I incorrectly predicted that there's no violation of human rights in BACZÚR v. HUNGARY.
Information
- Judgment date: 2017-03-07
- Communication date: 2015-04-21
- Application number(s): 8263/15
- Country: HUN
- Relevant ECHR article(s): 8, 8-1, 13, P1-1
- Conclusion:
Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 - Peaceful enjoyment of possessions) - Result: Violation SEE FINAL JUDGMENT
JURI Prediction
- Probability: 0.712321
- Prediction: No violation
Inconsistent
Legend
Communication text used for prediction
The applicant, Mr István Baczúr, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1958 and lives in Nagykozár.
He is represented before the Court by Mr D.Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
A.
The circumstances of the case The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant had worked as a tax inspector at the National Tax and Financial Control Administration until 1996 when he applied for disability retirement.
As it appears from the case-file, the medical expert commissioned at the time of his retirement had declared the applicant eligible for rehabilitation; thus he received a rehabilitation benefit until June 2012, the amount of which was eventually 173,980 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 570 euros (EUR)) per month.
On 29 December 2011 Act no.
CXCI of 2011 on the Benefits Granted to Persons with Reduced Work Capacity was enacted, effective as of 1 January 2012, which introduced a new system of allowances.
Beneficiaries were sent a letter and invited to apply, by 31 March 2012, for a reassessment of their condition by expert committees.
Once they had applied for this within the time-limit, they became entitled to a transitional allowance (the amount of which did not differ from that of the previously received allowance or pension) until the reassessment took place.
In the reassessment procedure, a disability allowance or a rehabilitation allowance could be granted, depending on the person’s real and actual condition.
On 28 March 2012 the applicant lodged a request for the new disability allowance.
His medical examination took place on 8 May 2012 before the expert committee of the National Rehabilitation and Social Authority.
The applicant’s state of health was rated at 46% and he was classified as a person suitable for rehabilitation under section 3 (2) point a) of Act no.
CXCI of 2011.
Since he did not have at least 180 calendar days with income during the calendar year preceding the first day of the payment, or 180 calendar days with income in the period directly preceding the first day of payment, the applicant’s rehabilitation allowance was calculated on the basis of the minimum wage (at the material time HUF 93,000, approximately EUR 310 per month) and established at 50% of the minimum wage, that is, in the amount of HUF 41,850 (approximately EUR 140) by a decision of the Baranya County Governmental Authority (Directorate of Pension Insurance) on 5 June 2012.
The applicant appealed against the first-instance administrative decision.
According to a further medical assessment, the applicant’s health status was at 46% and he was suitable for rehabilitation based on his state of health.
However, due to other circumstances, his rehabilitation was not recommended (section 3 (2) point ba) of Act no.
CXCI of 2011).
Consequently, the National Rehabilitation and Social Authority, acting as a second-instance authority, reversed the first-instance decision and established that the applicant was entitled to a disability allowance in the amount of HUF 55,800 (approximately EUR 180) per month.
Again, since the applicant did not have the requisite days with income in the qualifying periods, his allowance was based on the minimum wage and established at 60% of that.
The applicant sought judicial review of the decision, challenging the findings contained in the medical expert opinions concerning his health status and the calculation method of his entitlement.
According to a private medical expert commissioned by the applicant himself, his health status was at 37%, rather than 46%.
In its judgment of 4 April 2013 the Pécs Administrative and Labour Court upheld the second-instance administrative decision.
Relying on the second statutory medical expert opinion, the court endorsed the second‐instance administrative authority’s findings as to the applicant’s health status.
It added that, for the calculation of the amount of disability allowance, it was, in any case, irrelevant whether the health status was rated at 37 or 46%.
It held that the administrative authorities’ calculation of the amount was right.
The applicant did not lodge a petition for review with the Kúria.
B.
Relevant domestic law The relevant provisions of Act no.
LXXXIV of 2007 on Rehabilitation Benefit, in so far as relevant, provide as follows: Section 3 “(1) Rehabilitation benefit is due to a person who a) has suffered 50 to 79% loss of his health status and, in connection with that, he cannot be employed without rehabilitation at his current workplace or at the workplace where he has worked before the deterioration of his health or at any other workplace, and aa) does not work regularly and ab) his salary or income is 30% less than the amount he has earned as an average monthly salary during the fourth months preceding the deterioration of his health and b) is suitable for rehabilitation and c) has accumulated the necessary service time [a function of the age, as outlined in the law].” Amount of the rehabilitation benefitSection 4 “(1) The amount of the rehabilitation benefit shall be 120% of the disability pension (category III).” Act no.
