to reinstate the applicant.
In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought a declaratory judgment stating that the Township had been liable to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 January 1994 and 31 August 1997.
On 4 June 2008 the Rijeka Municipal Court declared her action for a declaratory judgment inadmissible, finding that under the domestic law it was not allowed to seek a declaratory judgment stating the existence of a fact.
This decision was upheld by the Rijeka County Court and the Supreme Court on 21 October 2009 and 28 August 2012 respectively.
In a constitutional complaint lodged with the Constitutional Court on 14 January 2013 the applicant argued, inter alia, that her employment in the Municipality had never been terminated and that since her employer was preventing her from returning to work she was entitled to salary arrears.
She further relied on the decision of the Constitutional Court of 7 July 2005 confirming the obligation of the Township to reinstate her.
On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint.
The decision was served on her representative on 8 July 2015.
4.
Other relevant facts Meanwhile, following the decisions of the Supreme Court of 6 May 1999 and 12 June 2002, the Township instituted civil proceedings against the applicant seeking repayment of salary arrears initially awarded to her by the final judgments in 1995 and 1999.
The first- and the second-instance courts ruled against the applicant, and the proceedings are currently pending before the Supreme Court.
B.
Relevant domestic law The relevant provision of the Labour Act (Zakon o radu, Official Gazette nos.
38/1995, 54/1995, 65/1995, 17/2001, 82/2001, 114/2003, 142/2003, 30/2004 and 137/2004), as in force at the material time, provided as follows: Section 93(3) “An employee shall be entitled to salary arrears for the period during which his or her work was interrupted through the fault of his or her employer, or due to other circumstances for which the employee cannot be held accountable.” COMPLAINTS 1.
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she was never reinstated in her post, despite having obtained an enforcement title to that effect in 1993 against the relevant local authority.
2.
She further complains that the decisions of the domestic courts delivered in her disfavour contradicted the Constitutional Court’s decision of 7 July 2005, and were thus in breach of the principle of legal certainty.
3.
Lastly, she complains that the domestic courts’ refusal to award her salary arrears violated her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions, as protected by Article 1 of Protocol No.
1.

Judgment

FIRST SECTION
CASE OF ŽIC v. CROATIA
(Applications nos.
54115/15, 193/16 and 398/16)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 May 2022

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Žic v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President, Alena Poláčková, Davor Derenčinović, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos.
54115/15, 193/16 and 398/16) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 27 October, 10 December and 29 December 2015 respectively by a Croatian national, Ms Seadeta Žic, born in 1955 and living in Rijeka (“the applicant”) who was represented by Mr M. Zrilić, a lawyer practicing in Rijeka;
the decision to give notice to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik, of the complaints concerning the applicant’s inability to have an enforcement title against a local authority executed, the breach of the principle of legal certainty and the domestic courts’ refusal to award her salary arrears and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 26 April 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The case concerns the applicant’s inability to have an enforcement title against a local authority executed and to obtain salary arrears. 2. The applicant worked for the Rijeka Municipality until 1991, when she was made redundant. On 29 July 1992 she obtained a judgment against the Municipality ordering her reinstatement. The judgment became final on 10 February 1993 and enforceable on 18 March 1993. 3. Meanwhile, on 30 December 1992, following a reorganisation of local government in Croatia, the Municipality ceased to exist, and its powers were transferred to the newly founded local government units the Rijeka Township and the Primorsko-Goranska County. 4. The applicant instituted three sets of proceedings where the first one concerns (non-)enforcement of the principal judgment and the remaining two concern payment of salary arrears. 5. On 8 September 1993 the applicant applied for the enforcement of the judgment of 29 July 1992 against the Township. On 22 July 1994 the enforcement court ordered the Township to reinstate the applicant. 6. Upon a civil action by the Township, in 2002 the civil courts declared the enforcement inadmissible, finding that it was the County, and not the Township, which had succeeded the obligation to reinstate the applicant. On 3 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 7. In 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Township seeking payment of salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994. In 1995 the civil courts ruled in favour of the applicant and she received the entire amount of salary arrears awarded to her. 8. However, following an appeal on points of law by the Township, in 1999 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment. 9. Meanwhile, in 1998, the applicant instituted another set of civil proceedings against the Township, seeking payment of salary arrears for the period from 1 September 1997 onwards. Following the Supreme Court’s decision of 1999, these proceedings were joined to those instituted in 1993. 