I correctly predicted that there was a violation of human rights in OGANEZOVA v. ARMENIA and 1 other application.
Information
- Judgment date: 2025-08-26
- Communication date: 2019-05-17
- Application number(s): 71367/12;72961/12
- Country: ARM
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 3, 8, 8-1, 14
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Prompt information)
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Brought promptly before judge or other officer)
Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.530726
- Prediction: Violation
Consistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
Applications nos.
71367/12 and 72961/12Armine OGANEZOVA against Armenialodged on 8 November 2012 and 15 January 2013 respectively The applicant in both cases, Ms Armine Oganezova, is an Armenian national who was born in 1980 and lives in Nacka, Sweden.
She is represented before the Court by Mr M. Hovsepyan, director of PINK Armenia (Public Information and Need of Knowledge) NGO.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
1.
Background to the case The applicant, also known by the name ‘Tsomak’, is a well-known member of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community in Armenia.
She has been involved in promoting the rights of LGBT persons in Armenia and internationally.
The applicant co-owned and managed a bar called the D.I.Y.
Club (‘the club’) in the centre of Yerevan, a place where members of the LGBT community would meet to socialise.
In June 2011 the applicant participated in a gay pride march in Istanbul.
While in Istanbul, she gave an interview to a local newspaper criticising Armenia’s human rights record.
In August 2011 the applicant was contacted by Yerkir Media television channel and asked to give an interview to discuss her visit to Istanbul.
On 25 July 2011 the interview was broadcast, following which she became the subject of an online hate campaign, intimidation and threats on the basis of her sexual orientation.
Shortly thereafter several persons entered the club to harass and intimidate the people gathered there.
Fearing that the club would become a target for homophobic attacks, the applicant and the two other co-owners of the club, A.P.
and N.D., arranged a meeting with A.K., H.K., who were brothers, and two others who had been identified as the perpetrators of the incident.
According to the applicant, it was agreed during the meeting that there would not be any further attacks.
2.
The arson attack on the club and the ensuing investigation At around 5 a.m. on 8 May 2012 an arson attack was made on the club.
The applicant was informed of the attack by a friend who happened to be passing by and witnessed that the club was on fire and that there were fire brigades operating at the scene.
Upon arrival the applicant discovered that the interior of the club had been severely damaged.
According to the applicant, A.P.
had seen a group of men around the premises the previous evening.
This group of men, which included brothers A.K.
and H.K., harassed and intimidated the club staff members.
They were all wearing similar jackets with the logo “Black Ravens Armenia” which is associated with a well-known fascist group in Armenia.
Shortly after her arrival the applicant called the police.
A number of forensic experts arrived and informed the applicant that no fingerprints had been found.
At 5 p.m. two police officers arrived at the club.
According to the applicant, they entered the premises, gave a contact telephone number and left instantly without asking any questions.
After the policemen left, the employees of a nearby business came to speak with the applicant and suggested watching the footage from their security camera, which showed a person breaking through the door of the club and throwing an explosive substance inside.
A.P.
then recognised A.K.
on the footage.
Thereafter the applicant called the police once again to describe what she had seen on the security camera footage.
The police later arrived and took the security camera footage.
It appears that the police instituted criminal proceedings on account of intentional property damage under Article 185 of the Criminal Code.
On 9 May 2012 A.K.
and H.K.
were arrested.
Statements were taken from them whereby they confessed to having set the club on fire, after they had made sure that there was no one left inside.
In their statement the brothers mentioned that the reason for the arson attack was the fact that the club was a gathering place for LGBT persons.
Later on the same day the applicant and N.D. went to the police station to file a report and were informed that both men had confessed to the arson attack on the club.
During his interview on 10 May 2012 A.K.
re-affirmed that he and his brother had carried out the arson attack on the club because it was a gathering place for homosexuals and, besides, the applicant had participated in a gay pride march in Turkey.
On the same date H.K.
was also questioned and made similar statements.
On 11 May 2012 charges were brought against A.K.
and H.K.
under Article 185 § 3 of the Criminal Code (intentional property damage resulting in substantial loss).
It appears that the investigating authority sought a court order to put A.K.
and H.K.
in pre-trial detention.
It further appears that A.K.
and H.K.
were released on bail based on sureties provided by Hr.K.
and A.M., parliamentarians from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party.
On 12 May 2012 A.H. was questioned again and submitted that he had made his previous statements under duress.
He had been ill-treated at the police station and forced to make self-incriminatory statements on his and his brother’s behalf.
He refused to provide any details concerning the alleged perpetrators or to describe the circumstances of the alleged incident.
It appears that A.H. and H.K.
refused to make any further statements and denied the charges throughout the investigation.
On 31 May 2013 the bill of indictment was finalised and the case was sent to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court (‘the District Court’) for examination.
The relevant parts of the indictment read as follows: “... [A.H.] and [H.K.]
are members of a “Fascist” group operating in [the Republic of Armenia] and are guided by the ideology of the said group that is, among other convictions, against homosexuality, therefore for the sake of the “high” values of that ideology they had visited [the club] numerous times ... had spit on [the club], vomited in front of the door thereby bothering the [club’s] management and expressing their discontent towards homosexuals... ... on 7 May 2012 [A.H.], [H.K.]
and an unidentified person, having come to a prior agreement to set [the club] on fire ... at around 4 a.m. on 8 May 2012 they had arrived at [the club] and ... intentionally set [the club] on fire with fuel that they had brought along ... they had then escaped, having caused property damage in the amount of 3,227,563 Armenian drams ...” In the proceedings before the District Court A.H. and K.H.
admitted the charges and requested application of the expedited procedure.
It appears that at some point during the proceedings before the District Court the mother of [A.H.] and [H.K.]
transferred to the court’s deposit account an amount exceeding the estimated property damage to the club.
By judgment of 25 July 2013 the District Court found [A.H.] and [H.K.]
guilty as charged and sentenced them to two years’ imprisonment.
At the same time, the District Court decided to impose a suspended sentence with two years’ probation.
The judgment stated that the estimated property damage was to be compensated from the amount deposited with the District Court’s account.
The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s judgment of 25 July 2013 arguing against the imposition of a conditional sentence.
She claimed, inter alia, that the sentence imposed on [A.H.] and [H.K.]
was too lenient in comparison to the gravity of the hate crime that they had committed.
On 23 October 2013 the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal.
In doing so, it upheld the District Court’s judgment as regards [A.H.’s] and [H.K.’s] conviction and punishment and decided to exempt them from serving their punishment by virtue of the Amnesty Act adopted by the National Assembly on 3 October 2013.
The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law.
On 25 December 2013 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.
3.
Events following the arson attack On 10 May 2012 the applicant was informed that several young people had gathered in front of the club, acting aggressively and writing homophobic graffiti on the walls, much of which was directed specifically at the applicant, making it clear that she would not be allowed to re-open the club and that a further attack would be organised.
According to the applicant, she called the police, who arrived with considerable delay and did not undertake any measures to investigate the threats made to her.