CXCI of 2011 on the Benefits Granted to Persons with Reduced Work Capacity, in so far as relevant, provides as follows: 1.
General regulationsSection 1 “(2) 3.2 Average monthly wage: 30 times the daily average of the income constituting the basis for health insurance contributions (hereinafter referred to as “income”) generated in the calendar year preceding the first day of the payment (hereinafter referred to as “reference period”); if the person concerned does not have income acquired during 180 days within the reference period, the average monthly wage shall be 30 times the average daily income generated during the 180 calendar days preceding the first day of payment; if the person concerned does not have income acquired during 180 days within the reference period or within the 180 calendar days preceding the first day of payment, nor does he have any income whatsoever, the average monthly salary shall be the minimum wage.” 2.
Allowances for Persons with Reduced Work CapacitySection 2 “(1) A person whose health status has been found to be of 60% or less in the rehabilitation authority’s complex reassessment (henceforth: persons with reduced work capacity) and who: a) has been covered for a minimum 1,095 days by the social security under section 5 of [the Social Security Act] in the five years preceding the submission of the request, and b) is not been engaged in any money-earning activities and c) is not receiving any regular cash allowance shall be eligible for allowances granted to persons with reduced work capacity.
(2) By derogation from subsection (1) (a), persons a) who became covered by the social security within 180 days from the termination of their schooling and whose social security cover was not interrupted for any period exceeding 30 days before the submission of their request, or b) who received on 31 December 2011 disability pension, accident disability pension, rehabilitation benefit or social allowance for persons with health impairment shall be eligible for the benefits granted to persons with reduced work capacity irrespective of the duration of the period covered with social security.
(3) The 1,095-day-long insurance period shall include: a) periods of sick pay, accident sick pay, pregnancy and confinement benefit, child care benefit and jobseeker benefit; b) the period of disability pension, accident disability pension, rehabilitation benefit, social allowance for persons with health impairment; c) the service time accumulated under an agreement concluded under section 34 of [the Social Security Act] with a view to accumulating service time and income that generate pension entitlement; provided that the agreement was concluded by 31 December 2011.” Section 3 “(1) Subject to the rehabilitation authority’s rehabilitation proposal made in the framework of the complex reassessment, the allowance to be granted for a person with reduced work capacity shall be either: a) rehabilitation allowance, or b) disability allowance (2) Within the framework of the complex reassessment procedure, the rehabilitation authority verifies whether a) the person with reduced work capacity can be rehabilitated, more specifically aa) his employability can be restored, or ab) he is in constant need of employment rehabilitation; b) the rehabilitation of the person with reduced work capacity is not recommended, more specifically ba) that his employability can be restored through rehabilitation based on his state of health; however, due to other circumstances defined within the scope of the decree on the professional rules for complex rating, his rehabilitation is not recommended; bc) he can only be employed if constantly assisted, or bd) his health impairment is significant and he is either dependent or independent with assistance.” Section 4 “Any disabled person that can be rehabilitated shall be eligible for rehabilitation allowance.” Section 5 “(1) Any person with reduced work capacity whose rehabilitation is not recommended shall be eligible for disability allowance.
(2) A person with reduced work capacity shall also be eligible for disability allowance if a) his employability can be restored through rehabilitation, or b) he is in constant need of employment rehabilitation and the period remaining for reaching the old age pension age threshold does not exceed 5 years when the application was submitted or on the date of review.” 4.
Disability allowanceSection 12 “(1) The rate of the disability allowance shall be equivalent to a) 40% of the average monthly wage or minimum 30% and maximum 45% of the minimum wage in the case defined in section 3 (2) point b) sub-point ba) and section 5 (2) point a); b) 60% of the average monthly wage or minimum 45% and maximum 150% of the minimum wage in the case defined in section 3 (2) point b) sub-pint bb) and section 5 (2) point b); c) 65% of the average monthly wage or minimum 50% and maximum 150% of the minimum wage in the case defined in section 3 (2) point b) subpoint bc); d) 70% of the average monthly wage or minimum 55% and maximum 150% of the minimum wage in the case defined in section 3 (2) point b) sub-point bd).