10. In 2011 the civil courts dismissed the applicant’s claim for salary arrears for the period between 1 September 1997 and 30 April 2007, noting that the enforcement of the judgment of 29 July 1992 had been declared inadmissible in respect of the Township. They also held that the question whether the Township was liable to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994 had to be resolved in the civil proceedings which the Township had meanwhile instituted against her (see paragraph 18 below). 11. On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 12. In 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Township and the County seeking payment of salary arrears for the period between 1 February 1994 and 1 September 1997. In 1999 the civil courts allowed her claim in respect of the Township and dismissed it in respect of the County. The applicant received the entire amount of salary arrears awarded to her. 13. In 2002 the Supreme Court, following an appeal on points of law by the Township, reversed that judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim in respect of the Township. It found that in fact it was the County which had succeeded the obligation to reinstate her and was thus liable to pay her salary arrears. 14. On 7 July 2005 the Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It found that the Supreme Court had wrongly applied the relevant domestic law when concluding that the Township had not had an obligation to reinstate the applicant. 15. In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought a declaratory judgment stating that the Township had been liable to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 January 1994 and 31 August 1997. 16. Her declaratory action was eventually declared inadmissible. In particular, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had not had any legal interest to seek a declaratory judgment, because she had already obtained the salary arrears, regardless of the fact that the judgment had subsequently been quashed. It deemed that the question whether the Township was liable to pay her salary arrears had to be resolved in the civil proceedings which the Township had meanwhile instituted against her (see paragraph 18 below). 17. On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 18. Meanwhile, following the decisions of the Supreme Court of 1999 and 2002 (see paragraphs 8 and 13 above), the Township instituted civil proceedings against the applicant seeking repayment of salary arrears initially awarded to her by the final judgments in 1995 and 1999 (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above). The civil courts ruled against the applicant. The proceedings are currently pending before the Constitutional Court. 19. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she was never reinstated in her post, despite having obtained an enforcement title to that effect against a local authority; that the domestic courts’ decisions delivered against her had contradicted the Constitutional Court’s decision of 7 July 2005 and were thus in breach of the principle of legal certainty; and that the domestic courts’ decisions refusing her claims for salary arrears amounted to a breach of her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
20.
Having regard to the intertwined subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 21. The applicant complained that the judgment of 29 July 1992 obtained against a local authority remained unenforced. 22. Given the fact that the applicant’s entitlement to enforcement of the judgment subsisted subsequent to the Convention’s entry into force in respect of Croatia on 5 November 1997 and that the judgment has not been enforced yet, the Court finds that it has temporal jurisdiction and dismisses the Government’s objection in this regard (compare Krstić v. Serbia, no. 45394/06, § 68, 10 December 2013). 23. The Court furthermore notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 24. The Court observes that the reason stated by the domestic courts to ultimately refuse the enforcement of the judgment was that the applicant sought its enforcement against the wrong local authority, namely, against the Township instead of the County (see paragraph 6 above). 25. In this connection the Court reiterates that according to its constant case-law a person who has obtained an enforcement title against the State cannot be required to resort to enforcement proceedings in order to have it executed (see, for example, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 89, ECHR 2006‐V; Metaxas v. Greece, no. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004; and Reynbakh v. Russia, no. 23405/03, § 24, 29 September 2005). The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases where the State or a local authority had failed to comply with an enforceable judgment in the applicant’s favour (see, for example, Reynbakh, cited above, §§ 27-28, and Čikanović v. Croatia, no. 27630/07, § 53, 5 February 2015). 26. If the applicant was thus not even required to resort to enforcement proceedings, it follows that she cannot suffer adverse consequences for directing her application for enforcement against the allegedly wrong authority. This is even more so in the situation of the present case where it was not clear which local authority had to reinstate the applicant, and where the domestic courts were delivering conflicting decisions on that issue. In such situations it is not incumbent on the applicant to identify the proper authority (see Kostadin Mihaylov v. Bulgaria, no. 17868/07, 27 March 2008) but for the State to facilitate such identification (see Plechanow v. Poland, no. 22279/04, § 109, 7 July 2009). 27. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention regarding the non-enforcement of the judgment of 29 July 1992. 28. The applicant also complained that the domestic courts’ decisions refusing her claims for salary arrears amounted to a breach of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 29. As to the Government’s objection that she failed to properly exhaust domestic remedies by not claiming salary arrears from the County, the Court finds that the issue is closely linked to the substance of the applicant’s complaint and must therefore be joined to the merits (see Plechanow, cited above, §§ 93-94). 30. The Court furthermore finds that the complaint is not manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other ground. It must therefore be declared admissible. 31. From the decisions of the domestic courts it is evident that the applicant’s claims for salary arrears were ultimately rejected only because she had sued the wrong local authority, that is, for the same reason her application for enforcement of the judgment ordering her reinstatement was denied (see paragraph 6 above). Her claims for salary arrears thus had a sufficient basis in national law to be protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 32. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is linked to her Article 6 § 1 complaint above. Accordingly, reiterating its findings in paragraphs 25-27 above, and referring to its case‐law (see Plechanow, cited above, §§ 99-112), the Court considers that the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation to provide measures safeguarding the applicant’s right to the effective enjoyment of her possessions. 33. It follows that the Government’s objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed, and the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 34. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the breach of the principle of legal certainty because the domestic courts’ decisions in all three sets of proceedings were in contradiction with the decision of the Constitutional Court of 7 July 2005 (see paragraph 14 above). 35. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present case. It thus considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaint (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
36.
The applicant claimed 87,974 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, which corresponds to salary arrears for the period between 1 September 1997 and 30 April 2007, together with the accrued statutory default interest. She also sought EUR 150,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, 90,258 Croatian kunas (HRK) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and HRK 40,000 for those incurred before the Court. The Government contested these claims. 37. The Court finds that in the present case the most appropriate way of repairing the consequences of the violations found is to reopen the civil proceedings complained of (compare Čikanović, cited above, § 66). Since under section 428a of the Croatian Civil Procedure Act an applicant may seek the reopening of the civil proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of the Convention, there is no call to award the applicant any sum in respect of pecuniary damage (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, §§ 32-33, ECHR 2000-XI). 38. On the other hand, the Court finds that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 7,800 under that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. 39. Having regard that the applicant can seek the reopening of the three sets of domestic civil proceedings and thereby obtain a fresh decision on costs before the civil courts and the Supreme Court (see paragraph 37 above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,600 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and EUR 4,000 for those incurred before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 7,800 (seven thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 6,600 (six thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 May 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Liv Tigerstedt Péter Paczolay Deputy Registrar President

FIRST SECTION
CASE OF ŽIC v. CROATIA
(Applications nos.
54115/15, 193/16 and 398/16)

JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 May 2022

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Žic v. Croatia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President, Alena Poláčková, Davor Derenčinović, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos.
54115/15, 193/16 and 398/16) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 27 October, 10 December and 29 December 2015 respectively by a Croatian national, Ms Seadeta Žic, born in 1955 and living in Rijeka (“the applicant”) who was represented by Mr M. Zrilić, a lawyer practicing in Rijeka;
the decision to give notice to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs Š. Stažnik, of the complaints concerning the applicant’s inability to have an enforcement title against a local authority executed, the breach of the principle of legal certainty and the domestic courts’ refusal to award her salary arrears and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the applications;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 26 April 2022,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1.