During the following days, groups of people gathered outside the club seeking to intimidate and harass the applicant and the supporters of the club.
They also destroyed much of what was left in the club, spilling paint over the fixtures.
They had also left homophobic comments with threats on the walls such as “Go to hell Tsomak”, “We will kill you Tsomak” and so on.
On 11 May 2012 two human rights activists gave an interview to an online publication where they discussed the arson attack on the club and in general the attitudes of society towards the LGBT community.
Following the interview, an online group called “No to homosexuality” was created and pictures of the applicant and several LGBT rights activists were posted online.
A stream of insulting and threatening messages was posted against those individuals and members of the LGBT community generally.
On the same date the applicant gave a television interview where she discussed the arson attack and the homophobic attitude towards the LGBT community.
This interview was followed by a significant number of threats and homophobic comments addressed to the applicant.
In an interview given on 15 May 2012 A.M., when asked about the reasons for providing surety for the two men accused of the arson attack on the club, he stated, in particular, the following: “... in this case, I am sure that these young people behaved in the context of our societal and national ideology, in a right way.
...
I consider that her type, I do not want to say a rude word, are destroying Armenian society...” On 17 May 2012 two unidentified men entered the club and began shouting abuse and threatening the applicant.
They smashed some of the furnishings and spat at her.
The applicant was terrified and thought that she was going to be physically harmed.
On the same date the applicant and her friend filed a report with the Chief of Police asking for the identification and prosecution of the persons who had attacked them and for their own security to be ensured.
They submitted, in particular, that the attackers had insulted them and threatened to return, adding that they would blow up the club anyway and that people like them should be annihilated.
By another request to the Chief of Police dated 18 May 2012 the applicant sought protection from regular attacks and harassment for her and the staff members.
She also sought to prevent further damage to the property of the club.
On the same date E.S., the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly made the following statement: “As an Armenian citizen and member of a national-conservative party, I find the rebellion of two young Armenian people against the homosexuals who have created a den of perversion in our country and have a goal of alienating society from its moral values completely right and justified ...” On 21 May 2012 a “Diversity” march took place in Yerevan which was attacked by a group protesting against it.
According to the applicant, she was informed that a group of protesters had threatened to damage the club.
Later that evening the applicant received a call from the owners of a business next to the club, to the effect that around fifty men had entered the club and that they could hear considerable noise from the premises, mainly of objects being smashed.
When the applicant arrived, there was no one left and there was a large poster hanging outside the building with an abusive message.
The fixtures and furniture had been broken and the walls vandalised with threatening messages and swastikas.
The applicant reported the attack to the police, who arrived some time later.
The police officers took a look around the club and left.
According to the applicant, many of her friends were subjected to homophobic abuse and threats online during the days following the “Diversity” march, to the extent that they were afraid to walk around the city and feared for their safety.
The applicant’s sister also received correspondence with threats.
A week after the arson attack the applicant’s sister was asked to resign from her job as a waitress in a restaurant since the management did not want anyone to know that she worked there, because of the potential danger of any potential attacks on the restaurant.
It appears that by decision of 25 May 2012 the police undertook measures of protection in respect of the applicant and her closest relations.
On 23 June 2012 the applicant and her sister left Armenia for Sweden.
She applied for asylum on the basis of persecution due to her sexual orientation.
By the applicant’s account, her decision to leave Armenia was motivated by the constant threats that she was receiving online and from the stress and fear brought about by the people who gathered around the club for weeks after the arson attack.
She was no longer able to earn a living after what had happened to the club.
She was supported by her sister until the latter lost her job.
The applicant currently lives and works in Sweden.
B.
Relevant domestic law 1.
The Constitution of 1995 (with the amendments of 27 November 2005) Article 14.1 “Everyone shall be equal before the law.
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or other personal or social circumstances shall be prohibited.” 2.
The Criminal Code Article 185: Intentional property destruction or damage “1.
Intentional destruction or damaging of a person’s property which has caused significant harm, shall be punishable by a fine from fifty to one hundred times the minimum salary or ... or imprisonment for up to two years.
2.
The same offence which: 1) has been committed by arson, explosion or other publicly dangerous method; ... 3.
Offences envisaged in the first and second parts of this Article which: 1) have caused particularly grave harm; ... Shall be punishable by imprisonment from two to six years.” C. Relevant international material 1.
Council of Europe (a) Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity The relevant excerpts from Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 March 2010 read as follows: “The Committee of Ministers ...
Recommends that member states: ... 2. ensure that legislative and other measures are adopted and effectively implemented to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, to ensure respect for the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons and to promote tolerance towards them; 3. ensure that victims of discrimination are aware of and have access to effective legal remedies before a national authority, and that measures to combat discrimination include, where appropriate, sanctions for infringements and the provision of adequate reparation for victims of discrimination; ...
I.
Right to life, security and protection from violence A.
“Hate crimes” and other hate-motivated incidents 1.
Member states should ensure effective, prompt and impartial investigations into alleged cases of crimes and other incidents, where the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim is reasonably suspected to have constituted a motive for the perpetrator; they should further ensure that particular attention is paid to the investigation of such crimes and incidents when allegedly committed by law enforcement officials or by other persons acting in an official capacity, and that those responsible for such acts are effectively brought to justice and, where appropriate, punished in order to avoid impunity.
2.
Member states should ensure that when determining sanctions, a bias motive related to sexual orientation or gender identity may be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance.
3.
Member states should take appropriate measures to ensure that victims and witnesses of sexual orientation or gender identity related “hate crimes” and other hate-motivated incidents are encouraged to report these crimes and incidents; for this purpose, member states should take all necessary steps to ensure that law enforcement structures, including the judiciary, have the necessary knowledge and skills to identify such crimes and incidents and provide adequate assistance and support to victims and witnesses.
4.
Member states should take appropriate measures to ensure the safety and dignity of all persons in prison or in other ways deprived of their liberty, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, and in particular take protective measures against physical assault, rape and other forms of sexual abuse, whether committed by other inmates or staff; measures should be taken so as to adequately protect and respect the gender identity of transgender persons.
5.
Member states should ensure that relevant data are gathered and analysed on the prevalence and nature of discrimination and intolerance on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, and in particular on “hate crimes” and hate-motivated incidents related to sexual orientation or gender identity.
B.
“Hate speech” 6.
Member states should take appropriate measures to combat all forms of expression, including in the media and on the Internet, which may be reasonably understood as likely to produce the effect of inciting, spreading or promoting hatred or other forms of discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.
Such “hate speech” should be prohibited and publicly disavowed whenever it occurs.
All measures should respect the fundamental right to freedom of expression in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention and the case law of the Court.
7.
Member states should raise awareness among public authorities and public institutions at all levels of their responsibility to refrain from statements, in particular to the media, which may reasonably be understood as legitimising such hatred or discrimination.
8.