“ Following an amendment which entered into force as of 1 January 2014, sub-sections (5) and (6) have been added to section 34 of Act no.
CXCI of 2011 concerning persons who previously received rehabilitation benefits, providing as follows: “(5) If a person who received rehabilitation benefit until 31 December 2011 receives an allowance for persons with reduced work capacity as of 1 January 2014, the basis of the calculation of his allowance shall be 140% of the amount of the rehabilitation allowance he received in the preceding month.
(6) If a person who received rehabilitation benefit until 31 December 2011 receives an allowance for persons with reduced work capacity prior to 1 January 2014, the rehabilitation authority shall ex officio amend until 31 May 2014 the amount of the allowance in accordance with sub-section (5) with effect from 1 January 2014.” Act no.
III of 1952 on the Civil Procedure Code, in so far as relevant, provides, as follows: Section 270 “(2) A petition for the review of a final judgment or a final ruling adopted on the merits of the case may be submitted to the Kúria – alleging a breach of law – by a party, the intervener, or by any person to whom any provision of the decision may be of concern, against the relevant part.” COMPLAINT The applicant complains about the significant decrease of the amount which he receives on account of his reduced work capacity.
He invokes Article 1 of Protocol No.
1, Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention.
Judgment
FOURTH SECTIONCASE OF BACZÚR v. HUNGARY
(Application no. 8263/15)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
7 March 2017
FINAL
07/06/2017
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Baczúr v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Vincent A. De Gaetano, President,András Sajó,Nona Tsotsoria,Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,Krzysztof Wojtyczek,Egidijus Kūris,Iulia Motoc, judges,
and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 31 January 2017,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 8263/15) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr István Baczúr (“the applicant”), on 12 March 2013. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr D. Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Justice. 3. The applicant complained, in particular, of a significant decrease in the benefit he had received on account of his reduced capacity to work. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as well as on Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. 4. On 21 April 2015 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Nagykozár. 6. The applicant had been working as a tax inspector. In 1996 he applied for early retirement on account of disability. As of 1 April 1996, he was declared to have lost 67% of his capacity to work and was granted a disability pension of 114,880 Hungarian forints (HUF) per month (approximately 370 euros (EUR) at the rate of January 2017). That disability assessment was maintained in 1999, 2003 and 2006. 7. The relevant assessment methodology changed as of 1 January 2008. The applicant’s case was reviewed under the new rules in 2009. Without any significant change in his state of health having occurred, he was then found to have lost 50% of his working capacity. As a consequence, his disability pension was terminated and, as of 1 July 2009, he was declared suitable for institutional rehabilitation and granted a monthly rehabilitation allowance in the amount of HUF 152,820 (approximately EUR 490), minus payroll deductions. Under the relevant statute, the benefit could only be granted for a limited period, namely until 31 October 2011 in the applicant’s case. The law allowed for one extension of the time-limit, making the maximum deadline for the benefit 30 June 2012. However, under the law, the overall period allowable for rehabilitation could not exceed three years. 8. The monthly amount payable evolved in the period preceding the deadline. On expiry, it was HUF 173,980 (approximately EUR 570) per month, minus HUF 17,398 in payroll deductions, resulting in a net sum of HUF 156,585 (approximately EUR 510). 9. Meanwhile, on 29 December 2011 Act no. CXCI of 2011 on the Benefits Granted to Persons with Reduced Work Capacity was enacted. It came into effect on 1 January 2012 and introduced a new system of allowances. 10. On 28 March 2012 the applicant applied for a disability allowance under the new law. On 8 May 2012 he was medically examined before an expert panel of the National Rehabilitation and Social Welfare Authority. The applicant’s state of health was rated at 46% and he was classified as being suitable for rehabilitation within a time-frame of thirty-six months. The authority initially granted him HUF 41,850 (approximately EUR 140) per month in disability allowance, as of 1 July 2012. 11. On appeal, the applicant’s health score was maintained but the second-instance authority no longer recommended his rehabilitation. The monthly disability allowance corresponding to his situation was eventually set at HUF 55,800 (approximately EUR 180). 12. The applicant sought a judicial review before the Pécs Administrative and Labour Court, but in vain. On 26 May 2014 the Kúria rejected his petition for review on the grounds that he had not relied on any particular breach of the law, as required by the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Following a further legislative amendment of 1 April 2014, the applicant became entitled to a disability allowance of HUF 159,100 (approximately EUR 520) per month retroactively as of 1 January 2014. THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
14. The applicant complained that the drastic decrease in his monthly disability allowance, which had prevailed between 1 July 2012 and 31 December 2013, amounted to an unjustified deprivation of possessions in view of the fact that his underlying medical condition had not changed. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Articles 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alone, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