The case concerns the applicant’s inability to have an enforcement title against a local authority executed and to obtain salary arrears. 2. The applicant worked for the Rijeka Municipality until 1991, when she was made redundant. On 29 July 1992 she obtained a judgment against the Municipality ordering her reinstatement. The judgment became final on 10 February 1993 and enforceable on 18 March 1993. 3. Meanwhile, on 30 December 1992, following a reorganisation of local government in Croatia, the Municipality ceased to exist, and its powers were transferred to the newly founded local government units the Rijeka Township and the Primorsko-Goranska County. 4. The applicant instituted three sets of proceedings where the first one concerns (non-)enforcement of the principal judgment and the remaining two concern payment of salary arrears. 5. On 8 September 1993 the applicant applied for the enforcement of the judgment of 29 July 1992 against the Township. On 22 July 1994 the enforcement court ordered the Township to reinstate the applicant. 6. Upon a civil action by the Township, in 2002 the civil courts declared the enforcement inadmissible, finding that it was the County, and not the Township, which had succeeded the obligation to reinstate the applicant. On 3 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 7. In 1993 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Township seeking payment of salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994. In 1995 the civil courts ruled in favour of the applicant and she received the entire amount of salary arrears awarded to her. 8. However, following an appeal on points of law by the Township, in 1999 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment. 9. Meanwhile, in 1998, the applicant instituted another set of civil proceedings against the Township, seeking payment of salary arrears for the period from 1 September 1997 onwards. Following the Supreme Court’s decision of 1999, these proceedings were joined to those instituted in 1993. 10. In 2011 the civil courts dismissed the applicant’s claim for salary arrears for the period between 1 September 1997 and 30 April 2007, noting that the enforcement of the judgment of 29 July 1992 had been declared inadmissible in respect of the Township. They also held that the question whether the Township was liable to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 August 1991 and 1 January 1994 had to be resolved in the civil proceedings which the Township had meanwhile instituted against her (see paragraph 18 below). 11. On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 12. In 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Township and the County seeking payment of salary arrears for the period between 1 February 1994 and 1 September 1997. In 1999 the civil courts allowed her claim in respect of the Township and dismissed it in respect of the County. The applicant received the entire amount of salary arrears awarded to her. 13. In 2002 the Supreme Court, following an appeal on points of law by the Township, reversed that judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim in respect of the Township. It found that in fact it was the County which had succeeded the obligation to reinstate her and was thus liable to pay her salary arrears. 14. On 7 July 2005 the Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court. It found that the Supreme Court had wrongly applied the relevant domestic law when concluding that the Township had not had an obligation to reinstate the applicant. 15. In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought a declaratory judgment stating that the Township had been liable to pay her salary arrears for the period between 1 January 1994 and 31 August 1997. 16. Her declaratory action was eventually declared inadmissible. In particular, the Supreme Court held that the applicant had not had any legal interest to seek a declaratory judgment, because she had already obtained the salary arrears, regardless of the fact that the judgment had subsequently been quashed. It deemed that the question whether the Township was liable to pay her salary arrears had to be resolved in the civil proceedings which the Township had meanwhile instituted against her (see paragraph 18 below). 17. On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 18. Meanwhile, following the decisions of the Supreme Court of 1999 and 2002 (see paragraphs 8 and 13 above), the Township instituted civil proceedings against the applicant seeking repayment of salary arrears initially awarded to her by the final judgments in 1995 and 1999 (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above). The civil courts ruled against the applicant. The proceedings are currently pending before the Constitutional Court. 19. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that she was never reinstated in her post, despite having obtained an enforcement title to that effect against a local authority; that the domestic courts’ decisions delivered against her had contradicted the Constitutional Court’s decision of 7 July 2005 and were thus in breach of the principle of legal certainty; and that the domestic courts’ decisions refusing her claims for salary arrears amounted to a breach of her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
20.