Public officials and other state representatives should be encouraged to promote tolerance and respect for the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons whenever they engage in a dialogue with key representatives of the civil society, including media and sports organisations, political organisations and religious communities.” (b) Statement by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance about recent events in Armenia, involving leading political figures openly condoning homophobic violence “Strasbourg, 7.6.2012 - The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe wishes to express concern about recent events in Armenia, involving leading political figures openly condoning homophobic violence.
Setting a club on fire was characterised by a high-ranking State official as a rebellion against homosexuals, which was completely right and justified.
And one of the persons arrested by the police in connection with the attack was bailed out by two members of parliament, who appeared to provide support for the alleged perpetrators in, inter alia, declarations made to the press.
ECRI draws attention to the destructive consequences that such statements - and the various manifestations of hatred they have encouraged - are likely to have for the peaceful and tolerant society it has always tried to foster in Armenia and all other Council of Europe member States.
In ECRI’s view, events of this nature create a dangerous sense of impunity which undermines, in a fundamental manner, overall respect for human rights.
ECRI, therefore, calls on the Armenian authorities to investigate fully the underlying criminal acts with a view to establishing, inter alia, the motives of the alleged perpetrators.
It also calls urgently on all Armenian political parties to distance themselves from such extreme forms of expression, which are clearly incompatible with the values that ECRI has always promoted.” 2.
Amnesty International In its statement of 18 May 2012 Amnesty International made the following comments: “... On 8 May, self-described “fascists” were caught on tape by a security camera as they threw Molotov cocktails through the windows of a gay-friendly bar in downtown Yerevan.
Police reportedly arrived at the scene 12 hours later to investigate the arson attack.
Two young men were arrested as part of the investigation, but were bailed shortly afterwards by two opposition parliamentarians from the nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation - Dashnaktsutyun party (ARF), who condoned the attack, saying it was in line with “the context of societal and national ideology”.
ARF leaders have distanced themselves from the bailout, saying that the parliamentarians acted in their personal capacity, but they have fallen short of publicly calling on their colleagues to apologize for supporting the alleged hate crime.
[E.S.
], spokesperson for Armenia’s ruling Republican Party and Parliament Vice Speaker told Hayots Ashkharh newspaper Thursday that, “As an Armenian citizen and member of [the ruling] national-conservative party, I find the rebellion of the two young Armenian people against the homosexuals ... completely right and justified ...Those human rights defenders, who are trying to earn cheap dividends from this incident, I urge them first and foremost to protect the national and universal values.” Amnesty International believes this type of official discourse is dangerous, fuels discrimination and undermines the role of human rights defenders ...” 3.
The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) on the LGBT community’s problems in Armenia In its report on the situation of the LGBT community in Armenia published in 2009, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) made the following comments: “In principle, LGBT people have the same right to legal protection under the Constitution as all Armenian citizens.
However, in practice LGBT people do not for the most part make use of this protection, as there is no guarantee that their rights will be upheld either in courts or in police stations.
Numerous human rights reports and testimonies given to ILGA-Europe bear witness to the deeply negative, discriminatory attitudes towards homosexuals in law-enforcement bodies.
They show that some LGBT people (mostly gay men and MtF transgender persons) who have been brought to police departments have been subject to torture, arbitrary detention and blackmail.
...
The survey carried out by We For Civil Equality breaks down the types of harassment, violence and human rights abuses directed specifically at lesbian or bisexual women ...: 61% of those surveyed had experienced verbal harassment because of their sexual orientation, 31% were threatened with violence and 1.5% had been assaulted or wounded with a weapon, 37% had personal property damaged or destroyed and 13% had objects thrown at them for this reason.
Further, 70% of these women were spat at, while 24% were punched, hit, kicked or beaten because of their sexual orientation, and 12% testified to being excluded or deliberately ignored.
As regards sexual assault, 12% recorded that this had happened to them, 20% said they had been sexually harassed and 1.5% had been raped.” 4.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee The relevant parts of the Concluding Observations adopted by the Human Rights Committee at its 105th session, 9-27 July 2012, following consideration of the report presented by Armenia under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights read as follows: “6.
The Committee is concerned about the lack of comprehensive legislation on discrimination.
It is also concerned about violence against racial and religious minorities, including by civil servants and high-level representatives of the executive power, and about the failure on the part of the police and judicial authorities to investigate, prosecute and punish hate crimes ...
The State party should ensure that its definition of discrimination covers all forms of discrimination as set out in the Covenant (race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status).
Further, the State party should combat violence and incitement to racial and religious hatred, provide proper protection to minorities, and ensure adequate investigation and prosecution of such cases ... 10.
The Committee is concerned at the discrimination and violence suffered by lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons and rejects all violations of their human rights on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity (arts.
3, 6, 7 and 26).
The State party should state clearly and officially that it does not tolerate any form of social stigmatization of homosexuality, bisexuality or transexuality, or harassment of, or discrimination or violence against persons because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
The State party should prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and provide effective protection to LGBT persons.” COMPLAINTS The applicant complains under Article 3 of the Convention that the relevant domestic authorities failed to protect her from harassment, physical abuse, threats and intimidation because of her sexual orientation and to investigate effectively the arson attack and the subsequent incidents by establishing, in particular, the discriminatory motive of the attackers.
The applicant further complains under the same provision of the State’s failure to ensure a legal framework providing protection for members of the LGBT community from hate crime.
The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the failure of the State to secure legal mechanisms to prosecute the arson attack as a hate crime, and the authorities’ failure to take appropriate and effective measures to protect her from attacks and abuse perpetrated by private individuals motivated by prejudice towards LGBT persons, was in violation of the State’s positive obligations under this provision.
The applicant further complains under Article 13 of the Convention that there had been no effective domestic remedies available to her to seek redress for the violations complained of.
The applicant lastly complains under Article 14 of the Convention that she became the victim of abuse, threats and harassment due to her sexual orientation while the authorities failed to have any regard to that fact.