15. The Government argued that the application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. They essentially reiterated the arguments they had put forward in the case of Béláné Nagy v. Hungary ([GC], no. 53080/13, §§ 60-66, 13 December 2016), emphasising, as an additional and crucial element, that the present application concerned a fixed-term benefit which, on its expiry, did not create any “assertable right” or “legitimate expectation” enabling the applicant to avail himself of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in order to challenge the reduced benefit granted to him in the period complained of. 16. The applicant contested that view. 17. The Court considers that the Government’s objection is so closely linked to the substance of the applicant’s complaint that it should be joined to the merits (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 71). It further notes that the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
18. As to the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant submitted that, given that his state of health was permanently impaired, he legitimately expected an adequate benefit from the State throughout, notwithstanding the fact that the statutory time-frame for rehabilitation was a fixed-term one. Any change in the rate of his health impairment was artificial and had resulted merely from the 2008 change in the scoring methodology. 19. As to compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant accepted that the measures underlying his grievance had pursued the general interest of overhauling the system of disability benefits and had been lawful. However, he was of the view that the interference he had suffered was disproportionate in that two-thirds of his benefit had been eliminated for a period of one and a half years, notably from 1 July 2012 until 31 December 2013 (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above). 20. The Government submitted that even if Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were applicable, the applicant had not sustained any interference with his rights under that provision, since there was no basis in domestic law for him to claim the continuous payment of an unchanged disability benefit, no matter how the circumstances evolved. Moreover, even assuming the existence of an interference, the measures applied in the applicant’s case flowed directly from the relevant rules of the domestic law as amended and pursued the general interest of rationalising the system of disability benefits. They could by no means be considered as disproportionate since (i) the impugned period had lasted only eighteen months; (ii) the applicant had been in receipt of a benefit even during that time; (iii) the amount of that benefit had exceeded one-third of his previous benefit and almost equalled 60% of the minimum subsistence income relevant in the years 2012 and 2013; and (iv) the 2014 amendment, consisting in an equitable adjustment of the law, had resulted in partial compensation for the applicant. 2. The Court’s assessment
21. The Court has summarised its position on the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in cases similar to the present one in paragraphs 72 to 110 of the Béláné Nagy judgment (cited above). It sees no reason to depart from those considerations. 22. In particular, the Court reiterates that, in the field of social-security benefits, “for the recognition of a possession consisting in a legitimate expectation, the applicant must have an assertable right which ... may not fall short of a sufficiently established, substantive proprietary interest under the national law” (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 79). 23. It transpires from the facts of the present application that, since 1996, the applicant has been continuously entitled, under one legal regime or another, to receive disability benefits from the State. For the Court, this element gains particular significance when dealing with the Government’s argument pointing to the fixed-term character of the rehabilitation allowance. It has not been disputed by the Government that the applicant’s health impairment has, by and large, remained unchanged throughout the entire period since 1996. This was reflected repeatedly by the domestic authorities’ consecutive decisions granting him various related benefits. 24. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant’s claim for disability benefit during the eighteen-month period in issue (from 1 July 2012 until 31 December 2013) constituted a “sufficiently established, substantive proprietary interest under the national law”, just as it had in the preceding or subsequent periods. This holds true irrespective of whether the benefit in a given period was granted for a definite or an indefinite duration, since the underlying medical condition remained constant. 25. It follows that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable and the Government’s preliminary objection of incompatibility ratione materiae must be dismissed. 26. Moreover, the Court cannot but emphasise that, as of 1 July 2012, the applicant’s benefit had been reduced to approximately one-third of its previous value – a situation which lasted eighteen months, since the applicant became entitled to a higher disability allowance calculated according to a further legislative amendment only as of 1 January 2014 (see paragraphs 10-13 above). It must therefore be concluded that his right to receive social-security benefits on account of his ailments was interfered with. It remains to be ascertained whether the interference was justified. 