Having regard to the intertwined subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. 21. The applicant complained that the judgment of 29 July 1992 obtained against a local authority remained unenforced. 22. Given the fact that the applicant’s entitlement to enforcement of the judgment subsisted subsequent to the Convention’s entry into force in respect of Croatia on 5 November 1997 and that the judgment has not been enforced yet, the Court finds that it has temporal jurisdiction and dismisses the Government’s objection in this regard (compare Krstić v. Serbia, no. 45394/06, § 68, 10 December 2013). 23. The Court furthermore notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‐founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 24. The Court observes that the reason stated by the domestic courts to ultimately refuse the enforcement of the judgment was that the applicant sought its enforcement against the wrong local authority, namely, against the Township instead of the County (see paragraph 6 above). 25. In this connection the Court reiterates that according to its constant case-law a person who has obtained an enforcement title against the State cannot be required to resort to enforcement proceedings in order to have it executed (see, for example, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 89, ECHR 2006‐V; Metaxas v. Greece, no. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004; and Reynbakh v. Russia, no. 23405/03, § 24, 29 September 2005). The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases where the State or a local authority had failed to comply with an enforceable judgment in the applicant’s favour (see, for example, Reynbakh, cited above, §§ 27-28, and Čikanović v. Croatia, no. 27630/07, § 53, 5 February 2015). 26. If the applicant was thus not even required to resort to enforcement proceedings, it follows that she cannot suffer adverse consequences for directing her application for enforcement against the allegedly wrong authority. This is even more so in the situation of the present case where it was not clear which local authority had to reinstate the applicant, and where the domestic courts were delivering conflicting decisions on that issue. In such situations it is not incumbent on the applicant to identify the proper authority (see Kostadin Mihaylov v. Bulgaria, no. 17868/07, 27 March 2008) but for the State to facilitate such identification (see Plechanow v. Poland, no. 22279/04, § 109, 7 July 2009). 27. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention regarding the non-enforcement of the judgment of 29 July 1992. 28. The applicant also complained that the domestic courts’ decisions refusing her claims for salary arrears amounted to a breach of her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 29. As to the Government’s objection that she failed to properly exhaust domestic remedies by not claiming salary arrears from the County, the Court finds that the issue is closely linked to the substance of the applicant’s complaint and must therefore be joined to the merits (see Plechanow, cited above, §§ 93-94). 30. The Court furthermore finds that the complaint is not manifestly illfounded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other ground. It must therefore be declared admissible. 31. From the decisions of the domestic courts it is evident that the applicant’s claims for salary arrears were ultimately rejected only because she had sued the wrong local authority, that is, for the same reason her application for enforcement of the judgment ordering her reinstatement was denied (see paragraph 6 above). Her claims for salary arrears thus had a sufficient basis in national law to be protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 32. The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is linked to her Article 6 § 1 complaint above. Accordingly, reiterating its findings in paragraphs 25-27 above, and referring to its case‐law (see Plechanow, cited above, §§ 99-112), the Court considers that the State has failed to comply with its positive obligation to provide measures safeguarding the applicant’s right to the effective enjoyment of her possessions. 33. It follows that the Government’s objection concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed, and the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 34. The applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the breach of the principle of legal certainty because the domestic courts’ decisions in all three sets of proceedings were in contradiction with the decision of the Constitutional Court of 7 July 2005 (see paragraph 14 above). 35. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present case. It thus considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaint (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
36.
The applicant claimed 87,974 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, which corresponds to salary arrears for the period between 1 September 1997 and 30 April 2007, together with the accrued statutory default interest. She also sought EUR 150,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, 90,258 Croatian kunas (HRK) in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and HRK 40,000 for those incurred before the Court. The Government contested these claims. 37. The Court finds that in the present case the most appropriate way of repairing the consequences of the violations found is to reopen the civil proceedings complained of (compare Čikanović, cited above, § 66). Since under section 428a of the Croatian Civil Procedure Act an applicant may seek the reopening of the civil proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of the Convention, there is no call to award the applicant any sum in respect of pecuniary damage (see Iatridis v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 31107/96, §§ 32-33, ECHR 2000-XI). 38. On the other hand, the Court finds that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 7,800 under that head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. 39. Having regard that the applicant can seek the reopening of the three sets of domestic civil proceedings and thereby obtain a fresh decision on costs before the civil courts and the Supreme Court (see paragraph 37 above), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,600 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Constitutional Court and EUR 4,000 for those incurred before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 7,800 (seven thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 6,600 (six thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 May 2022, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Liv Tigerstedt Péter Paczolay Deputy Registrar President