Judgment
THIRD SECTIONCASE OF ATANASIJE RISTIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 38336/21)
JUDGMENT
Art 5 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4 • Unlawful arrest and detention of the applicant in the absence of an arrest record • Applicant not informed of the reasons for his arrest • Applicant deprived of the possibility of being brought before a court of law to test the lawfulness of his detention • No opportunity to seek judicial review of detention
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
26 August 2025
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Atanasije Ristić v. Serbia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Ioannis Ktistakis, President, Lətif Hüseynov, Darian Pavli, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Diana Kovatcheva, Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, Mateja Đurović, judges,and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 38336/21) against the Republic of Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Serbian national, Mr Atanasije Ristić (“the applicant”), on 30 June 2021;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Serbian Government (“the Government”);
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 27 May and 1 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
INTRODUCTION
1. Relying on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been subjected to a medical intervention against his will and that he had been detained in a hospital in the absence of any authorisation. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1994 and lives in Belgrade. The applicant was represented by Ms S. Radivojević, a lawyer practising in Belgrade. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. On 19 November 2016 at around 10 p.m. two police officers approached three young men, including the applicant, in the street. After the police officers identified themselves, the applicant took a plastic bag out of his pocket, put it into his mouth and started to run, trying to escape and uttering profanities. He hit a dead end, where the police officers caught up with him. According to the police report, the applicant refused to surrender and resisted arrest. The officers had to use force to subdue him. When patrol officers arrived, the applicant gave in and was taken to the police station. 6. At the police station, police officers questioned the applicant. No document authorising his arrest was produced. He was not allowed to contact a lawyer or his family. The applicant admitted that he had swallowed a plastic bag containing drugs. 7. On 20 November 2016 at 12.50 a.m. the applicant was taken to the Clinic for Emergency and Clinical Toxicology associated with the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, where he was placed under twenty-four-hour police surveillance. According to the medical report prepared by the hospital administration, the applicant did not show any signs or symptoms of substance intoxication on arrival. His vital signs remained normal. A urine test confirmed the presence of cocaine. No amphetamine was detected in the applicant’s urine. 8. According to the applicant, during his stay at the hospital, he was constantly shackled with hand- and ankle-cuffs to the bed. He was only allowed to use the bathroom in the presence of police officers. 9. On 22 November 2016 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination. It did not show any presence of free gas or fluid in the abdomen (signs of perforation). On the same day, the applicant was given a laxative. The medical report did not mention the reason for prescribing the laxative, nor did it specify its type or name. The applicant denied that he had been informed that the liquid he had been made to ingest was a laxative or that he had given consent to taking it. At around 3.10 p.m., in the presence of a police officer, the applicant had a bowel movement and excreted a plastic bag containing seven smaller plastic bags with white powder in each of them. Subsequently, it was established that the powder contained amphetamine and caffeine (the total weight was 4.77 grams). The police seized the powder, admitting it into evidence in a criminal case against the applicant on multiple charges, including possession of illegal drugs (see paragraphs 11-12 below). On the same day, at around 4 p.m., the applicant was allowed to contact his lawyer and family. Two of his friends visited him in hospital. 10. On 23 November 2016 at 1 p.m. the police transferred the applicant from the hospital to the police station. At 3.20 p.m. he was released. 11. On 30 November 2016 the prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on multiple charges, including possession of illegal drugs. 12. On 13 June 2018 the applicant entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor’s office and on 22 June 2018 the Belgrade First Basic Court accepted that agreement, found the applicant guilty as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment. 13. On 23 December 2016 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court of Serbia, alleging, inter alia, that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty between 19 and 23 November 2016 and that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment during his confinement at the hospital. In particular, he asserted, without referring to any evidence, that he had been arbitrarily detained at the hospital by the police in the absence of any court order authorising his arrest or detention, that he had remained shackled to the bed for over ninety hours and that a laxative had been administered against his will and then his bowel movements had been monitored. 14. The Constitutional Court found that the actions by the police had been justified by the risk to the applicant’s life resulting from his having swallowed amphetamine in the amount possibly exceeding a lethal dose of 200 mg. The medical practitioners had reacted appropriately to the situation and had provided the necessary medical treatment to eliminate the danger. Once the applicant’s life had been out of danger, he had been released from hospital. The Constitutional Court relied on the police report describing the events of 19 November 2016, medical documentation prepared by the Clinic where the applicant had been hospitalised and the case file in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 15. The Constitutional Court conceded that the applicant’s stay in hospital had amounted to deprivation of liberty. It further acknowledged that there had been no order authorising the applicant’s detention, nor had the applicant been informed of his rights when taken into custody. In the Constitutional Court’s view, those omissions had been justified by the urgency of the situation. Priority had been given to saving the applicant’s life. The actions of the authorities, albeit not fully compliant with the applicable rules, had been legitimate and constitutionally acceptable. No ruling was made as regards the applicant’s allegations that he had remained shackled to the hospital bed for over ninety hours. 16. On 28 December 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated. On 30 December 2020 the applicant received a copy of the relevant decision. THE LAW
17. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to use effective domestic remedies before applying to the Constitutional Court. In their view, the applicant could have submitted a complaint to the Ministry of the Interior to challenge the lawfulness of the police officers’ conduct during his arrest and detention in hospital. Alternatively, he could have brought his grievances to the attention of the Ombudsman, whose office dealt expressly with complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. Furthermore, the applicant could have lodged a criminal complaint against the police officers, which would have prompted a criminal investigation into their conduct. Lastly, it had been open to the applicant to lodge a civil claim for damages against the Ministry of Justice. 18. Referring to the above, the Government submitted that the application should be dismissed by the Court owing to the applicant’s failure to exhaust effective domestic remedies. 19. The applicant pointed out that his complaints had been examined on the merits by the Constitutional Court, which was the highest and last-instance court for the protection of human rights in Serbia. That court’s decision had been final in respect of his complaints and he had not been required to make use of any other avenue for the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 20. The Court observes that, in a number of previous cases against Serbia, it has examined the issues similar to the objection raised in the present case by the Government. It has consistently ruled in that regard that where the Constitutional Court had examined the merits of the applicant’s complaints without dismissing them on account of the applicant’s failure to exhaust the remedies referred to by the Government, the applicant was clearly not required to pursue yet another avenue of potential redress, civil or otherwise, after that (see, among other authorities, Jevtović v. Serbia, no. 29896/14, §§ 66-70, 3 December 2019, and Negovanović and Others v. Serbia, nos. 29907/16 and 3 others, §§ 58-68, 25 January 2022). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to conclude otherwise in the present case. It considers that, having made use of the constitutional appeal procedure, whereby violations could be found and compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court, the applicant was clearly not required to make use of any other remedies referred to by the Government. Their objection that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention must therefore be dismissed. 21. The applicant complained that the treatment he had been subjected to while in custody in hospital had been inhuman and degrading. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Admissibility