27. A synopsis of the Court’s position on compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this field can be found in paragraphs 112 to 118 of the Béláné Nagy judgment (cited above). Those considerations are also valid in the present case. 28. The Court notes at the outset that the measure complained of had undisputedly a clear basis in national law; and it accepts that it corresponded to the general interest attached to the rationalisation of the social-security system. At this juncture, the Court reiterates that “the fact that a person has entered into and forms part of a State social-security system (even if a compulsory one, as in the instant case) does not necessarily mean that that system cannot be changed, either as to the conditions of eligibility of payment or as to the quantum of the benefit or pension (see, mutatis mutandis, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 42184/05, §§ 85-89, ECHR 2010; and Richardson v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 26252/08, § 17, 10 April 2012). Indeed, the Court has accepted the possibility of amendments to social-security legislation which may be adopted in response to societal changes and evolving views on the categories of persons who need social assistance, and also to the evolution of individual situations (see Wieczorek v. Poland, no. 18176/05, § 67, 8 December 2009)” (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 88). The Court would stress that, in present-day conditions, these considerations play a primordial role in assessing complaints going to the impairment of social welfare rights; and they undoubtedly provide the State with a wide margin of appreciation in rationalising their social-security systems (see paragraph 31 below). Nevertheless, the examination of proportionality of such measures cannot be dispensed with. 29. In addressing the proportionality of the measure, that is, in considering whether the interference imposed an excessive individual burden on the applicant, the Court will have regard to the particular context in which the issue arose, namely that of a social-security scheme. Such schemes are an expression of a society’s solidarity with its vulnerable members (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 116). An important consideration is whether the applicant’s right to derive benefits from the social-insurance scheme in question has been infringed in a manner resulting in the impairment of the essence of his pension rights (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 118). For the Court, a two-thirds reduction, as in the present case, undoubtedly falls into this latter category. 30. The Court notes that although the applicant – unlike Mrs Nagy – was not completely deprived of all entitlements, his income was nevertheless abruptly reduced to EUR 180 per month (see paragraph 11 above), which, as admitted by the Government themselves, was barely 60% of the minimum subsistence level relevant in the period in issue (see paragraph 20 above). This element is aggravated by the fact that the applicant apparently had no other significant income on which to subsist and that he belonged to a vulnerable group of disabled persons (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 123). 31. The Court thus considers that in the present case the application of the impugned legislation resulted in a situation in which a fair balance was not struck between the interests at stake – even if that legislation was aimed at protecting the public purse by rationalising the scheme of disability benefits, a matter of legitimate general interest in whose pursuit the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation (see paragraph 28 above). Once again, it must be stressed that the applicant suffered the removal of two-thirds of his benefit, whereas there was no indication that he had failed to act in good faith at all times, to co-operate with the authorities or to make any relevant claims or representations (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, §§ 121, 125 and 126). 32. The Court thus considers that there was no reasonable relation of proportionality between the aim pursued and the restrictions applied to the applicant’s allowance in the period from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2013. It therefore finds that, notwithstanding the State’s wide margin of appreciation in this field, the applicant had to bear, in the period at issue; an excessive individual burden. Even though the applicant later benefitted from a further legislative amendment, which resulted in an increase of his disability allowance, that measure only applied from 1 January 2014 onwards (see paragraph 13 above). 33. It follows that there has been a violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
34. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
35. The applicant claimed EUR 6,320 in respect of pecuniary damage, which corresponds to the accumulated difference between the previous benefit and the one prevailing in the period giving rise to the violation found. He also claimed EUR 30,000 in non-pecuniary damage. 36. The Government found these claims to be excessive. 37. The Court cannot speculate on the amount of disability benefit which would have been disbursed to the applicant had the violation not occurred. It therefore awards him a lump sum of EUR 5,000 in respect of the pecuniary damage sustained (see Béláné Nagy, cited above, § 131). Moreover, it considers that he must have suffered some non-pecuniary damage on account of the distress suffered and awards him, on the basis of equity, EUR 5,000 under this head. B. Costs and expenses
38. The applicant also claimed EUR 13,400 plus VAT for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This amount corresponds to sixty-seven hours of legal work billable by his lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR 200 plus VAT. 39. The Government contested this claim. 40. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 9,000 covering costs under all heads. C. Default interest
41. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Joins to the merits the Government’s preliminary objection and dismisses it;
2. Declares the application admissible;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
4. Holds,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR 9,000 (nine thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 March 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Marialena TsirliVincent A. De GaetanoRegistrar President