22. The Government submitted that the police officers’ decision to take the applicant to hospital and subject him to medical procedures had been justified. Having swallowed amphetamine, the applicant had put himself in a life-threatening situation. The police had had to take measures to protect his life and limb. The officers’ response to the situation had been compatible with the Convention requirements. The Government denied that the applicant had been shackled to the hospital bed for three days. They argued that the applicant had failed to provide any evidence to support his allegations. It was highly unlikely, according to them, that such severe measures of restraint would have left no marks on his arms or legs. Moreover, it had been open to the applicant to ask the authorities to question medical personnel at the hospital to confirm his allegations. However, he had failed to do so. 23. The applicant argued that the treatment he had been subjected to by the police officers while in the hospital had caused him suffering reaching the level of severity falling under Article 3 of the Convention. For the period of more than three days that he had spent in hospital, he had been unable to move freely, as he had been shackled to his hospital bed. A doctor had made him take an unknown substance, without informing him of its nature or the reasons for its administration. The use of a laxative had not been legally or medically justified. The medical examination and associated tests had not shown that there had been any risk to his life. The only purpose of the medical intervention had been to extract evidence from his body in order to open a criminal case against him. In such circumstances, it would have been possible for the police officers to give preference to natural bowel movements rather than subject him to the highly intrusive procedure of administering a laxative. He had had to defecate in the presence of a police officer, which had been particularly humiliating. The police had failed to obtain any authorisation from a court or prosecutor for their actions, nor had they informed any competent authorities thereof. (a) Alleged use of restraints
24. As to the applicant’s complaint that he had been shackled to the hospital bed for three days, the Court reiterates that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Labita v Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 121, ECHR 2000-IV). 25. The Court notes that the applicant was released on 23 November 2016 and lodged his complaint with the Constitutional Court on 23 December 2016. During that period, he was not in a situation that could have reasonably prevented him from obtaining a medical report to substantiate his allegations about the use of restraints. Furthermore, the applicant did not file a criminal complaint in this respect or a civil claim for damages. Nor did he provide any explanation as to why he chose not to proceed so. 26. The Court also notes that the Constitutional Court did not make a ruling as regards the well-foundedness of the applicant’s allegations (see paragraph 15 above). In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicant raised an arguable claim. The Court cannot therefore conclude that the authorities were under an obligation to carry out an official investigation into the matter (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 116, ECHR 2015; Yağci and Özcan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 83646/17, §§ 20-26, 16 October 2018; and Bazjaks v. Latvia, no. 71572/01, § 79, 19 October 2010). 27. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. (b) Medical intervention
28. As to the medical intervention the applicant was subjected to, the Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other numerous authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000-XI). It further reiterates that Article 3 imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX). As a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist and that procedural guarantees for the decision, for example to force-feed, exist and are complied with (see, Bogumil v. Portugal, no. 35228/03, § 69, 7 October 2008, and, mutatis mutandis, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 82, Series A no. 244). Moreover, account has to be taken of whether the person concerned experienced serious physical pain or suffering as a result of the forcible medical intervention, whether the forcible medical procedure was ordered and administered by medical doctors and whether the person concerned was placed under constant medical supervision and, lastly, whether the forcible medical intervention resulted in any aggravation of his or her state of health or had lasting consequences for his or her health (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, §§ 72-74, ECHR 2006-IX, with further references, and Bogumil, cited above, § 70). 29. Having examined the relevant facts, the Court considers that once the applicant had admitted to having swallowed amphetamine, the police officers were under an obligation to take measures to prevent any risk to his health resulting from his actions. The Court accepts that the police officers’ decision to take the applicant to a hospital, where, as indicated in the medical report, he was examined and subjected to a medical intervention, was compatible with the requirements set out in Article 3 of the Convention. The Court takes into account the fact that the impugned measure was administered by medical practitioners – and not the police – in a specialised institution, after a comprehensive medical examination and a two days’ wait for the drugs to pass through the applicant’s body naturally. The Court also refers to the findings of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 14 above) that the amount of the drugs swallowed voluntarily by the applicant might have exceeded a lethal dose posing a serious risk to his health. Furthermore, the intervention was of a short duration and did not cause any bodily injury or deterioration of the applicant’s state of health. Nor does the Court discern any evidence that the treatment caused intense physical or mental suffering. No force was used to make the applicant ingest the medication. After the intervention, the applicant remained in medical care for another day. He was released from the hospital and transferred to a police station once there was no longer a risk to his health. Lastly, the Court does not lose sight that the amphetamines were later admitted as evidence in the criminal case against the applicant. 30. Taking the above considerations into account, the Court cannot but find that the measures applied in this case do not reach the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 31. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 32. The applicant complained that his detention in hospital for ninety hours had been unlawful and arbitrary, in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention. He also referred to Article 13 of the Convention. 33. The Court, being master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will consider these complaints under Article 5 of the Convention (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). Article 5 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. ...”
34. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. 35. The applicant submitted that, following his arrest on 19 November 2016, he had been detained by the police until 23 November 2016 in the absence of any court order. As a result, he had been unable to obtain a review of the lawfulness of his detention. He also denied having been informed of the reasons for his arrest or his rights as a detainee. Nor had he been brought before a judge. He had been denied contact with his lawyer and family members until the police officers had been able to obtain the evidence in the criminal case against him. 36. The Government acknowledged, similarly to the Constitutional Court, that at no time had a court order authorising the applicant’s detention been issued. They further reiterated the Constitutional Court’s reasoning that the police officers had had to do everything possible to save the applicant’s life, which had been in danger after he had swallowed a plastic bag containing amphetamine. The urgency of the situation had obliged the police to prioritise saving the applicant’s life. Even though their actions had not strictly followed the letter of the law, they had been legitimate and constitutionally acceptable. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the medical practitioners at the hospital had notified the applicant’s family of his situation. The Government discerned no violation of the applicant’s rights set out in Article 5 of the Convention. 37. The Court reiterates that any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1, be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of that law (see Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, § 125, 1 June 2021). 38. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, § 37, Series A no. 33; Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, §§ 72‐73, ECHR 2000‐III; and S., V. and A. v. Denmark [GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, § 74, 22 October 2018). Detention will be “arbitrary” where, despite complying with the letter of national law, there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities (see, for example, Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986, § 59, Series A no. 111, and Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, §§ 77-79, 9 July 2009) or where the domestic authorities neglected to attempt to apply the relevant legislation correctly (see Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 47, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II; Liu v. Russia, no. 42086/05, § 82, 6 December 2007; and Marturana v. Italy, no. 63154/00, § 80, 4 March 2008). 39. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes, and the Government did not argue otherwise, that no record was drawn up of the applicant’s arrest and ensuing detention from 19 to 23 November 2016. 40. In this connection, the Court observes that the absence of an arrest record must in itself be considered a most serious failing, as it has been the Court’s consistent view that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and discloses a most grave violation of that provision. The absence of a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, §§ 87 and 89, ECHR 2006-III; Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, §§ 78 and 79, 25 October 2005; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 125, Reports 1998-III). The Court cannot subscribe to the Government’s argument that the urgency of the situation prevented the police from properly recording the applicant’s arrest and detention and concludes that his deprivation of liberty did not comply with the guarantees of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 41. In terms of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that this provision contains the elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty and is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article 5 (see, for example, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 115, 15 December 2016). Where a person has been informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention, he may, if he sees fit, apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of his detention (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, § 40, Series A no. 182, and Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, § 50, ECHR 2002-I). Any person who is entitled to take proceedings to have the lawfulness of his detention decided speedily cannot make effective use of that right unless he is promptly and adequately informed of the reasons why he has been deprived of his liberty (see Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1990, § 28, Series A no. 170-A; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 413, ECHR 2005-III; and Grubnyk v. Ukraine, no. 58444/15, §§ 97 and 99, 17 September 2020). Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was indeed not informed of the reasons for his arrest in disregard of the requirements of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention. 42. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention furthermore provides persons arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence with a guarantee against any arbitrary or unjustified deprivation of liberty (see Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 25642/94, § 47, ECHR 1999-III, and Stephens v. Malta (no. 2), no. 33740/06, § 52, 21 April 2009). Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the individual’s right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee embodied in Article 5 § 3 (see Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1988, § 58, Series A no. 145-B; Pantea v. Romania, no. 33343/96, § 236, ECHR 2003-VI (extracts); and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 146, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII). As regards the present case, the applicant was clearly deprived of the possibility of being brought before a court of law to test the lawfulness of his detention. 43. Lastly, the Court recalls that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provides that arrested or detained persons are entitled to a review by a court of law bearing upon the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of their deprivation of liberty (see, for example, Oravec v. Croatia, no. 51249/11, § 64, 11 July 2017, with further references). Where there is no judicial remedy at all available to individuals to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, examination of a complaint under Article 5 § 4 has been considered warranted, regardless of the length of the detention in question (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Moustahi v. France, no. 9347/14, §§ 103 and 104, 25 June 2020). With this in mind and in the context of the present case, where the applicant was given no opportunity to seek judicial review of his detention, the Court is of the opinion that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is not only applicable but also that its requirements have not been respected (ibid.). 44. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of the applicant’s rights secured under Article 5 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention. 45. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
46. The applicant claimed 6,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 47. The Government submitted that no award should be made to the applicant, discerning no violation of his rights under the Convention. 48. The Court observes that it has found serious violations of the Convention in the present case and awards the applicant the amount claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 49. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,480 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court. In particular, he sought the reimbursement of postal expenses in the amount of EUR 200. He also claimed the reimbursement of the legal costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court of Serbia in the amount of EUR 760 and in the proceedings before the Court in the amount of EUR 1,520. 50. The Government suggested that the claim be dismissed. 51. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to their quantum. That is, the applicant must have paid them or be bound to pay them pursuant to a legal or contractual obligation, and they must have been unavoidable in order to prevent the violation found or to obtain redress (see, among other authorities, Đurić v. Serbia, no. 24989/17, § 95, 6 February 2024, with further references). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the applicant’s claim in respect of the postal costs and expenses claimed and considers it reasonable to award to the applicant EUR 1,726 for the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
(ii) EUR 1,726 (one thousand seven hundred and twenty-six euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 August 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Milan Blaško Ioannis Ktistakis Registrar President
THIRD SECTION
CASE OF ATANASIJE RISTIĆ v. SERBIA
(Application no. 38336/21)
JUDGMENT
Art 5 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4 • Unlawful arrest and detention of the applicant in the absence of an arrest record • Applicant not informed of the reasons for his arrest • Applicant deprived of the possibility of being brought before a court of law to test the lawfulness of his detention • No opportunity to seek judicial review of detention
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. STRASBOURG
26 August 2025
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. Art 5 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4 • Unlawful arrest and detention of the applicant in the absence of an arrest record • Applicant not informed of the reasons for his arrest • Applicant deprived of the possibility of being brought before a court of law to test the lawfulness of his detention • No opportunity to seek judicial review of detention
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court. In the case of Atanasije Ristić v. Serbia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Ioannis Ktistakis, President, Lətif Hüseynov, Darian Pavli, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Diana Kovatcheva, Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, Mateja Đurović, judges,and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 38336/21) against the Republic of Serbia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Serbian national, Mr Atanasije Ristić (“the applicant”), on 30 June 2021;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Serbian Government (“the Government”);
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on 27 May and 1 July 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
INTRODUCTION
1. Relying on Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been subjected to a medical intervention against his will and that he had been detained in a hospital in the absence of any authorisation. THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1994 and lives in Belgrade. The applicant was represented by Ms S. Radivojević, a lawyer practising in Belgrade. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Ms Z. Jadrijević Mladar. 4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5. On 19 November 2016 at around 10 p.m. two police officers approached three young men, including the applicant, in the street. After the police officers identified themselves, the applicant took a plastic bag out of his pocket, put it into his mouth and started to run, trying to escape and uttering profanities. He hit a dead end, where the police officers caught up with him. According to the police report, the applicant refused to surrender and resisted arrest. The officers had to use force to subdue him. When patrol officers arrived, the applicant gave in and was taken to the police station. 6. At the police station, police officers questioned the applicant. No document authorising his arrest was produced. He was not allowed to contact a lawyer or his family. The applicant admitted that he had swallowed a plastic bag containing drugs. 7. On 20 November 2016 at 12.50 a.m. the applicant was taken to the Clinic for Emergency and Clinical Toxicology associated with the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, where he was placed under twenty-four-hour police surveillance. According to the medical report prepared by the hospital administration, the applicant did not show any signs or symptoms of substance intoxication on arrival. His vital signs remained normal. A urine test confirmed the presence of cocaine. No amphetamine was detected in the applicant’s urine. 8. According to the applicant, during his stay at the hospital, he was constantly shackled with hand- and ankle-cuffs to the bed. He was only allowed to use the bathroom in the presence of police officers. 9. On 22 November 2016 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination. It did not show any presence of free gas or fluid in the abdomen (signs of perforation). On the same day, the applicant was given a laxative. The medical report did not mention the reason for prescribing the laxative, nor did it specify its type or name. The applicant denied that he had been informed that the liquid he had been made to ingest was a laxative or that he had given consent to taking it. At around 3.10 p.m., in the presence of a police officer, the applicant had a bowel movement and excreted a plastic bag containing seven smaller plastic bags with white powder in each of them. Subsequently, it was established that the powder contained amphetamine and caffeine (the total weight was 4.77 grams). The police seized the powder, admitting it into evidence in a criminal case against the applicant on multiple charges, including possession of illegal drugs (see paragraphs 11-12 below). On the same day, at around 4 p.m., the applicant was allowed to contact his lawyer and family. Two of his friends visited him in hospital. 10. On 23 November 2016 at 1 p.m. the police transferred the applicant from the hospital to the police station. At 3.20 p.m. he was released. 11. On 30 November 2016 the prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on multiple charges, including possession of illegal drugs. 12. On 13 June 2018 the applicant entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor’s office and on 22 June 2018 the Belgrade First Basic Court accepted that agreement, found the applicant guilty as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment. 13. On 23 December 2016 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court of Serbia, alleging, inter alia, that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty between 19 and 23 November 2016 and that he had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment during his confinement at the hospital. In particular, he asserted, without referring to any evidence, that he had been arbitrarily detained at the hospital by the police in the absence of any court order authorising his arrest or detention, that he had remained shackled to the bed for over ninety hours and that a laxative had been administered against his will and then his bowel movements had been monitored. 14. The Constitutional Court found that the actions by the police had been justified by the risk to the applicant’s life resulting from his having swallowed amphetamine in the amount possibly exceeding a lethal dose of 200 mg. The medical practitioners had reacted appropriately to the situation and had provided the necessary medical treatment to eliminate the danger. Once the applicant’s life had been out of danger, he had been released from hospital. The Constitutional Court relied on the police report describing the events of 19 November 2016, medical documentation prepared by the Clinic where the applicant had been hospitalised and the case file in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 15. The Constitutional Court conceded that the applicant’s stay in hospital had amounted to deprivation of liberty. It further acknowledged that there had been no order authorising the applicant’s detention, nor had the applicant been informed of his rights when taken into custody. In the Constitutional Court’s view, those omissions had been justified by the urgency of the situation. Priority had been given to saving the applicant’s life. The actions of the authorities, albeit not fully compliant with the applicable rules, had been legitimate and constitutionally acceptable. No ruling was made as regards the applicant’s allegations that he had remained shackled to the hospital bed for over ninety hours. 16. On 28 December 2020 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated. On 30 December 2020 the applicant received a copy of the relevant decision. THE LAW
17. The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to use effective domestic remedies before applying to the Constitutional Court. In their view, the applicant could have submitted a complaint to the Ministry of the Interior to challenge the lawfulness of the police officers’ conduct during his arrest and detention in hospital. Alternatively, he could have brought his grievances to the attention of the Ombudsman, whose office dealt expressly with complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. Furthermore, the applicant could have lodged a criminal complaint against the police officers, which would have prompted a criminal investigation into their conduct. Lastly, it had been open to the applicant to lodge a civil claim for damages against the Ministry of Justice. 18. Referring to the above, the Government submitted that the application should be dismissed by the Court owing to the applicant’s failure to exhaust effective domestic remedies. 19. The applicant pointed out that his complaints had been examined on the merits by the Constitutional Court, which was the highest and last-instance court for the protection of human rights in Serbia. That court’s decision had been final in respect of his complaints and he had not been required to make use of any other avenue for the exhaustion of domestic remedies. 20. The Court observes that, in a number of previous cases against Serbia, it has examined the issues similar to the objection raised in the present case by the Government. It has consistently ruled in that regard that where the Constitutional Court had examined the merits of the applicant’s complaints without dismissing them on account of the applicant’s failure to exhaust the remedies referred to by the Government, the applicant was clearly not required to pursue yet another avenue of potential redress, civil or otherwise, after that (see, among other authorities, Jevtović v. Serbia, no. 29896/14, §§ 66-70, 3 December 2019, and Negovanović and Others v. Serbia, nos. 29907/16 and 3 others, §§ 58-68, 25 January 2022). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to conclude otherwise in the present case. It considers that, having made use of the constitutional appeal procedure, whereby violations could be found and compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court, the applicant was clearly not required to make use of any other remedies referred to by the Government. Their objection that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention must therefore be dismissed. 21. The applicant complained that the treatment he had been subjected to while in custody in hospital had been inhuman and degrading. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Admissibility
22. The Government submitted that the police officers’ decision to take the applicant to hospital and subject him to medical procedures had been justified. Having swallowed amphetamine, the applicant had put himself in a life-threatening situation. The police had had to take measures to protect his life and limb. The officers’ response to the situation had been compatible with the Convention requirements. The Government denied that the applicant had been shackled to the hospital bed for three days. They argued that the applicant had failed to provide any evidence to support his allegations. It was highly unlikely, according to them, that such severe measures of restraint would have left no marks on his arms or legs. Moreover, it had been open to the applicant to ask the authorities to question medical personnel at the hospital to confirm his allegations. However, he had failed to do so. 23. The applicant argued that the treatment he had been subjected to by the police officers while in the hospital had caused him suffering reaching the level of severity falling under Article 3 of the Convention. For the period of more than three days that he had spent in hospital, he had been unable to move freely, as he had been shackled to his hospital bed. A doctor had made him take an unknown substance, without informing him of its nature or the reasons for its administration. The use of a laxative had not been legally or medically justified. The medical examination and associated tests had not shown that there had been any risk to his life. The only purpose of the medical intervention had been to extract evidence from his body in order to open a criminal case against him. In such circumstances, it would have been possible for the police officers to give preference to natural bowel movements rather than subject him to the highly intrusive procedure of administering a laxative. He had had to defecate in the presence of a police officer, which had been particularly humiliating. The police had failed to obtain any authorisation from a court or prosecutor for their actions, nor had they informed any competent authorities thereof. (a) Alleged use of restraints
24. As to the applicant’s complaint that he had been shackled to the hospital bed for three days, the Court reiterates that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Labita v Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 121, ECHR 2000-IV). 25. The Court notes that the applicant was released on 23 November 2016 and lodged his complaint with the Constitutional Court on 23 December 2016. During that period, he was not in a situation that could have reasonably prevented him from obtaining a medical report to substantiate his allegations about the use of restraints. Furthermore, the applicant did not file a criminal complaint in this respect or a civil claim for damages. Nor did he provide any explanation as to why he chose not to proceed so. 26. The Court also notes that the Constitutional Court did not make a ruling as regards the well-foundedness of the applicant’s allegations (see paragraph 15 above). In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the applicant raised an arguable claim. The Court cannot therefore conclude that the authorities were under an obligation to carry out an official investigation into the matter (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09, § 116, ECHR 2015; Yağci and Özcan v. Turkey (dec.), no. 83646/17, §§ 20-26, 16 October 2018; and Bazjaks v. Latvia, no. 71572/01, § 79, 19 October 2010). 27. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. (b) Medical intervention
28. As to the medical intervention the applicant was subjected to, the Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other numerous authorities, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000-XI). It further reiterates that Article 3 imposes an obligation on the State to protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Mouisel v. France, no. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX). As a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading. The Court must nevertheless satisfy itself that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist and that procedural guarantees for the decision, for example to force-feed, exist and are complied with (see, Bogumil v. Portugal, no. 35228/03, § 69, 7 October 2008, and, mutatis mutandis, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, § 82, Series A no. 244). Moreover, account has to be taken of whether the person concerned experienced serious physical pain or suffering as a result of the forcible medical intervention, whether the forcible medical procedure was ordered and administered by medical doctors and whether the person concerned was placed under constant medical supervision and, lastly, whether the forcible medical intervention resulted in any aggravation of his or her state of health or had lasting consequences for his or her health (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810/00, §§ 72-74, ECHR 2006-IX, with further references, and Bogumil, cited above, § 70). 29. Having examined the relevant facts, the Court considers that once the applicant had admitted to having swallowed amphetamine, the police officers were under an obligation to take measures to prevent any risk to his health resulting from his actions. The Court accepts that the police officers’ decision to take the applicant to a hospital, where, as indicated in the medical report, he was examined and subjected to a medical intervention, was compatible with the requirements set out in Article 3 of the Convention. The Court takes into account the fact that the impugned measure was administered by medical practitioners – and not the police – in a specialised institution, after a comprehensive medical examination and a two days’ wait for the drugs to pass through the applicant’s body naturally. The Court also refers to the findings of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 14 above) that the amount of the drugs swallowed voluntarily by the applicant might have exceeded a lethal dose posing a serious risk to his health. Furthermore, the intervention was of a short duration and did not cause any bodily injury or deterioration of the applicant’s state of health. Nor does the Court discern any evidence that the treatment caused intense physical or mental suffering. No force was used to make the applicant ingest the medication. After the intervention, the applicant remained in medical care for another day. He was released from the hospital and transferred to a police station once there was no longer a risk to his health. Lastly, the Court does not lose sight that the amphetamines were later admitted as evidence in the criminal case against the applicant. 30. Taking the above considerations into account, the Court cannot but find that the measures applied in this case do not reach the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. 31. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 32. The applicant complained that his detention in hospital for ninety hours had been unlawful and arbitrary, in contravention of Article 5 of the Convention. He also referred to Article 13 of the Convention. 33. The Court, being master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will consider these complaints under Article 5 of the Convention (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 126, 20 March 2018). Article 5 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. ...”
34. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. 35. The applicant submitted that, following his arrest on 19 November 2016, he had been detained by the police until 23 November 2016 in the absence of any court order. As a result, he had been unable to obtain a review of the lawfulness of his detention. He also denied having been informed of the reasons for his arrest or his rights as a detainee. Nor had he been brought before a judge. He had been denied contact with his lawyer and family members until the police officers had been able to obtain the evidence in the criminal case against him. 36. The Government acknowledged, similarly to the Constitutional Court, that at no time had a court order authorising the applicant’s detention been issued. They further reiterated the Constitutional Court’s reasoning that the police officers had had to do everything possible to save the applicant’s life, which had been in danger after he had swallowed a plastic bag containing amphetamine. The urgency of the situation had obliged the police to prioritise saving the applicant’s life. Even though their actions had not strictly followed the letter of the law, they had been legitimate and constitutionally acceptable. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the medical practitioners at the hospital had notified the applicant’s family of his situation. The Government discerned no violation of the applicant’s rights set out in Article 5 of the Convention. 37. The Court reiterates that any deprivation of liberty must, in addition to falling within one of the exceptions set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1, be “lawful”. Where the “lawfulness” of detention is in issue, including the question whether “a procedure prescribed by law” has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of that law (see Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, § 125, 1 June 2021). 38. Compliance with national law is not, however, sufficient: Article 5 § 1 requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, § 37, Series A no. 33; Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629/95, §§ 72‐73, ECHR 2000‐III; and S., V. and A. v. Denmark [GC], nos. 35553/12 and 2 others, § 74, 22 October 2018). Detention will be “arbitrary” where, despite complying with the letter of national law, there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities (see, for example, Bozano v. France, 18 December 1986, § 59, Series A no. 111, and Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, §§ 77-79, 9 July 2009) or where the domestic authorities neglected to attempt to apply the relevant legislation correctly (see Benham v. the United Kingdom, 10 June 1996, § 47, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II; Liu v. Russia, no. 42086/05, § 82, 6 December 2007; and Marturana v. Italy, no. 63154/00, § 80, 4 March 2008). 39. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes, and the Government did not argue otherwise, that no record was drawn up of the applicant’s arrest and ensuing detention from 19 to 23 November 2016. 40. In this connection, the Court observes that the absence of an arrest record must in itself be considered a most serious failing, as it has been the Court’s consistent view that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and discloses a most grave violation of that provision. The absence of a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see Menesheva v. Russia, no. 59261/00, §§ 87 and 89, ECHR 2006-III; Fedotov v. Russia, no. 5140/02, §§ 78 and 79, 25 October 2005; and Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 125, Reports 1998-III). The Court cannot subscribe to the Government’s argument that the urgency of the situation prevented the police from properly recording the applicant’s arrest and detention and concludes that his deprivation of liberty did not comply with the guarantees of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 41. In terms of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention, the Court reiterates that this provision contains the elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty and is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article 5 (see, for example, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483/12, § 115, 15 December 2016). Where a person has been informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention, he may, if he sees fit, apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of his detention (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, § 40, Series A no. 182, and Čonka v. Belgium, no. 51564/99, § 50, ECHR 2002-I). Any person who is entitled to take proceedings to have the lawfulness of his detention decided speedily cannot make effective use of that right unless he is promptly and adequately informed of the reasons why he has been deprived of his liberty (see Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1990, § 28, Series A no. 170-A; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378/02, § 413, ECHR 2005-III; and Grubnyk v. Ukraine, no. 58444/15, §§ 97 and 99, 17 September 2020). Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was indeed not informed of the reasons for his arrest in disregard of the requirements of Article 5 § 2 of the Convention. 42. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention furthermore provides persons arrested or detained on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence with a guarantee against any arbitrary or unjustified deprivation of liberty (see Aquilina v. Malta [GC], no. 25642/94, § 47, ECHR 1999-III, and Stephens v. Malta (no. 2), no. 33740/06, § 52, 21 April 2009). Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the individual’s right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee embodied in Article 5 § 3 (see Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1988, § 58, Series A no. 145-B; Pantea v. Romania, no. 33343/96, § 236, ECHR 2003-VI (extracts); and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 146, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII). As regards the present case, the applicant was clearly deprived of the possibility of being brought before a court of law to test the lawfulness of his detention. 43. Lastly, the Court recalls that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention provides that arrested or detained persons are entitled to a review by a court of law bearing upon the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of the Convention, of their deprivation of liberty (see, for example, Oravec v. Croatia, no. 51249/11, § 64, 11 July 2017, with further references). Where there is no judicial remedy at all available to individuals to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, examination of a complaint under Article 5 § 4 has been considered warranted, regardless of the length of the detention in question (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Moustahi v. France, no. 9347/14, §§ 103 and 104, 25 June 2020). With this in mind and in the context of the present case, where the applicant was given no opportunity to seek judicial review of his detention, the Court is of the opinion that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is not only applicable but also that its requirements have not been respected (ibid.). 44. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of the applicant’s rights secured under Article 5 §§ 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention. 45. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
46. The applicant claimed 6,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 47. The Government submitted that no award should be made to the applicant, discerning no violation of his rights under the Convention. 48. The Court observes that it has found serious violations of the Convention in the present case and awards the applicant the amount claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 49. The applicant also claimed EUR 2,480 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court. In particular, he sought the reimbursement of postal expenses in the amount of EUR 200. He also claimed the reimbursement of the legal costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court of Serbia in the amount of EUR 760 and in the proceedings before the Court in the amount of EUR 1,520. 50. The Government suggested that the claim be dismissed. 51. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and were also reasonable as to their quantum. That is, the applicant must have paid them or be bound to pay them pursuant to a legal or contractual obligation, and they must have been unavoidable in order to prevent the violation found or to obtain redress (see, among other authorities, Đurić v. Serbia, no. 24989/17, § 95, 6 February 2024, with further references). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the applicant’s claim in respect of the postal costs and expenses claimed and considers it reasonable to award to the applicant EUR 1,726 for the proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 6,000 (six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage,
(ii) EUR 1,726 (one thousand seven hundred and twenty-six euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
Done in English, and notified in writing on 26 August 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Milan Blaško Ioannis Ktistakis Registrar President
